NOVEMBER 2007 HOT TOPICS

Keeping Advanced Conventional Weapons Out of the Hands of Terrorists

While the potential terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons is receiving considerable attention, too little attention has been directed to terrorist use of advanced conventional weapons. A RAND Corporation study, which focused on five advanced conventional weapons that could pose the greatest threat—sniper rifles, squad-level weapons, antitank missiles, large limpet mines, and GPS-guided mortars—outlines two ways of limiting the threat of such systems: raising threat awareness and reducing the threat through procedural and technical use controls.

The study found that GPS-guided mortars are the most worrisome, being both attractive to terrorists and difficult to mitigate with only awareness and procedural controls; actual technical use controls are required. But because these systems are still in their design phase, when such technical use controls are most practical to incorporate, the study argues that now is the time to act. The study suggests that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) could play a key role by pushing the U.S. government to begin diplomatic discussions with key producer nations to raise awareness of potential terrorist use of these systems and by commissioning a detailed technical study of the modules and architecture needed to implement proposed technical use controls.

READ THE REPORT: Stealing the Sword: Limiting Terrorist Use of Advanced Conventional Weapons

Understanding How Terrorists Use Advanced Information and Communication Technologies

Most examinations of the technology used to enable terrorist operations focus on weapons and how new technologies might increase the resulting damages, injuries, and fatalities. But information gathering, assessment and planning, coordination, logistics, and command capabilities all play a role in terrorist attacks, and the very existence of a terrorist organization is based on recruiting and information campaigns. A RAND study sought to identify which network technologies terrorists are likely to use to conduct successful operations, understand terrorists' decisions about when and under what conditions particular technologies will be used, and determine the implications of these insights for efforts to combat terrorism.

The study concludes that future network technologies are most likely to result in real but modest improvement in terrorist group efficiency, particularly for such groups' supporting activities. However, such technologies do not dramatically improve their attack operations. Precluding terrorists from getting the network technology they want is impractical; developing direct counters is unlikely to yield high payoffs. Instead, exploiting the technologies and the information that such technologies use to enable more direct security force operations is a more promising option.

READ THE REPORT: Networked Technologies for Networked Terrorists

Figuring Out Where Terrorists Are Likeliest to Strike

To help prioritize terrorism security efforts, DHS is continuing to explore new approaches to modeling terrorism risk. A RAND report presents the results of three applications of a model—one routinely used by the insurance industry for assessing liability—to assess terrorism risk across and within states and cities and to assist in intelligence analysis.

The study shows that such probabilistic terrorism modeling can be used to assess the distribution of risk across states or urban areas. Also, when assessing terrorism risk within an urban area, the approach provides a common method for identifying the attack modes and targets that are the key determinants of the area's total risk. The study concludes that such information may be less useful for local officials who have access to and knowledge of site-specific details, but it could provide a common perspective to federal decisionmakers who lack the local knowledge.

READ THE REPORT: Terrorism Risk Modeling for Intelligence Analysis and Infrastructure Protection

Collecting Information for Counterinsurgency Operations

U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have failed to exploit information power. In counterinsurgency operations, in which the population is the battleground, the key to success is to connect with and learn from the population itself. This increases the effectiveness of the indigenous government and U.S. support of it. A new RAND study argues that today's military and intelligence networks—compartmentalized, overly controlled, and limited to U.S. warfighters—hamper counterinsurgency efforts and deprive the United States of what ought to be a strategic advantage.

In contrast, based on a review of 160 requirements for counterinsurgency, the study calls for an integrated counterinsurgency network linking U.S. and indigenous operators and based on principles of inclusiveness, integration, and user preeminence. Elements would include creating an IT-enhanced, fraud-resistant registry census; enhancing and taking advantage of the proliferation of cell phones in developing countries for intelligence; developing enhanced 911 services and forensics; and establishing a national wiki so that citizens can characterize their environment.

READ THE REPORT: Byting Back—Regaining Information Superiority Against 21st-Century Insurgents

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