Asymmetric Warfare

This commentary appeared on ForeignAffairs.com on March 27, 2013.

Last week, Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), declared a cease-fire in his party's nearly three-decade-long struggle with the Turkish state. Before then, the insurgency -- which had claimed some 40,000 lives -- had seemed intractable. Ankara's attempts to put it down had only inflamed Kurdish nationalism and made the PKK stronger. But with Ocalan now apparently ready to try to resolve differences peacefully, the prospects that the uprising will come to an end have improved.

Ocalan's announcement came at an opportune time. Several factors had already made the moment ripe for peace. First, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the broader Turkish public had come to recognize that trying to end the insurgency with force was a dead end and that the government would have to make a more determined effort to find a political solution to the Kurdish conflict.

Second, the Kurdish issue is closely linked to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's political ambitions. Under AKP bylaws, Erdogan cannot run for another term as prime minister when his second term ends next year. Instead, he is widely expected to try to run for president. If he wins, he will be the first popularly elected president in Turkish history, capping his political career and giving him the chance to shape Turkish politics until 2023, the hundredth anniversary of the founding of the Turkish Republic.

The latest clash between Israel and Hamas in Gaza has myriad military and diplomatic implications.

Dalia Dassa Kaye, Director of the RAND Center for Middle East Public Policy, says efforts underway to end the hostilities offer potential for a sustainable cease-fire.

"But the cycle of violence is likely to continue without a broader strategy," Dassa Kaye says. "An unfortunate consequence of this new round of confrontation is that Hamas' political position has strengthened among Palestinians, further marginalizing the already weak Palestinian Authority ruling over the West Bank. Without renewed negotiation efforts to bring about a two-state solution, this trajectory is only likely to continue, raising the prospect of Hamas rule over all Palestinian territories.

In Afghanistan, the U.S. military has been fighting the longest war in the nation's history—and many Americans don't understand why. The final presidential debate on Monday affords President Obama and Governor Romney an excellent opportunity to provide answers.

A number of servicemen and women now on their first deployments were just seven years old when the war began, and the reasons for invading over a decade ago are not the same reasons that might justify the continued loss of lives and the spending of billions of dollars today.

America's next Commander-in-Chief has a chance to explain to the American people, both those who risk their lives in uniform and those whose taxes pay for the war, exactly what they can expect in the years to come. Specifics would be welcome.

This commentary appeared on GlobalSecurity.org on August 7, 2012.

The fighting in Damascus is so far not the Battle of Berlin or the Fall of Saigon, marking the clear beginning of the end. The endgame, indeed, may be a long way off.

So what happens next? It is difficult to sort out the military situation on the ground or the maneuvers behind the scenes. But here is a brief sketch of possible scenarios.

The following is excerpted from James Dobbins' Aug. 1, 2012 prepared testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs regarding the situation in Syria.

What is important for the U.S. government to do at this stage is forge relationships with those likely to next govern Syria. These relationships should be developed at many levels, diplomatic, covert, military, economic and political, to include democracy building work by our Republican and Democratic Institutes, contacts with individual members of Congress, as well as with all the relevant arms of our Executive Branch.

As we get to know the Syrian opposition better, we will discover, I have no doubt, that not all are democrats, that many are ill disposed toward the United States, and that most if not all are ill disposed toward Israel. We will also discover, I expect, that most are even more ill disposed toward Iran, and therefore not inclined to help Tehran extend its influence into the Levant.

This commentary appeared on World Policy Blog on June 6, 2012.

War games are especially important as countries prepare to counter adversaries who use asymmetric strategies or weapons, forcing military planners to deal with unfamiliar threats. These war games are indispensable tools to train (learn how to perform one's responsibilities), educate (learn about a situation not previously understood), and formulate strategy (determine how to respond to specific threats and capabilities).

Consider a game where the objective is to learn how to respond to attacks by North Korea on South Korea using weapons of mass destruction. This game is set at a time when North Korea has fielded nuclear warheads for its ballistic missiles, seeking to test U.S. responses to this threat. The anatomy that follows examines how the players might act in three periods of the war game. Here, we depict one possible subset of the conflict events that could occur. A full-scale training game would examine these events and hundreds of other possible events over the conflict, though likely paying special attention to those outlined here.

This commentary appeared on NYTimes.com on April 3, 2012 as part of a NYT Room for Debate discussion, "Should the U.S. Leave Afghanistan Now?"

What does history suggest about the prospects for further efforts in Afghanistan? At Rand we analyzed 30 counterinsurgency campaigns from 1978 to 2008 to determine the ingredients of success or failure. We compared the results to the ongoing campaign in Afghanistan.

We found that in Afghanistan, the government and counterinsurgency forces have realized many positive indicators, like uncontested air dominance, sufficient military strength to force the insurgents to fight as guerrillas, quality intelligence and forces seeking to establish positive relations with the population.