Middle East

This commentary appeared on U.S. News & World Report on October 25, 2012.

A year ago this week, the Libyan people watched as Muammar Qadhafi, their dictator of 42 years, was captured and killed in gory, televised fashion. With his death, a seven-month NATO intervention came to an end and a door opened to a better future for the Libyan people.

Libya had considerable advantages compared with other post-conflict states. It was wealthy. The region was relatively stable. And the rebel victory was uncontested....

The remainder of this op-ed can be found at usnews.com.

This commentary appeared on NYTimes.com on October 23, 2012.

Mitt Romney and Barack Obama had some sharp rhetorical exchanges, but on substance there were few discernible differences. If Mr. Obama was expecting Mr. Romney to distinguish himself by supporting military policies that would be unpopular with Americans (whether in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan or Iran), he was likely disappointed. Mr. Romney went out of his way to argue that killing bad guys would not be enough to fight radical forces; economic development, education and civil society are key ingredients to future stability. Mr. Obama couldn't agree more.

Mr. Obama said his aim is to get Iran to stop its "nuclear program," while Romney spoke about preventing a "nuclear-capable" Iran. But neither candidate defined the point in Iran's nuclear enrichment that would trigger military action. Both agreed military action would be the last resort. And Mr. Romney even credited Mr. Obama for applying crippling sanctions, only criticizing him for not doing it earlier (which of course Mr. Obama denied) and suggesting he would find ways to strengthen them.

This commentary appeared on GlobalSecurity.org on October 18, 2012.

Since taking power in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has overreacted to criticism of the organization. The events in Cairo, in which MB supporters are battling demonstrators that criticized President Mohamed Morsi, are just the latest in a larger pattern.

When the Brotherhood-led parliament faced demonstrations this past winter, the MB dispatched its youth to shout down the protests. When journalists dared to criticize President Morsi, the MB pressed charges, relying on the Mubarak-era legal framework that criminalizes the insulting of the President. And when secular liberals recently took to Tahrir Square to protest the Brotherhood's consolidation of power, MB supporters were bused in as a counter.

This commentary appeared on U.S. News & World Report on October 18, 2012.

The recent spate of attacks by Afghan police and military forces on their coalition partners and advisors has drawn renewed attention to the future of U.S. forces in Afghanistan—something CBS News's Bob Schieffer has promised to ask President Obama and Governor Romney about at Monday's final presidential debate.

The attacks are not only causing the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force to rethink its approaches, but have also focused attention on wider worries about the capabilities, loyalty, and staying power of the Afghan National Security Forces. While these concerns are very real, I have at least one reason to think that the Afghan forces might be more capable than we expect.

In discussing the latest Iran-Israel dynamics, you can't get away from red lines. They concern the line Iran would have to cross in its nuclear program to prompt a military attack. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu went so far as to literally draw a red line on a poster at the UN General Assembly last month. The moderator of the forthcoming U.S. presidential debate on foreign policy said he intends to ask the candidates about these red lines.

What is at stake? Netanyahu's UN address suggested that Israeli military action against Iran is not likely until next spring, buying some time for policies like sanctions and diplomacy to play out—and for the U.S. presidential election to be resolved. But Netanyahu's red line signaled that Israel is not giving up on a military option to thwart Iran's nuclear ambitions and will continue to press the United States to do the same.

In Afghanistan, the U.S. military has been fighting the longest war in the nation's history—and many Americans don't understand why. The final presidential debate on Monday affords President Obama and Governor Romney an excellent opportunity to provide answers.

A number of servicemen and women now on their first deployments were just seven years old when the war began, and the reasons for invading over a decade ago are not the same reasons that might justify the continued loss of lives and the spending of billions of dollars today.

America's next Commander-in-Chief has a chance to explain to the American people, both those who risk their lives in uniform and those whose taxes pay for the war, exactly what they can expect in the years to come. Specifics would be welcome.

This commentary draws from an article that will appear in the December 2012–January 2013 issue of Survival.

The tragic assault on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi on September 11, 2012 raised new doubts about the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya. But while the attack drew into question aspects of Libya's transition, it did not change the fact that the intervention had toppled Muammar Qaddafi and opened the door to a better future for the country. Without it hundreds, perhaps thousands, of innocent civilians would have died and the pro-democracy protest movements sweeping across the Middle East and North Africa would probably have been slowed. From this perspective it remains a genuine, even if moderate, success for NATO.

But could it be repeated? A year after Qaddafi's death, the ways in which good fortune contributed to NATO's success are even clearer. Militarily, Qaddafi's air defense system was relatively weak and his security forces had been so hollowed out that most of them quickly defected. Geographically, most of Libya's important towns, including Tripoli, were located near the Mediterranean coast, within fairly easy striking distance of NATO bases in Italy and Greece. Politically, France and Britain—largely for domestic political reasons—were eager to push their allies to intervene. And international opprobrium of Qaddafi's actions was strong enough to permit a UN Security Council Resolution authorizing a no-fly zone, as well as a more ambitious civilian protection mission that allowed NATO to attack Qaddafi's ground forces.

This commentary appeared on U.S. News & World Report on October 11, 2012.

Several days ago, a still-mysterious drone penetrated Israeli airspace and was shot down by Israeli Air Force fighter jets over a sparsely populated region in the Negev desert. In all likelihood, it won't be the last.

I recently spent several years in the private sector at one of the world's foremost developers of unmanned aircraft. Part of my work focused on the competitive landscape for the unmanned vehicle market—examining the strategic implications of new products and capabilities offered by other companies. Even a modestly careful examination of public information (no proprietary secrets involved) reveals some basic facts about the unmanned and remotely piloted aircraft market.

In the first few days of 2012, the Afghan Taliban confirmed in an email to media outlets what had been whispered about for weeks: that a tentative agreement had been reached to open an office in Qatar from which to engage in preliminary peace negotiations with the U.S.-led coalition. The move drew criticism for cutting the Afghan government out of the loop and for lending legitimacy and influence to the Taliban even as it continued carrying out serious attacks. However, it also represented the first important step toward the near-universally accepted reality that any resolution in Afghanistan would occur at the negotiation table and not on the battlefield.

That effort now appears to be dead, or at least on life support. After months of delays and rumored prisoner exchanges, it was reported last week that the United States is revising its aims. Going forward, the priority will be to leave behind an Afghan security and governance apparatus capable of denying the Taliban some strategic objectives and thus compelling them to reconsider peace talks.

This commentary appeared on Project Syndicate on October 8, 2012.

More than any of the previous events in the Arab Spring, Syria's turmoil has presented serious difficulties for Western policymakers. Just as Syria comprises a more complex society than the other Arab countries currently in the throes of political transition, so, too, are its external relations more complex. As a result, any attempt at decisive military intervention would be not only difficult, but also extremely risky.

Syria's leading role in Lebanon, even after withdrawing its occupying forces there, is only one complication. Another is Alawite-minority rule in a Sunni-majority country, which makes Syria a proxy for Shia Iran in the Sunni Arab world. Still other Syrian minority groups — non-Alawite Shia, Orthodox and Catholic Christians, and Druze — are linked to neighboring countries and regional players, inviting intense external interest and even active support. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Russia all have strategic interests and factional connections to Syria.