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# Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence

Lessons Learned and Best Practices

***Report of a Panel of Senior Practitioners***

*Co-chairs: Robert E. Hunter (principal author), Edward Gnehm, and George Joulwan  
Rapporteur: Christopher Chivvis*

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NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH DIVISION



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## Preface

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This project grew out of a decade's worth of experience, principally gained by the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the European Union (EU), in military interventions abroad and their aftermath. This experience centered on the Balkans in the 1990s—Bosnia and Kosovo—and on the Middle East and environs in the current decade—Iraq and Afghanistan.

In all four of these instances of crisis, conflict, and the postconflict period, it has become increasingly clear that success, defined in any reasonable terms, has depended on how a variety of different instruments of power and influence are exercised, often in concert with one another. In short, military and civilian activities have become virtually inseparable in the kinds of engagements and operations discussed here, and they certainly have become interdependent. So too has cooperation between institutions of government and nongovernmental organizations; and there is also a premium on relations between states and international institutions, as well as on interaction among the latter.

Initial insights about these new requirements for cooperation (if not actual integration) of military and nonmilitary activity began in the field and on the ground. They were gained in the first instance by people, especially in the military, who had to work “outside the rule book” as they were faced with circumstances quite different from traditional combat operations and confronted the requirements that emerged when combat ceased.

This project is an exploration into what people who have actually been involved in operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan have learned about “getting the job done.” It is a compilation, a synthesis, and an analysis of lessons learned and best practices ranging across the full spectrum of activities from the time before military intervention takes place—indeed, insights from this phase might help to obviate the need for intervention—all the way through to what is generically called postconflict nation-building.

This effort originated jointly at the RAND Corporation and the American Academy of Diplomacy, and it has brought together senior practitioners from a wide variety of institutions and disciplines who have direct experience in the situations focused on here. They include U.S., allied, coalition, and United Nations (UN) military leaders, U.S. and European diplomats, and representatives of private-sector and nongovernmental organizations. Together, they have been able to paint a picture of requirements and possibilities for cooperative action that offers hope for dealing effectively with new challenges brought on by insurgency, terrorism, and the disruption of societies through other new forms of conflict.

The project began in March 2006 with a conference jointly sponsored by the RAND Corporation, the American Academy of Diplomacy, and the American University School of

International Service, which led to a preliminary publication,<sup>1</sup> and it has been carried forward during the last two years by RAND and the Academy, in the process engaging more than 60 military, diplomatic, and nongovernmental senior practitioners from 10 different countries. Participants are listed at the end of the Executive Summary.

This project was conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center (ISDP) of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD) in cooperation with the American Academy of Diplomacy. NSRD conducts research and analysis for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the defense agencies, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Intelligence Community, allied foreign governments, and foundations.

For more information on RAND's International Security and Defense Policy Center, contact the Director, James Dobbins. He can be reached by email at [James\\_Dobbins@rand.org](mailto:James_Dobbins@rand.org); by phone at 703-413-1100, extension 5134; or by mail at the RAND Corporation, 1200 S. Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202. More information about RAND is available at [www.rand.org](http://www.rand.org).

The American Academy of Diplomacy was founded in 1983 and was designed to explore ways in which persons who had served in positions of major responsibility could cooperate to promote the highest standards in American diplomatic practice. Its membership includes more than 100 leading figures in the practice of U.S. foreign policy, drawn in major part at the ambassadorial level from the Foreign Service, but also including outstanding figures from the military and non-career ambassadors.

The overriding concern underlying each and every activity of the Academy is its belief that the quality of American diplomacy is vital to its effectiveness, whether the practitioner comes from the career service or the political domain. That concern is evident in the objectives stated in its articles of incorporation:

- To foster high standards of qualification for, and performance in, the conduct of diplomacy and the foreign affairs of the United States
- To increase public understanding and appreciation of the contributions of diplomacy to the national interests of the United States
- To study and, as appropriate, to disseminate findings and recommendations with regard to the conduct and content of American foreign policy
- To encourage the strengthening and improvement of American diplomatic representation abroad.

The American Academy of Diplomacy is located at 1726 M Street, NW, Suite 202, Washington, D.C. 20036. Its president is Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann and its Program Director is Yvonne Siu. For further information, see [academy@academyofdiplomacy.org](mailto:academy@academyofdiplomacy.org), or Telephone: +1-202-331-3721 and Fax: +1-202-833-4555.

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<sup>1</sup> Robert E. Hunter and Khalid Nadiri, *Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence in National Security: Starting the Dialogue*, RAND Corporation, CF-231-CC, 2006.

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## Summary

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Over the past several years, it has become clear that success in certain types of modern combat operations and their aftermath—Afghanistan and Iraq are prime examples—requires the integration of different instruments of U.S. power and influence, both military and civilian, to a far greater degree than in previous major conflicts.<sup>1</sup> This need for an integrated approach was foreshadowed by the U.S. experience in Bosnia and Kosovo, not only in halting the fighting but also in keeping it from reemerging. Experience in these four conflicts, as well as in combating international terrorism, provides fertile ground for a systematic analysis of what works and what does not; an analysis that highlights necessary changes in the way the United States undertakes military interventions and deals with the political-military and societal consequences of such interventions. The same applies to key international security institutions, notably NATO.

It is striking that lessons learned and best practices in this area have emanated mostly from the field rather than at the national command level in Washington (or at NATO–Brussels). More often than not, lessons with the greatest utility for the future have emerged from what individual commands, missions, units, and individuals have done in practice in order to complete their assignments and achieve their broader goals. This has led to innovation and cooperation across institutional, bureaucratic, and cultural boundaries, both military and civilian, and between U.S. government entities, international institutions, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). It has also led to a basic insight: Where these cooperative and integrated efforts work, they become an important security multiplier, helping to achieve results that none of the instruments of power and influence could achieve on their own. As will become clear in this report, the integration of instruments of power and influence can help the United States and its friends and allies deal with the range of emerging threats and challenges that can be collectively referred to as *asymmetrical warfare*.

This report is the product of more than two years of research and dialogue among experienced practitioners working to document and analyze lessons learned and best practices, especially from Iraq and Afghanistan but also informed by Bosnia and Kosovo. It is directed in the first instance toward military intervention and its aftermath in operations at the relatively low end of the military-kinetic spectrum, such as counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. But it

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<sup>1</sup> Earlier instructive instances of the relationship between conflict and postconflict situations and U.S. military-civilian interaction include post–World War II Germany and Japan, post–U.S. Civil War Reconstruction, and the so-called Philippine Insurrection of 1899–1902. The two European examples, however, involved modern industrial societies, large-scale occupation by a U.S. citizen-army able to impart nonmilitary “lessons,” and homogeneous populations essentially cooperative, to their own collective benefit, with the “occupiers.” Reconstruction in the American South contains many lessons of what *not* to do, while the Philippine example is the closest parallel to post–May 2003 Iraq.

is also directed at all phases of combat, as well as efforts to forestall conflict and, where it does take place, to deal with the postconflict period, including what is now often called nation-building. As becomes clear in this report, key lessons also apply across the board for the future of U.S. foreign policy and national security.

The report summarizes the results of conferences and meetings of a panel of senior practitioners convened jointly by the RAND Corporation and the American Academy of Diplomacy that brought together nearly 70 individuals with extensive civilian and military experience, including at senior levels of government in the United States, Canada, and Europe; at international institutions; at NGOs; and in the private sector. The project's terms of reference are presented in the Introduction. Our most salient findings are summarized in Chapter Five as 18 Basic Principles for Success. A list of the members of the panel of senior practitioners follows this Summary, and brief biographical notes on the panel are provided in Appendix C.

## **Strategic Framework Issues**

Six observations set the framework for our recommendations:

### **1. Process Versus Policy and Product**

Most of the discussion and recommendations that follow are about process rather than policy or product. In particular, to be effective, the integration of instruments of power and influence needs to be as flexible as possible, especially at the theater and field levels.

### **2. The National Security Act**

Unless the administration that takes office in January 2009 and Congress are unwilling or unable to adopt this report's most important recommendations, we do not call here for a root-and-branch reorganization of the U.S. government or amending the National Security Act. We believe the act is sufficiently flexible to allow for the implementation of our recommendations: the key issues are leadership, from the President on down, and the way in which the National Security Council (NSC) system is organized and used.

### **3. Money Matters**

Funding is critical, as are other resources in sufficient amounts. This includes ensuring that the right institutions and individuals get the money they need when they need it; that money and other resources are moved flexibly from task to task; and as many decisions as possible are allowed to be taken on the spot by the people doing the practical work.

### **4. Congress Matters**

Congress appropriates the money and sets parameters and limitations on how it is spent. Thus it must be treated as a full member of the team, from start to finish. To do its part effectively, Congress needs to update outmoded processes and procedures for dealing with U.S. foreign and security policy in the modern age.

## 5. The Importance of the Host Government

Interventions rarely succeed without a sound and potentially successful partner on the ground: It is their country, not ours. Acting in concert with the local government and helping it to build capacity are almost always preconditions for long-term success.

## 6. Some Modesty is in Order

Recent U.S. military engagements abroad show that there are limits to the uses of various levers of power and influence. Outsiders can only accomplish so much. Their capacity to transform societies is limited. Political change is almost always a lengthy process, social change even more so, and cultural change (if it can be done at all) a matter of decades, if not centuries.

## Key Recommendations: United States

### Defining the Tasks: Planning

**Planning First.** The most important factor in determining whether a military or military-political-economic operation succeeds is prior planning. This must be undertaken at every level of activity and from the outset involve every actor with a potential role in an operation: This is the concept of obtaining “buy in.” It must include host governments, as well as non-U.S. organizations that could become involved in any phase of an operation.

Effective planning can help rectify gaps in funding and numbers of competent personnel, especially in the civilian agencies. Otherwise, the U.S. military often ends up having to undertake tasks (e.g., nation-building) for which others are better qualified and that divert it from military tasks. Timely planning can lead to greater effectiveness early in an intervention (perhaps before an insurgency or other opposition has a chance to develop), when opportunities to influence events tend to be greatest and when the architecture of postconflict efforts is best put in place.

**Resources and Authority.** With the assignment of missions and responsibilities must also come money, other resources, and a share in authority. This means involving the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and congressional leadership from the beginning.

**National Security Council Leadership.** To provide proper oversight and political direction, the overall U.S. planning function should be lodged at the NSC level, operating in tandem with OMB, and planning in different agencies should be overseen by the NSC. This should include a standing, White House–level planning process dealing with generic requirements; the identification of relationships among tasks and agencies likely always to be present; and the gaming of different scenarios and their planning and resource requirements.

### Engaging the U.S. Government Broadly

**Who Is There, Who Is Not There.** Experience in Afghanistan and Iraq has sent a powerful message about the need for more parts of U.S. government to be involved in foreign interventions in order to maximize the effectiveness of the U.S. power and influence projected into conflict situations. The U.S. military has usually taken the lead. The U. S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) often have been less involved than needed to ensure maximum effect, in major part because of lack of resources. Other elements of the U.S. government have been largely absent. For example, only a handful of per-

sonnel from the U.S. Department of Agriculture are deployed in Afghanistan. In many cases, USAID will be best placed to undertake and integrate activities that fall under the rubric of development—*provided that it is sufficiently funded and staffed*. Where USAID falls short, expertise should be drawn from the Departments of Justice, Health and Human Services, and Education; the Drug Enforcement Administration; and the National Institutes of Health. However, all of these agencies have other missions, budgets, and domestic political constituencies that inhibit foreign deployment and make them reluctant to take part in such operations. *There needs to be an expeditionary capacity in these critical civilian areas to enable overall mission success; this will only happen if required by the President and Congress.*

**Local Police.** In both Afghanistan and Iraq, training local police forces is a critical requirement. Finding and encouraging U.S. police trainers to deploy abroad has proved daunting, in part because few U.S. police forces either have officers to spare or the inclination to take part in foreign interventions. International cooperation is thus crucial to success in this area—e.g., Italy’s *carabinieri* and France’s *gendarmerie*.

**Recommendations.** *At heart, there must be political will to make the necessary changes and to foster the interagency cooperation that is so essential. That means political leadership at the top of the U.S. government—clear presidential direction and congressional support—along with adequate funding.*

Specifically:

**Enlarge the Department of State and USAID.** The Department of State currently has about 6,600 officers. The panel of senior practitioners welcomes the Bush administration’s recommendation in the FY09 budget to increase this number by 1,100 officers, and Congress should fully fund it. Priority should be given to further increases in Department of State personnel (both in the Foreign Service and the Civil Service, as well as at USAID) over the next five years, building on lessons learned and as practice determines need and usefulness. This increase is also needed to develop, train, and retain significant numbers of officers with specialized skills that will not be needed at all times but which need always to be on call.

**Education.** Education in national security affairs needs to reflect the new demands of civil-military cooperation. The National Defense University (Ft. McNair, Washington, D.C.) should include a new multi-agency National Security College. Resources should be made available for Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) and their counterparts in other agencies with national security responsibilities to have significant mid-career educational opportunities. The Foreign Service Institute should increase the number of students from the Department of Defense (DoD) and other agencies. Career-tracking adjustments will be needed to ensure that this added education provides added benefits in future assignments and promotions.

**Support Bush Administration Initiatives.** President Bush’s proposal for National Security Professional Development (Executive Order 13434) should be fully funded and implemented, along with his 2007 State of the Union Address proposal for a volunteer Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC). The CRC should recruit, train, exercise, and retain a wide variety of skills associated with combat Phase 4 (nation-building) and have the capacity to deploy lead elements rapidly after the initial introduction of military forces.

**A Civilian Goldwater-Nichols?** Should the next administration prove unwilling or unable through executive actions to make the changes outlined here, Congress should legislate the necessary additional incentives and requirements for serving civilian officers in various U.S. government departments and agencies, along the lines of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which applies only to the military. Even without such

legislation, different civilian elements of the U.S. government should provide tangible incentives and rewards to officers who take part in cross-agency and cross-discipline service and who are prepared to be part of a deployable expeditionary capacity in civilian activity. Promotion boards should be tasked to take into account such career-enhancing service and to ensure that such service is not career retarding.

**Congress Must Also Act.** Responsibility for authorizing, appropriating, and overseeing executive branch agencies is in both houses of Congress divided among a variety of different committees and subcommittees. A basic overhaul of these procedures is unrealistic. We propose the creation of two new select committees, one in each house, devoted to reviewing the overall integration of instruments of power and influence and reporting findings in terms of possible programs and appropriations. We also propose that the Congressional Research Service (CRS) prepare its own annual report on this subject and that the Government Accountability Office be tasked to do likewise. We propose joint committee hearings on overall national security issues, requirements, and budgets.

**A National Security Budget.** In like fashion, the administration's annual budget submissions each January should include analysis of the relationships of different programs to one another in a separate volume on the national security budget that includes foreign assistance, diplomacy, defense, homeland security, and intelligence.

**Shift Budget Priorities—Military to Nonmilitary.** The administration should analyze overall national security requirements and compare them with the distribution of resources among departments and agencies. The current ratio of funding as between OMB's 050 account (defense) and the 150 account (Department of State, all foreign aid, and international institutions) is about 17:1. *This is a dysfunctional skewing of resources-to-tasks that is far beyond legitimate disparities deriving from the higher costs of military instruments.* DoD is authorized to transfer up to \$200 million to the Department of State for reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance programs in foreign countries. These funds should be increased substantially. Even better would be direct budgeting to the Department of State and USAID and a consequent long-term strengthening of their capacity to perform such work. Funding should thus be increased for the Department of State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and for USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and Office of Transition Initiatives.

**Recreate a USIA-Like Capacity.** In 1999, the United States Information Agency (USIA) was folded into the Department of State. In our judgment, that amalgamation has been less than successful, especially in keeping a high priority on a quasi-independent presentation of "the best of America" as opposed to being a captive arm of U.S. foreign policy. Something "USIA like" is also needed for interaction with the military in operations, both well in advance of operations in particular countries and in postconflict situations. The simplest step would be simply to recreate USIA, by congressional mandate if it cannot be accomplished through administrative action.

### **The Interagency Process in the Theater and the Field**

*In many respects, interagency efforts at the theater or field level are even more important than at higher levels of government.* Interaction between military and nonmilitary activities needs to be seamless. As requirements for assistance with governance (including human rights), reconstruction, stabilization, and development increase, the requirement also increases for cooperation across institutional boundaries.

**One Team.** The in-theater U.S. country team needs to be all-inclusive (including specialized agencies and organizations such as the Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. Special Operations Command), be able to share information and intelligence, have common communications protocols and systems, and put a premium on building and sustaining mutual confidence and respect.

**End Stovepiping.** To the extent possible, stovepiping of different agencies must be eliminated, such as the current practice of requiring field-level missions to refer to higher levels in-theater or to Washington for permission to take actions that either need to be decided upon rapidly or where local expertise should trump that at the parent level.

**Effective Lines of Authority.** There need to be clear lines of authority in the theater and field. Where possible (i.e., where military requirements are not overriding), the local U.S. ambassador should be the senior officer in the interagency country team. In any event, the practical working relationship between the U.S. ambassador and the local U.S. military commander is critical for success. Setting parameters and business rules can help build mutual trust.

**Political Advisors.** The Department of State provides political advisors (POLADs) to U.S. military commands who work directly for the commander, not the department. They provide the independent advice of a seasoned FSO to the commander; a conduit for policy and position on a semi-official basis; and feedback to the Department of State on military perspectives. POLADs should also be assigned to subordinate commands. They should be formed into a POLADs Corps to foster a sense of shared experience. Likewise, key U.S. military commands should assign liaison officers to appropriate bureaus of the Department of State. USAID and the U.S. military can be linked through the creation of Development Advisors, as well as Senior Development Advisor positions, for each combatant command.

### Needs and Opportunities in the Theater and in the Field

**Field-Level Collaboration.** In a combat zone, there needs to be the closest collaboration regarding the conduct of military operations, the provision of security for noncombat (and especially civilian) activities, the role that civilian activities play in both facilitating military success and the success of the overall mission, and the way in which all tasks are melded.

**It's Their Country!** Setting objectives, planning operations, coordinating activities, and assigning authority and responsibilities must be done with the full involvement of the host country. *In approaching nation-(re)building, it is critical to ensure that there is buy-in from the host nation's leadership and a basis for the support of the host nation's people.*

**Making it Work with the Host Government.** To be effective, coordination among outside actors and with local agencies must be comprehensive. In Afghanistan, this has been undertaken by the Policy Action Group (see Appendix A). Such a structure is needed for any multinational counterinsurgency operation to draw together efforts by the host nation and outsiders. Similar organizations are needed on a regional basis—e.g., a Joint Afghan-Pakistan Action Group.

**Talking the (Local) Talk.** A premium must be put on recruiting as many U.S. personnel as possible for service in the field who can communicate in the local language(s). All personnel, civilian and military, who may interact with the local population need to be given cultural and historical awareness training before deployment. It is also clear that foreign language training in U.S. schools and colleges needs to be given far greater emphasis than at present. This critical liability to the evolving U.S. role in the world needs to be corrected.

**Training (and More Training).** This includes both the training of units and individuals in their separate military and nonmilitary organizations and training them together. It needs to include training military units and personnel likely to be engaged with a local population in a wide range of civilian skills.

**The Person on the Spot Usually Knows Best.** Local commanders (military and civilian) are usually best able to assess local needs and opportunities, as well as practical issues regarding military and nonmilitary activities. Emphasis on tactical flexibility and on devolving authority and responsibility to low levels should apply both to military operations and nonmilitary activities and personnel.

**Flexible Funding Authority.** This flexibility must extend to the allocation of resources, including across agencies operating in the field. For many U.S. government agencies in Washington, this will require a major bureaucratic leap in the dark, and Congress must be willing to cede some of its fiscal authority. Ideally, in any given intervention, there should be a country-team financial account of significant size that is administered jointly by the local U.S. ambassador and the combatant commander.

**Helping USAID Do Its Job.** To be effective in the field, USAID must have more capacity to manage its funds. Its current contracting procedures inhibit its effectiveness and need to be redesigned for wartime. USAID's funding mechanism for foreign interventions needs to be structured along the same lines as its disaster assistance capacity, which allows for quick responses by the U.S. government to foreign natural disasters.

**They Build a Road; We Gain an Ally.** In Afghanistan, infrastructure projects (especially road building) have proved to be highly productive investments, positively affecting the local economy and governance and winning hearts and minds. More funds need to be made available and more authority given to officials on the spot. Institutions like the World Bank may sometimes be better able to undertake this work but often lack the funding and flexibility to respond quickly.

**Conservation of Experience.** Military units and nonmilitary personnel often develop skills and modes of operation not provided for in the rule book or easily taught in predeployment briefings. They develop critical relationships with national and local government officials, tribal/clan leaders, and the local population that cannot be easily passed on from one unit/individual to another. A high premium should thus be put on lessons learned and best practices, which need to be assiduously developed, validated, and passed on, both in the indoctrination of incoming personnel and in U.S.-based training and national security education.

**Extended Tours of Duty—Military and Civilian.** Likewise, there is value in extending the tours of duty of some military and nonmilitary personnel, especially where units and individuals engage with local leaders and civilian populations, as in nation-building. However, units and individuals, especially those involved in combat tasks, must at some point be rotated. This argues for the creation of cadres of individuals who will accept longer tours to provide continuity and who will educate follow-on leadership on engagement with local contacts. Specialists recruited for this purpose should be given added incentives for long service in theater.

### **Provincial Reconstruction Teams**

Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) are in wide use in Iraq and in 26 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces as part of the NATO-led effort there (see Appendix B). Typically, a U.S.-led PRT consists of a joint civil-military leadership group representing the Department of State, USAID, and DoD, supported by a core unit of military security personnel that provides for the defense

of the PRT itself and, in a more limited capacity, helps provide some protection for local populations. Opinions about PRTs are strongly divided between the governmental—especially the military—and nongovernmental camps. In any event, the following should apply:

**Tailor to Needs and Conditions.** With PRTs, there can be no one-size-fits-all structure. Judgments about the best combination of tasks, skills to be deployed, balance to be struck between military and nonmilitary personnel, and size and resources can only be made on the ground, often as the result of trial and error.

**Not a Band-Aid.** PRTs are not a substitute for more-robust efforts by aid agencies, to compensate for a lack of military personnel, or as half measures for more-encompassing reforms that need to be undertaken by central, regional, or local governments.

**Minimum Size.** In general, regarding PRTs, bigger is better. In some cases, the more robust Vietnam-era model of Civil Operations Rural Development Support (CORDS) will more likely prove successful.

**Doctrine.** DoD, the Department of State, and USAID need jointly to develop clear and precise doctrine about PRT missions, structure, operations, and activities. Ideas should be elicited from the UN, NATO, NGOs, international organizations, and the Iraqi and Afghan governments.

**Pass on the Knowledge.** Much work has already been done in both Iraq and Afghanistan to develop PRT lessons learned and best practices. A training school of excellence should be created for both U.S. and non-U.S. personnel—e.g., the NATO School at Oberammergau, Germany.

### **Nongovernmental Organizations**

Many NGOs, especially those engaged in humanitarian or development work, can be of significant value to U.S. objectives in country even if they act independently. They vary on the issue of neutrality and how closely they can be seen to associate with the military and civilian government agencies. These differences need to be respected. Complete integration of their efforts with those of military and civilian government officials will rarely be possible, but will fall somewhere on the spectrum of coalescence, collaboration, cooperation, or information sharing. In some circumstances, objectives will be better served through an expeditionary civilian capacity deployed with the military.

**Get to Know the NGOs.** U.S. and international institutions should identify in advance relevant NGOs, including what they can do, where they are prepared to operate, and conditions of relations with U.S. military and civilian agencies, the UN, the EU, and NATO. Long-term relations can be pursued with appropriate NGOs to build mutual trust and confidence. Relevant U.S. government agencies should have liaison officers in contact with NGOs, and selected NGOs should be invited to join the planning process, at least to ensure the sharing of information.

**NGOs in Theater-Level Planning.** At the in-theater level, NGOs should be invited to take part in day-to-day information sharing and to join PRTs. Some may present problems, however, especially if they operate in insecure areas, act in ways offensive to the host government or population, or need to be rescued from hostile situations.

### **Private Contractors**

In conflict zones, the use of private contractors for many duties related to U.S. military deployments has increased dramatically in recent years. They have proved their worth in undertaking

some tasks the performance of which by uniformed personnel would detract from the latter's skills and training—e.g., catering and logistical transport in noncombat areas. Private contractors can also be of value in construction, training local personnel, and helping restart economies disrupted by war or political breakdown.

**Planning.** The potential roles and missions of private contractors should be taken into account in U.S. government planning, and representatives of this sector should be called upon for advice and counsel. The United States should create a single set of rules, regulations, and standards for contracts with nongovernmental entities and individuals that is uniform across U.S. government agencies.

**Armed Personnel.** In theater, the activities of contract U.S. private-sector local military, paramilitary, and police trainers should be rigorously supervised by U.S. military or civilian officials. Any security personnel carrying weapons should be part of the U.S. military establishment or the Department of State Departmental Security, with appropriate legislative mandate, jurisdiction, and investigative and judicial instruments. These necessary steps will impose significant new personnel and funding requirements on DoD and the Department of State.

## Key Recommendations: International Cooperation

U.S. activities, both civilian and military, can often be multiplied by the engagement of non-U.S. agents and assets. In some cases, other countries have useful nonmilitary instruments that the U.S. lacks. Even where this is not true, engaging non-U.S. assets can spread material and human costs, thus helping to sustain U.S. popular and congressional support for operations. However, there will often be a necessary trade-off: the need to share decision and influence in addition to risk and responsibility. *The panel of senior practitioners believes that, in the situations explored here, the United States should generally accept some limits on independence of decision and action to gain tangible and political support from other nations.*

### Transatlantic Strategic Engagement

In any event, there is great value in regular, senior-level engagement of key partner states, especially across the Atlantic, about overall strategic issues, including potential crises or conflicts and the ramifications of the use of force, and other instruments that may be brought to bear on the situation. Ideally, this should be done within NATO. It also needs to be done through a new strategic partnership between the United States and the EU, recognizing the immense nonmilitary capabilities of nations on both sides of the Atlantic, especially in health, education, development, nation-building, and governance.

### Rules of the Road

Lines of authority need to be as clear as when the United States acts alone. Effective coordination of multinational action requires all nations taking part to delegate substantial authority to their local representatives—a step that is especially difficult for EU and NATO nations. There also need to be functional arrangements for combining military and civilian activities. The United States may be the largest and most influential player, but the U.S. country team can only be one player among many in setting directions, making and executing plans, and fostering coherence and cooperation. European allies must recognize that their influence

will depend to a large degree on their willingness to contribute resources and to allow those resources to be used flexibly.

### **Coordinating the Nonmilitary Effort**

Coordination of nonmilitary activities benefits from having a single individual of ministerial rank—e.g., from the UN or EU—able to speak for major outside entities (especially to coordinate external development assistance) and to work effectively with the host government. In Afghanistan, this is proving to be indispensable.

### **Information, Intelligence, and C<sup>4</sup>ISR**

For effective conduct of multinational operations, information and intelligence need to be shared across institutions to the degree possible. Many countries resist sharing intelligence. The critical way around this problem is mutual trust, developed through experience. Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C<sup>4</sup>ISR) issues are closely related and also have to be sorted out if operations are to succeed.

### **Interoperability, Technological Transfer, and the Defense Trade**

In order for the U.S. military to be able to work effectively with the militaries of other nations and institutions (including the UN, the EU, and other members of NATO), more work needs to be done to overcome impediments in three critical areas: the compatibility of equipment among the military forces of different actors, the sharing of high technology (where appropriate), and the ability of countries to preserve their defense industrial bases (in part through freer defense trade), which helps to create domestic political support for defense efforts. The United States, including Congress, needs to assume a lead role in these areas, but European allies and the EU must also play necessary roles.

### **United Nations**

The UN is the largest provider of military forces in intervention operations after the United States, with nearly 100,000 soldiers and police deployed in some 20 operations. It is also a major provider of nonmilitary activity, especially in the areas of development, human rights, and refugee assistance. For most countries, the UN is the critical political validator of military action, especially in the form of resolutions of the UN Security Council, preferably under Chapter VII (enforcement) of the UN Charter. Most countries, to include U.S. allies in Europe, find it difficult to engage in military actions that do not directly affect the security of the homeland without a UN mandate. NATO's military actions regarding Kosovo in 1999, undertaken without a UN Security Council mandate, were a short-lived exception: NATO member states supported the intervention, but any UN Security Council mandate would have been vetoed by the Russians and perhaps also the Chinese. A UN mandate was secured for the subsequent NATO-led Kosovo Force. The UN is also the principal provider of international police around the world, a form of security providing that, while often indispensable, is usually in short supply. In both Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO looked to the UN to provide the police elements of the international mission. The UN helps to conduct, supervise, and validate elections. And it has long played a critical role both in political transitions and in transitions from open conflict to peacekeeping operations. Indeed, despite the derogatory comments made about the UN by U.S. detractors, its work relieves the United States of major burdens in many parts of the world. Further, because of its long experience, the UN's perspective should almost always be

called upon and, unless there are reasons to the contrary, heeded, at least as a guidepost to what is possible, what can most usefully be done, and what errors are to be avoided.

Thus, the UN should be involved in planning, UN representatives should be part of international coordinating mechanisms in the field, and there should be permanent, senior-level liaison between the UN and both NATO and the EU. Stabilization, reconstruction, and nation-building capacity should be built into the UN through the creation of a Technical Agency for Stabilization and Reconstruction.

### **North Atlantic Treaty Organization**

NATO and its member nations have gained a wealth of experience from postconflict deployments in Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as from current operations in Afghanistan, where NATO has commanded the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) since August 2003. NATO also has done some military training in Iraq and has had relevant experience elsewhere, including earthquake disaster relief in Pakistan.

**Caveats and Other Problems.** In Afghanistan, NATO and the ISAF mission have been handicapped by the so-called caveats imposed by some NATO member states that limit where their forces can be deployed and the tasks they can undertake. Caveats reduce local commanders' tactical flexibility, decrease NATO's military effectiveness, and create serious political strains within the Alliance. Yet without imposing caveats, some NATO countries would not politically be able to be engaged at all. *In the future, NATO will need to consider issues of caveats at an early stage to help determine whether to become engaged or to act with a coalition of the willing and able.* Related problems include inadequate supplies of some types of combat equipment, the relatively short tours for deployed forces from many NATO countries—a problem that is particularly acute in the case of PRTs—and the frequent turnover of the NATO-ISAF command team in Kabul, which handicaps conservation of experience.

**Compensating with Nonmilitary Activity.** In addition to military operations, these issues also affect political relations within the Alliance, with its cardinal principle of risk sharing. If the imposition of caveats regarding military activity is unavoidable for domestic political reasons, member states can compensate in part by heightened contributions to nonmilitary activities, including assistance with reconstruction, development, and governance. For example, in Afghanistan, poppy eradication, police training, and the creation of a functioning judiciary are all areas where European-led efforts have fallen short and where increased levels of support are needed. NATO should also continue to develop its concept of training missions—e.g., the NATO Training Mission in Iraq. It contributes to coalition military operations and demonstrates some burden sharing within the Alliance.

**Contending Cultures.** In recent years, day-to-day interaction between NATO's political and military elements has increased because the Alliance has been engaged in both combat and postcombat peacekeeping. This has revealed communication problems and lack of understanding, especially between the civilian (i.e., diplomatic) and military cultures. These problems can be mitigated in part by leadership and greater efforts on the part of individuals to achieve mutual comprehension without abandoning key political principles (such as the consensus rule that binds allies politically). Even so, *NATO urgently needs to reform the way it does business, especially in information and decision flow. NATO's dependence on the flow of paper would not be tolerated by any modern corporation.* The hardware and software to achieve a revolution in communications and electronic management have been developed and tested by Allied Command Transformation (ACT). Adopting a NATO Strategic Overview and making it available widely

throughout the Alliance could help bridge cultural and procedural divisions and enable the North Atlantic Council to make decisions on a timelier basis without sacrificing any necessary thorough review.

**Force and Effectiveness Enablers.** To get maximum effect from well-trained and -equipped NATO forces, the allies should, to the extent possible, deploy the NATO Response Force in Afghanistan and in similar circumstances in the future. NATO should reform its practice of allowing costs to “lie where they fall”—i.e., requiring the countries providing forces for missions to bear all the costs rather than spreading them equitably across all allies. NATO needs to increase resources to ensure effective staffing, especially in the commands; the trend is now the opposite.

**The Comprehensive Approach.** The NATO Alliance has formally embraced the so-called comprehensive approach, which recognizes the need to relate different instruments and techniques to one another. Decisions taken at the April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania, need to be embraced throughout the Alliance, with major funding and committed civilian and military leadership.

**Working Beyond NATO.** Creating working relationships with other nonmilitary government agencies, international institutions, and NGOs is critical for NATO commanders in the field. In Afghanistan, the NATO ISAF commander must be able to coordinate activities of a wide variety of other actors, few of which are under his direct authority. His personal interaction and leadership skills are critical in bringing different instruments of power and influence into productive correspondence. Equally important is the deployment of high quality personnel from other countries and institutions. The NATO ISAF commander should be supported by a senior representative of the NATO Secretary General (a position that should be filled at a high level) in order to imbue him with sufficient authority, build trust within the organization, and ensure a clear link to NATO civilian leadership.

### **Allied Command Transformation**

A major instrument for engaging allied and other non-U.S. capacities in the cooperation/coordination/integration of instruments of power and influence is NATO’s ACT, which is charged with being NATO’s leading agent of change. This includes the critical area of interoperability, which also incorporates information and knowledge sharing across the force.

**Training.** ACT is now (2008) assuming responsibility for training deployed/deployable NATO personnel and the Afghan National Army. This practice should be extended to all NATO training in Iraq and increased in size and scope.

**PRTs.** ACT should have senior responsibility for developing doctrine and requirements for PRTs, including training of potential PRT team members, both military and civilian, from different allied countries and the passing on of lessons learned and best practices.

**Add Civilians and Share Experience.** ACT should add a significant civilian component to develop doctrine, procedures, and techniques of civil-military cooperation within the theater, as well as to conduct both generic planning and training of NATO and national personnel. The results should be offered both to deployed and deployable NATO commands, to allied nations, and to the EU, along with lessons learned and best practices developed by ACT’s Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre in Monsanto, Portugal.

## European Union

An increasing European role in circumstances focused on in this report is clearly valuable. It also adds to coherence and effectiveness of the EU, a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy for more than a half-century. The EU's *European Security Strategy* of December 2003 identified five central challenges that are similar to those of greatest U.S. concern: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime.

**Respective Military Roles.** Military roles to be played by EU institutions parallel those played by NATO, except for collective defense under NATO's Article 5, where all agree that NATO would have responsibility. The theology of competition has been substantially muted on both sides, thus reducing differences that have often kept NATO and the European Security and Defense Policy acting at arms-length. *Still, significant barriers remain to full cooperation between NATO and the EU*, both in Brussels and in the field (especially in Afghanistan), the latter largely because of Turkish objections related to Cyprus and Ankara's quest for EU membership.

**Beyond Military Roles.** The EU is ideally suited for assuming other security roles, including paramilitary deployments and police training. The EU also can provide significant capabilities, resources, and personnel, directly and through member states and NGOs, to fulfill nonmilitary (civilian) tasks. The EU should assume a much greater share of the collective nonmilitary burden in Afghanistan, both through the appointment of a senior representative of substantial skills and stature and through the dedication of sizeable resources, far beyond the total contribution of European states so far. It should assume a major share of responsibility for the effective operation of PRTs in Afghanistan.

**Practical Cooperation.** NATO and the EU should jointly conduct training and exercises. They should cooperate on standardization and interoperability, as well as on a government-private partnership to reduce transatlantic barriers to defense trade, especially in high technology. The EU should have representatives in NATO planning (and vice versa), as well as in relevant planning agencies within the U.S. government, on both an immediate and contingency basis. The EU should also agree to so-called reverse Berlin-plus sharing of nonmilitary assets with NATO.

## Building Beyond Conflict Situations

Finally, it has become apparent that the many lessons learned and best practices presented here can also have utility for a far broader range of U.S. engagements abroad during both military and nonmilitary activities. An important, immediate test case is the creation of the new U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), which, even more than the U.S. Southern Command for Latin America, will endeavor from the outset to blend and integrate different instruments of power and influence, with the emphasis on "influence" (and especially civilian influence). The lessons learned and best practices discussed here can be instrumental in helping AFRICOM to start out on the right foot and avoid being viewed primarily as a military instrument in a part of the world where such a perception is unlikely to serve overall U.S. goals.

The lessons learned and best practices discussed here can also have utility in shaping the roles of key international institutions like NATO, the EU, and the UN across a wide spectrum of military and civilian activities, especially regarding those tasks they can better undertake by working together rather than separately. However, outlining this application of our findings

in full measure is beyond the scope of this initial report. It should be the subject of follow-on work.

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## Abbreviations

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ACO	Allied Command Operations
ACT	Allied Command Transformation
AFRICOM	U.S. Africa Command
C <sup>4</sup> ISR	command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
CERP	Commanders' Emergency Relief Program
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CHOD	Chief of Defense (NATO)
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
COIN	counterinsurgency
CORDS	Civil Operations Rural Development Support
CRC	Civilian Reserve Corps
CRS	Congressional Research Service
DEVAD	Development Advisor
DoD	Department of Defense
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
EU	European Union
FSO	Foreign Service Officer
FY	fiscal year
GoA	Government of Afghanistan
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
ICITAP	International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (U.S. Department of Justice)
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross

IFOR/SFOR	Implementation and Stabilization Forces
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KFOR	Kosovo Force
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NRF	NATO Response Force
NSC	National Security Council
OFDA	USAID's Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
PAG	Policy Action Group
POLAD	political advisor
PRT	provincial reconstruction team
S/CRS	Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (U.S. Department of State)
SDA	Senior Development Advisor
SOF	special operations forces
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USIA	U.S. Information Agency

## Introduction

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Since the end of the Cold War, and especially since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has been faced with an increasing number of challenges abroad in which securing U.S. interests requires new forms of interaction among a variety of instruments for projecting power and promoting influence. The traditional model for U.S. foreign intervention, in which military power was separated chronologically from economic, political, and other forms of nonmilitary activity, has been in many circumstances replaced by an almost seamless melding of military and nonmilitary efforts. This was true in Bosnia from 1995 onward, as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led Implementation and Stabilization Forces (IFOR/SFOR) worked closely with civilian agencies, the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); this experience was repeated following the 1999 Kosovo War. This necessary cooperation between different sources of power and influence has also been repeated, in different forms, in Afghanistan and Iraq, in parts of East Africa, and in Colombia. The period of an intervention following the most intense period of military action, what in military parlance is called Combat Phase 4, is also known as *nation-building*. In addition to continued military support, it requires the direct engagement and cooperation of nonmilitary activities and institutions.

One reason for this new emphasis on cooperation among different instruments of power and influence has been the growth of so-called asymmetrical warfare directed against the United States and some of its allies and partners in a deliberate effort to reduce the effectiveness of the classical means of projecting power and securing influence. This is one reason that efforts to influence “hearts and minds” have achieved such importance because such efforts, when successful, can reduce the capacity of adversaries to influence local populations, including through terrorism but also through ideological and propaganda tools. Practitioners of asymmetrical warfare techniques also seek to influence public opinion in the United States and other allied and partner countries by imposing casualty levels sufficient to erode public support for deployments and interventions, even where these are patently in the national interest of the countries sending troops and civilian workers. Combined military and civilian efforts can, if used wisely and well, decrease the political appeal of an adversary and contribute to overall mission success.

In like fashion, more-extensive and more-intense interaction among diplomacy, economic and social action, and military preparations can be an instrumental part of managing crises short of war—and perhaps sometimes obviating the need for war. Thus functions that were previously often divisible into separate packages (e.g., military, intelligence, politics, economics, and social action) and as government versus private sector and other nongovernment activities must now be viewed, analyzed, understood, and organized in relation to one another. In

all, the interaction and integration of all these instruments can become an important *security multiplier*, doing far more to advance the goals of U.S. foreign policy when acting together than any of these instruments could achieve when used singly or in small clusters.

Some methods for reshaping how the U.S. government conducts business in the national security arena are already in train, others are yet to be developed, and still others will only become apparent in time. Already apparent, however, is the need for a significant change in the culture and methodology for securing U.S. interests abroad from focusing on individual functions and, in many cases, the actions of separate agencies and qualities of power and influence to focusing at all levels on the ideas of coordination, cooperation, and, if possible, integration.

Most analyses of new requirements for interaction among different instruments of power and influence and among different parts of the U.S. government (as well as interaction with non-U.S. government entities) have tended to focus on the level of policy coordination and decision in Washington. The National Security Council (NSC) and its staff have been complemented with an International Economic Policy Council, and the directors of each have seats on the other body. A new Homeland Security Council has been created. The NSC interagency process has added new actors as extra functions have been recognized as falling within the ambit of national security and as more agencies have thus been recognized as having a both rightful and necessary place at the table.

Less well-documented, codified, and analyzed is experience at the other end of the telescope: the field level, where diplomats, soldiers, economists, engineers, development specialists, and domestic and legal affairs advisors, along with a host of other experts and actors, have been learning to work together. U.S. ambassadors and their civilian missions, especially in strife-torn countries and regions, have developed patterns of working closely with the local U.S. military commands, as well as with international agencies and NGOs. Meanwhile, U.S. combatant commanders in virtually every region have been discovering the need to work ever more closely with their civilian counterparts and, in many circumstances, with people and institutions outside of the U.S. government.

This bottom-up perspective presents new requirements for cooperation and, where possible, integration among a diverse set of functions and actors. Some of these requirements are already well understood, at least by U.S. personnel in the field; others require understanding at the Washington level; others are yet to be discovered and will only emerge as challenges to, and opportunities for, the United States emerge.

At the same time, a number of America's friends and allies are facing similar challenges. In particular, NATO engagements "out of area"—beginning with Bosnia and Kosovo and now extending especially to Afghanistan—are experiencing a similar need for the integration of instruments of power and influence. This includes interaction among NATO, the EU, the UN, and NGOs. Allied Command Transformation (ACT), in particular, is beginning to address this set of issues.

## The Project

In light of these new circumstances in conflicts abroad and military interventions, the RAND Corporation and the American Academy for Diplomacy decided in 2006 to conduct a joint project to examine the complex issues involved in bringing to bear, in a cohesive and integrated fashion, the various instruments for projecting U.S. power and influence to promote

U.S. national interests. This project also investigated similar requirements and possibilities for the principal U.S. alliance, NATO, as well as connections with the EU. The project focused in the first instance on the bottom-up perspective—the field level—but it also considered the implications for Washington policymaking—the top-down perspective—and the interactions between them. It took a similar approach regarding the interaction of U.S. and non-U.S. personnel and agencies in the field and interactions at higher levels, including within and between the members of the NATO Alliance, the EU, and the UN.

This bottom-up approach has drawn upon experience in the field in several regions and circumstances to uncover lessons learned, identify best practices to be given broader currency, and develop suggestions for promoting cooperation, coordination, and integration of effort at the working level to achieve the goals of foreign and national security policy.

As co-organizers of the project, the RAND Corporation and the American Academy of Diplomacy convened a project panel of senior practitioners composed of approximately 70 individuals, including RAND staff, members of the Academy, senior retired military officers (including retired combatant commanders), former diplomats, representatives of the NGO community and private sector, representatives of international institutions, and other experts in critical areas of foreign policy, national security, and economics. Particularly important has been a series of dialogues promoted between diplomats and military officers.

The project was chaired by Amb. Edward (“Skip”) Gnehm from the American Academy of Diplomacy and George Washington University and most recently before that U.S. Ambassador to Jordan; Amb. Robert Hunter, a Senior Advisor at the RAND Corporation and former U.S. Ambassador to NATO; and Gen. George Joulwan, U.S. Army (ret.), formerly NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe and before that Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Southern Command.

The project commissioned a series of papers written by members of the panel of senior practitioners or by outside experts on key issues related primarily to the bottom-up perspective (which has been less well-researched than the top-down perspective). It is in this bottom-up view where lessons learned and best practices from contemporary experience are so important and where the testimony of action officers from different disciplines and institutions is so valuable.

In the course of its work, the panel of senior practitioners reviewed and discussed the commissioned papers, met with serving civilian and military officers and other agents of change, and developed this report to present analysis and specific recommendations. In addition to its regular meetings at the RAND Corporation, the panel of senior practitioners also met for a two-day conference at the Rockefeller Brothers Fund facilities at Pocantico Hills, New York, and for a weekend conference at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation center in Cadenabbia, Italy, beside Lake Como.

The culmination of the project is this report, which we hope will have an impact both in the United States and in allied countries, NATO, and the European Union. It describes problems and possibilities, presents analyses of key factors, and offers recommendations in the following four substantive areas:

- Specific ways and means to facilitate the cooperation, coordination, and integration of different instruments of power and influence at the field level, including NGOs and the private sector

- Implications for decisionmaking and action at the Washington level (including the NSC process)
- Connections between the two efforts that help each to reinforce the effectiveness of the other
- International dimensions, especially cooperation with the EU, NATO, the UN, and non-U.S. NGOs.

## Framing Comments

Some particular perspectives and limitations need to be presented at the outset.

### Focused on the “How” and “What”

First, this report concerns the “how” and the “what” of interventions abroad, not the “why” or “whether.” Indeed, in recent years (and particularly since the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003), discussion and debate about military interventions have raised a number of cautionary notes. Further, there is always the risk of planning to fight the last war. Thus this report does not focus on policy prescriptions for particular circumstances, although it does make some specific recommendations regarding Afghanistan and Iraq. Rather, it focuses on preparations that should be made in order to facilitate decisionmaking regarding potential military interventions (including possible abstention from intervention), and, if the result of that process is a decision to intervene, the best way of conducting the intervention, in all relevant aspects and particulars, including nonmilitary aspects and what should be done in the aftermath, so that the overall effort has the best chance for success. This may also lead to a decision to intervene without employing a military force in combat operations—e.g., limiting military deployments to deterrence or influence purposes.

In addition, the methodology advanced here can apply to a wide range of different non-combat circumstances—indeed, potentially across the board in U.S. foreign and national security policy—especially with regard to preparations, planning, organization, and the relationship of different instruments. It takes into account differing bureaucratic, political, governmental, and cultural attitudes of potential actors toward the conduct of international relations.

### Act With Others When Possible

Second, U.S. experience in recent years has underscored the value, when possible, of undertaking engagements abroad with other nations or alliances as opposed to acting alone. Of course, this will not always be possible—recent experiences should not be misinterpreted as implying some universal rule. Indeed, like any other nation, the United States must retain the ability to act alone to protect its interests, to include the use of military force. Thus, the panel of senior practitioners believes that *the United States should act with others when it can, alone only when it must*. Nevertheless, as we struggle to replace the collapsed global framework provided by the Cold War with something better—that is, a set of international attitudes, practices, procedures, behavior, and institutions that focus on trying to prevent conflict before it happens and deal with its underlying causes—it has become clear that the United States, as a major power with a heritage of leadership, will almost always be able to contribute more to global comity (and usually do better for itself) by acting in concert with other like-minded nations and within international institutions such as the UN and NATO.

A major implication of this assessment is that the United States continues to have a strong interest in the preservation, development, and expansion of international institutions, including but not limited to the UN and its offshoots, the various international economic and financial institutions, and particularly NATO and the European Union. It will often be advantageous to the United States, as well as to allied and partner nations, to devolve as much responsibility and activity as possible onto various international institutions—provided, of course, that the balance of equities is consistent with the national interests of the party nations.

### **Reaching Agreement on Goals and Methods**

Third, in a related point, if there is to be cooperation among nations (or within an alliance) in conducting an intervention and its aftermath, there is perforce a need for a meeting of the minds among leaders of the various countries engaged regarding what is to be done and why (or what is not to be done and why not), as well as the means to be employed, in what combinations, and by whom. *This is often difficult to achieve and, as a result, approximation may have to suffice, as well as transparency and an effort to understand one another's interests, perspectives, attitudes, values, practices, and domestic political constraints.* If effective, this process can also help to rally popular support at home. All of this may seem obvious, but it is often a stumbling block in crafting coalition or alliance efforts; all of this can also produce misunderstandings that derive from a lack of clarity at the outset. This report presents a number of ideas for dealing with this important matter.

### **Other Challenges Facing the United States and Allies**

Fourth, and perhaps most important given the purview and structure of this project, it should be obvious that the project covers only one facet of the new global challenges facing the United States and its allies and partners abroad, and thus our analysis and recommendations are not comprehensive in terms of strategies and tactics required to deal effectively with the future global landscape. Indeed, there needs to be a continued search by the United States and others for ways to achieve valid goals and objectives abroad through means that do *not* involve intervention (and certainly not military intervention). At the same time, the United States, through its military forces and civilian instruments of diplomacy and international assistance, must also be prepared to operate across the conflict spectrum. This report concentrates on the lower end of the spectrum in terms of the use of military force, including counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism operations. But U.S. forces and components thereof (as well as those in alliances such as NATO) must be balanced to allow for deterrence or engagement at the high end of military action—major combat operations—if necessary. Even at the high end of the spectrum of military operations, the principle of integrating all elements of national power and influence applies.

The issues covered here, therefore, represent only one element of what needs to be a much wider set of considerations that cover the integration of instruments of power and influence across the board. We have limited our focus here on approaches to policy and action where there is intervention abroad and, more particularly, some form of military intervention; even within that framework, we have limited ourselves to types of military or military-related interventions that perforce carry with them a substantial requirement for nonmilitary activities and instruments, a relatively new phenomenon. Thus we do not consider major combat operations, such as the coalition military operation against Iraq in 1991, the NATO air campaigns in the

Balkans in 1995 and 1999, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, or even the initial assaults in 2001 against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

We have chosen to limit our purview in part because of current U.S. and allied engagements in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and in Iraq; in part because it has been these sustained engagements that have most brought into play issues of integrating military and nonmilitary activities and instruments to one another in novel ways; in part because of the special challenges that these engagements have been posing for the United States and other countries; and in part because so many of the lessons learned and best practices canvassed are being derived from these recent and ongoing experiences. Also, by working at first within this limited frame of reference, we hope to set standards and build experience for the development of other basic changes that will need to take place in the understanding and conduct of U.S. national security policy and that of friends and allies abroad.

Thus, what is covered here must be placed in a wider context, both for U.S. policy and that of other countries; if it is to be truly useful, this report can only be one of several that together can help to guide the way forward. The lessons it contains and the best practices it suggests in many cases can be applied to a broader compass of activity, if only to point the way to useful methods of thought and analysis that in many cases are new.

### **Limits to What Outsiders Can Do**

Fifth, recent U.S. military engagements abroad remind us that there are limits to the uses of various levers of power and influence in many places and circumstances. Only so much can be accomplished by outsiders in any intervention, regardless of how welcome their presence may be at the outset and even when their engagement is perceived as productive and benevolent. In particular, many years' experience regarding efforts to shape other societies (much less remake them) has demonstrated that the capacity of outsiders to transform societies is almost always limited, even when there is a high level of human and financial capital, a sophisticated knowledge of the nature of the society in question, and a high degree of cultural and political sensitivity. *Political* change is almost always a lengthy process, *social* change even more so, and *cultural* change (if it can be effected at all) a matter of decades, if not centuries. Such considerations argue for a high degree of selectivity before any intervention takes place. Among the key considerations: Is the outcome worth the investment? Are we willing to stay the course? Are U.S. interests so compelling that the intervention will be politically sustainable at home over time?

The supposed precedents of Germany and Japan in the late 1940s must be seen for what they really were: the refashioning of highly homogeneous societies that were already technologically advanced and in which the overwhelming mass of the population was committed to rejecting the previous regime and to achieving social balance and freedom from conflict. Few, if any, of these factors apply in the cases being considered here. Nor did they apply in most earlier efforts to undertake nation-building in non-Westernized societies, whether by European colonial powers or by the United States, from the Philippine Insurrection of 1899–1902 through the Balkans to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Indeed, the widespread use of the term *nation-building* in the United States (as opposed to the more accurate British term *state-building*) illustrates a fundamental lack of sensitivity to the nature and perhaps even intractability of the challenges we face. In parts of the world where intervention is most likely, the term *nation* has not lost its 19th-century connotation of “tribe” or “distinct people.” Attitudes toward other “nations” within the same country are likely to be

hostile and marked by zero-sum thinking. One need only look at Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sudan for confirmation. In all of them, the international community's goal has not been to reinforce one ethnic group at the expense of all the others. Rather, the goal of any intervention should be to help build a viable *state* in which the people, whatever their sense of nationhood, can feel at home.

## The Way Forward

None of these cautionary notes is designed to argue that current difficulties (e.g., in Iraq and Afghanistan) or even popular or leadership disillusionment should rule out all future engagements or armed interventions. Indeed, in some cases it may be in the fundamental U.S. national interest, as well as that of allies and partners, to make the effort, however difficult it may prove to be and however imperfect may be the results. It is rather to say that the whole subject of what can be achieved needs to be approached with caution and a good deal of humility. At one level, the United States needs to learn from others' experience, both other countries with far greater experience at peacekeeping in all its dimensions and the United Nations, with its extensive experience integrating military and nonmilitary instruments. At another level, outside efforts to reshape societies have proved to be exceedingly difficult and sometimes even counterproductive. At times, the very act of intervention—especially by a major power like the United States—can stimulate its own resistance and thus undercut the goals of the intervention, including security and stabilization goals. The promotion of values must also take into full account “means” as well as “ends” if positive results are to emerge. And, in any event, it is hard for outsiders to get inside the skin of other cultures and nationalities, even where there is a sincere commitment to do so.

It is also increasingly clear that interventions rarely if ever succeed without a sound and potentially successful partner on the ground (i.e., a functioning and legitimate local government), and that acting in concert with that partner is a precondition for any success beyond the most rudimentary military occupation. Even in an effort undertaken purely to secure national interests, there is an increasing requirement to apply an oath of intervention to ensure success: *primum non nocere* [above all, do no harm].



## Discussion and Recommendations

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Bearing in mind these framing points, in undertaking our discussions and making recommendations, we sought to focus on the issues, ideas, and suggestions regarding the integration of instruments of power and influence that we believe to be most likely to confer the maximum benefit. We have also tried to present as comprehensive a picture as possible within the constraints of the project. At the same time, as noted, we have limited our purview. Thus this report does not seek to provide either strategic or tactical advice regarding major combat operations. Nor is it intended as a comprehensive blueprint for COIN, although many of our recommendations will apply to COIN operations.

### **Broad Recommendations**

#### **Focus on What Can Get Done**

We have sought to be realistic about what we are proposing. First, not all of the recommendations we present here could, even with the best will in the world, be implemented rapidly or with ease: We have tried to distinguish between what can be done rapidly and what may take some time to decide and then implement. Even more fundamental reform of structures, processes, and attitudes within government will need to be undertaken for there to be a truly comprehensive meeting of requirements in what can be viewed as revolutionary times in terms of the shape, function, and effects of international relations. Yet even if some key suggestions and requirements take months or years to implement, that fact should not be used as an excuse for ignoring other steps, even partial measures, that can be taken now.

#### **Many Must Act**

Second, we recognize that no single agency of the U.S. government or other entity can take all the decisions and actions we recommend. We thus identify responsibility for acting, whether within the U.S. government or, where appropriate, the private sector, NGOs, other governments, and alliances and other international institutions.

#### **Different Degrees of Difficulty**

Third, we have assessed the degree of difficulty in implementing our suggestions: Some can be implemented simply by individuals on the ground or in the field without the need for direction from higher authority. At times, this may even be, at least initially, in contravention of higher-level direction. Indeed, some of the best practices we have identified have emerged because low-level commanders or their civilian counterparts followed the dictum that “it is better to

ask for forgiveness than permission.” Some of our suggestions can be implemented through administrative decision, in particular by direction (in the case of U.S. government actions) by individuals higher in the chain of command or within the National Command Authority. And some will require action by Congress or, where appropriate, by institutions like NATO and the EU. Obviously, this degree of difficulty in terms of who needs to act will affect the timeliness of the implementation of some recommendations, assuming that higher levels of the U.S. executive branch, Congress, and international institutions are prepared to adopt them.

### **Process and Flexibility**

Most of the discussion and recommendations that follow are about *process* rather than either *policy* or *product*. This, we believe, is both natural and appropriate, given a cardinal point in our recommendations: To be effective, either the integration of instruments of power and influence or some looser arrangement for cooperation or coalescence needs to be as flexible as possible, especially at the theater and field levels. This flexibility is important for a particular reason. During the Cold War, trying to influence hearts and minds was almost always an ancillary activity, secondary to the need to contain Soviet power. By contrast, success in post-Cold War interventions such as those being considered here depends heavily on influencing hearts and minds. Thus flexibility and the devolution of authority and responsibility that it implies are critical matters.

### **Success Does Not Require Reinventing Government**

We should also be clear on another central point: *We believe that what most needs to be done can be achieved without a root-and-branch reorganization of the U.S. government*, including without formal amendment to, or a rewriting of, the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. We believe the act itself contains sufficient flexibility. *The key issues are leadership, from the presidential level on down and in Congress*, and the way in which the NSC System is organized and used. This includes flexibility regarding the participants in the system, perhaps involving people and institutions from outside the executive branch (and possibly the government). Having said that, in terms of the adaptation of the U.S. government to be able to meet a broad range of new requirements in the future, a thorough review of the act would be worthwhile and some changes may prove useful. At the same time, in the international domain, we are not calling for a fundamental rewiring of the NATO Alliance or modification of the North Atlantic Treaty.

We do believe that our recommendations, based as almost all of them are on the observation of successful, pragmatic responses to real-life situations and challenges, can materially advance the chances for success in U.S. national security efforts within the areas under discussion here, as well as efforts by NATO and other international organizations. That does not mean that our recommendations will be easy to implement: Bureaucratic and political resistance even to the best ideas has a long pedigree.

### **Success Is Possible, Answers Exist**

To begin with, we make three critical observations about implementing what we believe to be necessary reforms if the United States and, where appropriate, friends and allies are to succeed in the radically new environment that we are considering in this report. First, almost all of what we suggest depends on the willingness of individuals and institutions to *recognize* that there are serious problems that must be resolved and that cannot be simply ignored or dealt

with by temporary work-arounds. We assert that, in many instances, *the means exist* for resolving these problems. Many of these means have been discovered through experimentation and are already available to others through proper attention to best practices and lessons learned. To a great extent, the ability to bring about change is a matter of attitude, cultural understanding, adaptability, leadership, and political will. Where these qualities now exist, especially in a number of the theater and field situations we reviewed, success is clearly possible (and indeed likely) if some relatively simple steps are taken.

### **National Security Has Changed**

Second, what the term *national security* means in the United States is changing dramatically. It has long been understood as some compound of a strong and vibrant national economy that is able to play its productive part an increasingly globalizing economy; a political process at home that retains the support and respect of the body politic and functions more or less effectively; and the protection of the nation from threats and challenges emanating from abroad, especially those that entail a military component or that can be countered primarily through military means. This definition is changing, however, and not just in the sense that military, political, and economic elements must all be involved in some mixture: This was, after all, the essence of the “combined arms” that brought success in the Cold War. Rather, the definition is changing in terms of the requirement that these three (and other) elements of national power and influence be brought together, in the same theater, at the same time, and in close coordination with one another, so that each can contribute to the success of the others and hence to the whole. This requires a different way of thinking about national security and of determining which tools in which combinations will be best in order to meet and master particular situations to the benefit of the United States—or, where friends and allies are involved, of the collective as a whole.

### **Money and Other Resources**

Third, it is necessary at the outset to understand fully that what we are proposing will require that adequate funding, as well as other resources in adequate amounts, is available where and when it is needed. *This point is a critical, indeed indispensable, theme of this report.* This means not just “enough” money to do the job—essential in itself. It also means

- the right institutions and individuals are given the money they need, when they need it, to complete their missions
- the creation of a capacity to move money (and resources) flexibly from task to task—and also from one element of an operation to another—preferably with decisions taken on the spot to the extent feasible
- willingness to be responsive on the part of home institutions (e.g., different departments of the U.S. government), the administration overall (including the Office of Management and Budget), and the U.S. Congress.

Just stating this general observation may seem to many seasoned observers to be heresy or to fall in the realm of “no can do.” However, *it is the opinion of the panel of senior practitioners that, without a major change in attitude and practice regarding the raising, distribution, allocation, and spending of money and related resources on U.S. national security, critical tasks now facing us as a nation will be unachievable.* It is that important and that simple.

### **Recruit, Train, Reward**

In addition, as will be expanded on below, a critical element will be more-effective civilian instruments, and that includes the need for reform in the recruitment, training, exercising, and incentive structure at the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Until they recruit the right kinds of people for the tasks considered in this report (not just negotiators, but skilled administrators and program managers), train them properly (in strategic planning, program management, budgeting, implementation, and congressional relations, including a serious mid-career training program), rotate them through a variety of positions (not just up a political or economic reporting chain) to ensure they have broad experience, and reward them for crossing agency lines to widen their perspective, all the funding and flexibility in the world is likely to be wasted.

### **Leadership Is Key**

Of course, the element that most separates success from failure is leadership—from top to bottom and from bottom to top. In its analysis, the panel of senior practitioners focused on the bottom-to-top dimension because we realized this is where the “rubber meets the road,” both in terms of tasks to be completed in U.S. military operations in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan in particular and, more broadly, in terms of the lessons learned and best practices that inform leadership of the U.S. government at higher levels. It is the leadership we have seen from the bottom upwards that affirms our belief that the basic problems we have identified are not insurmountable: On a day-to-day basis, people are exercising the leadership needed to get these problems solved.

### **Setting Strategic Objectives**

It is self-evident that, before the United States becomes engaged in any military venture abroad, its leaders should have a clear sense of both the why and the how—the reasons for deploying force and the basic ways that it and other instruments of power and influence are to be brought to bear. In order to determine the ways in which each part of an operation will work with the others, they all must start with the same “game plan” that defines the nature of the overall mission, outlines what needs to be accomplished to achieve success, and identifies those with the capacity and the skills to play a useful part in the various aspects of the effort. This requirement for pre-operation analysis is multiplied exponentially where non-U.S. government organizations and individuals are to be engaged (especially NGOs with their particular capacities and constraints), along with institutions such as the UN, NATO, and the EU. Each of these institutions and their member states will have its own capacities and also its own political and other limitations, depending on goals, missions, and the anticipated type and extent of combat or noncombat military activity and other deployment of resources.

### **Defining the Goals and How to Achieve Them**

The goals for any intervention will not define themselves, and formulating the best means for accomplishing them requires careful thought. Strategic plans will only be effective if the lead executive authority—most often the U.S. administration—can define what its objectives are and, in at least rough terms, how it intends to accomplish them. It is also necessary for that lead executive authority to work directly with all other potentially engaged partners, domestic

or foreign, whose activities are important to an operation's success. Consultations with allies are generally not difficult to undertake; but the will and the common sense need to be there to initiate them, and consultations must include ample listening in addition to talking.



## The U.S. Dimension

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### Defining the Tasks: Planning

Following the requirement to have, at the outset, a clear sense of (shared) purpose, perhaps the most important factor in determining whether a military or military-related operation (such as those being discussed here) will be successful is the planning process. Even a well thought out and planned effort can fail, often because of either the “fog of war” (or the “fog of peace”) or unintended consequences, but a sure recipe for failure is to conduct planning not as a comprehensive effort but as a series of disconnected or poorly coordinated efforts on the part of different sectors of the U.S. government or as between it and friends and allies that it expects to take part in an operation. Nor is this just the planning process at the higher levels of government or within an alliance. Effective planning must be undertaken at every level of activity, *and every actor with a role in the operation must be part of the planning, wherever possible from the beginning of the effort.* This is not a self-evident proposition. Indeed, for decades, it has been a common practice for the United States to work out basic plans on its own and then to present them more-or-less complete to allies or for the military branch of government, where a military intervention is involved, to develop plans that assign to other agencies of government—e.g., the Department of State—roles and missions it deems appropriate for them. The essence of this lesson has six parts.

### Six Parts to Planning

**Involve Everyone in Planning.** Different agencies, institutions, and individuals each have particular skills that need in some not-predefined measure to be involved, and hence these parties need to be able to bring to bear *from the planning stage onward* their own specialized expertise and knowledge. They must be available at an early stage to present their comparative advantages. Failure to follow this prescription often ends with the lead (if only by default) agency—most often the U.S. military—undertaking aspects and elements of an overall mission (e.g., nation-building) for which it is not as well qualified as some other entity or entities. This may come at the price of diversion from what it does best—e.g., provide security and combat capabilities. Not only is it important to involve a wide range of actors at the planning stage, it is also important that they have the ability and willingness to recognize that others may be better equipped to do all or part of the job than they are. The planning process also needs to account for the likely shifting over time of primacy among different instruments of power and influence and different actors, defined in shorthand as *supporting* and *supported*. In Bosnia- and Iraq-like scenarios, the military would initially be the supported entity; once the environment was secure, the military would shift to supporting civilian agencies, NGOs, etc.

**Relate Planning to Resources.** At the same time, with the assignment of missions and responsibilities must also come a comparable allocation of funding and other resources, as well as a share in authority. The planning process cannot ignore resource issues, leave them to the last minute, or consider them to be outside the process. When this last occurs, decisions already made will be presented to the resource planners, who must somehow find the money. To be effective, the planning process must include resource questions from the outset. Planners will then understand what resource issues are difficult to solve, which are easy, and how the planning needs to adapt. The lack of early involvement of resource managers contributed significantly to U.S. problems in post-invasion Iraq.

**Balancing the Force.** Engaging all entities that have a potential role in an operation in the planning effort encourages an intelligent balancing of the force, not just among military skills and capabilities but also across the range of tasks to be performed throughout the expected course of the operation. This encompasses the preconflict situation (Phase 0) through normalization (Phase 4) to stabilization, reconstruction, development, and even beyond. Naturally, this should include, to the degree relevant, U.S. Special Operations Command and the Intelligence Community.

**Involve the Host Government in Planning.** Following this logic, predeployment, pre-operations, precombat planning should include, to the degree possible, planning for the twin, critical requirements of (1) COIN and (2) governance, human rights, and development as essential parts of stabilization and reconstruction. This also implies that planning include host governments and entities in country (where appropriate involving NGOs) with experience with and the capacity for one or both of these tasks. Indeed, the role of host governments is indispensable, a point too often ignored.

**Prepare for Plan-Fight-Plan.** If operations begin too quickly to allow extensive preplanning—e.g., Afghanistan in 2001—then great care must be taken to establish an integrated plan-fight-plan capacity on an interagency basis. This structure must be created at the theater and operational level as well as in Washington.

**Creating “Buy-In.”** If agencies, institutions, and individuals are to “buy in” to an operation, they have to be given a chance to participate in the planning and decision processes from the beginning and to have a clear sense that they have been so engaged. This is also generally a critical domestic political requirement for both U.S. and non-U.S. participants.

### **Recommendations for Implementing the Planning Process**

**The National Security Council Must Lead in Planning.** While planning of necessity has to be lodged for detailed analysis in each part of the government that will be responsible for carrying out particular actions, there also needs to be a planning capacity across the executive branch. In order to permit a proper purview of all the tasks that have to be performed as well as to provide proper oversight and political direction, the overall U.S. planning function should be lodged in the NSC—i.e., at the White House level, operating in tandem with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) (but without giving OMB veto power over planning). To ensure that organizational planning and resource planning proceed in lockstep, the NSC and OMB should have a joint cell for considering these issues. Of course, the full set of resources needed for undertaking the planning effort strictly at the NSC level does not now exist (nor should an effort of the necessary magnitude be physically lodged there). But the central direction, the setting of overall parameters, the interagency reconciliation process, the allocation of resources (with OMB engagement), and the systematic and continuing review of results very

much belong at this level. Creating task forces that draw on personnel from the relevant agencies can help to bridge the gap between authority and expertise, provided that there is adequate supervision, policy control, and leadership.

**Standing Planning Process.** Furthermore, every operation does, to a significant degree, need to be planned *de novo*, as reflecting the necessarily unique circumstances of every preconflict, conflict, and postconflict engagement. But there can and should be a capacity, deriving authority from the NSC, for a *standing planning process*. This should deal with generic requirements, identify relationships among tasks and agencies likely always to be present, and, on occasion, game different scenarios and their planning and resource requirements. This effort to anticipate the future is frequently done within the various agencies; there also needs to be such a function that spans agencies and that looks toward the overall requirements of undertaking a range of engagements. Among other things, this can identify commonalities, demonstrate which agencies are best qualified to undertake which tasks, help with balancing the entire force, and help to drive budget allocations in the right directions over the long term. By contrast, cobbling together needed capabilities only after action is required rather than systematically evolving them over time is to risk being unprepared when the time comes to act. Further, such a standing planning process will foster relationships among all personnel likely to become engaged in carrying out cross-agency and cross-discipline deployments, relationships that will stand them in good stead when they are called upon to carry out their responsibilities. This integration should not be looked upon as the imposition of a straitjacket on any component or a diminution of the ability of different agencies to accomplish their particular missions; rather, it is to encourage a change in the way of thinking so that “interagency” becomes a habit of mind rather than just a bureaucratic term.

**Planning Flexibility.** At the same time, those undertaking the planning (especially when it is an international team) must remind themselves that “no plan survives the first day of operations intact.” Planners must incorporate enough flexibility to respond both to events and to the evolving views of local authorities, and they must remind their constituencies that the plan is not a ratified treaty that needs to be re-negotiated before any variation can occur.

## Engaging the U.S. Government Broadly

Experience in Afghanistan and, to a lesser degree, Iraq has sent a powerful message about the extent to which far more components of the U.S. government need to be involved in maximizing the projection of U.S. power and influence into conflict situations than has been the case in past operations (even though, in many circumstances of a less daunting nature than Iraq or Afghanistan, this injunction may be modulated). This issue also arose in regard to U.S. involvement in the Balkans, through the NATO-led IFOR and SFOR for Bosnia, as well as the Kosovo Force (KFOR). In these situations, the U.S. military took the lead, and to a lesser degree personnel and resources of the U.S. Department of State were directly involved. This “lesser degree” was not because of a lack of willingness on the part of Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) and other government officers to serve in conflict zones and run personal risks, but rather because of a lack of resources and sufficient understanding of the extent to which diplomatic and political efforts are often needed to complement military efforts. The same can be said of personnel and programs of USAID, potentially a major actor in the development aspect

of the combined tasks (leaving the Department of State to take the lead in the governance aspect and some other activities).

### **Missing Agencies**

In all of these instances, however, other elements of the U.S. government have been largely absent. In Afghanistan, for example, a country with both a critical demand for agricultural development—including the need to develop alternatives to the production of poppies, doubly corrosive because it both funds the Taliban and spreads drugs to other countries—and a significant capacity for such development, only a small handful of personnel from the U.S. Department of Agriculture are deployed. And this from a nation that has perhaps the best-organized and most successful agricultural extension service in the world. The Departments of Defense and State and USAID have been “at war,” but almost all the rest of the U.S. government has not been so engaged. Of course, in many cases, USAID is better placed to undertake activities that fall under the rubric “development”—*provided that it is sufficiently funded and staffed*. But there is still a case for mobilizing the capacities of other departments and agencies, especially in terms of increasing resources, engaging specialized capabilities, and demonstrating across-the-government support for a national effort. Where USAID falls short, expertise is available and should be drawn from agencies such as the Departments of Justice, Health and Human Services, and Education and the National Institutes of Health. However, all of these agencies have other missions, budgets, and domestic political constituencies. Presidential direction and additional funding for broadened missions are both essential and, to date, have been almost entirely lacking. These agencies need to be tasked to develop an *expeditionary capacity* (the need to be determined by NSC-level planning) to buttress the U.S. civilian presence in intervention zones. Congress should provide the requisite funding.

### **Police Training**

The ability of the United States to play its part in helping to craft success in Afghanistan is thus limited by bureaucratic resistance, and this limitation is also evident in Iraq. In both instances, one of the most important requirements is the training of local police forces. In both cases, the initially available local forces were partisan, corrupt, and inefficient; yet the occupying forces could neither foster the creation of a local force fast enough to meet the need for civic order nor spare the personnel to do the job themselves. Finding and encouraging U.S. police trainers to deploy to these countries has been one of the most daunting tasks facing the U.S. government, in part because, unlike a number of European countries, the United States has no national police force—i.e., no *carabinieri* (Italy) or *gendarmerie* (France). Few local U.S. police forces have either the officers to spare or the inclination to do so—even were serious funding available which, in general, it is not. Unfortunately, European countries with trained personnel have not taken up the slack at anywhere near the level required, in large part because their national police forces have been sized to meet purely domestic needs.

### **Don't Ask the Military to Do Others' Work**

Where there is a vacuum in providing the nonmilitary services that are so necessary to the success of the overall operation, most often the U.S. military is called upon to fill it. This can often be effective, as the U.S. military has a number of instruments that can be applied, including Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) personnel and reservists who have skills in different areas relevant to the tasks, including nation-building. Yet the panel of senior practitioners

judges that assigning to the military the responsibility for undertaking tasks that are primarily civilian in character is not a good use of military personnel and, in some cases, can lead to the degrading of military capacities for action. The panel recognizes, however, that problems and challenges in these areas derive to a great extent from differences in the bureaucratic and other cultures in different parts of the U.S. government (and even within some agencies). Stovepiping of authority and resource management will be addressed below; there are also stovepipes of attitude, approach, training, and practice that impede the integration of different instruments of power and influence. These obstacles are often the hardest to overcome, sometimes taking years. *At heart, there must be political will within all relevant agencies to make the changes and foster the interagency cooperation that is indispensable; this in turn requires political leadership at the top of the U.S. government that is invested in these changes.*

### Recommendations

The panel of senior practitioners proposes a number of specific recommendations to address this critical issue of a government too often only partially committed to the success of combat and, more particularly, postcombat operations and is too often ill-prepared to do everything that is needed to ensure success:

**More People at the Department of State and USAID.** The numbers of nonmilitary personnel available for operations such as those being discussed in this report need to be increased substantially. The Department of State has only about 6,600 officers. The panel of senior practitioners welcomes the Bush administration's recommendation in its FY09 budget proposal to increase this number by 1,100 officers. That recommendation should be funded by Congress and implemented as soon as possible. However, in order to be successful at 21st-century foreign interventions, the Department of State is not only substantially under funded but also has a critical shortage of adequately trained and experienced officers to carry out its growing responsibilities. Priority should be given to a substantial increase in Department of State personnel (in both the Foreign Service and Civil Service) even beyond the 1,100 proposed, building on lessons learned from the initial increases and as practice determines need and usefulness. This is required to cover not only existing gaps but also expected increased demand in the future. A parallel, substantial increase in USAID funding and personnel is also needed if the United States is to succeed in effectively integrating instruments of power and influence.

**The Right Skills, When Needed.** One of the most frustrating aspects of the work of the Department of State today is that it does not have enough of the right people available at the times when they are needed. This calculation takes into account personnel needed to collaborate with the military and other agencies of government in engagements abroad and also those required for many other purposes, including efforts to help obviate the need for employing military instruments. This may be a politically unpalatable message in terms of budgeting, recruiting, and a prevailing ethos in the United States about the relative roles and missions of the various arms of government in providing national security (i.e., as between military and nonmilitary instruments, activities, and personnel). Nonetheless, it is a valid conclusion that needs to be fully understood and acted upon if the United States is to be truly committed to its own security interests and those of friends and allies in the years ahead.

**Contingency Cadres Trained and Ready to Go.** This significant increase in the number of personnel at the Department of State is also needed in order to develop, train, and retain significant numbers of officers with specialized skills that will not be needed at all times but that need to be available on an on-call basis. In a commercial enterprise this would be called "float;"

it is especially prevalent in firms that need to be able to respond rapidly to clients' requests with fully equipped and experienced teams of experts and others who can be deployed quickly. This includes the requirement to have a significant cadre of individuals with broad experience in different cultures and fluent in different languages. When a conflict starts or some other requirement for deployment abroad emerges, it is already too late to develop these skills within the Foreign Service or other components of the U.S. government personnel system. To be sure, private contractors with these skills can be hired on a temporary and ad hoc basis, but they will likely lack other skills that can only be acquired through diplomatic, political, economic, and political-military training and other experience. A cadre of retired personnel should also be developed and fostered; these individuals could be called upon for expert help when needed, but would not be a substitute for the recruiting, training, and retention of personnel in house. In part, the current lack of various types of contingency cadres on duty at the Department of State can be offset through the creation of a departmental reserve force of officers qualified in particular skills and knowledge (see the section on a Civilian Reserve Corps, below), but this, too, would not provide a complete replacement for the necessary in-house cadres.

**Support for These Changes.** The motivation for a combined effort on the part of all relevant segments of the U.S. executive branch must begin at the highest political level, proceeding downward through cabinet- and subcabinet-level officials. At the same time, adequate funds—tailored and specifically relevant to the specific tasks and requirements being discussed here—must be budgeted for by the OMB and then fought for in the administration's budget negotiations with Congress.

**Career-Long Cross-Discipline, Cross-Agency Education.** Education in national security affairs needs to reflect the new demands of civil-military cooperation and the full range of tasks and requirements that this could entail. Indeed, this is critical if there is to be a progressive breaking down of the cultural barriers between different elements of the U.S. government's national security establishment (military and civilian) that are often so potent in preventing cooperation and that contribute to the stovepiping of attitude and approach. Modernization of education in national security affairs might include the establishment of a National Security Academy at an educational level parallel to that of the four service academies. It should as soon as possible include the addition of a National Security College to the National Defense University located at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C. Until this is formally accomplished, the National Defense University should proceed to recruit faculty and students from different elements and disciplines in the U.S. government, significantly expand the student body, and develop appropriate interdisciplinary courses. Special emphasis needs to be placed on training military officers in relevant civilian skills and responsibilities, especially those applicable in situations when it is not possible to separate military and civilian functions either functionally or by having the engagement of the latter only follow the accomplishment of the former. At the same time, the Foreign Service Institute should also increase the number of officers among its students who come from the Department of Defense (DoD) and other agencies.

**Mid-Career Education.** In addition, sufficient resources should be made available for FSOs and their counterparts in other agencies with actual or potential national security responsibilities to have mid-career educational opportunities analogous to those now available to military officers, who typically spend up to one-third of their careers (from college onward) in one form or another of formal education. This mid-career training would help to broaden skill sets and create more flexible and programmatically adept officers. This will no doubt require an increase in the number of FSOs and of officers in other security-relevant departments, as well as career-

tracking adjustments that ensure that the added education provides benefits in terms of future assignments and promotions rather than derailing promotion opportunities.

**Support Bush Administration Initiatives.** As part of this effort, the proposal put forward by President Bush in Executive Order 13434 of May 17, 2007, for National Security Professional Development, should be fully implemented, in particular to

. . . (a) identify and enhance existing national security professional development programs and infrastructure, and establish new programs as necessary, in order to fulfill their respective missions to educate, train, and employ security professionals consistent with the National Strategy. . .<sup>1</sup>

At the same time, there should be full implementation of the President's proposal in his January 23, 2007, State of the Union address

. . . to design and establish a volunteer Civilian Reserve Corps, of a size appropriate to potential future tasks. Such a corps would function much like our military reserve. It would ease the burden on the Armed Forces by allowing the engagement of civilians with critical skills to serve on missions abroad when America needs them.<sup>2</sup>

**Helping the Civilian Reserve Corps Work.** It will be important that this corps recruit, train, exercise, and retain a wide variety of skills associated with Phase 4 or nation-building, with a capacity for lead elements (planning, liaison, acculturation, etc.) to be deployed as soon as possible after the initial introduction of military forces into a combat situation. Particular emphasis should be put on the corps' ability to train foreign nationals in relevant skills, including noncombat security skills. As we have learned in engagements from Bosnia onward, one of the most important requirements (and one of the most difficult to procure) is the right personnel for police training. This should be a high priority in a Civilian Reserve Corps. In addition, the corps should be well-represented at the senior levels of planning and decision in the Washington-based interagency process.

**Fund the Civilian Reserve Corps.** To be effective, a Civilian Reserve Corps needs to receive sufficient funding that is realistically correlated with its potential mission requirements; there need to be processes and standards for recruiting, training, and certifying members of this corps; its relationship to other instruments of power and influence must be worked out in advance of operations; it needs to be a part of all planning efforts; its leaders should be members of the in-theater country team (see below); and it should be able to coordinate effectively both with similar efforts in allied countries (e.g., Canada's CANADEM<sup>3</sup>) and as appropriate with NGOs.

**Involve the Civilian Reserve Corps Across the Government.** This Civilian Reserve Corps should be well-represented within the relevant government agencies, beginning with the Department of State and USAID, and also within the U.S. military, with liaison officers in each of the deployable combatant commands and with U.S. Joint Forces Command.

<sup>1</sup> The White House, Executive Order 13434, "National Security Professional Development," May 17, 2007.

<sup>2</sup> The White House, The State of the Union, transcript of address, January 23, 2007.

<sup>3</sup> See CANADEM's Web site (<http://canadem.ca>).

**Police Training.** In addition to the Civilian Reserve Corps, funding for the Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) should be increased and programs adapted as needed to be more effective in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. Local police forces throughout the United States should be given subsidies to encourage the allocation of officers for membership in a Police Training Corps, which could be deployed as needed abroad. Experience in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan testifies to the need for, and value of, such a national Police Training Corps.

**A Civilian Goldwater-Nichols? Providing Incentives for Cross-Agency Service.** Should the next administration in the White House prove unwilling or unable through executive action to make changes outlined here, Congress should consider establishing the incentives and requirements for serving civilian officers in the departments and agencies of the U.S. government through legislation along the lines of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 that applies to the military. Even without such legislation, different elements of the U.S. government should provide tangible incentives and rewards to officers who are prepared to take part in cross-agency and cross-discipline service and willing to undertake service in deployable expeditionary activities in areas of civilian activity. This will require a significant change to the current incentive and personnel system. In particular, promotion boards should be tasked via Executive Order to take into account such career-enhancing service in a way analogous to veterans' preference for government employment. Each department and agency should be mandated to ensure that such interagency service is a career-enhancer rather than a career-retarder. If needed to address practical noncompliance, this authority can be vested at the NSC level. The Senate should also insist that these criteria be applied when approving the promotion of career FSOs and relevant officers from other agencies.

**Congress Needs to Adapt.** While we have noted above the difficulties (and hence delays) inherent in a major restructuring of the U.S. government, it is clear that the integration of instruments of power and influence would be greatly facilitated by changes in the way that Congress conducts its business. Responsibilities for the authorization and appropriations for and the oversight of different departments and agencies, as well as different functions, are divided in both houses among a number of different committees and, within the House and Senate appropriations committees, a variety of subcommittees. Short of a major restructuring of Congress (which is not to be expected), it is unlikely that any of these committees or subcommittees would agree to cede its responsibilities. We do, however, propose the creation of two *new* select committees, one in each house, devoted to reviewing the overall integration of instruments of power and influence and reporting their findings in terms of possible programs and appropriations. We also propose a standing requirement for both the Congressional Research Service and the Government Accountability Office to prepare their own annual reports on this subject. None of these new requirements would impinge directly on the current distribution of power within Congress, but they would help individual committees (and Congress as a whole) make better-informed decisions about the intersection of elements of power and influence—elements that do not respect institutional boundaries in Congress any more than those in the executive branch.

**An OMB Budget for National Security.** In like fashion, the administration's annual budget submissions to Congress each January should include an analysis of the relationships of different programs to one another in the form of a separate volume on the national security budget, including foreign assistance, diplomacy, defense, homeland security, and intelligence. Current budget categories do not permit this type of cross-cutting analysis of relationships within over-

all national security requirements, and changing that situation—creating a true national security budget—has eluded the White House and Congress for decades. This is unfortunate, as such a presentation would clearly permit better-informed decisionmaking. While one cannot (and should not) actually merge the budgets of different agencies, an integrated justification document would clearly help to relate funding decisions made in each arena to the others. OMB should conduct a national security budget review, and the NSC should take part in that review. Congress should create a budget function for homeland security, which it does not have now. Congress should hold joint hearings on the national security budget.

**Putting Resources Where They Are Needed: A Critical Analysis and Change.** At the same time, the administration should conduct a thorough analysis of overall national security requirements and compare them to the distribution of resources among departments and agencies and a great variety of programs, including among departments that may not be generally associated with national security (e.g., the Departments of Justice, Health and Human Services, Education, and Agriculture and the Institutes of Health). This will provide the White House a basis from which it can begin an effort to rebalance the budget. As of now, the ratio between the 050 account (defense) and the 150 account (Department of State, all foreign aid, international institutions) is about 17:1.<sup>4</sup> In view of the challenges facing the United States abroad, this represents a skewing of resources-to-tasks far beyond the natural disparities that derive from the inherently higher costs of military instruments (as compared with nonmilitary instruments) of power and influence.

**The “F Process.”** The panel of senior practitioners endorses the new foreign assistance reform process (the so-called F Process) begun by the Department of State and USAID in 2006, “built around five priority objectives that, if achieved, support our overarching goal by helping move countries toward self-sufficiency and strengthening strategic partnerships.” These priorities are peace and security, governing justly and democratically, investing in people, economic growth, and humanitarian assistance.<sup>5</sup>

**Support the Defense Secretary’s Initiatives.** Within this general concept, the White House should begin to put significant dollars behind the initiative proposed by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in his November 26, 2007, Alf Landon Lecture:

What is clear to me is that there is a need for a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security—diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development.<sup>6</sup>

As he noted, “The Department of Defense has taken on many of these burdens that might have been assumed by civilian agencies in the past. . .” This prescription should be taken even further, not only to cover areas where DoD now provides services by default but also to ensure that a full range of nonmilitary tasks is adequately funded and effective. The shift of even a

<sup>4</sup> Budget authority (estimated) for FY 2008 (October 1, 2007–September 30, 2008) was \$693,214 million for “050 National Defense” and \$39,465 million for “150 International Affairs” (Office of Management and Budget, *Budget for Fiscal Year 2009: Historical Tables*, U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008, p. 90). Estimated outlays for FY 2008 were similar in terms of ratio: \$607,263 million (050) and \$34,826 million (150) (Office of Management and Budget., 2008, p. 55).

<sup>5</sup> U.S. Department of State, Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance, “Foreign Assistance Reform: Achieving Results & Sustainability in Support of Transformational Diplomacy,” fact sheet, June 22, 2006.

<sup>6</sup> Robert M. Gates, U.S. Secretary of Defense, “Landon Lecture: Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates,” transcript of address at Kansas State University, November 26, 2007.

modest amount of funding from the defense to nondefense accounts will not happen unless the White House (especially OMB) and Congress make it happen. Yet for the current fiscal year (FY08), Congress actually cut spending for the Department of State by 4.5 percent from the administration's request.

**Sharing DoD Funds with State.** Under Section 1206 of the Defense Authorization Act of 2008, DoD is able to transfer up to \$200 million to the Department of State for reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance programs in foreign countries (doubled from FY07).<sup>7</sup> (This authority is in addition to a program established in FY06 that enables DoD to spend up to \$200 million “to train and equip foreign militaries to undertake counterterrorism or stability operations;” this authorization was increased to \$300 million in FY07).<sup>8</sup> But this is only a small fraction of the funds needed for the size program that would enable the Department of State to carry out the relevant tasks, both to be effective in the field and to relieve U.S. military forces of some of their burden. One option would be immediately to increase these funds by at least a factor of ten; far preferable would be direct budgeting to the Department of State and USAID and a consequent strengthening of their capacity over the long term. This would help to fence these funds off from fluctuations in other DoD funding requirements. At the moment, such responsibilities are assigned to the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). But this is at too low a bureaucratic level to be effective: Planning oversight and integration should be conducted at the NSC/OMB level. Such additional funding for the Department of State, properly organized and coordinated, should be supplemented with several hundred million dollars in funding for other relevant agencies.

**Recreate a USIA-Like Capacity.** Public diplomacy is an important part of U.S. engagements abroad and can be critical to influencing hearts and minds. In 1999, the United States Information Agency (USIA) was folded into the Department of State. In our judgment, that amalgamation has been less than successful. Many highly trained USIA officers have departed, the priority placed on USIA-type activities has been downgraded, and a valuable instrument for the presentation in other countries of an American perspective has been lost. USIA was an instrument that, while fully a part of the U.S. government, retained some distance from short-term foreign policy priorities. Public diplomacy, correctly conceived and implemented, is also an important part of the integration of civilian and military instruments. USIA-type activities are a critical facet of our ability to build long-term relationships before conflict situations emerge, and they can be a valuable part of Phase 4 or nation-building efforts. Unless a “USIA” could be separated out from the Department of State by administrative action, Congress should reauthorize USIA, fund it adequately, and enable it to make effective use of modern methods of communication and education.

<sup>7</sup> The administration request for FY 2009 is for a three-year authorization of Section 1206 funding of \$500 million. (Nina M. Serafino, *Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006: A Fact Sheet on Department of Defense Authority to Train and Equip Foreign Military Forces*, CRS Report for Congress, May 15, 2008.)

<sup>8</sup> U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Section 1206 Security Assistance Program—Findings on Criteria, Coordination, and Implementation,” GAO-07-416R, March 5, 2007.

## The Interagency Process in the Theater and in the Field

The interagency process that we are stressing here needs to apply at all levels of an operation or engagement. In many respects, interagency efforts at the theater or field level are as important as, or even more so than, those at higher levels of government. Although particularly true of COIN operations and any that involve either preconflict (Phase 0) or postconflict/normalization (Phase 4) activities, this judgment also applies in many instances during the intervening phases. The interaction between military and nonmilitary activities needs to be as seamless as possible; sometimes this may just be required in planning and preparation, other times instruments will need to be integrated across the entire time and activity spectrum. Indeed, as requirements increase for governance (including human rights) and development—i.e., nation-building—the requirement for cooperation across institutional boundaries also increases. This cooperation must be undertaken on a regular, day-to-day, and moment-to-moment basis; it cannot simply be episodic if it is to have significant effect.

This type of highly personalized interaction imposes significant demands on field-level structures and personnel.

### Recommendations

**Organizing at the Field Level: Fight Stovepiping.** The in-theater U.S. country team—the composition of which will vary from situation to situation—needs to be all-inclusive, able to share information and intelligence, and willing to put a premium on building and sustaining mutual confidence and respect. To the extent possible, it is also important to eliminate stovepiping within the different agencies represented, such as requirements that they routinely refer back to higher levels or to headquarters in Washington for permission to take actions that either need to be decided upon rapidly or where local expertise should trump that at the parent level. *Furthermore, eroding the stovepiping of action in the theater and field will depend heavily on reshaping the cultures of different elements of the U.S. government, and in particular the military and key civilian agencies; this cannot be accomplished at the theater and field level until it has been systematically developed at the Washington and home-agency level through training, education, and prior experience.* To the extent possible, the overall game plan, once decided and ratified at the higher levels of government, needs to be devolved to the theater and field levels for execution. This is particularly true where there is a premium on the effective interaction of personnel from different U.S. government agencies, productive relationships with nongovernmental or non-U.S. personnel, rapid and tailored responses to needs formulated by the host government, or the competition for hearts and minds. Effective interaction would be helped enormously by providing USAID with more-rapid and more-flexible contracting mechanisms in the field to allow it to respond to military complaints that civilians cannot meet the required pace of action.

**Recruit for Local Knowledge.** As noted earlier, there needs to be a premium on recruiting personnel for service in the field who can communicate in the local language(s). Also, all personnel, civilian and military, who may interact with the local population need to be given significant cultural and historical awareness training before deployment.

**Mission Clarity.** A key requirement for a successful country team is that all members of the team and the agencies and institutions they represent have coherence and clarity of mission.

**Involving Special Operations Forces.** Special operations forces (SOF) need to be engaged in the planning process and in decisions regarding roles, missions, and other activities, both civilian and military. Their specialized capabilities can provide a natural bridge between different functions and can provide a natural integrator of different approaches to achieving mission success. As the lead for synchronizing DoD efforts in the global war on terror (GWOT), the U.S. Special Operations Command plays a crucial and pivotal role. SOF must be prepared for a strategic environment characterized by geopolitical uncertainties, rapid technological advances, emerging and evolving threats, constrained resources, and evolving roles in the GWOT. Most notably, the less-visible SOF core competencies (unconventional warfare, psychological operations, foreign internal defense, special reconnaissance, and civil affairs) will take on increasingly vital roles, as they can serve to establish the conditions and backdrop to counter, deter, and potentially defeat terrorism. SOF training roles should include other U.S. government personnel in the theater and the field and, where appropriate, personnel from institutions such as NATO and the EU. In Afghanistan, small numbers of USAID personnel have been assigned directly to SOF units to assist them with economic development activities. This experiment has been successful for both sides and should be repeated in the future.

**Involving the Intelligence Community.** The Intelligence Community also needs to be engaged, in particular the Central Intelligence Agency, which is not just a gatherer and analyzer of intelligence but also a participant in policy discussions and, in conjunction with other elements of power and influence, an executor of policy in the field.

**Lines of Authority Must Be Clear.** At the same time, there need to be clear lines of authority. However, it would be difficult to impose a hard-and-fast rule. In terms of authority derived directly from the President, the local U.S. ambassador is legally supreme over all civilian and military personnel not under the authority of a unified combatant commander and should ideally be the senior officer in an interagency country team. This should be the default position, and it should apply (in practice as well as regulation) in regard to lines of authority affecting other nonmilitary U.S. government agencies. But assigning the lead to the U.S. ambassador over the senior U.S. military commander may not always be practicable, especially (1) where a conflict or other operation is being conducted in more than one country; (2) where the nature or phase of military operations argues for the primacy of the U.S. military commander (i.e., the nature of the military-civilian command relationship will vary over time as the situation on the ground evolves from kinetic to largely postkinetic operations); (3) where a coalition is engaged (e.g., the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force [ISAF] in Afghanistan); or (4) where no one country's ambassador could speak for all and where investing authority in a committee of allied ambassadors would be foolish. In any event, the practical working relationship between the U.S. ambassador and the U.S. theater-level military commander will almost always be a critical requirement for an operation's success.

**Setting Parameters and Business Rules.** These issues become particularly acute when nonmilitary personnel are working in high-risk areas. The relationship between the security-providing task and the reconstruction-development-governance tasks is inherently complex, and it is unlikely that any single template could cover the variety of different situations. Setting parameters and business rules for these situations is among the most important tasks of the country team and requires the building of mutual trust between military and civilian personnel.

**The Role of POLADS.** For a number of years, the Department of State has provided political advisors (POLADS) to a number of key U.S. military commands. These advisors are not

representatives of the Department of State but work directly for the commander. Some observers thus believe that they create only an illusion of civil-military integration and that the commands should instead have Department of State liaison officers attached to their staffs, officers who work for and represent the Department of State. There is clearly a balance to be struck, and both commanders and parent organizations need to be sensitive to the POLADs' three most useful roles: (1) independent advice to the commander from a seasoned FSO, (2) a conduit for policy and position on an official basis, and (3) feedback to the Department of State regarding important military perspectives. With this need for balance kept in mind, the useful technique of providing political advisors should be both expanded and upgraded.

**POLAD Criteria.** POLADs should be assigned not just to combatant commands but also to subordinate commands wherever that will be useful in promoting cooperation between the Department of State and the command. POLADs should be of sufficient rank and experience to be able to work effectively at senior military levels and to be taken seriously—at the senior commands, POLADs should be individuals who have already held an ambassadorial post. When political (and development, i.e., USAID) officers are assigned to subordinate commands within specific countries, they should be kept under the authority of the ambassador to ensure uniformity of political direction. This has been done successfully in Afghanistan and the model should be continued. In order to attract the best people, service as a POLAD should count toward promotion within the Foreign Service (as noted earlier, something that might need to be enacted into law).

**POLAD Corps.** The Department of State should create a POLAD Corps. Members would engage in frequent classified email exchanges and collective meetings at least twice a year. This would help to create a shared experience and to reinforce the mission of these officers to support the deployed U.S. military.

**Advisors from Other Departments.** In cases where a combatant command is likely to be engaged in operations that could require the assistance of other government agencies (e.g., USAID; the Departments of Education, Justice, or Health and Human Services; or the Drug Enforcement Administration) advisors comparable to a POLAD from those agencies should also be sent to the command. As with the POLADs, these individuals would be managed and coordinated under ambassadorial authority.

**Combatant Command Liaison.** By the same token, each of the combatant commands should have liaison officers assigned both to the Department of State and to USAID; this will serve both to increase the experience level of these officers and to ensure that the military or nonmilitary perspective is shared where activities are planned and carried out in the opposite bureaucratic-cultural environment.

**Working with Others.** The country team and its individual components also need to develop effective working relationships with field-level personnel from other governments and international institutions, as well as with representatives of both U.S. and foreign NGOs. The most productive working relationships with NGOs are developed at the lowest level of activity in the field (see discussion of NGOs below).

**The Development Advisor.** In Afghanistan, USAID created the position of Development Advisor (DEVAD) to promote integration of instruments of power and influence. The DEVADs serve at brigade, division, and corps levels, providing both general development advice and specific advice tied to USAID programming. They are the primary link between the U.S. military and USAID and as such may be called upon to represent the perspectives of the development community, including NGOs, other donors, and the UN. They work closely

with all of the headquarters staff, providing operational advice to the military planners and operations officers, technical advice to the civil-military office managing project funds, cultural advice to the intelligence and information operations officers, and direct advice to the commanding officer of the headquarters. They also provide information to USAID on military operations, concerns, and activities via the PRT office. The DEVADs work for USAID rather than for the military.

**Senior Development Advisors.** USAID has also created Senior Development Advisor (SDA) positions for each combatant command, managed through the USAID Office of Military Affairs. A Senior Foreign Service Officer, usually a former Mission Director or Deputy Mission Director, is assigned to advise the commander on USAID activities in the region and to improve program coordination and coherence. In addition to the SDA, USAID has created two more positions in the new U.S. Africa Command: a humanitarian-response officer from the Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and a program and planning advisor who will work with the military's planners. For reciprocity, each combatant command has a liaison officer stationed at USAID in the Office of Military Affairs.

## Needs and Opportunities in the Theater and in the Field

Most of the important opportunities for effectively integrating the diverse instruments of U.S. and coalition power and influence are found in the theater and in the field. In particular, it is at this level where the relationship between the kinetic aspects of an operation and the nonmilitary (or noncombat) aspects most need to be related to one another, where trade-offs must be made, and where differences in priorities and activities need to be resolved (or at least deconflicted). In a combat zone, there needs to be the closest collaboration regarding the conduct of military operations against the opponent, the provision of security for noncombat and especially civilian activities, the role that civilian activities play both in facilitating military success and the success of the overall mission, and the way in which all these tasks can be melded into an effective whole that can secure overall objectives. This is also the level at which personnel coming from outside the zone of conflict are most likely to be able to learn about local conditions, cultures, and the requirements of the affected population; it is also the level at which the greatest sensitivities need to be shown to local customs, attitudes, and outlook: The effort to win hearts and minds involves avoiding error and insensitivity as well as building on possibilities in personal interaction. The following are key observations and recommendations.

### Recommendations

**The Local Government Is Sovereign.** Outsiders first need to understand that they are in someone else's country. The power and position held by the outside military force and others will eventually be returned *in toto* to the local government and population. While the success of the mission will obviously be defined in major part in terms of securing U.S. interests and those of allies and other outside partners, pursuit of these interests must never lose sight of the enduring sovereignty of the local government. The setting of objectives, the planning of military and nonmilitary operations, the coordination of activities, and the assignment of authority and responsibilities must be done with the full involvement of the host country and, to the extent possible, be responsive to its requirements for success. In many cases, the United States (or allies and partners) will be unable or unwilling fully to accommodate the desires of

the local government, but it must not refuse to discuss these desires on their merits because of plans to do something else.

**Local Leadership Buy-In.** In approaching nation-building, it is critical to ensure that there is buy-in from leadership of the nation concerned. Outsiders can teach and train, but if the national leadership is not committed or does not believe in the methods, there is little outsiders can do to ensure the sustainment of whatever capabilities are developed. Therefore, all the activities discussed in this report need to be undertaken in a way that ensures both the decision level and the field level are addressed. That means that the coalition/U.S. team needs to mirror whatever government and/or security architecture is in place.

**Coordinating with the Central Government.** Coordination among outside actors and between them and local agencies will be effective only if overall efforts are both comprehensive and properly coordinated at the level of the central government (e.g., in Afghanistan, Kabul) and in subordinate parts of government and administration in the host country (e.g., in Afghanistan, the provinces). If the level of delivery of services or of governance is appropriate to the level of the local government at which it is being directed, the different elements will serve to reinforce one another. In Afghanistan, this has been managed by the Policy Action Group (PAG), created in June 2006 by the then commander of ISAF, General Sir David Richards (Appendix A). As originally conceived, the PAG was to operate within the Office of the President of Afghanistan and be composed of four groups, each headed by the appropriate Afghan minister, working on intelligence, security, strategic communication, and reconstruction and development, respectively. Recently less prominent as a direction and management tool, it has met regularly under the chairmanship of the Afghan president, along with key ministers, including Defense, Interior, Finance, Internal Communications, and Education. The top leaders of the outside military forces (Operation Emerging Freedom and the ISAF) and the UN (the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan [UNAMA]) have also served on the PAG, along with four key ambassadors (from the United States, Great Britain, Canada, and the Netherlands).<sup>9</sup> Such a structure, adapted to the circumstances, is needed if any multinational COIN operation is to be effective in bringing together both civilian and military efforts by the host nation and outsiders within the theater and, by extension, in the field.

**Dealing with Neighboring Countries.** This requirement also extends to the region where the conflict/intervention is taking place. Rarely will situations such as those being surveyed here be contained solely within the borders of a single country. In Afghanistan, for example, success is not possible unless a host of challenges is also met and mastered in regard to its neighbor, Pakistan. Thus coordination and coherence of effort needs, to the degree possible, to proceed on a regional basis. This could be pursued through an extension of the principle and practice of a group such as the PAG—e.g., the Joint Afghan-Pakistan Action Group proposed to the Afghan government but not implemented.

**Those on the Ground Best Understand Local Needs: Empower Them.** Higher levels of U.S. and allied command need to understand that local commanders (military and civilian) are usually in the best position to assess local needs and opportunities within the overall framework of an operation and practical issues regarding military and nonmilitary activities, including the provision of security for nation-building and other nonkinetic operations. The emphasis on tactical flexibility and on devolving authority and responsibility to the lowest level

<sup>9</sup> See Carlotta Gall, “General Takes Long View in Afghanistan,” *International Herald Tribune*, October 16, 2006.

practicable not only applies to military operations; it is also important for nonmilitary activities and personnel and for the cooperative relationships and activities with nongovernmental and non-U.S. individuals and entities (e.g., NATO, the EU, UN, etc.). In many cases, this devolving of responsibility will be critical for the success of hearts and minds efforts targeted at the local population. Of course, this argument for devolving authority and responsibility does not mean *carte blanche* for field operators, but it does mean significant trust in judgments made by competent people on the ground.

**Devolve Tactical Flexibility.** To the extent there is genuine agreement on overall goals and objectives for the intervention, it should be easier for the home governments to grant some tactical flexibility on the ground regarding how to pursue them. By contrast, disagreements among coalition partners as to what would constitute success are likely to lead to a tactical rigidity that diminishes the chances of achieving anyone's definition of success.

**Training and More Training.** A major factor of success in the theater and the field is proper and adequate training for field-level personnel. This must include both training units and individuals in their separate military and nonmilitary organizations and training them together. It also needs to include training in a wide range of civilian skills for military units and personnel likely to be engaged with a local population. Although whenever possible it is better to rely on personnel or units specifically adept at performing these functions, this will often not be feasible because of the pace of combat operations or the added demands of providing security protection for nonmilitary personnel working in a combat zone.

**Flexibility in Resource Allocation.** This flexibility in effort, activity, and coordination of different actors must also extend to resources, as well as to the roles, missions, and authorities of U.S. government agencies beyond DoD, the Department of State, and USAID. The issue is not just the need to recruit personnel from other agencies and to draw them into country-team work in order to forge cooperative efforts to the same ends; it is also about providing and allocating resources so major decisions about their use and the effects they produce can be made in the theater and in the field, as requirements, opportunities, and changes in circumstance dictate. For many U.S. government agencies in Washington, this would require a major bureaucratic leap in the dark (and Congress would also likely be loath to cede this authority), but experience has shown the need to do so to promote a totally integrated U.S. effort. Thus significant authority for allocating resources should be devolved to the military and civilian commanders in the field, with as many key decisions as possible made by the country team. This also means that significant resources must be made available within this framework of flexible allocation.

**USAID's Special Requirements.** Effective use of civilian resources in the field requires expanding USAID's capacity to manage its funds. At present, USAID staff design a program, hire a partner organization (NGO or contractor) to implement the program, and provide fiscal and programmatic oversight of the partner until its completion. In Iraq and Afghanistan, USAID's program budgets are significant, yet staffing levels have not increased, resulting in USAID's hiring partners to manage multiple subcontracts or subgrants that USAID would normally manage directly. The outsourcing of program management authority means that USAID officers at the provincial level have virtually no influence over programs operating in their area. USAID not only needs to regain the ability to manage smaller-sized programs through staffing increases, but also must restructure its management system to allow staff working at the subnational level to manage directly the smaller programs that are now handled at great additional cost by the large implementation partners. This will permit better integra-

tion of power and influence at the subnational level because the military already has this ability, and it has proved effective. At the same time, USAID's contracting restrictions are inhibiting its effectiveness and need to be redesigned for wartime. Requiring competitive bidding by U.S. firms, procuring U.S. goods, and restricting the uses of funds has significantly limited USAID's capacity to execute critical programs quickly on the ground. Moreover, spending money locally on goods and services can be critical to restarting an economy stalled by war or political collapse. Funds need to be structured along the lines of USAID's disaster assistance capacity, which allows for quick responses by the U.S. government to issues that were not considered when the budget requests went to Congress two years earlier. The current system does not allow people on the ground to react to crises as they occur. Further, USAID is an implementation agency for development activities, but in Iraq and Afghanistan, it must take on major responsibilities for strategic thinking and crisis response. The senior staff must be able to assess a program's strategic as well as its technical impact on U.S. policy in the country. It must understand the implications of funding decisions on the conflict or crisis. If USAID is to succeed, its senior staff must be trained to think beyond implementation.

**CERP Funding and a Better Way.** At the moment, U.S. military commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan are authorized to spend up to \$977,441,000 in FY08 for the Commanders' Emergency Relief Program (CERP) for "urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements."<sup>10</sup> While seemingly substantial, these funds are still inadequate when measured against the size of both the task and the opportunity to affect attitudes and critical local-population relationships on the ground, which may matter most in determining overall success, especially in the nonmilitary aspects of the mission. To be truly effective, however, the use of these funds should be subject to coordination with the local U.S. ambassador and fit within an overall program plan. Furthermore, the emphasis should be on enabling the Department of State and USAID, which have no comparable flexible funding, to assume more of the effort. Currently, too much of the burden of meeting rapidly changing developmental and humanitarian requirements falls to the military. Funding should thus be increased by an order of magnitude for the Department of State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and for USAID's OFDA and Office of Transition Initiatives.

**They Build a Road, We Gain an Ally.** An important observation from experience in Afghanistan is that infrastructure projects, and especially road-building efforts, have proved to be highly productive investments, in part because of the impact both on the local economy and on governance. Road building is particularly effective where outside resources are used to enable local contractors and people to build the roads, thus creating a sense of ownership and, in turn, opposition to insurgent or terrorist efforts to destroy these elements of economic opportunity. This is not a prescription with universal application, however. In general, large-scale infrastructure projects may be too expensive, too slow to produce growth, too dependent on foreign labor, and unlikely to be maintained adequately by the host governments unless they are funded by loans not grants, multilaterally not bilaterally, and are the result of formal agreements with the host government. There may be little value in building electrical generating plants if there is no system in place for charging for electricity and without the discipline to use the revenue generated by the plant to maintain and amortize it. Emergency repairs to existing infrastructure should be an early nation-building priority; creating new infrastructure

<sup>10</sup> Public Law 110-181, *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008*, Sec. 1205. Reauthorization of Commanders' Emergency Response Program, January 8, 2008.

should generally be left to the World Bank and other such organizations. However, for short-term priorities, these organizations lack the funding and the flexibility to respond quickly.

**Moving Money from One Agency to Another.** Significant funds also need to be available to U.S. officials on the ground to transfer resources from one agency's account to another, where judged *by the country team* to be likely to be most effective. Current authorities to do this are woefully inadequate. We have already noted the limit on transfers by DoD to the Department of State of funds for key foreign-assistance activities to \$200 million annually, along with our recommendation that such funds (with a major increase) be appropriated directly to the Department of State and USAID. Of course, Congress would be reluctant to delegate this type of fiscal authority to such a junior level, but this is an area where Congress needs to play a central role in the modernization of U.S. instruments of power and influence abroad. Ideally, there should be a country-team financial account of significant size, administered jointly by the local U.S. ambassador and the combatant commander, that is structured in a way that enables them to make rapid judgments about the best application of these resources to meet both strategic and tactical objectives.

**Flexibility in Deploying Personnel from Different Agencies.** The same joint decision-making should apply to the deployment of U.S. personnel from other agencies, to best combined effect. Of course, this presupposes that relevant agencies will provide significant resources and personnel, as determined in the first instance by country-team leaders on the ground. This applies in particular to resources from such key agencies as the Departments of Justice, Health and Human Services, and Agriculture and the National Institutes of Health and, where appropriate, the Drug Enforcement Administration.

**Conservation of Experience.** A critical factor governing an intervention's chances of success, both in combat situations where the integration or coordination of military and nonmilitary instruments of power and influence is engaged and in either preconflict or postconflict nation-building situations, is conservation of experience. Often, military units and nonmilitary personnel develop skills and modes of operation that are not dictated by the rule book or capable of being taught in a classroom or through predeployment briefings. Similarly, they develop relationships with national and local government officials, tribal/clan leaders, and the local population that are highly instrumental at any phase of combat. These, too, cannot be taught or even easily passed on from one unit or individual to another.

**Making the Best of Lessons Learned and Best Practices.** A high premium should be put on lessons learned and best practices, which need to be rigorously developed, validated, and assiduously passed on. This needs to be done especially at the theater and field levels, including indoctrination of incoming units and senior personnel. It also needs to be done in training in the United States made widely available among commands and in service and national security education (e.g., the service graduate schools and the National Defense University).

**Extending Some Tours of Duty to Conserve Experience.** There is also value in extending tours of duty of both military and nonmilitary personnel where these units and individuals are engaged with local leaders and civilian populations or where the interaction of military and nonmilitary activities are of significant importance, especially nation-building in insecure areas. This is a controversial recommendation: It is dictated, however, by observed results, both positive and negative. In particular, successful practices and productive relationships developed by individual military units in Iraq and Afghanistan or by civilian agents are difficult to hand off to successors, even with several weeks' overlap. Lore can be learned, but it is hard to teach. And relationships with local leaders, officials, military, and civilian populations that are based

on trust are difficult to transfer. Further, extended tours of duty can assist in obtaining buy-in from local leaders and populations because this provides a more consistent approach. Outsiders come and go, bringing good intentions and then leaving, and then others arrive with different methods, perhaps placing emphasis on different activities. This can cause a loss of focus and a deterioration of productive relationships that were difficult to develop. Senior personnel returning to the theater need, as much as possible, to return to areas and functions where they can use previously gained experience and contacts.

**Balancing Requirements: Experience and Morale.** Commanders (both civilian and military) thus need to make fine judgments regarding which units and individual personnel are most important for providing continuity; they must also make fine judgments regarding the balance between preserving these capabilities and the potential degrading of morale among long-serving personnel. Of course, units and individuals, especially those engaged in combat, must at some point be rotated, as a critical matter of morale, fairness, the need for refitting, and maintenance of capacities. This argues for the creation of cadres of individuals that can provide continuity through the education of follow-on leadership and by making introductions to local contacts. Specialists can be recruited for this purpose and provided with added incentives for long service in theater.

## Provincial Reconstruction Teams

One of the most notable inventions in recent years, apposite to this report, is the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). They are in wide use in Iraq, as well as in 26 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces (see Appendix B). Typically, a PRT consists of a joint civil-military leadership group representing the Department of State, USAID, and DoD, supported by a core unit of military security providers that defend the PRT itself, if needed, and help provide limited protection for local populations prepared to work with the PRT or the broader Operation Iraqi Freedom or ISAF mission. Opinions about PRTs are strongly divided.

### PRTs Are a Plus

One view is that the PRTs have proved effective in gaining the active involvement of allies and partners in Afghanistan: Indeed, it is true that most PRTs are administered by countries other than the United States. Amalgamated with the PRT are experts and specialists, some military, some nonmilitary, whose role according to this view is to work effectively with the local leadership and populations in a wide range of activities that can include mentoring local government officials, gathering intelligence, building mutually trusting relationships, meeting some of the basic needs of local populations, and serving as cadre elements for more-ambitious construction, infrastructure, and other nation-building projects. The PRT is at the center of efforts to gain the support of the population's hearts and minds for its government.

### PRTs Militarize Civilian Tasks

Another view is that PRTs amount to a militarization of civilian tasks and have led to a blurring of the distinction between political-military and humanitarian objectives. According to this view, there is a fundamental lack of clarity about the roles and functions of PRTs and how they relate to the quite distinct processes of securing the ground, stabilization, reconstruction, and development; some would argue that they are not so much PRTs as "PSTs"—i.e., Pro-

vincial Security Teams—and should essentially be concerned with securing the ground and stabilization activities rather than reconstruction and development. Critics of PRTs argue that the often unrealistic expectations about what PRTs can hope to achieve lead to their deployment across a wide range of different security environments, sometimes inappropriately. For example, some critics argue that, while PRTs might have been appropriate for the relatively benign conditions found in northern Afghanistan, they were certainly not appropriate for the war-fighting environment of the southern and eastern regions of the country.

### **Still, They Are Useful**

A third view is that PRTs are a useful device for delivering assistance in circumstances of high insecurity. However, it is clearly preferable for the military first to establish a generally secure environment in which civilian agencies can circulate freely without the need to live in military casernes, travel in military convoys, wear flak vests and helmets, and behave in large measure as if they were military personnel. If an insurgency has already taken root, then the PRT model gains credence as a useful tool. If it has not—according to this view—then the military should focus on creating enough ambient security so that civilians do not need to live and travel in a military cocoon.

### **Recommendations**

Whichever of these positions one takes—and there is at least some validity to each of them—the following are our key recommendations regarding PRTs, based on experience in Iraq and Afghanistan:

**Tailor PRTs to Local Conditions.** First, they need to be tailored to local conditions; there can be no one-size-fits-all model. (This should not, however, simply be a reflection of the lead nation's way of conducting business.) The best decisions regarding the best combination of tasks to be performed, skills to be deployed, balance to be struck between military and non-military personnel, and size and resources of a PRT will be made by those on the ground, often as the result of trial and error. However, agreement on common major purposes is important in advance of a PRT deployment, as is a well-integrated civil-military approach to the goal.

**Not a Band-Aid.** PRTs should not be seen as a substitute for more-robust efforts by aid agencies, a lack of military personnel, or as half measures for more encompassing reforms that need to be undertaken by central, regional, or local governments.

**Transparency and Buy-In.** The activities of PRTs need to be fully transparent to the host government and conducted in cooperation with it. Indeed, much of the benefits gained through a PRT effort, however successful in the short term, may be lost if the host nation's leadership is not engaged in the process and does not experience direct benefit. This process can be aided by continuity in foreign personnel.

**Bigger Is Better.** In general regarding PRTs, bigger is better. Experience in Afghanistan has shown that several PRTs have been inadequately staffed and resourced or—to put the point positively—more staff and more resources could have produced better results. Indeed, where they prove to be useful, PRTs should be a significant charge on funding for hearts-and-minds operations.

**Sometimes CORDS Would Work Better.** In some cases, in fact, the structure and resourcing of a PRT may be insufficient because of its limited design and compass. Indeed, the Vietnam-era model of Civil Operations Rural Development Support (CORDS) may in some circumstances be more likely to prove successful.

**Develop PRT Doctrine.** DoD, the Department of State, and USAID need jointly to develop clear and precise doctrine about the missions, structure, operations, and activities of a PRT or similar civil-military model. Ideas should be elicited from the UN, NATO, NGOs, international organizations, and the Iraqi and Afghan governments.

**Passing on PRT Lessons Learned and Best Practices.** Much has already been done in both Iraq and Afghanistan to develop lessons learned and best practices. This effort should be continued and expanded, including efforts directed at the training of units and personnel to be deployed to a combat zone in which PRTs are to be used. A training school of excellence regarding PRTs should be created for both U.S. and non-U.S. personnel—e.g., at the NATO School at Oberammergau, Germany (see the discussion on Allied Command Transformation below). As part of the lessons learned and best practices process, there should be widespread sharing of information and experience, as well as the development of a template of both minimum and optimal requirements for the creation and operation of any PRT, in addition to tailoring for the specific requirements and opportunities of each PRT.

## Nongovernmental Organizations

As used within the context of our discussions, the term *NGO* refers to nonprofit groups and institutions that are either involved on their own or are prepared to be involved in conflict situations, including preconflict and postconflict phases, to help meet the needs of a civilian population. However, the blanket term *NGO* cannot begin to describe the variety of roles, capabilities and activities of different organizations:

- Some have a purely humanitarian mandate—e.g., the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which strictly speaking is not an NGO at all but a form of intergovernmental organization, or *Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders*.
- Some have the dual mandate of providing both humanitarian and development assistance—e.g., Save the Children, Oxfam, or the Red Cross/Red Crescent Federation and its national societies, including Magen David Adom.
- The primary mission of others is to provide support for civil society—e.g., Transparency International, the National Endowment for Democracy (U.S.), or the German political party foundations (*Stiftungen*).

### What NGOs Can Contribute

In pursuit of U.S. interests and activities in a conflict area or those of institutions like NATO, the EU, or the UN, many NGOs can be of significant value in helping to secure strategic, political, and economic objectives. These objectives can be of instrumental as well as humanitarian value, ranging from caring for the sick and injured to the building of infrastructure, homes, schools, and hospitals, to providing investment for locally owned businesses, to advising governments on modernization and reform—indeed, the full range of activities is often summarized as nation-building. The efforts of NGOs can go even further, helping to promote success in efforts that cluster under the concept of hearts and minds—not just absolutely (that is, improvement of people’s lives will help them be less vulnerable to the appeals of insurgents or terrorists), but also relatively (that is, convincing people to be more favorable toward the

local government or to the intervening nation or alliance, such as U.S. military forces and civilians, NATO, etc.).

### **Which NGOs Will Work with the Military**

One critical element of NGOs, especially relevant here, is that they are what their name states: nongovernmental. This term usually does not merely refer to the structure of the organization and to its sources of funding (and many do directly or indirectly receive funding from governments) but rather to a quality of independence from government influence, much less control. The degree of independence sought or required by NGOs operating in conflict areas varies considerably. Those with a purely humanitarian mandate will find this decision to be relatively uncomplicated—and they will tend to keep their distance from any government—whereas, for the dual-mandate organizations, the balance between their humanitarian-assistance and their political-development roles will be harder to strike; the dilemmas they face may accordingly be more acute.

Thus at one end of the spectrum are those NGOs that are prepared to work closely with the U.S. government or with other governments and international institutions in the kinds of situations covered by this report. Such working relationships can even include coalescence around common goals, objectives, and specific activities. At the other end of the spectrum are those NGOs that want nothing to do with any government lest that connection either prejudice their neutrality or, worse, make them targets. This end of the spectrum especially includes many humanitarian NGOs. Some will oppose conflict, *per se*, although their activities can promote hearts and minds and nation-building objectives that are naturally advanced through their humanitarian and human-rights work. Some NGOs are prepared to accept security protection from the United States, NATO, etc.; others want no protection at all, judging—correctly or not—that engagement with a military or other security-providing force could create a greater risk of attack than would operating without outside protection.

### **NGOs Can Do Things Government Agencies Cannot**

The essential point here is that the nature of particular relationships with NGOs is less important than what the NGOs are able to achieve in support of shared goals: The results are what matters, whoever brings them about or whoever gets credit for them. Independence should be acknowledged—and indeed embraced—as contributing to greater NGO effectiveness rather than being seen as an obstacle.

### **Recommendations**

**The Range of NGO Engagement.** With regard to the engagement of NGOs, in general, *integration* of effort will rarely be possible. More often, it will fall somewhere along the spectrum of *coalescence, collaboration, cooperation, and information sharing*. Words matter: The willingness of some NGOs to take part in (or even to continue preexisting) independent activities in conflict zones can depend on how their roles are characterized. Indeed, there will be circumstances in which the objectives of an intervening nation (e.g., the United States) or alliance will be better served through the development of a readily deployable expeditionary civilian capacity that can be deployed together with the military (e.g., CANADEM).<sup>11</sup> In certain situations,

<sup>11</sup> See CANADEM's Web site (<http://canadem.ca>)

this is potentially more effective than trying to get NGOs to cooperate with the military. There will also be circumstances in which particular NGOs may cause more harm than good from the perspective of the overall mission; for example, if their activities alienate the host government or population or if they unwisely become exposed to threat situations from which they have to be rescued.

**Get to Know the NGOs in Advance.** Well in advance of a possible conflict, the United States and international institutions should develop databases on relevant NGOs that include their capabilities, where they are prepared to operate, and the conditions they impose on relations with, say, the U.S. military and other U.S. government agencies or the EU and NATO. Long-term relations should ideally be built up with relevant NGOs to encourage mutual trust and confidence and to help build a second database regarding what can be expected of NGO involvement in conflict or other military-deployment situations. For the EU, this should be executed through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). For NATO, this should be undertaken in the first instance by ACT and, for actual engagements, by Allied Command Operations and subordinate commands (e.g., ISAF in Afghanistan).

**NGO Contacts Should Come Through Nonmilitary Agencies.** As a general proposition, initial U.S. contacts with NGOs should, at the national level, be conducted by nonmilitary agencies (e.g., the Department of State, USAID, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the National Institutes of Health). European governments should follow the same approach, and, where international institutions are involved, the hierarchy of choice should be the UN, the EU, and then NATO. At the Washington level, there should be liaison officers responsible for contacts with NGOs included in all the relevant agencies as well as at the NSC.

**Some NGOs Can Cause Problems.** The United States, international institutions, and field actors, both military and civilian, will also need to judge which NGOs are capable of acting effectively in theater and which may simply make matters worse—for example, creating added security requirements without contributing significantly to humanitarian or nation-building activities. If these NGOs cannot be discouraged, they should be steered clear of.

**NGOs and Planning.** Wherever possible and appropriate, selected NGOs should be involved in the process of planning operations at the Washington level, at least for the purposes of information sharing. At the in-theater level, to the extent possible and to the extent they are willing to do so, NGOs should be involved in day-to-day planning and, respecting their particular roles, execution. The exchange of information and cooperation in activities has been accomplished extensively in Afghanistan, especially on the nonmilitary side of ISAF operations. It can also be useful to include significant amounts of NGO activity in PRTs, appropriately supported, coordinated, or at least deconflicted with other activities.

## Private Contractors

In conflict zones, the use of private contractors to undertake a multitude of duties is nothing new: It has been developing for many years as a significant adjunct to deployed forces. Iraq is a case in point, where the United States employs more private contractors (most of whom are Iraqis) than there are troops deployed in country. (Of course, it can be argued that many NGOs are also private contractors. But we are considering them to be separate as the terms are used here, and there are useful distinctions that will become apparent in the following discus-

sion). The types and roles of private contractors vary widely, and there can be few hard-and-fast rules regarding their use. They have proved their value to the U.S. military through undertaking some tasks whose performance by uniformed personnel would detract from skills and training of those personnel—e.g., catering and logistical transport in noncombat areas.

Obviously, private contractors can also be of value in practical aspects of nation-building, especially in construction, where military forces lack comparative value, and even where the use of CIMIC or skilled reserve forces would be less efficient. As observed in several conflict situations, the use of local contractors can also have a positive political as well as economic benefit at the local and national level, as part of appealing to hearts and minds. Private contractors can also play a useful role in the training of local personnel, including military, paramilitary, police, governmental, administrative, and civilian.

### Recommendations

**Factor In Potential Contractor Roles.** In advance of an operation, as part of both military and nonmilitary requirements, the potential roles and missions of private contractors should be taken into account to the degree that these requirements can be foreseen. Planning should include their roles, and representatives of this sector should be called upon for advice and counsel in this process.

**Create Relationships in Advance and Set Standards.** A cadre of planners for private-sector involvement should be created on a permanent basis, with U.S. government interagency liaison to appropriate professional groups. The U.S. should create a single set of rules, regulations, and standards for contracts with nongovernmental entities and individuals that will be uniform across U.S. government agencies, as a matter of both efficiency and integrity.

**Armed Contractors Must Be Subject to the Discipline and Control of DoD or the Department of State.** The activities of contracted U.S. private-sector trainers of local military, paramilitary, and police trainers should be rigorously supervised by U.S. military or civilian officials (e.g., operating under the authority of the local U.S. ambassador), and their activities should thus be coordinated with overall country-team policies and practices. As became a political issue in regard to the conflict in Iraq during 2007 (with negative consequences both in Iraq and in the United States), the role of private contractors in providing security, including for U.S. government personnel, is particularly sensitive. Thus, within the theater of operations, any U.S.-contracted or employed security personnel authorized to carry weapons should be part of the U.S. military establishment, come under military authority, and be subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Security personnel assigned to help protect employees of the Department of State or other U.S. nonmilitary employees should be part of Department of State's Departmental Security and be subject to all of its rules and regulations. In either case, these authorities will not be effective unless the ancillary tools are created and fully funded, including appropriate legislation, a basis for jurisdiction, investigative capacity, and judicial processes, procedures, and institutions. It must be understood that this proposal will impose significant personnel requirements both on DoD and the Department of State, but we judge this to be a cost worth bearing.

**The Economic Trade-Off.** One reason for the heavy reliance on private contractors, including in areas where the rationale is not either to prevent a diversion of skilled military personnel or to draw upon capacities where the private sector has a comparative advantage (e.g., construction), is to obviate the need either for a significantly larger standing military or a greater reliance on reserve forces, both of which have domestic political costs in the United States.

Notably, the tradeoff here is, at least in part, between this political cost and the economic cost of higher salaries and benefits that must be paid to attract civilians, especially to perform tasks in danger zones. However, the panel of senior practitioners judges that any conflict that is worthwhile for the United States engage in is a conflict worthy of the engagement of U.S. society, even where this imposes increased burdens on Americans of military service or of civilian service in combat zones. Indeed, such calculations should be an instrumental part of deciding whether or not to engage in conflict or otherwise to deploy military forces abroad in circumstances where there is no direct threat to the homeland.



## International Cooperation

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In the circumstances considered in this report, it is certainly true that the conduct of operations in Phase 0 and Phase 4 cannot be left to the military alone, and the success of all military operations covered by this report will be enhanced throughout all phases by effectively bringing to bear different elements of power and influence and integrating their engagement according to a common plan to achieve clear and agreed objectives. In the common phrase, such cooperation, coordination, and integration can be an important *force multiplier* or, more appropriately, an important *security multiplier*.

### The Multiplier Effect

Activities and actions conducted by the various instruments of the United States can be further multiplied by the engagement of non-U.S. agents and assets. In some cases, useful instruments, especially nonmilitary instruments, are available to other countries as much as, or even more than, they are to the United States. Further, the effective engagement of non-U.S. assets can help to spread costs, both material and human, and that fact, along with the accompanying political signal that the United States is not acting in isolation, can help to build and sustain support for operations among Congress and the American people. *Of course, presenting this proposition also brings with it an immediate requirement: That the U.S. goals for promoting security and the means by which it intends to accomplish those goals must also gain the approval of countries and other entities whose participation and support the United States seeks to enlist.* That is not a foregone conclusion in any circumstance. Even within an alliance as tightly bound as NATO, the interests of various allies will differ, as international disagreement over the Iraq War and its aftermath in recent years clearly attests. There also were differences of some degree even during the Cold War, despite the existence of an overarching and common concern about the possible encroachment of Soviet/communist power and ideology.

The framework for cooperation must be created, developed, and nurtured at all levels, from intergovernmental interactions (e.g., about the purposes of a military intervention, its extent, its requirements, its methods of being pursued, the definition of success, the potential duration of involvement, and the terms under which engagement can be brought to an end) to the lowest-level cooperation at the field level.

### Balancing Values

For the United States, there is often an important, even necessary, trade-off between choosing unilaterally to set the terms and conditions for intervention and garnering the support of allies,

partners, international institutions, and others (e.g., NGOs), whether military or nonmilitary. *In the situations considered here, we believe the balance should generally be struck in terms of accepting at least some limits on independence of decision in order to gain support from others.*

### **Transatlantic Strategic Relations**

Regardless of the nature of relations and authorities regarding combat and postcombat situations and regardless of whether the United States were to decide in any particular circumstance to act alone or with others, there would be great value in regular, senior-level discussions among key partners, especially across the Atlantic, about overall strategic issues, including potential crises or conflicts and the ramifications both for the use of force and for the bringing to bear of other instruments. Ideally, this should be done at NATO, as was often true before the 2003 Iraq crisis. It also needs to be done through a new strategic partnership between the United States and the EU, in recognition of the immense nonmilitary capabilities of nations on both sides of the Atlantic, especially in health, education, nation-building, and governance, that are buttressed by strong domestic economies, democratic governments, and societies underpinned by moral values and human rights.

### **Some General Principles for International Cooperation**

**Lines of Authority.** Within the conflict zone in the theater, lines of authority need to be clear and mutually agreed upon concerning the military side of operations. These demands can be particularly acute when two or more institutions are working together—e.g., the UN, NATO, and the EU—each with its own procedures and culture. On the nonmilitary side, arrangements for command/coalescence/cooperation also need to be as clear as possible. Since NATO lacks the experience, personnel, or mandate for promoting economic development and the UN and EU have no capacity or willingness to assume coordination of military and developmental tasks, there also need to be functional arrangements for combining the two sets of activities into as coherent a whole as possible.

**Engaging the Host Government.** These arrangements need to include representatives of the host government. In Afghanistan, this responsibility is at least nominally vested in the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, co-chaired by the Afghan Government and the UN.

**The United States Is Only One Voice and Vote.** In circumstances where international cooperation/engagement is part of the overall effort, the U.S. country team can only be one player among others in terms of setting directions, making and executing plans, and fostering coherence and cooperation. Given that the United States will often be in a leadership position simply because of the size and character of its military and nonmilitary involvement, it will often be the dominant actor in such efforts. But, as with dealing with local officials and civilian populations, U.S. leadership needs to be exercised deftly and with as much listening as talking. European allies must also recognize that the degree of their influence will depend in part on their willingness to contribute resources, military or nonmilitary.

**Getting Allies to Delegate Authority.** Many structural changes are required if the desired improvements to coordination policies are to become a reality on the ground. Since sovereign nations will not let one party or individual call the tune, nations need to delegate substantial authority to their local representatives to resolve disputes. In the U.S. case, the ambassador has much of the authority required to coordinate USAID efforts. However, EU nations have developmental ministries or agencies separate from their foreign ministries; one needs to be placed clearly in the lead. This tends to be difficult, but if nations cannot resolve lines of authority

within their own local representations, it is unrealistic to think that international agreement on who calls the tune can be reached. Both NATO and developmental agencies need sufficient staff to manage these enhanced coordination responsibilities. NATO needs to resolve unclear lines of authority between its Senior Civilian Representative (e.g., in Afghanistan) and the military staff concerning the responsibility for coordination with other national assistance agencies.

**Difficulties in Coordinating Nonmilitary Activities.** As a rule, nonmilitary activities are more difficult to coordinate than are military activities. It is important to designate a central coordination point for these nonmilitary activities, in some circumstances vested in a single, high-level individual of ministerial rank who is able to speak for major outside entities (e.g., governments and other international resource providers) and also able to work effectively with the host government. This individual could be a representative from the UN or the EU, or it could be someone deriving authority from both of these institutions, from NATO (in Afghanistan, ISAF), and from the local government. In Afghanistan, it has been clear for some time that such a high-level representative, able to coordinate external development assistance, is required for the success of that part of the mission concerned with development-reconstruction-governance.

**Information Problems.** One problem that has proved difficult to resolve in all of the situations we have reviewed is the need for adequate sharing of information among all major participants in operations, both military and nonmilitary. This does not mean sharing information about military strategy and tactics with nonmilitary organizations and individuals, but it does mean creating the means for those with a need to know to have the information they need to execute their own part of the overall task and to contribute their own ideas toward a common effort. Inadequate information sharing can also affect the security of nonmilitary personnel. At the same time, senior commands must take care to avoid overloading the field with requests for information. The ability of a large headquarters to send multiple email requests to a single officer in a PRT is staggering, and it can lead to the affected officer having to choose between doing and reporting. Higher levels also need to flow information downward so that personnel at the field level have a full picture of what is happening economically and politically around them. Hence, there must be a combination of expanding the field-level capacity, including civilians working for the Department of State and USAID, to report broadly, plus restraint on the part of headquarters staffs with regard to demanding excessive amounts of data from the field.

**Intelligence Sharing.** Intelligence sharing is a related problem. It can, of course, be critical; just as obvious is the fact that all governments, not just the United States, are chary of sharing intelligence, even of relatively low import, with other governments, much less with international institutions or NGOs. Their concerns go beyond protecting sources and methods to include the tendency of intelligence organizations to view their product as a valuable coin in their relations with other intelligence organizations. Within the framework we are considering, finding ways around both the information-sharing and intelligence-sharing roadblocks has proved particularly daunting. Of course, intelligence can be sanitized in order to direct action, and, in general, the default rule should be that “more sharing is better.” Here, the United States has special responsibilities, both because it will generally have superior intelligence-gathering capabilities, though not necessarily with regard to human intelligence, where other allies can have better access and understanding, and it will usually be the lead nation in a combined military operation. Often, however, the United States is reluctant to create the necessary intel-

ligence-sharing relationships. In Afghanistan, for instance, this is a problem in U.S. military cooperation with EU components. The cardinal requirement is mutual trust, which can only be developed through experience.

**C<sup>4</sup>ISR Issues.** The issue of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C<sup>4</sup>ISR) is closely related to that of information sharing. The C<sup>4</sup>ISR issue is of central importance in any operation and failing to get it right is a common, even endemic, problem. This is true even within the U.S. military services and as between them and nonmilitary U.S. agencies. It is compounded in U.S. relations with other nations and institutions, to say nothing of nongovernmental entities. The problem even exists in relations between NATO and the EU institutions of CFSP and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), in spite of the fact that 21 of the 27 members of the EU are NATO members! The problem has four main parts: hardware, software, business rules (protocols), and need to know. At the very least, operations in theater need to be supported by common and compatible hardware and as much open-source software as possible. Business rules should be established to determine which entities within an overall operation will have access to what information (on a need-to-know basis), but as much information as possible should be routinely shared consistent with military and other legitimate security requirements. In every operation, there should be a team dedicated to sorting out these issues, and the United States and European countries should be prepared to make available the equipment needed for cooperation in information sharing to be as effective as possible.

**Standardization and Interoperability.** With military (and some nonmilitary) activities, problems often arise regarding the coordination of actions across national and other boundaries because of incompatible equipment, including but not limited to C<sup>4</sup>ISR. Indeed, the problems are even more acute than during the Cold War, since operations involving more than one nation's deployed units now entail close interaction at very low levels in the chain of command, even down to the squad or individual level. It is essential that efforts to promote standardization and interoperability be intensified at the institutional level, including the politically charged issue of sharing high technology, especially as between the United States and its NATO allies; this is particularly important in theater, with C<sup>4</sup>ISR the most important area of concern.

**Technology Transfer and Defense Trade.** At the same time, transfers of high technology continue to be inadequate to meet the requirements of military cooperation. The United States imposes more limitations than other states, but many others impose their own limitations. The United States has made significant progress during the Bush administration, especially the President's Export Control Directive of January 2008.<sup>1</sup> More progress in this area is needed, however, and both NATO and the EU (the latter both within Europe and across the Atlantic) have a good distance to go. Similarly, on both sides of the Atlantic, there need to be new rules of the road that will provide greater opportunities for defense trade, which in turn can help to avoid the twin evils of a Fortress America or Fortress Europe and at the same time help to preserve national-defense industrial bases. In many countries, this is important for sustaining parliamentary support for defense spending.

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<sup>1</sup> U.S. Department of State, "President Issues Export Controls Directive to Reform U.S. Defense Trade Policies and Practices," press release, January 22, 2008.

## The United Nations

For virtually all countries, including NATO allies, the authority or imprimatur of the UN Security Council, whether acting under Chapter VI (advisory) or Chapter VII (enforcement) of the UN Charter, is an essential domestic political requirement for engaging in military operations abroad: It is the political validator *nonpareil*. There have been exceptions, such as NATO's military operations in and about Kosovo in 1999, when the UN Security Council was unable to act because of the threat of a veto by Russia and perhaps also by China. But the Alliance still wanted to use force. The conduct of NATO air operations without a UN mandate is likely to be the "exception that proves the rule" rather than serve as a model for NATO action. (Later, a UN Security Council mandate was secured before NATO troops entered Kosovo as part of KFOR.) This perceived requirement for NATO allies has been intensified following the invasion of Iraq, and indeed U.S. and coalition forces have been operating there under a UN mandate since the end of the initial occupation.

After the United States, the UN is the principal provider of military forces in foreign interventions, with nearly 100,000 soldiers and police currently deployed in some 20 operations. It is the leading provider of international police and of police training around the world. For instance, NATO looked to the UN to provide the international police in both Bosnia and Kosovo. The absence of a substantial international police presence in Afghanistan and Iraq has been a significant obstacle to progress in those countries and has placed additional strains on the U.S. military and others as they attempt to fill this gap.

The UN also helps to conduct, supervise, and validate elections, sometimes in parallel with NGOs and sometimes on its own. It has also long played a critical role in both political transitions and in transitions from conflict to peacekeeping. The United States has, for example, twice handed off military interventions in Haiti to the UN, in 1995 and 2004, once the insertion of international forces had been assured under U.S. leadership. Indeed, despite the often-derogatory comments made about the UN by some commentators in the United States, its work relieves the United States of major burdens in many parts of the world.

Because of its long experience in a number of roles directly affecting the issues raised in this report, the UN perspective should almost always be called upon and, unless there are reasons to the contrary, heeded, at least as a guidepost to what is possible, what can most usefully be done, and what errors are to be avoided.

### Planning and Coordination

Where there is possibility of cooperation with the UN and its agencies, they should be involved at all levels of planning. There is merit in creating an exchange of permanent liaison staff, at a senior level, as between the UN on the one hand and NATO and the EU on the other (as well as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe). UN representatives should also be part of international coordinating mechanisms in the field. Often, the UN's involvement will be politically reassuring (and perhaps essential) to the host government.

### The Lead Role for the UN?

There can be merit, in circumstances where it is possible, in promoting the UN as the principal security actor. The UN does not undertake invasions, however, or conduct COIN operations. For this type of mission, coalitions led by an individual state or an alliance will be necessary. Even when the UN is not the lead military actor, there may be advantage in giving it the lead-

ing political role, as the Clinton administration did in Kosovo and the Bush administration did in Afghanistan. Even in Iraq, where the Bush administration initially sought to limit the UN's role, it subsequently sought help from the UN in forming a provisional Iraqi government and in organizing several subsequent rounds of Iraqi elections.

### **UN Specialized Agencies**

The UN is also a major provider of support to nonmilitary activities, especially in the areas of development, human rights, and refugee assistance. Thus a UN role will almost always be desirable from the U.S. and allied point of view, consistent with other operational requirements. Indeed, coalition stabilization, reconstruction, and nation-building capacity should be built into the UN through the creation of a UN Technical Agency for Stabilization and Reconstruction, which would be the beneficiary and repository of national contributions to such undertakings.

### **The North Atlantic Treaty Organization**

NATO is America's premier alliance and preferred partner for military operations. Since the end of the Cold War, it has been significantly transformed, among other things to facilitate the projection of allied military power beyond the traditional region of its commitments and activities. A wealth of experience is available from NATO's postconflict deployments in Bosnia (IFOR/SFOR) and Kosovo (KFOR), as well as in current operations in Afghanistan where, since August 2003, NATO has been in command of ISAF. NATO also has some limited training functions in Iraq and has had relevant experience elsewhere, including earthquake disaster relief in Pakistan. All these deployments have depended from Allied Command Operations (ACO), with its U.S. commander, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. NATO now also operates the NATO Response Force, created following the Prague Summit of November 2002.

In the theaters in which NATO forces have been deployed, both for combat and post-combat purposes, they have proved the worth of 60 years of effort (particularly through what is now ACO) to forge a mutually reinforcing common capability out of the contributions of diverse countries. While there are inevitable stresses and strains, the classic problems usually inherent in coalition warfare are not prominent in NATO.

### **Caveats and Other Problems**

A major exception are the so-called caveats imposed by individual NATO allies as to where their forces can be deployed, what tasks they can undertake, and the elaborate procedures required for altering the application of the caveats. Clearly, caveats can limit local commanders' tactical flexibility and hence NATO's effectiveness; however, without caveats, some NATO countries would be unable to be engaged at all for political reasons, with resulting costs of failing to demonstrate that the entire Alliance supports the effort, as in Afghanistan. Indeed, it must be recognized that some allies' caveats reflect political disagreements about objectives—for example, allies' perceived or actual interests in the outcome of operations in Afghanistan must be judged within their domestic political and policy processes. In the future, however, NATO will need to consider issues of caveats at the earliest stages of a potential intervention to help determine whether to become engaged as a whole or to act with a "coalition of the willing

and able” within NATO rather than attempting to draw in all allies. Indeed, NATO air operations in its Bosnia and Kosovo campaigns drew on only a limited number of allied air forces, in part because others did not have the capabilities, but, in a few cases, for political reasons.

### **Short Tours of Duty**

The relatively short tours for deployed forces from many allied countries are a related problem. This can be particularly acute for PRTs, where personnel from some allied countries may be just beginning to learn how to make a PRT effective and to create useful relationships with local leaders and populations when they leave the country. These tours should be usefully extended if PRTs are to be successful; this is also a matter of conserving experience. By the same token, the NATO-ISAF command team in Kabul has been turned over too frequently; this, too, is a major impediment to conserving experience.

### **Impact on Allied Political Relations**

Of course, the issues of allied countries’ participation, caveats, and tour lengths in Afghanistan—as well as shortfalls in available equipment, such as helicopters—also affect overall political relations within the Alliance, in general pitting the United States and a limited number of other allies fully engaged in the zone of major combat against the rest.

### **Compensatory Contributions**

One partial offset for this problem may lie in the basic thrust of this report: the integration of instruments of power and influence. While commanders would like as much flexibility in the use of deployed forces as possible and the United States, in particular, tends to judge the worth of allies in terms of deployable and usable combat power, there is far more to providing security or gaining the overall objectives of combat and postcombat operations. Indeed, many European allies and Canada have significant capabilities for nonmilitary activities, especially in the areas of reconstruction-development-governance, that are in many cases superior to those available from the United States. For the sake of NATO cohesion, political relations across the Atlantic, and the success of the mission, European countries not able or willing to play a central role in combat operations should be called upon to provide significantly greater resources for noncombat operations. Furthermore, in many of those countries, there is more of a natural flow between military and civilian activities than there is in the United States, which has a very different history and tradition in its approach to warfare and its aftermath. The lessons that the United States is being hard-pressed to learn in relating military to some nonmilitary activities have already become part of the culture of some of the European allies and Canada, in part because of their history of involvement in UN peacekeeping.

### **Afghanistan: Poppies, Police Training, and Judicial Reform**

This issue of allied members’ effectiveness in undertaking nonmilitary responsibilities has also arisen in Afghanistan over key elements of activity flowing from the London Conference, which negotiated the Afghanistan Compact in January 2006. Lead responsibilities for poppy eradication, police training, and creating a functioning judiciary were assumed by Great Britain, Germany, and Italy, respectively. None received the support required from other nations and none had even the possibility of bringing sufficient resources to bear by itself. As a result, none has performed well. Clearly, all three areas are important for the success of the ISAF mission. Creating relationships with local officials and civilian population, gaining the needed

leadership, and providing adequate resources are key matters for NATO to sort out, along with other institutions, notably the EU.

### **NATO Training Mission in Iraq**

NATO should also continue to develop its concept of training missions, as it has been doing with its NATO Training Mission in Iraq.<sup>2</sup> This not only provides a valuable service on the ground, it is also a means for allies to be engaged in Iraq—14 at last count, along with Ukraine—in a way that both contributes to the U.S.-led Operation Iraqi Freedom and provides political benefits within the Alliance, including perceptions of burden sharing. The concept has been tested; it should be extended and applied elsewhere, if and when needed.

### **NATO's Culture Clash**

Far more than in during the Cold War and even in the 1990s when NATO was engaged militarily in the Balkans, day-to-day interaction between the political and military elements of NATO has increased substantially, in major part because the Alliance has been engaged in active and sustained combat and postcombat peacekeeping. This has revealed problems of communication and understanding among the members, in part arising from differences between civilian (diplomatic) and military cultures and in part because of different processes for considering issues and reaching decisions. Much work needs to be done to bridge this communications and culture gap, which has a significant effect at both the theater and at senior command and Brussels levels.

### **The North Atlantic Council Demands**

A key problem posed by this difference in viewpoint is that the North Atlantic Council (NAC) often wants to be more apprised of, and even engaged in, military developments and decisions than military leaders believe is warranted. By its own admission, the NAC often micromanages operations for its own political needs. By the same token, allied military leaders often complain that the NAC and its committee structure is ineffectual in defining goals, providing clear and timely guidance, adapting to changing circumstances, and permitting the military commands sufficient tactical flexibility to promote success in the field, especially with regard to NATO's combat and postcombat activities. The NAC also demands more information than the military leadership believes is necessary for the NAC to exercise proper oversight and direction. The panel of senior practitioners judges that each side is often right in its criticisms of the methods and procedures of the other in terms of maximizing the effect of NATO actions.

### **The Consensus Rule and Domestic Support for NATO**

One requirement that is regularly cited as a hindrance by the military commands is NATO's cardinal rule of taking all decisions by consensus and its practice of preparing issues for decision by the NAC through an elaborate committee structure (and sometimes though duplicative work by the NATO International Staff and International Military Staff). There are crucial political reasons for the consensus rule, however, especially the need for every member of the Alliance to have a full say in decisions that could lead its military forces into harm's way. Indeed, without the consensus rule, there would likely not be a NATO Alliance at all, at least

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<sup>2</sup> NATO, "NATO Training Mission–Iraq (NTM-I)," Web page, undated.

not as it now exists. In like fashion, much of what the military leaders see as political-level “meddling” in military decisions reflects domestic political requirements in allied states that must be accommodated, through one means or another, in order to gain and sustain consensus. Indeed, if this meddling did not take place at the NATO level, it would take place within the domestic politics of the individual allied states.

### **The Need for NATO Reform**

All three of these problems can be dealt with in part by effective leadership and by the development of productive relationships at senior political and military levels. All three can also be mitigated through reform of NATO’s business rules for information and decision flow. NATO Headquarters’ dependence on the flow of paper is antiquated and would not be tolerated within any modern corporation. At the same time, the civilian side of NATO is often provided with inadequate information by the military commands: The NAC often does not get the information it needs to exercise intelligent guidance. Modernization of NATO’s business practices is critical, including up-to-date internal communications, computers, and electronic presentation of information and discussion/decision documents. Information flows to and from military commands increasingly needs to be Web-based, along with NATO communications with member-state capitals.

### **Revolutionizing Information Flow at NATO**

Both the hardware and the software parameters to achieve this revolution in communications and electronic management have already been developed by ACT and tested in NATO crisis management exercises by ACT’s Senior Concept Developers. Adopting a NATO Strategic Overview and making it available widely throughout the Alliance could make a major contribution to bridging the cultural and procedural divide that exists between the political and military parts of the Alliance. This computer-based, fiber-optic, classified system could also enable the NAC to make decisions on a timelier basis without sacrificing any of the internal checks and balances that now are used to shape consensus and in the process to preserve national prerogatives. This new system would also be helpful to national delegations at NATO from smaller allies that have limited staff support. All that is lacking is a decision by the NAC to move rapidly in this direction. By contrast, waiting for the new NATO Headquarters building to be completed sometime in the next decade is a truly false economy and will detract significantly from NATO’s ability to be effective in combat and to promote the integration of instruments of power and influence now.

### **NRF to Afghanistan**

In order to get maximum effect from well-trained and well-equipped forces available to NATO, it should deploy the NRF in Afghanistan and in similar circumstances in the future, should any arise.

### **Ending “Costs Lie Where They Fall”**

At the same time, NATO should fundamentally reform its practice of requiring “costs to lie where they fall,” which means that countries that provide forces must also bear the full costs rather than having them spread equitably across all members of the Alliance. Also, NATO needs to increase the resources available to ensure effective staffing, especially in the commands. At the moment, the trend is in the opposite direction, thus risking a degrading of

NATO's capabilities, including in the newly critical nexus between military and civilian activities in theater—a major false economy.

### **Keeping NATO from Overstepping Its Proper Bounds**

As noted above, the U.S. military has in many circumstances taken on nonmilitary tasks, either because other U.S. government agencies cannot (because they lack the resources to do so) or will not provide these capabilities or because the process of integrating nonmilitary personnel has appeared to be more of a nuisance than the resulting contribution would be worth. NATO has a different problem with a similar effect: As a rule, it lacks the mandate to engage in nonmilitary activities outside of those that are specifically mandated for operations like IFOR/SFOR, KFOR, and ISAF. And even in these instances, NATO efforts in the nonmilitary area have proved most effective when it has been able to draw upon resources from elsewhere or to see these responsibilities exercised by other institutions (e.g., the UN or through a High Representative reporting to the EU). Indeed, for NATO to try undertaking actions for which it is not well suited would be to incur not just a risk of failure but also both inefficiency and political difficulties within the Alliance. Regarding the latter, a few allies have objected to NATO's becoming engaged in nonmilitary activities beyond its formal and practical competence; the United States, Great Britain, and a few other allies may view these objections as simply a nuisance, but they do have some merit in terms of the Alliance's focus on what it is best at doing and seeking help for other tasks.

### **The Comprehensive Approach: Key to the Future**

The NATO Alliance has formally embraced the so-called comprehensive approach, which recognizes the importance of relating different instruments and techniques to one another, better to achieve overall objectives. Blessed at the 2006 NATO Summit in Riga, Latvia, this approach derived from "Experience in Afghanistan and Kosovo [which] demonstrates that today's challenges require a comprehensive approach by the international community involving a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments."<sup>3</sup> The April 2008 Bucharest summit endorsed the commitment to the comprehensive approach and tasked the NAC "in Permanent Session to implement this Action Plan as a matter of priority and to keep it under continual review, taking into account all relevant developments as well as lessons learned."<sup>4</sup> The panel of senior practitioners fully supports this initiative and urges that it be rapidly developed and implemented.

### **Allied Reserve Corps**

It would also be useful for allied nations to develop an operating concept similar to the U.S. proposal for a Civilian Reserve Corps. However, developing a reserve corps or float is not a simple matter, depending as it does on consistency of policy and commitment over many years. This is often even more difficult in many European countries than in the United States. It must be remembered that the attitudes and practices that today characterize multinational effort

<sup>3</sup> NATO, "Riga Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Riga on 29 November 2006," press release, November 29, 2006. The term *comprehensive approach* is a more easily understood substitute for the cumbersome military term *effects-based approach to operations*.

<sup>4</sup> NATO, "Bucharest Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008," press release, April 3, 2008.

within NATO's integrated military structure (ACO) took decades to develop fully. A similar effort would be required, over a significant period of time, for the development of nonmilitary cooperation within and among allied countries.

### **In-Theater NATO Relations with Other Institutions**

Creating and sustaining working relationships with other nonmilitary government agencies, other international institutions, and NGOs is one of the most important tasks facing NATO commanders in theater and in the field: It is particularly acute in ISAF, where the NATO commander must be able to coordinate to the extent possible the activities of a wide variety of other actors, few if any of which fall under his direct authority or command. His personal interaction with representatives of other countries (e.g., ambassadors), liaison representatives of other institutions, and team leaders of personnel engaged in theater is critical to bringing different instruments of power and influence successfully into useful and productive correspondence. The NATO-ISAF commander should also have the support of a senior representative of the NATO Secretary General. This position now exists; it needs to continue being staffed at a senior level (i.e., by an individual with ambassadorial or ministerial experience) to ensure sufficient authority and to engender trust on all sides, in the first instance through appropriate rank and in the second instance through the personal skills and quality of the person selected.

### **Allied Command Transformation**

A major instrument for engaging allied and other non-U.S. capacities in the integration of instruments of power and influence is NATO's ACT, co-located with U.S. Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, Virginia, and under the same commander as that organization, the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation and Commander, Joint Forces Command. ACT is charged with being NATO's leading agent of change for the development and adaptation of methods and procedures to enable NATO forces to work effectively together, both today and in the future. This includes the critical and daunting area of interoperability, which also incorporates the difficult but essential task of information and knowledge sharing across the force.

### **ACT and Training and Lessons Learned**

As of early 2008, ACT was being assigned all responsibility within NATO for training deployed and deployable NATO personnel and also the Afghan National Army. This responsibility should also extend to all NATO training in Iraq, which itself should be increased in size and scope. ACT also oversees the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre in Monsanto, Portugal, the mission of which is critical for the purposes of this report. These and other responsibilities place ACT in an advantageous position to perform additional tasks of instrumental value. These include:

### **Responsibility for Developing PRTs**

ACT should be assigned the senior responsibility for the development of doctrine and requirements for PRTs, including training of potential PRT team members, both military and civilian, from different allied countries. Already, ACT has begun to develop relevant curricula for use at the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany. Most PRTs in Afghanistan are organized on a national basis, which can limit their effectiveness in terms of cooperation with

others and the passing along of lessons learned and best practices. However, to be most effective and to build trust with civilian leaderships, ACT will need to work with foreign affairs and development ministries of those countries involved with PRTs, following each nation's PRT doctrine as much as possible. These actions should build on the extensive training now being conducted at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina and, to a lesser extent, at the Department of State's Foreign Service Institute.

### **Communications and Information Flow**

The development of processes and techniques for facilitating communications and information sharing between military and civilian elements of a NATO or NATO-led operation where there is a mixture of actors and capabilities is also critical. Although this is particularly difficult and demanding, it is a task of great importance if there is to be effective cooperation, much less integration, of effort. Problems in this area exist even within nations and their military services, the United States included, and it is much more difficult to bridge gaps between the military and civilian agencies and personnel across nations. ACT should develop the capabilities needed in this area and make them available to all participants in operations.

### **Adding a Civilian Dimension**

ACT requires a significant civilian component to develop the doctrines, procedures, and techniques of civil-military cooperation within the theater, as well as to conduct both generic planning and training of NATO and national civilian personnel. The results can be offered both to deployed and deployable NATO efforts (e.g., ACO, ISAF, and the NRF) and to allied nations. ACT should also have many dedicated POLADs and DEVADs from NATO countries to support this effort. By the same token, ACT training efforts should include the training of civilians from national developmental and foreign ministries who will serve with PRTs.

### **ACT as a NATO Bridge to the EU**

NATO should offer the services of ACT to the EU and in particular to the ESDP and the European Union Military Committee. These services could be in the first instance military. As cooperation develops, there could be practical interaction between ACT and EU institutions in both military and civilian areas, including planning, training, and exercising. At the moment, there are significant political limitations on the possibilities for such collaboration between ACT and the EU, especially concerns on the part of France and Turkey. The former can be affected positively as soon as the end of 2008 by the prospect of increased French engagement with NATO's integrated command structure, a development that presupposes an evolution in U.S. government attitudes toward the role of ESDP, including a willingness to see the growth of potentially independent European capacities for the deployment and use of force and ancillary capabilities outside of the NATO framework. The panel of senior practitioners believes that this mutual accommodation, which underpinned the original French move toward the integrated command structure in 1993–1996 and the negotiation of the so-called Berlin/Brussels and Berlin-plus agreements under which NATO assets can be released to ESDP, is in everyone's mutual interest. It can go a long way toward facilitating cooperation between NATO and the EU, as well as the integration (or at least coalescence) of relevant military and civilian instruments of power and influence.

### **ACT and NGOs**

There is a role for ACT in developing relationships with NGOs, particularly in that it is one remove from ACO.

### **The European Union**

Potential roles for the EU are of essentially two types. The first relates to military roles that parallel those played by NATO, but limited to non–Article 5 situations (i.e., situations that do not call for collective defense as defined by the North Atlantic Treaty’s Article 5). All EU member states agree that NATO should continue to shoulder responsibility for collective-defense tasks. But there have been profound disagreements between some NATO members, notably the United States, and some members of both NATO and the EU, notably France, on what other responsibilities NATO should assume and what the ESDP should do.

### **Overcoming NATO-EU Differences**

The nature of the challenges faced by all members of NATO and the European Union (21 countries belong to both) are now such that overcoming differences that have often kept the two organizations at arms-length has become far more important than political and other concerns that have heretofore been expressed on either side of the argument. Efforts have been underway in the last few years to improve relations between NATO and the EU. Breaking down remaining barriers will require the United States to cease arguing, erroneously, that an effective ESDP is somehow a threat to NATO (a viewpoint now less prevalent in the U.S. government); it will require EU members to cease arguing that operations led by NATO somehow either weaken the potential for ESDP, interfere with the development of the EU, or presume inordinate U.S. influence in European affairs.

The simple fact is that each European military establishment has only one set of forces and nothing will change that fact, dictated by political and economic realities. ESDP depends for its potential effectiveness on practical relations with NATO, at least at the working level. Neither institution has thus far been negatively affected by these arrangements. And where there are significant requirements for integrating military and civilian efforts, there has already been success, notably in the EU’s assuming responsibility from NATO in Bosnia and the EU’s lead role in Macedonia. With leadership that can see beyond the theology of the past, tensions between NATO and the EU can also become matters of the past.

### **ESDP and NATO Are Compatible**

This transition will also be aided by the fact that ESDP is now clearly focused on low-end aspects of the so-called Petersberg Tasks, as European ambitions and limitations on resources have greatly reduced the chances of serious competition with NATO.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, in terms of the EU’s acting on its own without the use of NATO assets, no scenario has yet been devised under which ESDP would seek to use military force and either NATO as a whole or the United States in particular would have reason to object. At the same time, the EU is ideally suited for playing other security roles, including paramilitary deployments and police training, as the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan has been doing since June 2007.

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<sup>5</sup> Assembly of the Western European Union, *Petersberg Declaration*, Bonn, Germany, June 19, 1992.

### The European Union as Engine for Civilian Tasks

The second type of role the EU could play in intervention efforts is to provide significant capabilities, resources, and personnel, both directly and through member states and NGOs, to fulfill civilian tasks. Indeed, in Afghanistan, the NATO-led ISAF should decrease its responsibilities for reconstruction-development-governance and the EU should formally assume more responsibility, both on its own and in conjunction with the UN and its specialized agencies. Of course, to a significant degree, relative influence within the NATO Alliance will be in some proportion to contribution of resources and troops put at risk; but there also needs to be a calculus of influence based on the size of nonmilitary contributions to a common effort, especially since an integrated effort depends on all contributions.

The following should be done:

**EU Civilian Lead in Afghanistan.** The EU should assume a much greater share of the collective nonmilitary burden in Afghanistan, both with a senior representative of substantial skills and stature and with sizeable resources, far beyond the total European contribution so far. Thus, the EU should have a full role in the coordination of military and nonmilitary activities at ISAF and within the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board. In addition, the EU should assume a major share of responsibility for the effective preparation of European PRTs in Afghanistan, further developing the concept along with NATO at ACT, and radically increase European engagement in PRTs or other forms of direct support for development and governance.

**The EU in Iraq.** The EU should be willing to assume a significant role in nonmilitary activities in Iraq, coordinated with Operation Iraqi Freedom and with resources from that operation providing security.

**Breaking the Remaining NATO-EU Barriers.** The EU and NATO should each set the breaking down of remaining barriers to their full cooperation as a short-term goal. There are new prospects for a change in French policy. If that happens, then renewed efforts should be made to induce Turkey to withdraw its continuing objections to NATO-EU cooperation, a matter of high importance to both institutions.

**Berlin-Plus and Reverse Berlin-Plus.** In addition to further development of the so-called Berlin-plus arrangements, under which NATO assets can be made available to the EU under the ESDP, the EU should be willing to undertake “reverse Berlin-plus,”<sup>6</sup> whereby nonmilitary EU assets (i.e., those belonging to individual European countries) can be made available to NATO, either through direct transfer of authority or parallel efforts.

**Liaison, Information Sharing, Training.** Elements of NATO and EU bureaucracies that still operate in isolation should create liaison if not fully cooperative relationships. NATO and the EU should develop means for the effective sharing of information and should jointly act to develop means of circumventing the problems that are most hampering intelligence sharing in the field. Thus the EU should be included in the NATO Strategic Overview when it is established. NATO and the EU should also conduct training and exercises, together, including crisis-management exercises.

**Standardization, Interoperability, and Planning.** NATO and the EU should work together on issues of standardization and interoperability, as well as on a government-private partnership to reduce barriers to defense trade across the Atlantic. Finally, the EU should have

<sup>6</sup> NATO, “NATO-EU: A Strategic Partnership,” Web page, February 25, 2008.

representatives in NATO planning, as well as in relevant planning within the U.S. government, on both an immediate and contingency basis.



## **Eighteen Basic Principles for Success**

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In assessing responses needed to situations analyzed in this report, the panel of senior practitioners has concluded that virtually all can be clustered under 18 basic principles, lessons, and best practices. Most of our practical suggestions derive from these principles.

### **1. Leadership Is Most Important**

Achieving even part of the many recommendations in this report requires effective and sustained political leadership from the top, beginning with the U.S. President and carried on down the line in departments and agencies, civilian and military, in particular to change bureaucratic cultures, attitudes, and turf protecting. Congress must meet its own responsibilities for leadership and action, and the executive branch must bring Congress fully into its deliberations from the outset.

### **2. Prepare in Advance**

Whenever possible, relationships between military and nonmilitary institutions and personnel need to be developed, resourced, trained, and exercised in advance of possible operations and as part of systematic career-long education, training, and experience. This needs to include development of mutual understanding of different institutional cultures. The creation of standing capabilities, military and civilian, contributes significantly to effectiveness in operations.

### **3. Think About What We Are Trying to Do**

Developing and setting agreed goals and objectives in advance of operations are critical for success, all the more so when different national actors are involved. If agreed goals and objectives are stated in strategic rather than tactical terms, it should be possible to modify tactical plans without jeopardizing the coalition's or alliance's cohesion. This process will also help to develop and sustain domestic political support in all participating nations.

### **4. Planning**

Planning must be systematic, rigorous, and comprehensive before any military intervention begins and needs to include as many instruments and institutions as can be foreseen, civilian and military, governmental and nongovernmental. Planning needs to develop as complete a picture as possible of the roles, missions, and ends of intervention and the aftermath—as well as possible shifts in the nature and balance of roles and missions—and gain broad support for them. The touchstone should be to create *security multipliers*. All possible participants must be involved. Since actual events never precisely match the plan, there must be flexibility to modify

plans. This is particularly necessary if local authorities are to assume increasing amounts of day-to-day control as their capacity to do so increases.

### **5. Nothing Works Without Money**

Money matters: Nonmilitary instruments cannot possibly be adequate or effective unless they are sufficiently resourced. In the United States and many allied countries, that means shifting the balance between resources provided to the military and those provided for nonmilitary instruments and activities. The current ratio of U.S. funding for military as opposed to nonmilitary tasks is dysfunctional.

### **6. Know the Territory**

Knowledge of local history, culture, and language is one of the most important requirements for success, both military and civilian. Capacities in all three areas need to be developed, trained, and exercised on a contingency basis, to the extent possible, for a variety of situations. Human rights must be respected.

### **7. Work with the Locals**

Operations, whether military or nonmilitary, must be conducted in as much consonance as possible with local authorities, beginning with the national level but also extending to regional and local levels. This includes agreement on overall goals and objectives (as well as basic strategy and tactics), full cooperation and coordination in planning and conducting both military and civilian operations (including command relationships), and respect for national sovereignty.

### **8. Talking to One Another**

Integrated (or at least compatible) C<sup>4</sup>ISR, along with sufficient sharing of relevant information and intelligence, is indispensable to the success of operations and to the effective cooperation/coordination/integration of military and civilian instruments of power and influence.

### **9. Build International Partnerships**

This report focuses primarily on U.S. interests, engagements, policies, and practices. But the involvement of others—countries and institutions—can multiply effectiveness and, in some cases, can prove indispensable to success, especially in promoting reconstruction, development, and governance. Involving others will inevitably require the United States to share decision, influence, and definition of issues and methods, as well as risk and responsibility. This cardinal point requires a basic rethinking of U.S. attitudes and involvements.

### **10. What Gets Done Is More Important Than Who Does It**

Getting the job done must take precedence wherever possible over bureaucratic and institutional issues, rivalries, and constraints. This principle needs to apply within institutions (e.g., a military or civilian service), between institutions (e.g., military vs. civilian); between countries; and between international institutions (e.g., NATO, the EU, and the UN).

### **11. Whoever Does It Best Should Get the Job and the Money**

Tasks are generally best undertaken by the institutions and personnel most suited to carry them out, rather than through the adaptation of one institution to do another's natural functions (e.g., because of a lack of resources, alternatives, or cross-institution cooperative relation-

ships). This principle is most often violated when the military is tasked to take on nonmilitary tasks (including economic tasks) for which it is not well equipped. However, the exigencies of combat may require the military sometimes to undertake civilian tasks, at least temporarily, and this needs to be accounted for in training. In the case of multinational operations, particular tasks should be undertaken by the countries or institutions best suited to carry them out. Resourcing needs to take account of this principle.

#### **12. Who Works for and with Whom: Sort It Out Early**

Command and authority relationships need to be worked out in advance, to the extent possible, both at the national and theater levels and, where allies and other partners are involved, regarding command and other relationships among all actors. In many cases, these relationships will work best if they are lateral rather than hierarchical. They need to be reviewed and revised as the situation on the ground changes.

#### **13. The Person on the Spot Usually Knows Best**

In general, both responsibility and authority should be vested at as low a level as possible, ideally at the theater or at local level, including task forces, country teams, working parties, or other arrangements, with significant flexibility in the use and resourcing of instruments. This principle helps outside actors to respond most effectively to the needs of a local leadership and populace, including in efforts to win hearts and minds.

#### **14. Train Constantly**

Training and more training are essential to success, both within each component of an operation and across components. This lesson also applies to relations with local nationals, whether military, paramilitary, or civilian, including political and economic development and conflict analysis.

#### **15. Security and Development: Two Sides of the Same Coin**

It is usually true that “there is no development without security and no security without development.” It is also true that effective governance is indispensable to successful nation-building. This principle is also a caution that success may be a long time in coming, measured in years and not months.

#### **16. Pass On What You Learn**

Conservation of experience, especially at the theater level and below, is also indispensable to success. In addition to assuring that relevant personnel remain engaged for a situationally significant period of time, this includes an effective capacity within ongoing operations for lessons learned, sharing of experience, and adaptation, especially regarding best practices. This should be done on a military, civilian, and combined basis, and include all actors. It should also be integrated into planning, training, and exercising for possible future operations.


#### **17. NGOs Matter: Get It Right**

Relationships with NGOs need to be organized and operated through rules and procedures that respect the NGOs’ particular needs and potential roles in the overall effort, while seeking to maximize their contributions and minimize problems some may present.

**18. Acting Early Produces the Best Results**

Finally, pursuit of the preceding principles, to the extent possible, will help the United States and others to get things right from the beginning of an intervention, before an insurgency or other opposition has a chance to develop fully, when opportunities to influence indigenous actors tend to be greatest, and when the architecture of what is to follow is first created.


# Afghan Policy Action Group



RAND CF251-Appendix A



# ISAF Regional Command and PRT Locations



RAND CF251-Appendix B



## Biographies of Panel Members

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**Sir Michael Aaronson** is a Senior Concept Developer for NATO's Allied Command Transformation, a Director of Oxford Policy Management, and a Director of Corporates for Crisis. For 16 years he was a diplomat in the British Foreign Service. He then joined Save the Children UK, where he was initially Overseas Director and then, for 10 years, Chief Executive. He has been Chair of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva and Deputy Chair of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy.

**Dr. Gordon Adams** is Professor of International Relations, School of International Service, American University, and a Distinguished Fellow at the Henry L. Stimson Center. He was Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs at the Office of Management and Budget from 1993 to 1997. He founded the Defense Budget Project in Washington, D.C., was Deputy Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, and was Director of Security Policy Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs, the George Washington University.

**Omar G. Al-Shahery** graduated from Harvard with a Mid-Career Master of Public Affairs as part of the Mason Fellows Program before joining RAND in 2007 as a Senior Project Associate. As Deputy Director General of Defense Intelligence and Military Security in Iraq's Ministry of Defense, he was part of a small team that built the ministry from scratch. In 2005, he opened the first Iraqi human rights office in the history of Iraq, which oversees counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. After the war began in 2003, he re-activated the Oil for Food Program with a small team, coordinating with the UN, the Coalition Provisional Authority, and the Iraqi government. Before the war he was involved in high-tech projects in the defense and oil industry.

**Admiral John R. Anderson, Royal Canadian Navy (ret.),** is Lead Senior Concept Developer for NATO's Allied Command Transformation. He was Permanent Representative (Ambassador) of Canada on the North Atlantic Council, 1994–1997; Chief of Defense Staff of Canada's armed forces, 1993; Vice Chief of Defence Staff; and Commander, Maritime Command (CNO), 1991–1992.

**Ambassador Robert M. Beecroft** is Vice President for Diplomacy and Development with the Strategic Group of MPRI, a division of the L-3 Corporation, in Alexandria, Virginia. He retired from the U.S. Senior Foreign Service in June 2006 with the rank of Career Minister-Counselor. From 2001 to 2004, he led the mission from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe to Bosnia and Herzegovina, numbering 800 people from 30 coun-

tries. From 2004 to 2006, he was Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College in Washington, D.C. In the 1990s, he served in the U.S. mission to NATO.

**Dr. James Blackwell** is Senior Concept Developer to NATO's Allied Command Transformation. He was Executive Director of the Independent Panel to Review Department of Defense Detention Operations (the "Schlesinger Panel"). He has testified before Senate and House committees and subcommittees and the Base Realignment and Closure Commission. He has appeared on network television and radio worldwide, was a consultant to the History Channel from 1998 to 1999 for *Movies in Time*, was Fox News Channel's military analyst during the Bosnia and Kosovo Campaigns, and served as CNN's military analyst during the Persian Gulf War of 1991.

**Ambassador Avis Bohlen** served for almost 30 years as a career Foreign Service Officer with the U.S. State Department. She was Ambassador to Bulgaria, Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, and Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs. She is currently an adjunct professor at Georgetown University and serves on a variety of boards, including the American Academy of Diplomacy. She holds a B.A. from Radcliffe College and an M.A. from Columbia University.

**Doug Brooks** is President of the International Peace Operations Association, a nongovernmental, nonprofit, nonpartisan association of service companies dedicated to improving international peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian rescue, stabilization efforts, and disaster relief through greater privatization. He is a specialist on private-sector capabilities and African security issues and has written extensively on the regulation and constructive utilization of the private sector for international peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.

**Charles J. Brown** is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for International Law and Human Rights, as well as Managing Partner with Occam Advisors. He has served as President and Chief Executive Officer of Citizens for Global Solutions (2004–2007); Deputy Executive Director for Action at Amnesty International USA (2001–2004); and Chief of Staff and Director of the Office of Strategic Planning and External Affairs in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor in the U.S. Department of State (1998–2001).

**Dr. Christopher Chivvis, Rapporteur**, is an Associate Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation. From 2006 to 2008, he was a Transatlantic Postdoctoral Fellow for International Relations and Security with the RAND Corporation in Washington, D.C., the *Institut Français des Relations Internationales* [French Institute for International Relations] in Paris, and the *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik* [German Institute for International and Security Affairs] in Berlin.

**Ambassador Herman J. Cohen** teaches at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He is a retired Foreign Service Officer with 38 years experience at the Department of State, mainly in Africa and Europe. He was Ambassador to Senegal and the Gambia. In Washington, he was Senior Director for Africa on the NSC staff under President Ronald Reagan and Assistant Secretary of State for Africa under President George H. W. Bush. He also served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research under George Shultz.

**Dr. Jacquelyn K. Davis** is Executive Vice President of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. She has written and lectured extensively on topics related to U.S. alliance relations (both in NATO-Europe and the Asia-Pacific region), defense transformation and military technology trends, counter-proliferation, post-Cold War deterrence issues, and regional security dynamics. She is working on an assessment of the future of deterrence planning and serves as a member of the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel and the U.S. European Command's Senior Advisory Group. She received an M.A. and a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Pennsylvania.

**Ambassador James F. Dobbins** directs the RAND Corporation's International Security and Defense Policy Center. He has been Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, Special Assistant to the President for the Western Hemisphere, Special Adviser to the President and Secretary of State for the Balkans, and Ambassador to the European Community. He was the Clinton administration's special envoy for Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo and the Bush administration's first special envoy for Afghanistan. He is lead author of *The RAND History of Nation-Building* and *The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building*. In the wake of September 11, 2001, he was designated the Bush administration's representative to the Afghan opposition. He helped organize and then represented the United States at the Bonn Conference.

**Oberstleutnant i.G. Norbert Eitelhuber (BMZ)** is with the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development–Foreign and Security Policy, Peace Building, and Crisis Prevention Unit (seconded by the Ministry of Defence). He has served at the Federal Ministry of Defence–Strategy and Policy Branch. He has also worked at the *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik* [German Institute for International and Security Affairs], Research Unit: European and Security Affairs (seconded by the Bundeswehr).

**Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm, Jr., Co-Chairman**, is Kuwait Professor of Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University. During his 36 years as a career Foreign Service Officer with the Department of State, he served as Ambassador to Kuwait, Australia, and Jordan. He also served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Near East and South Asia and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East. He was Director General of the Foreign Service and Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations.

**Dr. Andreas Goldthau** is an Assistant Professor with the Public Policy Department, Central European University in Budapest, Hungary, where he also heads the Energy and Environment Program. Prior to that, he was a Transatlantic Fellow in International Relations and Security with the RAND Corporation and worked at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University and the *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik* [German Institute for International and Security Affairs].

**Dr. David C. Gompert** is a senior fellow at the RAND Corporation. He was formerly Senior Advisor for National Security and Defense, Coalition Provisional Authority, Iraq; President of RAND Europe; Vice President of the National Security Research Division at RAND; Special Assistant to President George H. W. Bush; Special Assistant to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger; and President, Systems Management Group, Unisys Corporation. He has authored

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**Jacqueline Grapin** is Board Chair of The European Institute in Washington, D.C., which she founded in 1989 and served as President of until 2006. She has held the positions of Economic Editor and Staff Writer for *Le Monde*, Director General of the Interavia Publishing Group in Geneva, and economic correspondent in the United States for *Le Figaro*. She was Editor-in-Chief of *Europa*, a joint publication of *Le Monde*, *The Times* (London), *Die Welt*, and *La Stampa*. She holds degrees in political science from the *Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris*; in business management from *École des Hautes Études Commerciales de Paris* (HEC Paris), Paris; in law from Paris I; and in strategic studies from the *Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale*.

**Ambassador Marc Grossman** is a Vice Chairman of The Cohen Group. He was a U.S. Foreign Service Officer from 1976 to 2005. His service included assignments as Ambassador to Turkey, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Director General of the Foreign Service, and Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs.

**Ambassador William C. Harrop** is a member of the Executive Committee of the American Academy of Diplomacy. A retired career diplomat, he was Inspector General of the U.S. State Department and Ambassador to Guinea, Zaire, Kenya, Seychelles, and Israel. He is now associated with a private foundation. He is a board member of the Henry L. Stimson Center, Population Services International, American Diplomacy Publishers, the Senior Living Foundation of the American Foreign Service, and the Washington Humane Society.

**Admiral Willy Herteleer, Belgian Navy (ret.)**, is Chairman of EURODEFENSE-BELGIUM and Senior Concept Developer for NATO's Allied Command Transformation. He was Belgian Chief of Naval Staff from 1993 and Chief of Defense from 1995 until 2003; as such he had Belgian responsibility for operations in East-Slavonia (United Nations Protection Force-UNPROFOR and United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia-UNTAES), Bosnia (UNPROFOR, Implementation Force-IFOR, Stabilization Force-SFOR), Kosovo (1999 air campaign, Kosovo Force-KFOR), and in Central Africa (1996/1997 and 2001).

**Dr. Stephen T. Hosmer** is a Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation. His research has focused on counterinsurgency warfare—including the ongoing conflict in Iraq, the Vietnam War, the psychological dimensions of military operations, the efficacy of operations aimed at removing enemy leaders, and Iraqi decisionmaking and battlefield behavior in both Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom. He is the author or coauthor of numerous books and reports relating to U.S. national security, including *Constraints on U.S. Strategy in Third World Conflict*, *The Fall of South Vietnam*, *The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did*, and *Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak*.

**Ambassador Robert E. Hunter, Co-Chairman**, is a Senior Advisor at the RAND Corporation. He is also President of the Atlantic Treaty Association, Chairman of the Council for a Community of Democracies, Senior International Consultant to Lockheed Martin Overseas Corporation, member of the Senior Advisory Group to the U.S. European Command, Senior Concept Developer for NATO's Allied Command Transformation, and a member of the Executive Committee of the American Academy of Diplomacy. He was U.S. Ambassador to NATO (1993–1998) and served on the National Security Council staff during the Carter administration as Director of West European and then Middle East Affairs.

**Minister Ali Ahmad Jalali** is Distinguished Professor at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. He was Interior Minister of Afghanistan from January 2003 to September 2005. He is a former colonel in the Afghan army and was a top military planner with the Afghan resistance following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He is the author of several books, including a three-volume military history of Afghanistan. His most recent book, *The Other Side of the Mountain*, coauthored with Lester Grau, is an analytical review of the Mujahedin's war against Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

**General James L. Jones, U.S. Marine Corps (ret.)**, is President and CEO of the U.S. Chamber Institute for 21st Century Energy. From July 1999 to January 2003, he was the 32nd Commandant of the Marine Corps. After relinquishing command as Commandant, he assumed the positions of Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and Commander of the United States European Command, positions he held until December 2006. He retired from active duty in the U.S. Marine Corps on February 1, 2007, after more than 40 years of service.

**Dr. Seth G. Jones** is a Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation and an Adjunct Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is the author, most recently, of the forthcoming *In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan* (W. W. Norton). He has published a wide range of journal articles in *International Security*, *The National Interest*, *Security Studies*, *Chicago Journal of International Law*, *International Affairs*, and *Survival*, as well as such newspapers and magazines as the *New York Times*, *Newsweek*, *Financial Times*, and the *International Herald Tribune*.

**General George Joulwan, U.S. Army (ret.), Co-Chairman**, was Commander, U.S. European Command and NATO's 11th Supreme Allied Commander Europe. As Commander, U.S. European Command, he conducted over 20 successful operations in Africa, Balkans, and the Middle East and established the first ever strategic policy for U.S. military engagement in Africa. As Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, he was the architect and overall commander of NATO's successful military operation in stopping the atrocities in Bosnia. The NATO operation comprised 37 nations and included Russian forces under his command. He was also Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Southern Command.

**Dr. Terrence Kelly** is a Senior Researcher with the RAND Corporation, where his primary research areas are national and homeland security policy. From February 2006 to April 2007, he served as the Director of the Joint Strategic Planning and Assessment Office for the U.S. Mission in Baghdad. In 2004, he was the Director for Militia Transition and Reintegration Programs for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. He served as the Senior National

Security Officer in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, held many Army field and staff positions, was a White House Fellow, and served as the Chief of Staff of the National Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office. He is currently an Adjunct Professor of Security Policy and Management at Carnegie Mellon University's Heinz School of Public Policy and Management, and he has held faculty positions in the Mathematical Sciences Department (visiting) at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, from which he received a Ph.D. in Mathematics and an M.S. in Computer and Systems Engineering. He is a 1982 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and holds a Masters in Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College.

**Dr. Lawrence J. Korb** is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress and Senior Advisor to the Center for Defense Information. Prior to joining the centers, he was a Senior Fellow and Director of National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and Director of the Center for Public Policy Education and Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution. He served as Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations, and Logistics) from 1981 to 1985.

**Mirco Kreibich** is Personal Secretary to the Parliamentary State Secretary, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. He studied Biological Sciences and Economics in Berlin, Cambridge (UK), and London. He joined the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development in 2002. Between October 2004 and March 2007, he was posted at the German Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, where he was responsible for coordination of German bilateral development cooperation, donor coordination, and policy dialogue with the Afghan Government.

**Robert R. LaGamma** is President-Designate of the Council for a Community of Democracies in Washington, D.C., of which he has been Executive Director since 2001 following a 35-year career in the Foreign Service of USIA. A specialist in Africa and in democracy promotion, he served in Cote d'Ivoire, Congo, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Togo, Senegal, Nigeria, and South Africa and directed USIA's Office of African Affairs.

**Paul LaRose-Edwards** is Executive Director of CANADEM (Canada's civilian reserve), a former military officer, and an international human rights lawyer. He has worked in mission areas and countries such as Rwanda, Kosovo, Croatia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Indonesia. He has served on the staff of NGOs such as Amnesty International, as well as the Canadian government, the UN, and the Commonwealth. He has worked as a consultant for such organizations as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the EU, and NATO. His last UN diplomatic post was as Representative of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Indonesia, and he served for four years with the Commonwealth Secretariat in London as Head of Human Rights.

**Samuel W. Lewis** served as a career diplomat for 33 years, holding posts as Director of the U.S. Department of State's Policy Planning Staff, Ambassador to Israel for eight years, Assistant Secretary for International Organizations, and Senior NSC Staff Member, as well as assignments to overseas posts in Afghanistan, Brazil, and Italy. Since retiring from the Department of State in 1985, he served for five years as the first President and CEO of the U.S. Institute

of Peace, taught courses at Georgetown University, Hamilton College, and Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, worked with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the Brookings Institution, served as adviser or board member for a number of nonprofit organizations concerned with foreign policy in general and the Middle East in particular, and contributed to several books, scholarly journals and newspapers. He is the recipient of six honorary doctoral degrees and graduated from Yale and Johns Hopkins universities.

**Dr. Julian Lindley-French** is Professor of Military Operational Science at the Netherlands Defence Academy, a senior associate fellow of the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, and a senior scholar at the Centre for Applied Policy at the University of Munich. A member of the Strategic Advisory Group of the Atlantic Council of the United States in Washington, he was formerly a director at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and is European Co-Chair of the US-European Working Group on Stabilisation and Reconstruction Missions for the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He has lectured in European Security at the Department of War Studies, Kings College London, as Deputy Director of the International Centre for Security Analysis (ICSA). He was a senior research fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris and has been appointed Chief Editor of the 800-page *Oxford Handbook on War* by Oxford University Press. He was educated at Oxford (M.A.), the University of East Anglia (M.A.), and the European University Institute (Ph.D.).

**Col. Michael A. Malachowsky, U.S. Marine Corps (ret.)**, is a Senior Defense Analyst for Booz Allen Hamilton currently working in the J-5 Strategy Division at U.S. Special Operations Command. An infantry officer with more than 36 years of active-duty service, he holds a master's degree in National Security Studies and was twice selected as a Commandant's Fellow (to the Merston Center for International Security Studies and the Center for Strategic and International Studies). He attended the Executive Program in National Security Management at Syracuse University's Maxwell School of Public Administration.

**Christa Meindersma** is Deputy Director of the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies in the Netherlands. She is an international lawyer with broad experience in international diplomacy. She worked as senior political adviser at the United Nations and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has been involved in peace negotiations and policymaking in East Timor, Nigeria, Cameroon, Kosovo, Darfur, Nepal, and New York. She is a member of the Committee on Peace and Security of the Advisory Council on International Affairs to the Dutch government.

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