Military Force Planning

During the Iraq war, private defense contractors providing security and support outnumbered troops on the ground at points. Contractors can enhance US military capacity but also entail risks. US experience with private security contractors holds several key lessons.

Ten years after it began, the Iraq war might best be remembered as America’s most privatized military engagement to date, with contractors hired by the Pentagon actually outnumbering troops on the ground at various points.

This might come as a surprise to many, since the sheer number of contractors used in Iraq was often overshadowed by events. By 2008, the US Department of Defense employed 155,826 private contractors in Iraq - and 152,275 troops. This degree of privatization is unprecedented in modern warfare...

The remainder of this commentary is available at csmonitor.com.

This video was recorded at RAND's Politics Aside event on November 16, 2012.

Ret. Gen. Peter Chiarelli, who was Army vice chief of staff and now is CEO of One Mind for Research, says budget cuts could strike the military unevenly, hurting vital programs. Chiarelli also discusses treating soldiers with post-traumatic stress while speaking with RAND Corporation President and CEO Michael Rich at RAND's Politics Aside conference in Santa Monica, Calif.

This commentary appeared in The Orange County Register on December 10, 2012.

Economists, the media, and the general public are closely following the debate (and deadline) as policymakers struggle to come to an agreement on a solution to the potential fiscal crisis. In the shuffle, it can be easy for inaccurate numbers to form the basis for arguments and assumptions about outcomes. One particularly complex area is defense spending and associated cuts. The urgency with which the fiscal cliff question must be addressed should not excuse faulty calculations when it comes to the U.S. military's operational and personnel needs.

It is difficult to say what impact proposed cuts will have on the military's discretionary spending or how those cuts would, in turn, affect the force. However, it is important to approach this question—and the overall debate with regard to defense spending—from an accurate baseline.

This commentary appeared on Newsday.com on November 9, 2012.

As we observe Veterans Day, the nation pauses to reflect upon the sacrifices of millions of veterans and their families. Honoring these sacrifices should be front and center on our policy agenda -- and not limited to one day a year. Our political leaders need to spell out, even at a time of renewed fiscal teeth-gnashing, just how they intend to ensure veterans and their families have access to high-quality health care, gainful employment and sufficient educational opportunities.

More than 2.5 million service members have been deployed to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001, including about 100,000 from New York State. These are young men and women who have worked to protect America. Some paid the ultimate sacrifice; thousands of others continue to bear the wounds of war. As they come home, their needs for support are complex and dynamic. Effectively meeting these needs calls for integrated, comprehensive solutions delivered by a combination of government agencies, as well as the nonprofit and private sectors.

Today, September 20, is the first anniversary of the repeal of the law commonly known as "Don't ask, Don't tell (DADT)," which prevented gay men, bisexuals, and lesbians from openly serving in the Armed Forces of the United States. Repeal of DADT meant that military accessions, promotions, separations, and assignments would be made without regard to sexual orientation. As we mark this historic change, it seems appropriate to remember how it took place and assess what has transpired over the past year.

The first attempt to allow gays to serve openly in the military came in January 1993, during the early days of the Clinton Administration. The attempt and the political and social context in which it occurred are documented in the 1993 RAND report, Sexual Orientation and U.S. Military Personnel Policy: Options and Assessment. RAND's research concluded that sexual orientation, by itself, was not germane to determining who may serve in the military, and that clear standards of conduct strictly enforced for all military personnel should be sufficient to allow gay men and lesbians to serve. Yet the Defense Department, the Congress and, one can argue, the American people, were not ready to accept such a conclusion. What resulted was the compromise policy of DADT.

The following is an excerpt from Olga Oliker's July 18, 2012 testimony to the House Armed Services Committee titled, "Security Force Development in Afghanistan: Learning from Iraq."

Another important lesson of recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq lies in the area of police development and, more broadly, the justice sector overall. Militaries are not effective means of building the sorts of police forces that post conflict societies want and need. However, the United States and most of its allies lack the capacity to deploy substantial numbers of police trainers to develop police in their own image. Nor, as the military experience shows, is that necessarily the right approach.

Today, as withdrawal looms, the United States and its partners should work with the Afghans to define what sort of police development can be realistically envisioned for Afghanistan, and devote resources and assistance to developing that into the future. The same holds true for the justice sector, without which no law and order can develop. This is a long-term proposition, and not one that can be resolved before forces are withdrawn. Early efforts to build security forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan were limited and proved woefully inadequate.

Adequate compensation is critical to recruiting and retaining an all-volunteer force—in peacetime and wartime alike. To assess the effectiveness of U.S. military pay and benefits, the president directs a review of military compensation every four years.

Last week, the Department of Defense released the 11th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) which, over the past two years, examined four areas: special and incentive pays for critical career fields; combat compensation; compensation for wounded warriors, caregivers, and survivors; and reserve component compensation and benefits.

Four studies from the RAND Corporation contributed to the 11th QRMC.

This commentary appeared on ForeignPolicy.com on April 16, 2012.

In an article posted on Thursday, April 12 ("Another path to airpower: Creating the militia U.S. Air Force of the 21st century"), Luke Ahmann asserts that "a recent RAND study determined that a full time force is cheaper than a part time force." As the leader of that study—which will be published in the near future, following peer review and editing—I can attest that we determined something entirely different. We looked at costs incurred in four fleets—C-130s, KC-135s, C-17s, and F-16s—during the five-year period from fiscal year 2006 through 2010. Force structure in each of these aircraft types is spread among active, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard units. Considering the prevailing operating characteristics of active and reserve units, we looked for the lowest-cost active/reserve mix that would have provided the same total fleet sizes and the same level of support for ongoing operational and aircrew proficiency flying demands. In each case, we found that a mix of active and reserve units, rather than a full-time, active-duty-only force, would provide the lowest overall costs.

This commentary appeared in The Hill on February 1, 2012.

With U.S. troops out of Iraq, the U.S. presence there will fall to 5,000 private security contractors charged by the State Department to guard American diplomatic installations and convoys, provide emergency medical evacuation and rescue U.S. diplomatic personnel if they fall under attack, among other tasks. Are security contractors up to the job?

The experience with private security contractors during the war was fraught with challenges that pose risks now. Iraqis, not surprisingly, hold negative feelings toward security contractors. Hostility peaked in 2007 when Blackwater contractors shot and killed 17 Iraqi civilians and wounded 20 others in Nisour Square.