Iran

This commentary appeared on U.S. News & World Report on May 14, 2013.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is hardly a poster boy for reform in Iran. He has depicted himself as an original revolutionary and ideological purist. He has questioned the Holocaust and is virulently anti-Israeli in his rhetoric. His re-election as president in 2009 set off the largest popular demonstration since the 1979 revolution. And his presidency has produced an era of economic stagnation, international isolation and deep anxiety for the Iranian people....

The remainder of this commentary is available at usnews.com.

This commentary appeared in U.S. News & World Report on April 24, 2013.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is a crucial player in the current Syrian conflict. Iran is the Syrian regime's biggest supporter, even more so than Russia. Tehran's ties with Damascus have historically been based on shared strategic interests, including thwarting U.S. and Israeli power in the Middle East. Both countries have also relied on each other to balance unfriendly Arab states.

The Syrian-Iranian alliance has largely lacked an ideological or religious dimension. The secular Syrian regime is dominated by members of the Alawite sect, which is distantly related to the Shi'a religion practiced by the majority of Iranians. Yet the Islamic Republic, the world's only theocracy, has displayed little religious affinity for the Assad regime. Rather, Tehran views Syria as a strategic gateway to the Arab world, a bulwark against American and Israeli power, and, perhaps most importantly, a crucial link to Lebanese Hezbollah. Syria is also a buffer against internal instability in Iran.

This commentary appeared in Foreign Policy on April 22, 2013.

As Iran's economy continues to deteriorate, the labor movement is a key player to watch because of its ability to pressure the Islamic Republic through protests and strikes. Iranian labor, encompassing unskilled workers from rural areas and lower-class urban laborers is not a homogenous group. And thus far, Iranian laborers have not joined the opposition Green Movement en masse. But the economic pains caused by the Iranian regime's mismanagement, corruption, and international sanctions have dealt serious blows to worker wages, benefits, and job security — enough reason for Iranian laborers to organize and oppose the regime. Parallels can be drawn between the Islamic Republic's treatment of the labor movement today and the Shah's treatment of Iranian workers before his overthrow, particularly in the regime's denial of the right to organize, the quashing of protests and strikes, and its refusal to address worker's rights.

Labor participation in the 1979 revolution was the result of long-standing frustration and resentment toward the Shah's industrialization efforts. The Shah's 1963 White Revolution, which brought major land and industrialization reforms, and Iran's rising oil prices from 1965 to 1975, compelled millions of Iranians to move from rural villages to major cities. The White Revolution's reallocation of rural property from wealthy landowners to farmers led to a steep decline in agricultural productivity. Farms were not as efficient in the hands of farmers as they were under the business-savvy elite. As a result, farming jobs dwindled in the late 1960s, forcing farmers to look to the cities for opportunity. Many of these rural migrants took jobs in construction, factories, and the energy sector.

This commentary appeared in Foreign Policy on April 3, 2013.

The role and plight of ethnic minorities in Iranian society tends to receive little attention from Western analysts and policymakers. This may be largely due to the predominance of Tehran as the focal point of Iranian culture, politics, and foreign policy. Moreover, Iran's ethnic minorities have been heavily marginalized by Iran's Persian-dominated Shiite theocracy. The suppression of minority rights has resulted in ethnic insurgencies over the years, some of which continue to bedevil the Iranian regime.

Nevertheless, many Iranian officials, religious leaders, and intellectuals, particularly those associated with the reformist movement, have come to view Iran's ethnic minorities as an essential component of the national fabric. They have also come to realize that the Iranian regime's repression and discrimination against minorities has not only slowed Iran's advancement, but it could one day jeopardize the survival of the Islamic Republic—and even Iran's territorial integrity.

This commentary appeared in U.S. News & World Report on March 6, 2013.

Iran's presidential campaign is well under way. The unprecedented public attack by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad against Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, in which Ahmadinejad accused Larijani of trying to control Iran through a family-run mafia, attests to a deep divide within the Iranian regime. But unlike in most real democracies, the likely contenders for the presidency are not trying to woo reluctant voters with snazzy TV ads or get-out-the-vote drives. Indeed, many regime officials would prefer that many Iranians—especially liberal urbanites—not vote at all.

The June election will not be about mobilizing the Iranian public. It is instead the culmination of a years-long evolution in Iranian politics: the transformation of the Islamic Republic from a mildly representative theocracy into a Revolutionary Guards-controlled kleptocracy. Ultimately, the election is meant to fulfill Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's ambition of wielding absolute authority. But far from strengthening his rule, the election could actually erode the credibility and legitimacy of a fading regime.

This commentary appeared on wilsoncenter.org on February 11, 2013.

Negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program are set to re-start in February, but Iran's previous foot dragging in agreeing to a time and venue for the negotiations has been vexing for U.S. and allied diplomats. Iranian behavior is particularly puzzling given the urgency of resolving the nuclear crisis peacefully and alleviating pressure on an increasingly vulnerable Iranian economy. What is Tehran thinking?

Some analysts have suggested that Tehran is divided internally and cannot make a decision. This is unlikely. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has consolidated power since the 2009 presidential election and makes decisions for the entire country. If Khamenei wants negotiations to proceed, then Iran's negotiators will respond accordingly. Rather, Khamenei is hesitant to engage the P5+1 (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany) due to his ideological distrust of the United States. Specifically, he may view the P5+1 offer for Iran to stop uranium enrichment to 20 percent, ship out its highly enriched uranium, and close down the underground Fordo facility in return for a consideration of 4 sanctions relief as not only a trap but also a prelude to defeat for himself and his regime. Khamenei may be reluctant to make a deal, but mounting pressures from a broad section of the political elite and Iranian society may ultimately force his hand and even loosen his grip on power.

This commentary appeared on NYTimes.com on February 6, 2013.

We've heard a great deal about how Washington is reacting to President Obama's nomination of Chuck Hagel as secretary of defense, so perhaps it's worth paying some attention to how Hagel is playing in Tehran.

Some U.S. pundits have warned that Hagel's nomination sends a bad signal to the Iranian regime. After all, Hagel has opposed U.S. sanctions against Iran and called a war against Iran unfeasible. Hagel's critics argue that the simple fact of his nomination telegraphs that the Obama administration isn't serious about using force to stop Iran's nuclear ambitions, undermining U.S. diplomacy and making a military conflict more likely rather than less.

This commentary appeared on United States Institute of Peace's Iran Primer on February 5, 2013.

What is Iran's strategy on diplomacy today—now that a fourth round of talks is scheduled in Kazakhstan on February 26?

Iran is still willing to give diplomacy a chance after a seven-month hiatus, as demonstrated by the announcement of new talks. But Tehran wants the P5+1 to make the first move. The regime is inherently distrustful of negotiations, which explains its hesitation to engage in talks. The leadership appears to think Iran will not receive a fair deal—no matter what it does. This distrust is rooted in the Islamic Republic's historic view of the United States.

Tehran also has major issues with the proposal of Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia and the United States—the so-called P5+1. The six world powers want a gesture from Tehran demonstrating its commitment to a diplomatic solution before considering sanctions relief. That could include suspending uranium enrichment to 20 percent at Fordo, its underground nuclear facility or shipping out its current stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium. The P5+1 has also asked Iran to shut down Fordo.

Given how prominently Iran has featured in Israeli national security debates over the past decade, it is remarkable how little this topic arose in the run-up to this week's Israeli election. That is bound to change in the months ahead. Whether Benjamin Netanyahu assembles a coalition moving further to the right or opts for a more centrist option will have a significant impact on the prospects for any renewal of negotiations with the Palestinians.

But the make-up of Netanyahu's future coalition will likely have far less impact on the Iran nuclear file than on the peace process. In the absence of any diplomatic breakthrough and the continued advance of Iran's nuclear enrichment program this year, we can expect Israeli leaders across the political spectrum to press the Obama administration for military options (and Israeli polling suggests that while the majority of Israelis do not favor an Israeli military action against Iran, they do support action by the United States).

This commentary appeared on United States Institute of Peace's Iran Primer on January 21, 2013.

As commander of the Revolutionary Guards, General Mohammad Ali Jafari is one of the dozen most powerful men in Iran. He is a hard-line ideologue loyal to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. He rose to power through a combination of ideological commitment and military vision. Jafari now commands one of the most feared militaries in the Middle East, which is also far better equipped than Iran's conventional army, navy and air force.

Jafari has an estimated 150,000 troops under his control. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps has its own powerful army (between 100,000 and 125,000), navy (up to 20,000) and air force (about 20,000). It also oversees several thousand members in the elite Qods Force, which trains and supports foreign insurgent organizations.