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## SUMMARY

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This document presents the proceedings of an urban operations conference held on April 13–14, 1999. The event sought to educate those interested in this complex topic while simultaneously providing a forum for debate on relevant issues. The attendee who was fortunate enough to hear all twenty-eight speakers and panel members did, in fact, learn much about the many faces a city can present during military urban operations. Nearly a third of those at the podium had “seen the urban elephant” from one or more of its multitudinous perspectives.<sup>1</sup> Others had been students and analysts of urban operations for years. Appendix A is a copy of the agenda for the event. Subsequent appendices contain speakers' and panel members' slides and supporting notes.

After a welcome by **David Chu**, Director of the RAND Arroyo Center, **Dr. A. Michael Andrews, II** of ASA(ALT) provided a comprehensive overview of his organization's efforts to support improved soldier urban operations readiness, both in the immediate future and well into the next century. **MG Norton A. Schwartz** followed with an innovative and somewhat contentious approach to military operations in cities, one that was undeniably joint, but one that also forwarded a more wide-ranging role for the U.S. Air Force than some might envi-

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<sup>1</sup>In the sense applied here, the term “see the elephant” refers to having experienced combat, especially for the first time (though the author has expanded the scope of the term to include experience with military urban operations that did not include combat in this case). Its first known use dates from the mid-19th century; the term attained common usage during the American Civil War. *Random House Historical Dictionary of American Slang, Volume 1, A–G*, 1st ed., s.v. “see the elephant.”

sion. Retired **MG James D. Delk**, who served as field commander during the 1992 Los Angeles riots, identified a myriad of lessons that could benefit active and reserve military forces as well as civilian agencies in future domestic crises, be they riots, natural disasters, or other events necessitating the joining of those groups. **MG Robert Scales** challenged the audience to consider dramatically different alternatives to current urban operational doctrinal approaches. **Lieutenant Sid Heal** of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department addressed the topic the previous year's conference attendees had identified as the one they would have most liked to discuss more fully: the application of nonlethal capabilities during urban contingencies. The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, **Gen. Terrence Dake**, provided the conference's keynote presentation. He put forth operational approaches to urban missions that dramatically differed with those described by speakers earlier in the day.

RAND's **Dr. Randy Steeb** opened the second day with a look into future urban challenges and potential changes to doctrine and technology that the U.S. armed forces might employ in confronting those demands. **LtCol Duane Schattle** of the J8 Urban Working Group provided a summary of the organization's work completed thus far and that remaining to be accomplished. A presentation of the Urban Warrior experiment's objectives and the goals of Marine Corps Warfighting Lab in general was given by **COL Gary Anderson**. He was followed by **COL Lester Martinez-Lopez**, whose personal experiences in Haiti provided the basis for a detailed and extensive identification of lessons pertinent to military medical support during stability missions in urban areas and the surrounding countryside.

These presentations by individual speakers were complemented by panel discussions in four primary subject areas. General Delk was joined by **BG Edward T. Buckley**, the FBI's **Jim Rice**, and the U.S. Army Chemical School's **COL Daniel Uyesugi** on a domestic MOUT/WMD panel. General Buckley commanded active component Army forces during the 1992 Los Angeles riots. Mr. Rice covered the wide range of considerations and organizations involved in any domestic urban operations contingency while also identifying the role the Federal Bureau of Investigation can play in overseas contingencies. Colonel Uyesugi analyzed the far-ranging implications a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) event would entail for military and civilian agencies alike. The second group, the MOUT doctrine

panel, entailed six discussions. The Marine Corps' **MAJ Mark Sumner** and Army's **LTC Mark Reardon** capsulated their services' recent initiatives in urban operations doctrine. **MAJ Jeff Newell** discussed development of the pending *Handbook for Joint Urban Operations*. Two aviators, the Marine Corps' **MAJ Floyd Usry** and USAF's **MAJ Brooks Wright**, presented their services' recent advances in MOUT aviation testing, training, and experimentation. Major Sumner completed the doctrine discussion with a review of preliminary work on JP 3-06, *Joint Urban Operations*. An initiatives/technology panel provided the forum for an update on the status of the Army (**MAJ Lee Offen**) and Marine Corps (**LtCol John Allison**) Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstrations. **LTC Bob Hahn** likewise reviewed Army After Next thinking on the challenges of urban operations in the 2025 period. Two doctoral candidates representing the RAND Arroyo Center, **Sean Edwards** and **Scott Gerwehr**, respectively described their innovative work on urban communications and deception operations. The final offering of the conference was the panel on recent MOUT operation. The audience was fortunate to have an opportunity to draw on the experiences or in-depth analyses of four field experts. **COL Dave Patton's** extensive time in Haiti served as the foundation for his comments on stability and support mission tasks in urban environments. **COL T. W. Parker** similarly looked back on his noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) responsibilities in Africa to provide lessons of value in preparing for similar and other future contingencies in cities. Two gentlemen with extraordinary insights into the Russian experience in Grozny, **Tim Thomas** and **Les Grau**, respectively analyzed asymmetry in urban warfare and logistical support during such events.

These many individuals covered much of the military urban operations spectrum, from support missions in Haiti to combat in Grozny to consideration of WMD concerns, from domestic and homeland defense matters to events worldwide, from the lowest tactical levels to matters of operational and strategic importance. In so doing they not only educated with regard to their individual specific topics, but in the larger sense they communicated that urban operations encompass far more in the way of scope and complexity than has at times been understood. Individual lessons found context in the greater whole.