Military Strategy

Reports this week suggest the Obama administration is considering reducing the number of U.S. military forces in Afghanistan to around 10,000 by 2014. Unfortunately, this discussion is happening in something of a vacuum. As the U.S. withdraws its forces, military and civilian officials have yet to clearly outline strategic objectives for the region and discuss the tasks required to achieve those objectives.

Indeed, the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan is only one of several important policy choices—and not necessarily the most important one. For example: What will the U.S. do about the insurgent sanctuary in Pakistan? In a country where tribes, sub-tribes, and clans still retain substantial power in rural areas, how much will the U.S. strategy depend on Afghan central government action?

This commentary appeared on BBC Persian on November 9, 2012.

The U.S. effort to isolate and pressure Iran in order to extract concessions on the nuclear program faces a significant vulnerability: the strong ties between the Islamic Republic and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The PRC has emerged as Iran’s biggest trade and energy partner, allowing Tehran to escape some of the worst consequences of sanctions. In addition, the Chinese leadership views Iran not only as an important economic partner, but also a potential ally in offsetting U.S. power in the Middle East and beyond. Growing competition between the United States and China in the Asia/Pacific region could translate into increasing cooperation between China and Iran, presenting an obstacle for U.S. efforts to dissuade Iran from weaponizing its nuclear program.

However, growing ties between China and Iran also presents challenges for both nations’ authoritarian regimes. The Chinese leadership does not want to appear to be abetting an increasingly isolated Iran in conflict with much of the Western world, upon which China relies on for its economic growth. There have been indications that Chinese companies have succumbed to pressure and reduced ties to the Iranian economy. In addition, the Islamic Republic is wary of being perceived as a client state of a growing foreign power. But China could also be reducing ties to Iran for the moment, waiting for the U.S. presidential election to end in order to craft a more permanent Iran policy that could benefit its long term national and economic security interests.

This commentary appeared on Foreign Policy on October 25, 2012.

Tough talk couldn't have saved Ambassador Stevens.

One argument heard lately is that by "apologizing for America," President Obama projected a weak image of America, thereby emboldening radical forces in the Muslim world to target American interests—and specifically American diplomats in Benghazi. Setting aside the question of whether Obama actually apologized for America, one may ask whether it is plausible that administration rhetoric could have such a consequences. Do mere words matter so much?

This commentary appeared on NYTimes.com on October 23, 2012.

Mitt Romney and Barack Obama had some sharp rhetorical exchanges, but on substance there were few discernible differences. If Mr. Obama was expecting Mr. Romney to distinguish himself by supporting military policies that would be unpopular with Americans (whether in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan or Iran), he was likely disappointed. Mr. Romney went out of his way to argue that killing bad guys would not be enough to fight radical forces; economic development, education and civil society are key ingredients to future stability. Mr. Obama couldn't agree more.

Mr. Obama said his aim is to get Iran to stop its "nuclear program," while Romney spoke about preventing a "nuclear-capable" Iran. But neither candidate defined the point in Iran's nuclear enrichment that would trigger military action. Both agreed military action would be the last resort. And Mr. Romney even credited Mr. Obama for applying crippling sanctions, only criticizing him for not doing it earlier (which of course Mr. Obama denied) and suggesting he would find ways to strengthen them.

In discussing the latest Iran-Israel dynamics, you can't get away from red lines. They concern the line Iran would have to cross in its nuclear program to prompt a military attack. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu went so far as to literally draw a red line on a poster at the UN General Assembly last month. The moderator of the forthcoming U.S. presidential debate on foreign policy said he intends to ask the candidates about these red lines.

What is at stake? Netanyahu's UN address suggested that Israeli military action against Iran is not likely until next spring, buying some time for policies like sanctions and diplomacy to play out—and for the U.S. presidential election to be resolved. But Netanyahu's red line signaled that Israel is not giving up on a military option to thwart Iran's nuclear ambitions and will continue to press the United States to do the same.

This commentary appeared on Project Syndicate on October 8, 2012.

More than any of the previous events in the Arab Spring, Syria's turmoil has presented serious difficulties for Western policymakers. Just as Syria comprises a more complex society than the other Arab countries currently in the throes of political transition, so, too, are its external relations more complex. As a result, any attempt at decisive military intervention would be not only difficult, but also extremely risky.

Syria's leading role in Lebanon, even after withdrawing its occupying forces there, is only one complication. Another is Alawite-minority rule in a Sunni-majority country, which makes Syria a proxy for Shia Iran in the Sunni Arab world. Still other Syrian minority groups — non-Alawite Shia, Orthodox and Catholic Christians, and Druze — are linked to neighboring countries and regional players, inviting intense external interest and even active support. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Russia all have strategic interests and factional connections to Syria.

This commentary appeared on United States Institute of Peace's Iran Primer on October 2, 2012.

Iran's repeated threats to close the Strait of Hormuz are a pivotal part of a military strategy based on psychological and asymmetric warfare. Blocking the strategic waterway, through which 90 percent of Persian Gulf oil flows to the outside world, would have sweeping implications for regional security and global oil markets. It may be the Islamic Republic's most potent weapon. Tehran has also hinted it would retaliate against U.S. forces, notably the Fifth Fleet based in the Persian Gulf, if it is attacked.

Since the 1979 revolution, Iran has developed sufficient military capabilities to back up its threats. The Revolutionary Guards Navy may be able to inflict damage on U.S. forces. It operates hundreds of small and relatively fast attack boats, some armed with sophisticated anti-ship cruise missiles. Its fleet could attempt to swarm larger U.S. ships and try to penetrate their defenses, even if they could not destroy the more powerful American vessels. Iran could also fire missiles at U.S. warships from its 1000 mile-long Gulf coastline. An even more controversial Iranian move would be scattering mines either near the Strait or in the Persian Gulf, which could slow or stop shipping as the U.S. Navy tried to clear the waterway.

This commentary appeared on United States Institute of Peace's Iran Primer on October 1, 2012.

Iran's response to Israeli or U.S. air strikes is likely to feature unconventional tactics that would not necessarily lead to battlefield successes, such as defeat of the U.S. Fifth Fleet. But its strategy could theoretically achieve an overall political and psychological victory.

The Islamic Republic's reaction would incorporate lessons learned from the eight-year Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s and the 34-day war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006—two of the defining conflicts of the late 20th century. The Gulf War was the longest and deadliest modern Middle East conflict. And Hezbollah, with aid and arms from Iran, fought the longest modern war with Israel. Iran would almost certainly also factor in past U.S. military operations in the region.

This commentary originally appeared on the "Politics, Power, and Preventive Action" blog at cfr.org on September 24, 2012.

Targeting militant leaders is central to many states' national security strategies, but does it work? Among academics, the conventional wisdom says no (PDF): many militant organizations have managed to persist after their key leaders were either captured or killed. Al-Qaeda (AQ) is a case in point: it not only survived Osama bin Laden's death, it remains a meaningful threat.

Even though militant organizations do not always collapse following the capture or killing of top leaders, a pair of recent studies (here and here) find that targeted killing, or “leadership decapitation,” may be much more effective than previously believed. (Full Disclosure: I am the author of this one.) Drawing on extensive, newly compiled historical evidence, each study finds that leadership decapitation has historically tended to disrupt militant operations and degrade their capabilities, ultimately weakening militant organizations and shortening their lifespans. Simply put, when terrorists are afraid to poke their heads above ground, it becomes exceedingly difficult for them to communicate, coordinate, and conduct attacks—especially sophisticated ones like 9/11.

This commentary appeared in Foreign Policy on September 25, 2012.

Critics of U.S. policy toward Iran have long claimed that Iran's nuclear progress remains unimpeded, while the United States continues "fruitless" negotiations with the Islamic Republic.

Diplomacy with Iran may not be the silver bullet that many would wish for, but the critics have it wrong. The U.S.-led sanctions regime against the Islamic Republic, along with deft U.S. handling of the Arab uprisings, has put Iran's leaders into a corner.

The remainder of this article can be found at foreignpolicy.com.