As the array of expertise required to be a successful leader in the U.S. Navy has become more complex, Navy leaders have become increasingly concerned that senior officers need additional kinds of expertise, beyond those traditionally developed in naval officers, to be successful in commanding, leading, and managing the Navy enterprise. This study explores whether there is a gap in officer development that manifests itself in the flag officer ranks.

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Insecurity in the 21st century appears to come less from the collisions of powerful states than from the debris of imploding ones. Failed states present a variety of dangers: religious and ethnic violence; trafficking of drugs, weapons, blood diamonds, and humans; transnational crime and piracy; uncontrolled territory, borders, and waters; terrorist breeding grounds and sanctuaries; refugee overflows; communicable diseases; environmental degradation; and warlords and stateless armies. For security, material, and moral reasons, leading states cannot ignore failed ones. This paper aims to improve the understanding and treatment of failed states by offering an integrated approach based on two ideas: that certain critical challenges at the intersections between security, economics, and politics must be met if the cycle is to be broken and that, in meeting those critical challenges, the guiding goal should be to lift local populations from the status of victims of failure to agents of recovery.

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Despite the U.S. armed forces' historical role as a model for racial integration and decades of Department of Defense (DoD) efforts to promote racial and ethnic diversity, many groups are still underrepresented within the department, especially among DoD's active duty and civilian leadership. This is a particularly important issue for DoD because many military leaders believe that maintaining a diverse workforce is critical for the department's national security mission. This report discusses the initial steps that DoD should take in developing a department-wide plan to achieve greater diversity within its active duty and civilian leadership.

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The publication of a new counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine manual in late 2006 was widely heralded as an indication that the U.S. military was finally coming to understand the problems it has recently faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, this interpretation assumes a tight linkage between doctrine as written and operations as actually conducted. By comparing modern counterinsurgency doctrine and operations to those of the 1960s, this paper tests and ultimately disproves this proposition. An examination of COIN doctrine and operations in the 1960s reveals that operations seldom matched written doctrine. Instead of winning hearts and minds, improving civil-military relations, conducting small-unit operations, and gathering intelligence, most Vietnam War commanders and units attempted to defeat the insurgency through large-scale operations and overwhelming firepower. Modern U.S. COIN operations in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate a similar preference. To help explain the discrepancy between written doctrine and actual operations, this paper posits that ingrained organizational concepts and beliefs have a much greater influence on operations than written doctrine.

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Current unrest in the Malay-Muslim provinces of southern Thailand has captured growing national, regional, and international attention due to the heightened tempo and scale of rebel attacks, the increasingly jihadist undertone that has come to characterize insurgent actions, and the central government's often brutal handling of the situation on the ground. No concrete evidence suggests that the region has been decisively transformed into a new beachhead for pan-regional jihadism. Although many of the attacks currently being perpetrated in the three Malay provinces have a definite religious element, it is not apparent that this has altered the essential localized and nationalistic aspect of the conflict. Perhaps the clearest reason to believe that the southern Thai conflict has not metastasized into a broader jihadist struggle is the fact that there has been neither a migration of violence north nor directed attacks against foreigners, tourist resorts, or overt symbols of U.S. cultural capitalism.

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In June 2007, the RAND Corporation and the Royal Danish Defence College hosted a conference titled “Afghanistan: State and Society, Great Power Politics, and the Way Ahead”. The two-day event, held in Copenhagen, was attended by more than 100 politicians, scholars, academics, and was representative of both governmental and nongovernmental institutions from more than 20 states. Its theme was to discuss the problems that Afghanistan faces in the wake of the U.S.-led attack on al Qaeda training camps and the Taliban government; examine the challenges confronting the NATO International Security Assistance Force as it coordinates nation-building activities in Afghanistan; and suggest ways to address these issues.

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RAND Arroyo Center’s annual report describes the skills and abilities that have been carefully developed over its history with an eye on large, complex institutional problems that the Army is likely to face. While particular research streams have evolved over time, generic areas of substantive focus have remained largely intact and are reflected in Arroyo’s four programs of research: Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources; Force Development and Technology; Military Logistics; and Manpower and Training. These programs, along with the specific research streams they maintain, support the four “imperatives” essential to restoring the Army’s balance: sustain the Army’s soldiers, families and civilians; prepare forces to succeed in the current conflict; reset units and rebuild readiness; and transform the Army to meet the demands of the 21st century.

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The U.S. Air Force greatly increased the number of operational surveillance and reconnaissance sensors and its ability to process data from these sensors in support of operations across a wide range of conflicts. However, along with the increased number of sensors comes an increase in the complexity of the tasking of these assets needed to prosecute either planned for or emergent battlefield targets. This problem has been compounded by an increased use of mobile systems by adversaries. As part of the authors’ research, they developed new assessment techniques and operational strategies to improve the command and control process for assigning intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets in dynamic environments.

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COMMENTARY

The following is a list of national security related commentary pieces that RAND researchers have contributed to newspapers in the past month. To retrieve past commentary pieces, please visit RAND's commentary page.

AFGHAN PROGRESS SPOTTY BUT HOPEFUL
Authors: Obaid Younossi and Peter Dahl Thruelsen (Providence Journal)

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GIVE THEM SABBATICALS
Author: Laura Miller(USA Today)

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