
FIGURES

4.1	Types of Networks	85
6.1	JSTARS Picture of Moving Mechanized Forces	164
6.2	Effects of Weapon Accuracy on Weapon Needs	173
6.3	Operational Impact of Effective Wide-Area Surveillance of Moving Ground Forces	175
6.4	Armored Vehicle Interdiction: Yesterday and Today	177
7.1	Adversary Asymmetric Options and Potential CONOPs	192
9.1	Future U.S. Regional Adversaries Might Seek Asymmetric Strategies	254
9.2	Two Concepts of SIW	255
9.3	Designing a First-Generation SIW Strategy and Policy Decisionmaking Framework	265
10.1	Air Force Combat Operations	285
10.2	Supporting the Forces and Sustaining Operations . . .	286
10.3	Potential Threats to Air Force Information Systems	288
10.4	Potential Computer Vulnerabilities in the AOC	291
10.5	Potential Computer Vulnerabilities in the Support and Sustainability Network	292
10.6	Some Typical Theater Air Communication Links	294
10.7	Air Force Systems Rely Heavily on Defense and Public Information Infrastructure	295
10.8	GPS Jamming Can Reduce Weapon Accuracy Substantially	297
10.9	Potential Effects of Attacks on Information Systems	298

10.10	Arrival Delays Have Little Effect	300
10.11	Planning Cycle Delays Have Only Minor Effect	300
10.12	Maintaining Multiple Types of Munitions May Reduce the Impact of the Vulnerability of Specific Types of Systems	305
10.13	The Combination of Reduced Force Structure and Simplified Weapon Mix Can Substantially Increase the Impact of Information Vulnerabilities	305