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On June 23-25 2002, RAND's Center for Middle East Public Policy (CMEPP) and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) held a workshop focusing on terrorism and asymmetric conflict in Southwest Asia. This conference was the third in a series of collaborative efforts by GCSP and RAND in the area of security policy. We would like to thank Andrew Rathmell for acting as the rapporteur for the conference, and all of the conference participants who are enumerated in Appendix 2.

Shahram Chubin, Jerrold Green
Introduction

At previous RAND-GCSP workshops in 1999 and 2001, participants examined, respectively, possible roles for NATO in the Middle East and the challenges to Turkey as both a European and Middle Eastern actor. The 2002 workshop, scheduled for June 23-25, 2002, was originally intended to take a broad look at issues relating to Southwest Asia, where Europe and the United States have long grappled with a range of strategic and political differences. However, in light of the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 and the subsequent U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan, the organisers decided to refocus the workshop around the specific theme of terrorism and asymmetric conflict in Southwest Asia. The workshop focused on both the global and regional aspects of the terrorist threat.

The starting point for discussion was the observation that, despite significant U.S. military and economic investment in Southwest Asia since WWII, the region has not followed the path of Europe and East Asia in terms of either economic advancement or the development of stable, democratic structures. From a U.S. strategic perspective, Southwest Asian countries have not become valuable economic or political partners to the United States. Instead, the region has been the venue for crisis after crisis, crises that have required a series of costly U.S. military interventions.

The continued instability of the region is likely to pose an even greater national security problem in the future, as the United States becomes increasingly dependent on the region’s supply of cheap oil – both to serve its own needs and those of its allies. At the same time, Southwest Asia’s lack of stability means that direct U.S. military intervention in the region is becoming an ever greater burden on the U.S. defence establishment. Intervention will become even more costly with the inevitable proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the escalating terrorist threat.
Southwest Asia therefore poses a strategic dilemma for the United States and its allies. This dilemma hinges on three main questions. Can the global economy’s dependence on the region be reduced? Can more stable political and economic structures be promoted in the region? Can the costs of military intervention be kept down?

The RAND-GCSP workshop was convened at a time when the real dangers of regional instability were only too evident, even if the long-term implications of the events of September 11 remained unclear:

- The U.S.-led military campaign enjoyed significant success in Afghanistan, but it was evident that al-Qaida had not been defeated.
- The destabilisation of the sub-continent was becoming evident in the nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan.
- The Middle East peace process had effectively collapsed.
- The prospect of U.S. action against Iraq was becoming very real.

Against this background, a group of 26 experts from Europe and the United States came together for an informal discussion organized around four broad themes: 1) the military lessons of the Afghan campaign; 2) terrorism and asymmetric warfare; 3) the regional dimensions of terrorism and asymmetric conflict in Southwest Asia; and 4) Euro-Atlantic relations in Southwest Asia.

The following summary reflects the rapporteur’s sense of the discussion, which was conducted entirely on a not-for-attribution basis.

**Military Lessons**

It is too soon to draw firm conclusions from the military campaign against the Taliban, let alone the fight against al-Qaida. Participants concurred that the “war is anything but over and the broader battle against ‘global terrorism’ has scarcely begun.” It is also unclear how useful the lessons of Afghanistan will be as a guide to future military conflicts. The campaign entailed major logistical challenges for the United States due to the distance to theatre and the lack of forward bases. At the same time, the United States faced opponents, in both al-Qaida and the Taliban, that were politically divided, militarily weak, and deeply unpopular.

In military-technical terms, the campaign demonstrated the benefits of the ongoing transformation of the U.S. military into a network-centric organization with integrated air support, intelligence and surveillance capabilities, and small unit special forces. The small
scale of the conflict meant that the United States could rely primarily on special forces and specialised army units which are well on their way to operating in a joint and network-centric manner. The transformational impact of developments in C4ISR was marked in the contrast between U.S. and U.K. special forces. Although U.K. special forces operated effectively on a unit basis, these units were not integrated into the C4ISR network and so were unable to exploit the full potential of network-centric warfare.

This observation leads to some broader conclusions concerning the future of coalition military operations. The increasing technological gap between U.S. and European forces has also created a gap between U.S. and European capabilities to take part in network-centric warfare. As a result, the participation of allied forces in operations can pose a direct logistical and operational burden on the U.S. military. Indeed, because the United States faced an immediate threat after September 11, it felt it could not accept the delays and operational costs that would have been necessary to integrate allied military forces at the outset. The gap in capabilities can be closed fairly inexpensively in niche areas, such as transport, special forces, and long range strike. Nonetheless, participants agreed that Afghanistan highlighted the potential for a growing military disconnect between the United States and its allies unless the Allies, following the lead of the United Kingdom, seek to transform their armed forces as well.

In terms of lessons that apply specifically to the U.S. military, it must be recalled that the Afghan campaign took place in a relatively benign environment. Thus, U.S. forces did not face many of the more difficult challenges that future opponents are likely to pose, especially chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological warfare. One challenge that Afghanistan did pose, and which the United States has not addressed adequately, is that of collateral damage. As U.S. opponents become ever more adept at exploiting civilian casualties for psychological effect, it will become more important for the United States to have operational and technological means for minimising civilian casualties.

The U.S. military is conscious of the fact that countering terrorism is only one of its missions, albeit a high-priority one for now. The continuing need to address al-Qaida-like threats will not displace existing planning assumptions, but instead will be laid over the top of the existing force planning paradigm. Participants noted that at least three separate missions are currently animating discussions over U.S. force transformation: combating a dispersed, decentralised and globalised terrorist network; contending with failed states; and deterring or pre-empting rogue states that possess increasing military capabilities such as WMD either deployed in deep bunkers or mobile and dispersed amongst civilian populations.
Beyond the military-operational lessons from the Afghanistan campaign, there was considerable concern amongst participants at the lack of an overall U.S. grand strategy. During military interventions, the U.S. military has typically focused on identifying a short-term “exit strategy” rather than a grand strategic vision of the desired outcome. Conference participants were particularly troubled by the challenges the U.S. military faced in nation-building in Afghanistan as well as the continued lack of integrated planning between the military phases and the post-war phases of the operation. Participants felt that it would be far less costly to “fix the problem” by investing resources up front to build a more stable and secure state for the long term (something the international community has only partially achieved in Bosnia) rather than risking future military intervention in the event that Afghanistan descends again into being a rogue or failed state. Unfortunately, there is no sign that either the United States or the rest of the international community has the foresight or the staying power to make the required commitment.

One issue needing to be addressed in a grand strategy is perception management. Although the State Department has issued a Public Diplomacy plan, participants felt that the United States had not yet learned to effectively use “soft power” to fortify its hard power capabilities.1 And there are limitations to the role that perception management can play. When a U.S. policy is particularly unpopular in a region, as is the case with U.S. support for the Sharon government in Israel, no amount of public relations gloss can change perceptions of the United States.

Participants also examined overall lessons for the United States and its allies in regard to the immediate campaign against al-Qaida. It was observed that it is not at all clear that al-Qaida has actually been defeated; rather, the organization appears to have dispersed and gone underground. Indeed, the United States has identified 68 countries in which there are al-Qaida cells. To counter such a dispersed threat, the United States will need highly agile and mobile forces, and it will also need to concentrate more effort on the intelligence, diplomatic, and policing aspects of the struggle worldwide. Finally, the United States and its allies need to recognise that al-Qaida and its ilk will launch successful major attacks in the future; therefore, greater investment should be made in resilience and consequence management across society.

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1 After the conference adjourned, the White House announced plans to create a Global Office of Communications on July 30, 2002.
Terrorism and Asymmetric War

The concept of “new terrorism” could lead to the assumption that the recent actions of al-Qaida represent a wholly new phenomenon. This is not the case, however. Since the nineteenth century, radical Islamist leaders have periodically inflicted military defeats on Western “imperialists.” In the late nineteenth century, European anarchists were already operating in dispersed, loosely organised, international networks. More recently, Islamist terrorists in the 1990s employed tactics similar to those employed in the September 11 attacks: using civilian airliners as missiles, targeting the World Trade Center, and carrying out suicide attacks and simultaneous, mass casualty attacks.

Nonetheless, one participant observed that terrorism “is perhaps best viewed as the archetypal shark in the water. It must constantly move forward to survive and to succeed.” In this sense, Al-Qaida does represent a significant development beyond past terrorist movements, and the September 11 attacks marked a new phase in terrorism. The scale of the attacks and the globalised nature of the threat – which involved attempted attacks from the Philippines, through Singapore, to Pakistan, Morocco, France, Italy, and the United States itself -- indicate that terrorism can no longer be viewed as a disruptive tactic with limited strategic value. It has emerged as a political and strategic threat designed to undermine whole societies and keep them off-balance.

This shift is also evident in the ongoing campaign of suicide bombings in Israel and the Occupied Territories. Although these attacks are not linked to al-Qaida, the apparently limitless supply of martyrs and the repeated focus on suicide bombings provide further evidence of the strategic threat now posed by terrorism to the cohesion of society.

In this context, Al-Qaida has served as an exemplar for the new terrorism because of its regular use of martyrdom operations and its focus upon mass casualty “spectaculars.” The organizational structure and modus operandi developed by Usama bin Laden are also important innovations. Al-Qaida’s globalisation and effective use of modern technologies are derived more from the m.o. of modern multinational companies and venture capitalists than from traditional terrorist organisations or religious militants, although Al-Qaida also makes effective use of deception operations.

But what is most striking about the al-Qaida structure is the combination of tight central control over “spectaculars” exercised by bin Laden as al-Qaida’s CEO and the encouragement of bottom-up initiatives by freelancers. Al-Qaida therefore operates through four levels of personnel: the professional cadre who are groomed for the “spectaculars”; the
trained amateurs, including Ahmed Ressam and “shoe-bomber” Richard Reid; the local walk-ins, i.e., Islamist radicals who propose targets of opportunity; and like-minded insurgent groups such as Kashmiri or Chechen militants.

There was considerable discussion over the motivations of al-Qaida. Some participants argued that the movement indulged mainly in expressive rather than instrumental attacks and was therefore more akin to a mediaeval sect than a terrorist group with a political agenda. Others disagreed. They noted that, whilst al-Qaida certainly engages in expressive violence, its overall agenda is clear: to oust pro-American regimes in the Middle East, notably the Al-Saud, and to force the United States to withdraw from the region. Most participants agreed that religion was not a driving force for the group but more of a communication and mobilisation tool. But there was disagreement over the extent to which the group was motivated by the Palestinian issue. Many participants noted that bin Laden came to the Palestinian cause late; the trigger for his anti-American campaign was the arrival of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia in 1990.

Whatever the motives of al-Qaida, there was agreement that the organisation is far from destroyed. It is active in encouraging and supporting low-level operations against U.S. and European targets on a routine basis. Given its past tempo of operations, the organization is likely already planning another “spectacular.” Given the absence of a physical sanctuary in which to undertake conventional military training, al-Qaida is likely to focus upon Western vulnerabilities that can be exploited without extensive military training, such as information networks and infrastructure or biological warfare.

The question remains as to whether al-Qaida is a precursor of future terrorist threats or whether it is more accurately described as an epiphenomenon. It is clear that al-Qaida emerged under uniquely favourable circumstances. Those who came to make up its leadership received heavy state support in the 1980s from the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan in the fight against the Soviet Union; during the 1990s they were armed by Pakistani intelligence, while Sudan and Afghanistan provided sanctuaries.

Whilst these factors may have combined to create a unique threat in al-Qaida, the group has now inaugurated a new paradigm from which future opponents will learn. Mass casualty and suicide attacks have been recognised as an effective tactic against the West. Also evident are the benefits of a globalised and dispersed network structure that exploits modern communications. The vulnerabilities inherent to modern infrastructures are also clear.
In the longer term, it is important not to concentrate solely upon Islamist terrorism, although this form seems at present the most virulent. The simple fact is that Western societies are becoming more vulnerable in a broader sense. This vulnerability is due to many factors, including global communications, travel, and the proliferation of weapons technology, as well as the fact that the number of relatively deprived people in failing societies is growing. We shall therefore probably have to live with an increasing amount of more destructive terrorism.

Whilst there are no easy solutions, there are three particular observations that can be made:

• First, a regionalised approach to security no longer works. Security efforts must be as globalised as the threat.
• Second, we need to focus our intelligence effort on the characteristics of the “big hurts.” Spectacular attacks require long periods of planning and preparation; we should therefore configure our intelligence systems to detect the footprint of these preparations.
• Third, terrorist threats need to be kept in perspective. Whilst there has been a step-change in the threat from terrorism, in public policy terms it must be remembered that the number of Americans who died in the World Trade Center is outnumbered 9 to 1 by the number of Americans who commit suicide every year. Over-emphasising the threat from terrorism plays into the hands of the terrorists.

Regional Dimensions

The starting point for discussion of the regional dimensions of the U.S. campaign against al-Qaida was the observation that popular sympathy for the Taliban and al-Qaida within Persian Gulf and Middle Eastern states may be widespread but is shallow. There is little support for the Taliban as a regime and there is a recognition that bin Laden’s tactics were unacceptable. Nonetheless, the bin Laden story is eagerly followed as a “Bonnie and Clyde” narrative – everyone knows the outlaw must eventually be caught but there is sympathy for the “underdog” pursued by the sheriff.

What is more important is a growing “epidemic” of anti-Americanism in the Arab world driven by popular discontent over U.S. support for Israel and over the failure of Arab governments to deliver economic, social or political progress. Bad governance in Arab states and the denial of Palestinian rights are real issues for Arabs.
According to an analysis of the Bush Administration put forward by one participant, this popular discontent is not given any significance in Washington. The Bush Administration takes a realist view of the region, which holds that, since power resides with the region’s autocratic states, there is no real threat to U.S. interests from the “street.” From a realist perspective, debates over the future of the region should focus on ensuring that “rogue” states such as Iraq and Libya become client states, not on any deeper restructuring of regional polities.

Against this backdrop, debate turned to the question of Iraq. Although there is no discernible connection between al-Qaida and Iraq, the Bush Administration has clearly put regime change in Iraq high on its agenda. Unfortunately, there are no good options for dealing with Iraq. Option one is the status quo; this contains the situation but does not resolve it. Even China, Russia, and France now agree with the United States and the United Kingdom that Iraq is pursuing its WMD programmes despite UN sanctions. Option two would involve the return of UN weapons inspectors, thus offering a multilateral solution that would certainly increase our knowledge of the extent of Iraq’s weapons programmes. Inevitably, however, this option would return us to the cycle of “inspection crises.” The third, military option, leading to regime change, would provide a definitive solution to the question of Saddam and the banned weapons. But any military campaign has significant military and political uncertainties. Whether it succeeds or fails, the consequences of such a campaign could be far-reaching.

Participants spent some time debating the mechanics of regime change. It was agreed that the Iraqi opposition should not be compared to the weak Afghan opposition; regime change in Iraq would require large-scale U.S. military involvement. However, participants noted that the strength of the Iraqi military and state should not be overestimated, and that regime change could be facilitated if key props of the regime, such as the Republican Guard, could be won over. It was felt that these officers would be convinced to abandon the regime only if they believed the United States would follow through on its promises of support and if they were reassured that the country would not be handed over to Shiite politicians, such as Ahmed Chalabi. To prepare the way to winning the support of these key elements, then, the United States should cease its support for the discredited external opposition and display the staying power it has lacked in previous attempts to oust the Iraqi regime.

There is deep unease amongst Iraq’s neighbours about a potential attack. Politically, most Arab regimes feel threatened by the deterioration of the situation in Palestine and Israel. Economically, Iraqi trade with Turkey, Syria and Jordan is currently going well. Iraq’s
neighbours are also deeply concerned about the potential threat posed to their countries by the
Iraqi military, the possibility of covert retaliation, and the ramifications if the United States
were to fail to carry through the operation. However, conference participants felt that the
opposition could be minimised through imaginative U.S. diplomacy and trade-offs. For
instance, Saudi domestic concerns might be assuaged through an acceleration of U.S. efforts
to remove its forces from Saudi Arabia, either to neighbours such as Qatar or to over-the-
horizon basing.

A bigger problem is the current lack of a long-term U.S. strategy for the future of
Iraq. As one participant observed, regime change is not just about replacing one dictator with
another. Regime change would have to be accompanied by a commitment to the integrity of
Iraq’s borders; the creation of an acceptable regime that is pluralist, on the one hand, but that
does not threaten the power of the entrenched Sunni elite, on the other; the reconstruction of a
fundamentally flawed economy; and the absence of an ostensible threat to Iraq’s neighbours.

September 11 and the campaign in Afghanistan did not change the established order
in the Gulf and the Middle East. States are still trying to exploit global developments to
further their local concerns, and, for most states, Islamist opposition is not more of a threat
now than it was before September. But the pattern of regional relations could be shattered by
a successful U.S.-led change of regime in Iraq. If U.S.-led action on Iraq is the first step
towards reconstructing the region. we could see a wholly new level of U.S. involvement in
the Gulf and the Middle East, together with a dramatic change in regional relations. Most
regional actors, with long experience of external intervention, do not believe in the
practicality of a grand design by the United States to reorder the region. And few, if any, see
such a reordering as potentially positive either.

**Euro-Atlantic Relations in Southwest Asia**

The United States and Europe have long had different approaches to and emphases in
policy towards the Middle East, the Gulf, and counter-terrorism. Since the Bush
Administration came into office, Europeans have expressed growing concern over a number
of U.S. policies. However, in the aftermath of September 11, both sides expressed hope that
European support for the United States and the invocation of Article V of the North Atlantic
Treaty would bring the Euro-Atlantic Alliance together again. Europeans hoped that
September 11 would remind the United States that collective solutions to international
security challenges were better than unilateralist approaches. Unfortunately, from a
European perspective, this has not happened. Instead, the gap has grown.
Europeans acknowledge that the rapid military victory in Afghanistan meant that their offers of military help were of little use to the United States and that, in debates over the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, Europeans had overestimated the depths of Russian opposition to scrapping the treaty. But Europeans remain very concerned – and even outraged – at a number of events, including unilateral U.S. actions over the International Criminal Court, (non-)application of the Geneva Conventions to Taliban combatants, the inclusion of Iran in President Bush’s “axis of evil” speech, public statements over the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review and, in a different domain, U.S. behaviour over steel tariffs.

These specific arguments come on top of a significant difference in approach to fighting terrorism. Europeans recognize that the new terrorism threat is very real; indeed, attacks on European targets have already been undertaken or planned, and policy-makers see it as inevitable that a terrorist “spectacular” will be carried out on European soil. Indeed, due to the free movement of persons within Europe at a time when state police forces and intelligence services remain fragmented, Europe is more vulnerable than the United States to terrorist infiltration.

In general, however, Europe has focused on multilateral legal and police-led responses to terrorism, whereas the United States is prioritising unilateralist military responses. At present, the United States, which is only now discovering its vulnerability, appears to be exaggerating the threat. In contrast, European leaders are downplaying the threat and reluctant to spend extra on defence and security. They focus their attentions instead on European Union (EU) institution building and enlargement and on elections in key states.

From a U.S. perspective, it is important for Europeans to recognise both that Europe is not at the centre of America’s strategic universe and that NATO is very poorly designed for non-traditional operations. For instance, NATO has never been a sound mechanism for multilateral intelligence sharing. Therefore, whilst both parties are committed to cooperation on the policing front, the United States currently sees limited advantage in working closely with Europe as a whole on military counter-terrorist operations. This gloomy picture is relieved in part by the fact that there could be significant mutual benefits in closer U.S.-European collaboration in the area of civil defence and contingency planning.

The United States and Europe share similar interests in relation to Southwest Asia, but have adopted divergent tactics toward the region. Common interests include the free flow of oil, the preservation of “moderate” regimes, the Middle East peace process; and slowing the proliferation of WMD.
Trans-Atlantic differences in approach have been most marked in relation to Iraq and Iran. Concerning Iraq, the United States has been focused on regime change whilst most Europeans have focused on making the inspection regime work. In relation to Iran, both parties need to recognise that their policies – “critical dialogue” and “dual containment” have failed. It may be more honest and productive for both the Americans and Europeans to acknowledge this mutual failure and to start afresh, while working together.

More generally, the United States and Europe have made common mistakes in dealing with the region. These include treating the Gulf states merely as filling stations – a short term view; taking sides in the peace process; distorting regional political economies through massive arms sales; and assuming that status quo regimes in the Arab world are the best option.

September 11 may have done enough to convince Europeans and Americans alike that the “status quo” Arab states are part of the problem rather than part of the solution. The fact that 13 of the hijackers were Saudi citizens is a powerful indictment of the current approach. Likewise, the fact that most Arab regimes deliberately attempt to recast domestic protest against corruption and their own autocracy in religious terms and/or as protests against Israel demonstrates the long-term threat to Western interests posed by bad governance in the Arab world.

**Concluding Observations**

Since September 11, developments in Afghanistan, the Middle East/Gulf, and in trans-Atlantic relations have combined to pose some serious questions for European and U.S. policy towards terrorism, Southwest Asia, and the conduct of international relations more generally.

Trans-Atlantic relations have always had their ups and downs. But since the end of the Cold War, the unifying bonds have frayed. There are fears that the U.S. reaction to September 11 and Bush Administration policies more generally are rolling back progress toward a collective Euro-Atlantic approach to policing the world based upon the rule of law. But, from the U.S. perspective, it is not clear that even increases in European military spending would re-establish Europe as a significant security player. This divergence is
troubling at a time when terrorism poses a strategic threat to Europeans and Americans alike and when a proper debate on the balance between security and liberty is needed.

In military terms, the Afghan campaign has demonstrated U.S. progress towards force transformation. But this campaign has also reminded observers of just how far the bulk of U.S., as well as European, forces need to travel down this road. It has also reminded potential opponents of the United States of the importance of exploiting asymmetric weaknesses rather than playing to U.S. military strengths. The debates over the post-conflict stabilisation of Afghanistan and the potential campaign against Iraq have highlighted the fundamental flaw in U.S. strategy – the lack of a grand strategy and of a commitment to post-war reconstruction of failing states.

Perhaps the most telling conclusions reached by participants is that the terms of debate over European and U.S. relations toward Southwest Asia are now being re-drawn. There is an increasing perception on both sides of the Atlantic that the status quo – characterized by the collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and support for undemocratic, economically failing regimes in the Arab world – is untenable. In the long term, the region can be stabilised only if Arab states are better governed, take a more pluralist approach, and establish better managed economies that can absorb demographic growth without directing popular resentment into anti-Western, Islamist channels.

There was disagreement over the extent to which the United States and Europe should seek to impose “democratisation” on the Arab world. Some noted that this term is often used as an empty slogan by elites to dignify sham elections. Participants stressed that the focus of “democratisation” efforts should be on strengthening civil society in Arab states and improving inward investment. This also means refusing to accept at face value arguments by the West’s autocratic allies that their people are “not ready for democracy.”

“Fixing” the Middle East is an ambitious project which previous empires have sought to undertake. The demolition of the World Trade Center may just have made U.S. and European policy-makers realise that this is a project that can be put off no longer.
Appendix 1

Workshop on Terrorism and Asymmetric Conflict in Southwest Asia
GCSP, 23-25 June 2002
Programme

Sunday, 23 June 2002

19h30 Dinner at the Hôtel d’Angleterre

Welcome
Ambassador Ulrich LEHNER, Director, GCSP

Key note address
Asymmetric Warfare and Terrorism in Southwest Asia
Mr. David. GOMPERT, RAND Europe, Leiden, The Netherlands

Monday, 24 June 2002

09h00-09h15 Welcome and Introduction
Dr. Shahram CHUBIN, Director of Research, GCSP

Dr. Jerrold D. GREEN, Director of International Programs and Development; Director, Center for Middle East Public Policy, RAND

09h15-10h45 Military Lessons
Chair: Dr. Jerrold D. GREEN, Director of International Programs and Development; Director, Center for Middle East Public Policy, RAND

The Lessons of Afghanistan: War fighting, Intelligence, Force Transformation, Counterproliferation, and Arms Control
Dr. Anthony H. CORDESMAN, Senior Fellow, Middle Eastern Studies Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.

Discussants: Dr. Dennis M. GORMLEY, Consulting Senior Fellow, International Institute for Strategic Studies
Dr. Andrew RATHMELL, RAND Europe, Cambridge

10h45-11h15 Coffee Break

11h15-12h00 General Discussion

12h00-13h00 Lunch

13h00-14h30 Terrorism and Asymmetric War
Chair: Dr. Patrick SEALE, Author and Consultant, Paris

Rethinking Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism since 9/11
Dr. Bruce HOFFMAN, Director RAND Washington Office
Discussant: Dr. Shahram CHUBIN, Director of Research, GCSP
Dr. Andrew RATHMELL, RAND Europe, Cambridge
14h30-16h00  
**Regional Dimensions**

Chair: Dr. Shahram Chubin, Director of Research, GCSP

*Repercussions of the Afghan War, Iraq and Regional Perspectives*

Dr. Mustafa ALANI, Associate Fellow, RUSI, London

Discussants: Mr. Neil PARTRICK, Economist/Editor, Middle East and North Africa, Economist Intelligence Unit, London; Associate Fellow, RUSI, London

Dr. Volker Perthes, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin, Germany

Dr. Patrick SEALE, Author and Consultant, Paris

16h00-16h30  
**Coffee Break**

16h30-17h30  
**General Discussion**

Chair: Dr. Shahram CHUBIN, Director of Research, GCSP

20h00  
**Dinner at the Hotel President Wilson**

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**Tuesday, 25 June 2002**

09h00-11h00  
**Euro-Atlantic Relations in Southwest Asia: A European Perspective**

Chair: Dr. Bruce Hoffman, Director, RAND Washington Office

*Euro-Atlantic Relations one year after September 11*

Mrs. Thérèse DELPECH, Directeur chargé de la Prospective, CEA, Paris

Discussants: Prof. Stefano SILVESTRI, Vice President, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome, Italy

11h00-11h30  
**Coffee Break**

11h30-13h00  
**General Discussion and Concluding Remarks**

Dr. Shahram CHUBIN, Director of Research, GCSP

Dr. Jerrold D. GREEN, Director of International Programs and Development; Director, Center for Middle East Public Policy, RAND

13h00  
**Lunch, Attique WMO Building**
Appendix 2

WORKSHOP ON TERRORISM AND ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT IN SOUTH WEST ASIA
GCSP, 23-25 JUNE 2002

Participants

Dr. Shahram CHUBIN, Director of Research, GCSP
 Ambassador Ulrich LEHNER, Director, GCSP
 Dr. Mustafa ALANI, Associate Fellow, RUSI, London
 Dr. Christophe CARLE, Deputy Director, United Nations Institute of Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), Geneva
 Dr. Anthony H. CORDESMAN, Senior Fellow, Middle East Studies Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.
 Mr. Richard DAVISON, Faculty Member, GCSP
 Mrs. Thérèse DELPECH, Directeur chargé de la Prospective, CEA, Paris
 Mr. Pál DUNAY, Director, International Training Course in Security Policy (ITC), GCSP
 Mr. David GOMPERT, President, RAND Europe, Leiden, The Netherlands
 Mr. Dennis GORMLEY, Senior Fellow, IISS, London, U.K.
 Dr. Jerrold D. GREEN, Director of International Programs and Development; Director, Center for Middle East Public Policy, RAND
 Mr. Jan HYLLANDER, Faculty Member, GCSP
 Dr. Bruce HOFFMAN, Director, RAND Washington Office
 Mr. Bogdan KOLAROV, Participant, International Training Course in Security Policy (ITC), GCSP
 Ambassador Richard NARICH, Faculty Member, GCSP
 Ms. Nicole PINTER-KRAIENER, Project Co-ordinator, GCSP
 Mr. Neil PARTRICK, Economist/Editor, Middle East & North Africa, Economist Intelligence Unit, The Economist Group, London
 Dr. Volker PERTHES, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin
 Col. Mike POPE, Faculty Member, GCSP
 Dr. Andrew RATHMELL, RAND Europe, Cambridge
 Mr. Patrick SEALE, Author and Consultant, Paris
 Prof. Stefano SILVERSTRI, President, IAI, Rome, Italy
 Mr. Kim SITZLER, ZAPS/CAP, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bern
 Dr. Fred TANNER, Deputy Director, Head of Academic Affairs, GCSP
 Dr. Thierry TARDY, Faculty Member, GCSP
 Dr. Andrei ZAGORSKI, Faculty Member, GCSP