Nuclear Deterrence

This commentary appeared on NYTimes.com on October 23, 2012.

Mitt Romney and Barack Obama had some sharp rhetorical exchanges, but on substance there were few discernible differences. If Mr. Obama was expecting Mr. Romney to distinguish himself by supporting military policies that would be unpopular with Americans (whether in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan or Iran), he was likely disappointed. Mr. Romney went out of his way to argue that killing bad guys would not be enough to fight radical forces; economic development, education and civil society are key ingredients to future stability. Mr. Obama couldn't agree more.

Mr. Obama said his aim is to get Iran to stop its "nuclear program," while Romney spoke about preventing a "nuclear-capable" Iran. But neither candidate defined the point in Iran's nuclear enrichment that would trigger military action. Both agreed military action would be the last resort. And Mr. Romney even credited Mr. Obama for applying crippling sanctions, only criticizing him for not doing it earlier (which of course Mr. Obama denied) and suggesting he would find ways to strengthen them.

In discussing the latest Iran-Israel dynamics, you can't get away from red lines. They concern the line Iran would have to cross in its nuclear program to prompt a military attack. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu went so far as to literally draw a red line on a poster at the UN General Assembly last month. The moderator of the forthcoming U.S. presidential debate on foreign policy said he intends to ask the candidates about these red lines.

What is at stake? Netanyahu's UN address suggested that Israeli military action against Iran is not likely until next spring, buying some time for policies like sanctions and diplomacy to play out—and for the U.S. presidential election to be resolved. But Netanyahu's red line signaled that Israel is not giving up on a military option to thwart Iran's nuclear ambitions and will continue to press the United States to do the same.

This commentary appeared on United States Institute of Peace's Iran Primer on October 1, 2012.

Iran's response to Israeli or U.S. air strikes is likely to feature unconventional tactics that would not necessarily lead to battlefield successes, such as defeat of the U.S. Fifth Fleet. But its strategy could theoretically achieve an overall political and psychological victory.

The Islamic Republic's reaction would incorporate lessons learned from the eight-year Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s and the 34-day war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006—two of the defining conflicts of the late 20th century. The Gulf War was the longest and deadliest modern Middle East conflict. And Hezbollah, with aid and arms from Iran, fought the longest modern war with Israel. Iran would almost certainly also factor in past U.S. military operations in the region.

This commentary appeared in Foreign Policy on September 25, 2012.

Critics of U.S. policy toward Iran have long claimed that Iran's nuclear progress remains unimpeded, while the United States continues "fruitless" negotiations with the Islamic Republic.

Diplomacy with Iran may not be the silver bullet that many would wish for, but the critics have it wrong. The U.S.-led sanctions regime against the Islamic Republic, along with deft U.S. handling of the Arab uprisings, has put Iran's leaders into a corner.

The remainder of this article can be found at foreignpolicy.com.

This commentary appeared on CNN on September 6, 2012.

As war talk spikes again in Israel, U.S. officials are searching for ways to convince the Israelis to hold off on military action. It could be that the heightened debate in Israel over military options and war preparations in the country aim mainly to elicit even tougher international and American actions against Iran.

But there are leaders in Israel—including, it would seem, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak—who view the Iranian threat as severe enough to follow through on their threats, particularly now that they have staked their domestic and international reputations on doing so.

With the P5+1 (the United States, Russia, China, Britain, France, and Germany) set to resume talks with Iran in Moscow regarding the country's nuclear program, diplomats have expressed mixed sentiments about whether the parties will make headway on negotiations. In the meantime, Iran's economy continues to endure the high cost of sanctions and faces the possibility of an EU oil embargo beginning in July.

RAND expert Alireza Nader discusses these issues in an excerpt from a Congressional Briefing held on June 7, 2012.

RAND hosted an event featuring Philip Taubman, author of 'The Partnership: Five Cold Warriors and Their Quest to Ban the Bomb' on June 1, 2012.

Offering a clear analysis of the danger of nuclear terrorism and how it can be prevented, The Partnership sheds light on one of the most divisive security issues facing Washington today. Award-winning New York Times journalist Philip Taubman illuminates our vulnerability in the face of this pressing terrorist threat—and the unlikely efforts of five key Cold War players to eliminate the nuclear arsenal they helped create.

This commentary appeared on ForeignPolicy.com on May 22, 2012.

The May 23 Baghdad talks between Iran and the P5+1 (United States, Britain, France, Russia, China, plus Germany) may prove to be a crucial juncture in the Iranian nuclear crisis. The talks could lead to a compromise with Iran while a lack of compromise could lead to an Israeli strike against Iran's nuclear facilities, and possibly a costly regional war involving the United States.

There is reason to be pessimistic. The Iranian regime, an opponent of U.S. interests in the Middle East, a supporter of terrorism, and a gross violator of human rights, is hardly trustworthy. Iranian officials, who have appeared to be more compromising and flexible recently, may well be buying Iran more time to make advances on the nuclear program.

This commentary appeared on United States Institute of Peace's Iran Primer and PBS.org on April 17, 2012.

What did Iran get out of the talks with the six major powers—U.S., Britain, France, China, Russia and Germany—at the first diplomatic meeting in Istanbul?

Iran apparently took a constructive approach at the first round of talks, according to Western diplomats at the talks. Tehran's attitude at this point in time should come as no great surprise. The Islamic Republic is under tremendous economic and political pressure. U.S. sanctions against the Iranian Central Bank have caused major economic disruptions. The European embargo on Iranian oil, set to begin this July, will further weaken Iran's oil-dependent economy.

But the talks also demonstrate that the Iranian regime has substantial leverage over the so-called P5+1 major powers and the larger international community. Iran's nuclear program continues to make progress. Tehran is slowly approaching the point at which it can create nuclear weapons if the leadership chooses to do so. The lack of an effective military option may enhance Iran's bargaining position. Iranian leaders are aware of the costs of a military conflict—not just for Iran—as well as the costs for the United States and the international community. The talks are critical, and Iran holds the key to their success.

This commentary appeared on Al-Monitor on April 2, 2012.

Iran's announcement that it is willing to return to negotiations over its nuclear program this month [April 2012] is encouraging but the question remains: Will it be amenable to or even capable of compromising?

The Iranian economy has no doubt been damaged by recent sanctions against Iran's Central Bank and will be more so by an upcoming European embargo of Iranian oil. Recent political developments in Iran may also facilitate engagement by the Islamic Republic with the United States and its partners. There have been small signs that Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, may now be better able to make concessions on the nuclear program than in the past.