Nuclear Weapons and Warfare

This commentary appeared on ForeignPolicy.com on May 22, 2012.

The May 23 Baghdad talks between Iran and the P5+1 (United States, Britain, France, Russia, China, plus Germany) may prove to be a crucial juncture in the Iranian nuclear crisis. The talks could lead to a compromise with Iran while a lack of compromise could lead to an Israeli strike against Iran's nuclear facilities, and possibly a costly regional war involving the United States.

There is reason to be pessimistic. The Iranian regime, an opponent of U.S. interests in the Middle East, a supporter of terrorism, and a gross violator of human rights, is hardly trustworthy. Iranian officials, who have appeared to be more compromising and flexible recently, may well be buying Iran more time to make advances on the nuclear program.

This commentary appeared on United States Institute of Peace's Iran Primer and PBS.org on April 17, 2012.

What did Iran get out of the talks with the six major powers—U.S., Britain, France, China, Russia and Germany—at the first diplomatic meeting in Istanbul?

Iran apparently took a constructive approach at the first round of talks, according to Western diplomats at the talks. Tehran's attitude at this point in time should come as no great surprise. The Islamic Republic is under tremendous economic and political pressure. U.S. sanctions against the Iranian Central Bank have caused major economic disruptions. The European embargo on Iranian oil, set to begin this July, will further weaken Iran's oil-dependent economy.

But the talks also demonstrate that the Iranian regime has substantial leverage over the so-called P5+1 major powers and the larger international community. Iran's nuclear program continues to make progress. Tehran is slowly approaching the point at which it can create nuclear weapons if the leadership chooses to do so. The lack of an effective military option may enhance Iran's bargaining position. Iranian leaders are aware of the costs of a military conflict—not just for Iran—as well as the costs for the United States and the international community. The talks are critical, and Iran holds the key to their success.

This commentary appeared on Al-Monitor on April 2, 2012.

Iran's announcement that it is willing to return to negotiations over its nuclear program this month [April 2012] is encouraging but the question remains: Will it be amenable to or even capable of compromising?

The Iranian economy has no doubt been damaged by recent sanctions against Iran's Central Bank and will be more so by an upcoming European embargo of Iranian oil. Recent political developments in Iran may also facilitate engagement by the Islamic Republic with the United States and its partners. There have been small signs that Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, may now be better able to make concessions on the nuclear program than in the past.

This commentary appeared on U.S. News & World Report, Debate Club on March 5, 2012 as a response to the forum, Should the U.S. Discourage Israel From Attacking Iran?

Israel does not habitually forewarn its adversaries of impending attacks. Current Israeli threats to strike Iranian nuclear facilities are thus aimed not at Tehran, but at Washington and other international capitals that desperately do not want a new Middle East war. These threats have had no discernible impact on the Iranian government, except perhaps to accelerate its efforts to move key aspects of its nuclear program into hardened facilities. The threats have hit their intended target, however, leading to a dramatic strengthening of the international sanctions against Iran and a marked toughening of the Obama administration's own rhetoric. Indeed, based on President Obama's most recent statements, it would appear that the main issue separating the U.S. and Israeli leadership is not whether, but when, to attack Iran.

This commentary appeared on PBS FRONTLINE on February 23, 2012.

The fate of Iran's alleged nuclear weapons program—which now threatens yet another Middle East conflagration—rests in the hands of a single man: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Iranians are now gripped by a sense that their nation stands at a precipice. The Islamic Republic faces potentially devastating new international sanctions as well as possible Israeli military strikes on its nuclear facilities. Normally inured to insecurity, war and endemic crises, Iranians are now hoarding foodstuff and dollars, ready for the worst.

This commentary appeared in Los Angeles Times on February 21, 2012.

Talk of a military strike on Iranian nuclear facilities is not subsiding. If diplomacy can't head off Iran's nuclear ambitions, advocates for a military strike in Israel and the United States will only gain strength. While proponents may believe that Israel can endure the short-term military and diplomatic fallout of such action, the long-term consequences are likely to be disastrous for Israel's security.

Those believed to favor a military option, such as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak, argue that the Middle East with a nuclear-armed Iran would be far more dangerous than a military attack to prevent it. But their position rests on a faulty assumption that a future, post-attack Middle East would indeed be free of a nuclear-armed Iran. In fact, it may result in the worst of both worlds: a future nuclear-armed Iran more determined than ever to challenge the Jewish state, and with far fewer regional and international impediments to do so.

This commentary appeared on ForeignPolicy.com on January 26, 2012.

As the prospects for negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program dim, and an anxious American public contemplates the grim prospect of military action, attention has turned again to the prospect of changing Iran's regime. But is U.S. regime change in Iran, whether through sanctions or direct action, really a viable prospect?

Reuel Marc Gerecht and Mark Dubowitz have argued that the United States should pursue sanctions that lead to regime change. According to them, through sanctions, "a democratic counterrevolution in Persia might be reborn. A democratic Iran might keep the bomb that Khamenei built. But the U.S., Israel, Europe, and probably most of the Arab world would likely live with it without that much fear." The attraction of removing the Islamic Republic may be obvious. Sanctions may slow down Iran's nuclear drive but most likely will not roll back the program. Military strikes would do damage but are hardly guaranteed to destroy major facilities such as the recently opened Qom enrichment plant, buried beneath 300 feet of rock. For many, only a change of the regime would diminish the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran.

Facing an unprecedented array of sanctions imposed by the United States and Europe, Iran's leaders opened 2012 by announcing that a new uranium enrichment site in the mountains near Qom would soon become operational. The recent assassination of an Iranian nuclear scientist—believed by many to be another strike by Israel in a covert campaign to slow Iran's nuclear program—has only further raised tensions between Iran, the West, and Israel. The assassination and related sabotage efforts may not ultimately halt Iran's program, and may in fact provoke an Iranian response that would increase the odds of escalation leading to a conventional conflict. Thus begins the latest round in the perennial international guessing game: will this be the year that Israel uses military force to try to thwart Iran's nuclear ambitions?

To hear it from U.S. politicians, the Iranian nuclear program is a threat to Israel's very existence. Some urge the Obama administration to publicly support Israel's position by leaving "all options on the table"—diplomatic speak for a military strike. But before heading down the road of military action, those concerned for Israeli security should understand not only the risks of using force against Iran. They should also take heed of the complexity of Israeli views toward Iran.

Iran's threats to close the Straits of Hormuz in response to the latest American-led sanctions may be empty posturing. Still, Iran's slow march toward a nuclear weapons capability has dramatically increased tensions between Washington and Tehran. The Obama administration has not taken the option of a military strike off the table, and one must assume that the Iranians have not done so either.

In these circumstances, it is important to realistically judge the nature and extent of the Iranian threat. For all its bluster, the Iranian regime is more vulnerable than at any time in its 32-year history. Internally, Iran is constrained by deep political divisions, civil strife and a woeful economy. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has directly challenged the country's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, while Khamenei has spoken of eliminating the presidency.

North Korean dictator Kim Jong-Il is dead. His 28 year-old son, Kim Jong-Un, has been declared his successor, despite his age and relative lack of preparation. As a result, we can expect uncertain and dangerous times ahead.

When Kim Jong-Il rose to power under his father, Kim Il-Sung, he had some 30 years to consolidate his leadership during which time he was purging unfriendly individuals, moving his supporters into positions of power, and testing them. Still, after his father died, he spent three years consolidating his leadership and solidifying his grip on power and, reportedly, dodging assassins.