Pakistan

This commentary appeared in Christian Science Monitor on May 16, 2013.

Fairly or not, Bangladesh seems to make international news only at moments of tragedy.

Much of the misery that afflicts this teeming South Asian nation has been beyond human control. Since 1980, nearly 200,000 people have been killed in natural disasters, and more than 10 million Bangladeshis are affected by such events on average each year. Tropical Storm Mahasen hit coastal areas earlier today, killing 12 people, destroying thousands of homes, and forcing as many as a million people to flee the area....

The remainder of this commentary is available at csmonitor.com.

This weekend's elections in Pakistan are more likely to yield continuity than change, an outcome that could offer some opportunities for enhanced engagement between Washington and Islamabad, a pair of RAND experts told reporters on April 6.

During a conference call from Washington, Seth Jones, associate director of RAND's International Security and Defense Policy Center, and Jonah Blank, a senior political scientist, said a relatively free and fair election would be a welcome sign of political stability for a key U.S. partner in South Asia.

“There is an opportunity for reengaging a new civilian leadership that may have a short honeymoon period. …There is an opportunity to reset the U.S. relationship with Pakistan on some key issues,” Jones said.

On Friday, President Obama named Ambassador James F. Dobbins, a veteran diplomat and the current director of the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center, as his special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

“Jim's intellect, skills, and experience will serve the United States well in this critical post,” RAND President and CEO Michael Rich said. “We are honored to have had Jim's wisdom and leadership at RAND for more than a decade and thankful for the numerous contributions he has made to our security and defense research.”

During their administrations, Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush turned to Dobbins for a range of difficult assignments, including as envoy for Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia.

This commentary appeared on Global Security.org on April 12, 2013.

The Pentagon reportedly has secret plans to secure Pakistan's nuclear weapons against terrorists, a jihadist coup, or civil war. It also has conducted war games to explore how it might try to secure North Korea's nuclear arsenal in case of a coup or collapse of the regime.

Either of these missions would be a daunting military task, requiring a large-scale military commitment. More dangerous, though, would be a mission to contain nuclear weapons in a case where an army divides against itself, creating a chaotic and unpredictable strategic landscape.

This commentary appeared in Foreign Policy on March 1, 2013.

In November 2010, while working for U.S. Special Operations Command, I traveled to the U.S. base in Shkin along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Several dirt roads snake through the area, but virtually none are paved. The dusty, parched landscape is strangely reminiscent of Frederic Remington or C.M. Russell's paintings of the American West.

Shkin serves as a microcosm of one of the most significant weaknesses of the U.S. war in Afghanistan: a failure to address the insurgent sanctuary in Pakistan. As U.S. officials pointed out at Shkin, the Taliban and other insurgent groups use their safe haven in Pakistan to live, train, rearm, and conduct strategic and operational planning.

Reports this week suggest the Obama administration is considering reducing the number of U.S. military forces in Afghanistan to around 10,000 by 2014. Unfortunately, this discussion is happening in something of a vacuum. As the U.S. withdraws its forces, military and civilian officials have yet to clearly outline strategic objectives for the region and discuss the tasks required to achieve those objectives.

Indeed, the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan is only one of several important policy choices—and not necessarily the most important one. For example: What will the U.S. do about the insurgent sanctuary in Pakistan? In a country where tribes, sub-tribes, and clans still retain substantial power in rural areas, how much will the U.S. strategy depend on Afghan central government action?

This commentary appeared on The Diplomat on August 10, 2012.

Last week Pakistan's new spy chief Lieutenant General Zahir ul-Islam made an inaugural trip to the United States and met with his counterparts in the American intelligence community. Although little is known about was discussed, Islamabad's ongoing support of groups attacking U.S. and NATO forces — particularly the Haqqani Network — was almost certainly high on the agenda. Pakistan's backing of these entities, which has severely strained relations with Washington, is one of the main reasons why the Obama Administration has moved closer to Pakistan's arch-rival India, soliciting it to increase military engagement with Kabul.

General Zahir's visit could be read as a potential sign that American-Pakistani ties may be on the mend. Nonetheless, as we contend in our recent report, India's and Pakistan's Strategies in Afghanistan: Implications for the United States and the Region (RAND, 2012), the United States should continue to encourage Delhi to play more robust economic, commercial and military roles in Afghanistan. Not only is India a more reliable partner than Pakistan, but it has far more to contribute to stability and security in Afghanistan and in the wider regions of South and Central Asia.

This commentary appeared on GlobalSecurity.org on May 24, 2012.

This week's NATO summit successfully navigated a tricky turn toward an end to the alliance's combat role in Afghanistan without veering into a stampede from the region altogether. The plan for handing over the lead in combat operations to Afghan forces is a little more clear, allies committed over $1 billion annually to support the ANSF, and NATO reaffirmed it will stay beyond 2014—even after combat operations are over. Meanwhile, several allies signed long-term partnership agreements with Kabul that parallel the agreement signed by President Obama there three weeks ago.

But the summit also drew attention to at least three challenges on the road ahead:

The Haqqani network has become the bête noire of the United States in Afghanistan. This fall, it participated in a number of high-profile attacks on U.S. soldiers, the U.S. embassy, and NATO headquarters in Kabul. And on October 29, it was involved in a spectacular suicide attack against an armored military bus in Kabul that killed at least nine Americans. In response, U.S. officials have vowed to punish the organization, which is based in Pakistan's North Waziristan. Outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, bluntly noted in a September Senate Armed Services Committee hearing that the Haqqani network "has long enjoyed the support and protection of the Pakistani government and is, in many ways, a strategic arm of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency." And senior Pentagon and White House officials recently threatened to act unilaterally against the Haqqani network in Pakistan, including with drones, if Islamabad does not cut ties with the network.

Yet in focusing on the Haqqani network — which enjoys little popular support in Afghanistan — the United States is neglecting the more important (and difficult) task of dealing with the Taliban sanctuary in Pakistan's Baluchistan Province. Indeed, it has done so for quite some time. The United States has pockmarked North and South Waziristan with drone strikes. These have severely weakened al Qaeda and taken out some Haqqani leaders. But the Taliban's inner shura, their most important decision-making body, has been left unmolested in Baluchistan....

Perceived as hasty exit, President Obama's withdrawal of US troops risks re-establishing the Taliban and, worse, al-Qaida. This commentary appeared on guardian.co.uk on June 23, 2011.

There is a growing temptation in the United States to rush to the exit in Afghanistan. President Obama's decision to pull out 33,000 troops by next summer — 10,000 in 2011 and another 23,000 in 2012 — may amplify calls for a complete withdrawal as some Americans try to wash their hands from what was once "the good war". How times have changed.

Those who call for an immediate, full exit are making a grave mistake. Such an approach risks an outcome that should be unacceptable in Washington and London: a Taliban takeover of all, or substantial portions, of Afghanistan.