REMARKS GIVEN AT
RAND’S MEMORIAL SERVICE FOR

Henry S. Rowen

February 17, 2016
Introduction ................................................... 1
__Michael Rich__

Harry Rowen and RAND’s Domestic Research …… 3
__Donald B. Rice__

Harry Rowen and the Founding of the RAND Graduate School ...................... 7
__Charles Wolf, Jr.__

Tribute to Harry Rowen: The Defense Analyst …… 13
__James A. Thomson__

Harry Rowen at Stanford University ...................... 17
__Rafiq Dossani__

Remembering Harry Rowen’s Leadership:
Adapting to Change ................................. 21
__Susan L. Marquis__

Closing Remarks: ........................................... 25
__Hilary Rowen and Chris Rowen__
Good afternoon, and welcome to an event to honor the enormous contributions made to RAND and far beyond by Harry Rowen. And to give us a chance to reflect on what a special, wonderful person he was.

Let me take a moment to introduce two members of the Rowen Family today—daughter Hilary Rowen and son Chris Rowen, representing their four siblings and, of course, their mother, Beverly. Welcome.

Harry Rowen led an important and influential life, and so it is not surprising that there have been more than one gathering to remember him. Nevertheless, I wanted to have another one here at RAND, for people who knew him and worked with him, but also for the RAND employees and RAND supporters who didn’t have the chance to know him. I wanted to do that for three reasons:

First, Harry Rowen changed our institution in fundamental ways that benefited RAND and also wider society.

Second, although it has been 44 years since he worked at RAND, he maintained a strong and close connection right up until his death, inspiring and assisting me and the other two presidents who have followed him, as well as countless others.

And, third, Harry was someone who earned especially strong admiration and affection from everyone who had the good fortune to know him—through his brilliance, his commitment to learning and teaching, and his kindness. To me, that’s a combination worth saluting and remembering.

In the words of Alton Frye, a former RAND researcher who went on to the Council on Foreign Relations, Harry Rowen was a man of insight and vision, dedication and determination.
First some basics. Harry was born in Boston and graduated from MIT in 1949 with a degree in industrial management. He spent the 1950s on the research staff at RAND, first in the Cost Analysis Department; then, after earning a master’s in economics, in our Economics Department, headed by Charles Hitch. He returned to RAND in 1967 as RAND’s second president. In between and afterwards, he served in senior positions at the Bureau of the Budget, the National Intelligence Council, and the Department of Defense (a couple of times); and in important advisory capacities with other federal agencies. He worked with Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, Fred Hoffman, and others at PanHeuristics. And, of course, he ended his career at Stanford and the Hoover Institution.

Details on most of those career stops to follow.

Our first two speakers will reflect on Harry Rowen’s legacy at RAND. Don Rice succeeded Harry as president of RAND and served for 17 years, until President George H. W. Bush nominated him to be Secretary of the Air Force. Charles Wolf was the founding dean of what is now the Pardee RAND Graduate School, the world’s largest and foremost doctoral program in the field of public policy. He is about to mark his 61st anniversary as a RAND economist.

But, of course, Harry’s legacy extends well beyond RAND, and, to reflect on that part of his career, we will hear from Jim Thomson, RAND president number 4, who served more than 22 years in that role; Rafiq Dossani, director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy, who collaborated with Harry at Stanford; and Susan Marquis, the current dean of Pardee RAND, who will offer some concluding remarks.
Harry Rowen and RAND’s Domestic Research

Donald B. Rice—former RAND President and CEO (1972–1989)

All of us who are given responsibility to lead an organization quickly learn we are standing on the shoulders of those who came before us.

When I came to RAND as president, I was the fortunate beneficiary of Harry Rowen’s foresight and accomplishments in building the beginnings of RAND’s social and economic policy research—which I’ll short-hand as RAND’s domestic research programs.

That was 1972, and I’ll return there in a moment. But, first, let me note that nearly 44 years later, Harry somehow reached back from heaven to give me a personal distinction. You will remember his extensive and well-deserved obituary in the LA Times. There, alongside it, was the picture of the first three RAND presidents. So now you’re looking at the only guy you know who will get his picture on the obituary page of the LA Times twice! Thanks to Harry.

Moving full-force into domestic policy research was controversial at RAND in the mid-’60s. Our first president was against it. So was Jim Schlesinger.

Gus Shubert and Charlie Wolf were in favor. Many staff took sides. But the trustees approved it—and picked Harry as the new president in 1966. Coming aboard, Harry said, “there was a mixed reception to diversification, but enough people thought it was a good idea and wanted to do it,” typically understating his own role in setting a new course for RAND.

Here’s Harry in his own words, from his letter in the Annual Report for 1967:

The domestic scene is a new area of major interest to RAND. . . . (F)rom the evident seriousness of our domestic problems along with the expectation RAND might be able to make a useful contribution to the solution of some of them . . .
Domestic problems—race, education, public order, housing, health care, transportation, pollution—are complex, inadequately understood, strongly interactive, and dispersed in authority among many government jurisdictions. Our nation needs effective programs whose alternatives, costs, and consequences have been carefully assessed. RAND research can help this country make better social choices.

That first year saw the start of research programs for New York City, working on health, housing, law enforcement, and fire. The basic idea, per Harry: “... just as improving national security policy depended on working closely with defense policymakers, RAND’s solutions to social problems must be based on interaction with all levels of government.” Sound familiar?

Harry devoted more than half a million dollars in RAND funds (real money in those days) into jump-starting domestic research in 1967.

To stay within our limited time today, let’s fast-forward to early 1972. By then, RAND had a Domestic Programs Division, headed by Vice President Gus Shubert, with operating programs in seven policy areas: Communications, Education and Human Resources, Environment, Health and Biosciences, Population Behavior, Transportation, and Urban Policy.

The New York City–RAND Institute had been established in 1969 and already had a widely recognized record of accomplishment, especially in fire, policing, and housing. And, no surprise, not without plenty of local controversy.

The RAND Graduate Institute had been established in 1970 and had admitted its first two cohorts. The graduate fellows needed options in domestic policy areas as well as in national security subjects for their on-the-job training—which was a distinguishing aspect of the RGI program for the Ph.D. in policy analysis. The Domestic Programs and the RGI were synergistic in building RAND’s contributions in social economic policies. Harry had the foresight to support both of them.
What Harry started in those few years grew into the backbone of RAND’s domestic research for many years thereafter. To give a few examples:

- Improving educational outcomes, especially for disadvantaged children, was a main focus of work in Education and Human Resources.
- The Health Insurance Experiment was planned alongside other work that would lead to a comprehensive approach to health care economics, quality of care, and health status.
- Economic analysis and demographics were combined to study the problems of population growth and economic development in underdeveloped countries.
- The planned Housing Allowance Supply Experiment was gathering steam.
- Besides housing and health, work begun in New York City on policing, criminal justice, pollution, and other subjects was spreading to Mother RAND.

All of these subjects, started on in Harry’s time with his active support, built RAND’s domestic programs to a level of effort equal to the national security side by the end of the ’70s. While these successes brought their own challenges that had to be managed, RAND would not have thrived, some would say not have survived, without the spread into social and economic policy.

From any perspective, all of us who came after him owe Harry a great debt of gratitude for his foresight, leadership, and perseverance.
Harry Rowen and the Founding of the RAND Graduate School

Charles Wolf, Jr.—Distinguished Chair in International Economics; Senior Economic Adviser; Professor and Founding Dean, Pardee RAND Graduate School

RAND’s graduate school opened its doors (so to speak) in the academic year 1970–1971. The institution’s initial name was “The RAND Graduate Institute (RGI).” Its first class consisted of ten students (called “graduate fellows”), who were already younger members of RAND’s staff. They had master’s degrees in a wide range of academic disciplines: physics, engineering, economics, political science, and management. They were attracted by the idea of enhancing their ability to do policy analysis, and by the opportunity to acquire the doctoral degree.

At its inception, RGI had a core curriculum consisting of three parts: economics (both macro- and microeconomics), statistics and data analysis, and organizational and behavioral theory and application. The school’s core faculty consisted of RAND staff whose doctorates were in these fields, who already had considerable teaching experience, and indeed who were concurrently teaching at UCLA, USC, Pepperdine, and Cal State University, Northridge.

That’s the “front story.” Harry Rowen’s vision, drive, and decisiveness were the mainsprings of this initiative!

The backstory is more complicated, interesting, and replete with tension and disagreement, ironies, and occasionally even a touch of humor. These attributes—especially the disagreements and ironies—were manifested among both RAND’s staff and RAND’s Board of Trustees.

Harry’s role was crucial. He initiated, guided, negotiated, and occasionally temporized to sustain progress in the entire effort.

RGI (later called RGS, then PRGS, and, most recently, “Pardee RAND”) would not now exist had Harry not brought it about!
Harry initiated this endeavor at a monthly meeting of RAND’s *soi-disant* “Management Committee.” This committee—somewhat smaller in number than the “Operations Group” of subsequent RAND presidents—didn’t do any corporate managing whatsoever. The members managed the academic, disciplinary departments that they headed—i.e., Physics, Engineering, Economics, Management Sciences, and Social Science. Other committee members included Dick Goldstein (RAND’s single vice president), RAND’s corporate secretary, and our chief of security. Occasionally, other RAND folk (such as Albert Wohlstetter, Bruno Augenstein, and Herb Goldhamer) were invited to the committee’s meetings. Basically, the Management Committee was an advisory, consultative group serving RAND’s president—a sounding board for whatever he wanted to discuss.

Recall that this was a time of unusual turbulence in America. The bitterly divisive Vietnam War was grinding toward its end. Turmoil on college campuses was rife (recall the violence at Kent State University). Urban unrest was burgeoning and extensive (recall the demonstrations and burnings in East Los Angeles). Prevalence of restiveness and divisiveness was not unlike the present time, and perhaps was even more intense.

In these circumstances, the National Science Foundation released a report asserting that the nation was beset by serious societal problems whose understanding and resolution required broadly based interdisciplinary collaboration between the natural sciences and the social sciences.

This was the context in which Harry Rowen proposed, at a meeting of the Management Committee in the summer of 1969—the second year of his tenure as RAND’s president—that RAND consider establishing a graduate school. After an hour or so of discussion, Harry set up a two-person subcommittee to address two questions:

- First, should RAND establish a graduate school? (What were the pros and cons of doing so?)
• Second, if we were to do so, should it be done alone or in conjunction with another academic institution?

The two-person subcommittee consisted of Fred Ikle (head of the Social Sciences Department) and me (as head of the Economics Department).

Of course, RAND already had extensive and deep connections with academia, dating from RAND’s inception to its then-current situation. We had sustained for more than a dozen years an annual program in which 20–30 graduate students from top universities spent the summer months at RAND as interns working on RAND projects. The program also was a valuable adjunct for RAND’s hiring plans, affording us and the student interns a reciprocal opportunity to assess their possible future employment at RAND.

Fred Ikle and I spent the next six months interviewing a few dozen key RAND staff members to elicit their views on the two questions Harry had posed. We also met with the then-president of Caltech (Harold Brown) and with Caltech’s provost. We met with UCLA’s chancellor (Chuck Young) and a key UCLA faculty member, Nobel Prize–winning chemist Bill Libby, who was especially interested in developing a science policy program at UCLA. Harry Rowen participated in or helped arrange the UCLA and Caltech meetings, which were focused on the second of the two questions he had asked Fred and me to answer—if we were to start a graduate school, should we do it alone or collaboratively?

Our interlocutors at both Caltech and UCLA applauded the idea of a RAND graduate school. However, it became clear to Fred and me, during our meetings and in reflecting on them afterwards, that the myriad bureaucratic and other impediments of academic jurisdiction, curricular responsibility, and sharing and raising funding made a genuinely partnered governance of the school infeasible.

Our unequivocal conclusion was: “Do it alone, or don’t do it!”

The nonrandom set of RAND staff whom we interviewed were sharply divided in their views about starting the graduate school. A majority (perhaps a dozen) thought it was a great idea, likely to
be a stimulating addition to the RAND environment and likely to appeal particularly to RANDites who wanted to teach and to oversee the dissertation work of bright students. (This putative majority was separate from the younger staff members whom I mentioned earlier as prospective graduate students in the school.)

A vociferous minority of key RAND staff opposed the idea, arguing that the turbulent situation both at home and abroad made it more important that we concentrate on what we were doing and doing well, that starting RGI would divert the time and distract the attention of key people from our ongoing work, and that the latter would suffer as a result. Among this minority were some of Harry’s, Fred’s, and my close colleagues and friends.

When Harry discussed the issue in the Board of Trustees, he encountered a similarly divided response. The trustees included five academic members: two university presidents, one dean of a major university faculty, two physicists, and one political scientist.

The board’s chairman in 1968–1970 was a business executive (David Shepard), followed in 1971–1973 by a lawyer (Newton Minow). Other board members included a wide range of fields and experiences. Among the academically linked board members, the two university presidents opposed the RGI startup, the faculty dean was ambivalent, the political scientist was supportive, and I believe the physicists were either mildly supportive or mute. Strong endorsement for going ahead with the school came from Newt Minow, Frank Stanton, and several others.

The opposing argument by the university presidents acknowledged, on the one hand, the timeliness and importance of developing new schools and new curricula focused on policy analysis but, on the other hand, asserted that the best way to do this was at (and confined to) top universities that had the needed experience and skills. For RAND to enter the picture, they believed, would be a misdirection and misallocation of resources.

Harry contrived a temporized resolution for this divided response: namely, proceed with RGI, then revisit the subject
for board review after four or five years. The workability of this outcome was facilitated by RAND’s job protection of the first cohort of students. In the event, several of the initial students completed their dissertations and received their Ph.D.’s before RGI was fully accredited in 1975 by the Western Association of Schools and Colleges! So, the first degrees were “unaccredited.” Later, we accredited them retroactively!

The deftly compromised solution that Harry worked out with RAND’s board would have gladdened the heart of Edmund Burke!

To repeat and to conclude: The Pardee RAND Graduate School would not exist without the combination of insight, energy, perseverance, and ingenuity of Harry Rowen.
I first met Harry Rowen in 1978 in Germany, at a workshop of the European-American Institute. At that point, I was a member of the NSC staff. I guess the topic had something to do with nuclear weapons in Europe, since that was one of my responsibilities. From that point on, I frequently attended these meetings and got to know Harry.

Along with Albert Wohlstetter, Harry was one of the founders of the European-American Institute. The idea of the Institute was to promote discussions of North American and European security problems in an informal and unofficial setting before governmental positions had crystallized. It operated for about a decade, holding its meetings in some of the nicest spots in Europe. Cindy Price, who worked for the Wohlstetters during this time, suggests that it may have been Harry who gestured to the wide windows of the conference room in a deluxe hotel on the French Riviera, and said, “Look outside: This is what NATO is striving to protect.”

Harry and Albert established a parallel organization, the New Alternatives Workshop, for classified discussions among American officials and experts on defense issues. I attended many of these meetings as well.

A lot of the topics addressed by both organizations were focused on understanding the intersection of technology and defense strategy. This was a period when the development of sensors and munitions was creating options for a stronger NATO conventional defense in Europe and for nuclear options short of Armageddon, topics that Harry devoted a lot of time to in his career, at least into the ’80s, when he turned more attention toward Asia.

In both the European-American Institute and the New Alternative Workshop, Harry frequently took a speaking role to
introduce a topic for discussion. A few examples demonstrate his intellectual range:

- Implications for the Defense of Europe of Technologies of Precision
- Fault Lines in the Soviet Empire
- Responding to Ambiguous Warning.

Albert, Harry, and Roberta Wohlstetter were close colleagues, working together over their careers on a wide range of subjects related to defense strategy and international security. Harry played a special role: To paraphrase the old Merrill Lynch ad, when Harry spoke, people listened. As Cindy Price recalls, “I can see him so clearly walking through the door and into the living room at the Wohlstetters, stopping behind their red velvet couch to say hello, pleasantly good-humored but no-nonsense, a little stooped over to diminish his height but never his stature. The barometric pressure changed with his presence.”

A key European colleague, Uwe Nerlich of the Stiftung Wissenshaft und Politik in Germany, remembers Harry as never becoming “theological” and always open to alternative options and analysis. To paraphrase, Uwe says that “in his modest and unimposing ways, Harry was one of the great figures that enriched my life, and my sadness at his passing combines with gratitude for what I learned from him.” Uwe asked that I pass his best wishes to Harry’s family.

At times, Harry (along with Roberta) played the role of peacemaker. Albert’s relations with European colleagues became testy and threatened the continuation of the EAI. Harry kept it on track. It wasn’t always the European softies who could find themselves in Albert’s sights. I can recall Harry coming up to me after I was eviscerated by Albert for something I said at a workshop and saying, “Don’t worry. Everybody knows that he was tearing down a strawman.”

Harry’s close working relationship with Albert went back to his earliest days at RAND in the early 1950s, where he arrived after
graduating from MIT. They combined with Fred Hoffman and R. J. Lutz to produce one of the most influential studies in RAND history, *Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases*. It was influential in many ways: in its effect on U.S. nuclear strategy in the early days of the Cold War, and in its effect on the way RAND approached studies—the importance of getting the policy research question right and the comprehensiveness of the analysis, a style that came to be called systems analysis and later policy analysis.

In subsequent studies at RAND, Harry continued to focus on nuclear deterrence, especially the precarious nature of a U.S. strategy that threatened massive nuclear retaliation in the event of conventional attack on Europe by the Soviet Union.

This preoccupation carried over to his first job in government, as Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, where he handled NATO and Berlin. When the Berlin Wall crisis threatened the security of Europe and of the United States, as Alain Enthoven recalled, President Kennedy denounced the massive retaliation strategy as a choice between surrender and suicide. With Harry in vanguard, the U.S. began its effort to change NATO’s defense strategy to one of “flexible response”—ensuring that there would be response options other than massive strikes.

After the Pentagon, Harry went to the Bureau of the Budget. He was there when selected as RAND’s second president in 1967. He served in government two more times, first as chairman of the National Intelligence Council in the early ’80s and later as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from 1989 to 1991. I recall visiting him in his office in the Pentagon frequently in those years—not only was he a friend, but an important RAND client.

Harry’s legacy as RAND’s president includes RAND’s foray into domestic policy research and the formation of the Graduate School. Both topics are being covered by others at this service. I owe a debt of gratitude to Harry for this legacy. When I became RAND president in 1989, revenue from the DoD was about 80 percent of the total and, with the end of the Cold War, it was about to decline
precipitously. Fortunately, because of Harry and his successor, Don Rice, I had a lot of bench strength in domestic policy research to help build that revenue stream. Without Harry’s legacy, the viability of the institution could have been threatened.

During my years as RAND president, I had many opportunities to see Harry. For many years, he was a member of the advisory board of the Graduate School. We frequently invited him and Beverly to what might be called RAND tribal gatherings. He and she always came. I sometimes called him for advice. He was generous with his time and thoughts.

Always thoughtful and decent, the barometric pressure did indeed change when Harry entered the room.
Harry Rowen at Stanford University

*Rafiq Dossani—Director, RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy; Senior Economist; Professor, Pardee RAND Graduate School*

Harry joined Stanford University’s business school in 1970 from RAND on an invitation from its dean, Arjay Miller, then newly arrived from the Ford Motor Car Company. Miller wanted Harry, jointly with Alain Enthoven, to develop courses in public management leading up to a degree in public management. While the degree program did not succeed, due to insufficient student interest, over 30 percent of the students at the business school took at least some courses in public management.

Later, Harry became a senior fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Institution, while continuing with public service. In 1986, he wrote an influential article, “Living with a Sick Bear,” published in the *National Interest* journal. The article assessed the impact of the failing Soviet economy on its global ambitions, concluding that the USSR would soon have to drastically reset its relationship with the world.

Events in Silicon Valley and Asia began to attract world attention in the early 1990s. Harry’s interest in both led him to the then newly formed Asia Pacific Research Center, or APARC. The center conducted research on security issues in Japan and Korea. Under Harry, APARC broadened its scope, adding scholars on China, South Asia, and Southeast Asia and covering both security and developmental issues.

During this time, in an influential article, “The Short March: China’s Road to Democracy,” published in 1996 in the *National Interest*, Harry predicted that, in about 20 years—by 2015, to be precise, China would turn democratic. He argued that, unlike the Soviet Union, China’s economic success combined with decentralization of public management would inexorably cause power to leak from Beijing to the provinces. The tensions thus created would lead inevitably to a situation where democracy would emerge as the consensus.
Though Harry got the date wrong, this article should still guide us. The forces of growth and decentralization, and the tensions they raise, continue to drive change in China. A second insight, that a democratic China would not be an unmixed blessing for the United States, remains relevant as a guide to how relations with other emerging great power democracies, such as India, could evolve.

I met Harry in 1997, a few months into his APARC directorship. I had come to Palo Alto to meet my erstwhile thesis advisor, Paul Milgrom. Over lunch, I told Paul that I wanted to get out of investment banking and back into academics, but was having trouble getting highly ranked U.S. business schools excited by my background. Paul suggested I consult Harry Rowen. After lunch, I walked over to APARC’s offices, hoping for an unscheduled meeting with Harry.

Harry was in. As I was to find out later, if Harry was in town and it was a weekday between 9:30 a.m. and 5:30 p.m, Harry was always in his office, surrounded by books and papers piled high, always reading. As it turned out, Harry welcomed my relatively unconventional background of academics, investment banking, journalism, and civil society work. He thought it would bring some entrepreneurial energy to APARC, and said I could help him get South Asian studies started at Stanford. It is worth pointing out that, contrary to my recommendation, Harry insisted that we would research South Asia, not just India. Further, we would not just study public policy. Our work would also support the university’s core teaching functions by sponsoring courses of undergraduate interest, such as languages and anthropology.

These insights were to serve us well. Much of the work we did at APARC on South Asia in the security area involved both India and Pakistan, especially after their nuclear tests the following year. Today, the Center for South Asia that Harry founded within APARC is one of the most active centers for area studies at Stanford, and should be considered a tribute to Harry’s work.

In 2003, Harry was appointed to the Robb Silberman Commission that studied the failures of American intelligence on
weapons of mass destruction. As Tom Fingar has pointed out, the failure resulted from not observing rules that Harry himself had proposed when chairman of the National Intelligence Council, and which had, till then, served the Intelligence Community well: Get the question right, support it empirically, and always consider alternative explanations.

Harry was a person of loyalty and feeling, as I discovered many times. Once, I faced a legal challenge over authorship of an influential piece on Indian and Chinese engineers in Silicon Valley. Harry heard my side of the story, believed in it, and, at his own cost, engaged a lawyer to advise me on how to respond. On the lawyer’s advice, we put the weight of APARC behind our response, which resolved the problem.

I last met Harry a few weeks before his passing. I was in Palo Alto on a Friday afternoon for some work, and decided to visit him on a whim, just as I had done in 1997. We talked a bit about his blogs on China and, just like old times, revisited books that we had read in the interim. He then told me that his travel days to Asia were over. Taken aback, I asked him if his health had declined. “Not mine,” he said, “but Beverly’s has, so I need to be around her more.” In retrospect, it was so typical of Harry.
Remembering Harry Rowen’s Leadership: Adapting to Change

Susan L. Marquis—Dean, Pardee RAND Graduate School; Vice President, Emerging Policy Research and Methods; Distinguished Chair in Policy Analysis

It’s really rather extraordinary. Listening to this recounting of Harry Rowen’s accomplishments today, I cannot help but be grateful. Grateful that I had the opportunity to come to know Harry. And, more importantly, grateful that Harry was with us and applied his formidable intellect to the problems, complications, and difficulties of the Cold War and post–Cold War world.

Like all of the speakers this evening, I have known of Harry, his ideas, and his work for decades. I had overlapped with Harry—at very different levels—while in the Pentagon and had read his articles, particularly about the end of the Soviet Union. But, unlike the others, I didn’t get the opportunity to know Harry personally until I became dean of the Pardee RAND Graduate School. I had come to know Alain Enthoven, and it was Alain who introduced me to Harry—an introduction that was far more daunting than I hope either of them recognized. When it came time for the marking of the 40th anniversary of the graduate school at our 2010 Commencement, I invited Alain and Harry to be part of the celebration. Soon after, my periodic lunches with Alain in Palo Alto became lunches with Alain and Harry.

I’d like to say that Harry and I quickly became fast friends, but all of us who know Harry would recognize this as highly unlikely. I quickly learned that Harry really didn’t do “small talk.” Social niceties about the weather, cheery updates on the school and the like—they really had no place in our lunchtime discussions. Where we connected, and where friendship developed, was talking about ideas and about history. Given our shared backgrounds, we spent much time talking about the history of systems analysis at RAND
and in the Pentagon, where these ideas came from, and the evolution and role of this kind of thinking and analysis in public policy.

Picking up on this same thread, the other great pleasure in talking with Harry was discussing the graduate school he established while president of RAND, the unique nature of the school, its importance to RAND as an institution, and its future. Harry was engaged with RAND and deeply interested in the graduate school until he left us. He, often joined by Beverly, attended each commencement since 2010’s 40th anniversary celebration. Harry met with students, he attended our tribute to Jim Wilson, and he was with all of us at RAND for the celebration of Charles Wolf’s 60th anniversary. Even when travel was difficult, Harry believed it important to continue to take part in life at RAND.

Thinking about RAND’s wide-ranging influence, the future of the graduate school, and how important Harry’s leadership was to where we are now, I go back to what we just heard from Charles and Don. Harry became RAND’s president during a time of tumult, confusion, and change in the United States and the world. It is not too strong to say that uncertainty was rampant about the future of American society and even the future of the world in the nuclear age. Harry’s response was that of an “institutional leader.” He did not aspire simply to RAND’s survival. He did not follow the advice of some who felt that RAND should simply do what it did better. Instead, Harry responded to, and anticipated the results of, uncertainty and change by adapting and reshaping RAND. In establishing RAND’s domestic research program and inaugurating the new RAND Graduate Institute, Harry took the risks he knew were necessary for RAND not only to survive but to bring its capabilities and insight to new areas—extending systems analysis into policy analysis, and taking on the responsibility of educating and training the next generations of policy researchers and leaders.

Harry’s understanding of the change he saw all around him, his courage in making the leap of developing entirely new capabilities at RAND, made it possible for RAND not just to survive but to thrive, bringing the unique value of RAND to a much broader world. In
doing so, Harry laid the foundation for leadership, provided with great success over the following decades by Don Rice, Jim Thomson, and Michael Rich. Harry knew that change and uncertainty not only provided new opportunities for RAND but demanded that RAND take the leap needed to fulfill our mission. And this understanding was in part why he stayed so deeply engaged with RAND and the graduate school until the end of his time.

Harry, as much as or more than anyone, saw the change and uncertainty that are all around us. He understood the new world in which we find ourselves. And he knew that RAND once again faces both opportunities and the demand to change. Harry believed we were in the midst of troubling and very exciting times, and he looked forward to seeing how RAND would respond.

I’ll conclude our formal remarks here, ending with a reminder of the fond memories that each of us has of conversations, shared meals, and debates over new ideas with Harry. To all of you who spoke this evening, thank you for joining in this tribute to Harry Rowen.
Closing Remarks

Hilary Rowen and Chris Rowen

After the formal program, Hilary Rowen and Chris Rowen offered some parting remarks. They shared how their father took to heart the intellectual process, so much so that growing up in the Rowen household was really systems analysis at the domestic level. Everyone’s opinion was respected, but it needed to be an informed opinion drawn from reference material. The *Encylopaedia Britannica*, *Webster’s Dictionary*, and the *Oxford English Dictionary* were frequently found in the middle of the dining room table.

Harry was a person of infinite curiosity, perennially enthusiastic about what someone else was thinking. When Chris started a company, his father looked upon him as a laboratory experiment. Fresh data. Hilary shared that Harry liked nothing more than a really juicy problem he could sink his teeth into. It didn’t matter whether it was within his core expertise or unrelated. He would look at a problem from all angles. He loved nothing more than a really good idea.

Chris also acknowledged the role that RAND had played for his father. RAND was a place where Harry invested so much of his energy, his dreams. Though Harry did many things in his career, his time at RAND was the period that was most important, most meaningful, most gratifying.

The RAND experience was also part of Hilary and Chris’s experience growing up. Parties were held at the Rowen house, especially in the summer in the years when the summer intern program and the graduate school were just beginning. The Rowens always served sangria, in beautiful glass pitchers. Little did the RAND guests know that it was the Rowen children making that sangria out back in a full-sized garbage can reserved just for this purpose—muddling on an industrial scale.
Hilary, Chris, and their siblings grew up thinking that everybody’s dad lived surrounded by 47 different periodicals and newspaper clippings; that everybody’s dad appeared regularly in the op-ed pages of the Wall Street Journal; that everybody grew up discussing public policy at the dinner table. But then they found out how special he was.
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis.

This electronic document was made available from www.rand.org as a public service of the RAND Corporation.

Support RAND
- Browse Reports & Bookstore
- Make a charitable contribution

For More Information
- Visit RAND at www.rand.org
- Explore the RAND Corporation
- View document details

Corporate Publications
This product is part of the RAND Corporation corporate publication series. Corporate publications describe or promote RAND divisions and programs, summarize research results, or announce upcoming events.

Limited Electronic Distribution Rights
This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND electronic documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND electronic documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions.