How Can We Improve Air Travel Security? An Interview with Jack Riley
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Jack Riley, vice president and director of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD), has conducted extensive work on homeland security, border security, and law enforcement and crime control, including assessments of passenger rail and airport security. He has testified before Congress on multiple occasions on transportation security and border security. His most recent work is an essay called Air Travel Security Since 9/11. He has a Ph.D. in public policy from the Pardee RAND Graduate School.
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How has 9/11 affected airport security?
We've geared security efforts around preventing another 9/11-type attack and have significantly reduced the likelihood of such an attack in the future by doing such things as reinforcing cockpit doors, increasing passenger and crew knowledge of the need to intervene, and improving the visa process that helps prevent terrorists from getting permission to fly to the United States.
But what about the more recent security measures?
The security measures imposed after the so-called "Underwear Bomber" tried to detonate plastic explosives en route to Detroit have provoked considerable outcry. The use of whole body scanners raises a number of issues, such as 4th-Amendment concerns about unreasonable searches, speed of processing, and false alarms that require a patdown--the alternative--which is no more popular and is, in some ways, more problematic because it involves intimate contact between government representatives and passengers.
Is this level of security really needed?
The key is that such extensive security measures are not needed for all U.S. plane passengers. They impose significant deadweight losses on all travelers, but we know enough from people's travel profiles, security clearances, etc., to be able to trust some people and focus on those we don't know. A missed opportunity is the development of a trusted traveler program.
How would such a program work?
Interestingly, we have what amounts to a pilot program in place. At many airports, TSA personnel, airport personnel, and aircrews are not screened at all and are certainly not screened the same way passengers are. This shows that it is possible--and desirable--to treat certain low-risk populations differently to concentrate resources where they are needed. The concept should be extended to travelers.
Would such a program be burdensome to implement?
Not really. DHS already uses programs like Global Entry (GE), NEXUS, and SENTRI to expedite movement across borders. I just used my GE membership to fly from Korea to San Francisco. In Korea, I went through a walk-through metal detector and put my carry-on bag through X-ray. At SFO, I used a GE kiosk to give my flight details and customs declaration and then used my fingerprints to confirm my identity. In three minutes, I was free to enter the country without any additional inspection. That trusted status--backed by an already-paid-for extensive background investigation and biometric confirmation of identity--can easily be extended to airports.
What other steps could be taken?
The TSA should be required to analyze proposed security measures and regulations using clear, transparent risk-management principles. One reason we've ended up in the current situation is that security measures are grafted or layered on in response to specific incidents, with little regard to an integrated assessment of cost, effectiveness, or impact on risk. An important role for Congress is to help DHS/TSA set up a framework that measures the full costs (lost time, etc.) of security measures and to determine whether imposing new security measures achieves reductions in terrorism risk commensurate with the costs incurred.
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