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     <title>RAND: Jeremy Burke</title>
     <link rel="self" href="http://www.rand.org/about/people/b/burke_jeremy.xml"/>
     <updated>2013-04-14T18:26:00Z</updated>
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     <rights>Copyright (c) 2013, The RAND Corporation</rights>
     <author>
       <name>RAND Corporation</name>
     </author>
     <id>http://www.rand.org/about/people/b/burke_jeremy.html</id>
	 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Financial Literacy, Social Perception and Strategic Default</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WR937.html</id>
   <published>2012-07-20T09:45:00Z</published>
   <updated>2012-07-20T09:45:00Z</updated>
   <summary type="html">Uses survey data to examine the role of social expectations, financial literacy and knowledge of default consequences.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WR937.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Information Acquisition in Competitive Markets</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP50207.html</id>
   <published>2012-11-01T12:00:00Z</published>
   <updated>2012-11-01T12:00:00Z</updated>
   <summary type="html">The authors examine how price commitments impact the amount of information firms acquire about potential customers.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP50207.html" />
   
   <link rel="related" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?" />
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Primetime Spin</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP50208.html</id>
   <published>2008-01-01T12:00:00Z</published>
   <updated>2008-01-01T12:00:00Z</updated>
   <summary type="html">This paper develops a model of media bias in which rational agents acquire all their news from the source that is most likely to confirm their prior beliefs.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP50208.html" />
   
   <link rel="related" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2008.00189.x/abstract" />
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">What&apos;s in a Poll?</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP50209.html</id>
   <published>2008-10-01T12:00:00Z</published>
   <updated>2008-10-01T12:00:00Z</updated>
   <summary type="html">We examine the ability of pre-election polls to aggregate information about voter preferences.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP50209.html" />
   
   <link rel="related" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://rd.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11127-008-9322-x" />
 </entry>
 
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