Enlisted recruiting has been difficult in recent years. In fiscal year (FY) 1999, the Army missed its recruiting target—as did the Air Force, the service long regarded as immune to recruiting difficulties. Although all the services achieved their target in FY 2000, the percentage of high-quality recruits\(^1\) declined to its lowest level in over a decade. In part, these recent problems reflected the effects on recruiting of the unusually strong labor market and robust economic conditions. To respond to such business cycle fluctuations, the military has typically relied on such policies as higher expenditures on advertising, an increased number of recruiters, and enlistment incentives. While these policies will continue to be critical in countering short-term cyclical fluctuations, it is important to recognize that additional policies may be needed to respond to long-term trends. The research reported in this document informs the development of new policies that respond to two long-term trends. The first of these trends is the huge growth in college attendance in recent years. The second is the continuing growth in the use of information technology in the military and the demand for high-quality recruits. As discussed below, both trends point to the value of recruiting youth in the college market. By *youth in the college market* we mean high school youth who plan to go to college soon after completing high school, youth who are already in college, or youth who

\(^1\) *High-quality recruits* are those who have completed high school and scored in the upper 50 percent on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT).
might have recently left college (because they have graduated or dropped out).

This report contains four chapters, each of which explores a different facet of recruiting individuals in the college market. This chapter provides background information on recent demographic trends and highlights some theoretical reasons for recruiting youth in the college-bound market. It also introduces the other chapters and clarifies their role in furthering our understanding of recruiting college-market youth.

RECENT TRENDS THAT POINT TO THE RECRUITMENT OF COLLEGE-MARKET YOUTH

Growth in College Attendance

One of the fundamental long-term trends that has significance for military recruiting is the increase during the past two decades in the percentage of young people attending college. College attendance is at an all-time high. At the same time, the group traditionally targeted by military recruiters—high school graduates who do not have immediate plans to attend college—is shrinking. In 1975, around the advent of the all-volunteer force (AVF), this group comprised about half of recent high school graduates (Figure 1.1). In the intervening years, this fraction declined steadily, with the fraction of recent high school graduates who do not attend college within 12 months of graduation falling to one-third by 1998.

As discussed in greater detail in Asch et al. (1999), economists and demographers largely attribute this trend in college attendance to the growth in the college wage premium—that is, the percentage difference between the mean earnings of college graduates and the mean earnings of high school graduates. Mishel et al. (1999) found that the average college earnings premium grew from 40 percent in 1975 to 63 percent in 1998. The rapid growth in the college premium means that able young people who opt not to go to college and enter the military instead are generally forgoing a large earnings boost.2

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2Although some military recruits go on to attend college after their military service, the fraction who do so is well below one-quarter (Fair et al., 2000).
Since the military prefers high school graduates in AFQT categories I-IIIA, a group with a particularly strong interest in college (Kilburn and Klerman, 1999), the increase in the college premium is likely to adversely affect a potential recruit’s decision to enlist in the military.

Compounding the effects of the burgeoning interest in college attendance on the number of high-quality youth available for military service are the changes in the size of the overall youth population in recent years. The number of 18-year-old males in the United States declined from about 2.2 million in 1980 to about 2.0 million in 1998. This decline further lessened the supply of young men in the mili-
tary’s traditional target market: individuals who do not have immediate plans to attend college upon high school graduation. The number of young people who were not college bound within a year after high school in 1998 was about 69 percent of the number in 1980 (see Table 1.1).

Offsetting the negative effects of college interest and population changes on the size of the military’s traditional recruit market is the fact that the military’s accession requirement has also declined over the past decade, primarily due to the end of the cold war and the

Table 1.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Males Graduating from H.S. Within Last Year (000s)</th>
<th>Percentage Not Enrolled in College</th>
<th>Number Not Enrolled in College (000s)</th>
<th>Enlisted Accessions (000s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1,490</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>673</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1,508</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1,390</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1,429</td>
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<td>1986</td>
<td>1,331</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>314</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1,278</td>
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<td>296</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1,334</td>
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<td>1993</td>
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<td>1994</td>
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<td>39</td>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>1,238</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>463</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1,297</td>
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<td>1,354</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1,452</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

downsizing of the active force. The number of individuals the military needed to recruit fell by about half from 1980 to 1998.

To assess the adequacy of the supply of non-college-bound youth, we compare the absolute number of these youth to the number of recruits needed. Because of declines in the accession requirement, this ratio has actually grown since the beginning of the decade (Figure 1.2), rising from 2.2 in 1990 to about 2.8 in 1995. Nonetheless, the growth in the ratio of college-bound youth to the accession requirement was even greater. This ratio nearly doubled during the same period whereas the ratio of non-college-bound youth to the requirement increased only about one-quarter. The difference in the growth rates of these ratios suggests that while recruiters should not abandon the traditional market, the growing college-bound market might be a rich source of recruits.

![Figure 1.2—The Ratio of College-Bound Youth and Recent High School Graduates Who Are Not Attending College (Traditional Market) to Enlisted Accessions, by Year](image-url)

Features of Two-Year Colleges

Two-year colleges are an important component of the college market. Nearly half of the increase in college enrollment between 1980 and 1997 was due to rising attendance at community colleges (U.S. Department of Education, 2001). Currently, about 38 percent of students enrolled in higher education attend two-year colleges (U.S. Department of Education 2001). Furthermore, the chapters of this volume largely point toward two-year college students as having more recruiting potential than four-year college students. Despite the significant role that two-year colleges play in the higher education system of the United States, policymakers are generally less familiar with the features of two-year colleges than those of four-year colleges (Kane and Rouse, 1999). The following discussion provides a brief overview of key features of two-year colleges.

Two-year colleges originally focused on preparing capable students to transfer to four-year institutions. Students typically earned an associate’s degree (AA) after two years of general study and then had the option of transferring to a four-year college where they could complete their bachelor’s degree (BA). Two-year colleges now have a broader mandate, often offering programs that include continuing adult education and vocational/technical programs in addition to their AA programs. In contrast to four-year students, about a third of whom are enrolled in private institutions, only about 4 percent of two-year students enroll in private colleges.

Two-year colleges attempt to expand access to higher education in three ways. First, they often have open admissions—that is, just about everyone who applies is accepted. Second, they charge relatively low tuition: Full-time tuition and fees at a two-year institution averaged around $1,700 for the 1999–2000 academic year compared with nearly $7,000 at four-year colleges (U.S. Department of Education, 2001). Third, a student can easily attend a two-year college on a part-time basis. In fact, nearly two-thirds of two-year college students attend part-time.

These features are likely to reduce the cost and increase the benefit of programs that allow individuals to combine military service and two-year college relative to programs that combine service and four-year college. Given open admissions policies, most recruits would be
eligible to attend two-year programs. In addition, paying for part or all of students’ tuition would be relatively inexpensive. Finally, the flexible nature of attendance lends itself to concurrent service and school attendance. Currently, several programs do take advantage of these features to allow recruits to combine service and schooling. One is the reserves’ Montgomery GI Bill program (MGIB Chapter 1606), whereby students serve in the reserves while attending college using MGIB benefits. Another is the Navy’s new “Tech-Prep” program. Both of these programs partner with community colleges to enroll students in a field of study that will help prepare the student for a future military occupation. A similar program is the Navy’s “CASH” program, which offers high school graduates who agree to enter a nuclear field occupation the opportunity to attend community college before enlisting and to earn basic pay while they are enrolled. The Army is also experimenting with a “college-first” program. These programs are discussed in more detail in Chapter Four.

The availability of two-year colleges varies widely by state. For example, Louisiana and Montana enroll fewer than 7 percent of college students in two-year institutions, whereas in California, nearly 50 percent of all college students are enrolled in two-year colleges. This variability is potentially important for military recruiting. As discussed in Asch et al. (1999) and later in this volume, individuals who are interested in two-year colleges are also likely to be most interested in military enlistment. In localities where options to combine two-year college and military service are limited, military enlistment may be viewed as a relatively more attractive option.

Despite offering increased access to higher education, two-year colleges often do not lead to degree completion or to a transfer to a four-year college. Over half of students who enroll in two-year colleges complete less than one year of coursework, and less than half of them obtain some type of college degree (Kane and Rouse, 1999). Among two-year students who leave school before the beginning of their second year, about half eventually return—typically to a two-year institution—and the other half never return to a postsecondary institution (U.S. Department of Education, 1998). As shown in Figure 1.3, of students who obtain a degree, about one-third attain each of the following types of degrees: certificate, AA, and BA.
Two-year students’ relatively bleak prospects of completing a degree may lead one to question why they attend these institutions. However, even for two-year college students who do not complete a degree, the labor market return to college attendance may be appreciable. In a review of studies that examined the returns to two-year college attendance, Kane and Rouse (1999) reported that several studies have estimated that each year of two-year college attendance raises annual earnings by 5 to 8 percent (Kane and Rouse, 1995, Grubb, 1995, and Monk-Turner, 1994). These figures are similar to the estimated returns to completing each year of four-year college. Furthermore, studies found that, between ages 29 and 38, the typical two-year college entrant who enrolls but does not complete a degree earns 9 to 13 percent more than the typical high school graduate with similar high school grades and test scores (Leigh and Gill, 1997, Kane and Rouse, 1995). Obtaining an associate’s degree raises earnings above that for individuals who simply complete two years of college. Estimates of this incremental return to two-year degree completion
range from 8 to 19 percent (Jaeger and Page, 1996, Kane and Rouse, 1999). The much higher rate of return for women than for men is believed to largely reflect the exceptional return to nursing degrees (Grubb, 1995, Kane and Rouse, 1995).

A second reason that prospective students may find two-year colleges attractive is that two-year colleges give students who are uncertain about their educational and labor force prospects a chance to “try out” college. As discussed above, two-year colleges are relatively inexpensive, and they are amenable to part-time attendance. In fact, about 62 percent of two-year college students attend part-time, whereas only about 28 percent of four-year students attend part-time (Department of Education, 2001). Moreover, many two-year students live off-campus or with their parents and do not need to move to a new city, as is often the case for four-year students. These factors lower the cost of finding out whether they are “college material” and are well suited to attend college (Manski, 1989, Altonji, 1991). The fact that the majority of two-year students complete less than one year of coursework indicates that most two-year students find out that college is not their best alternative. In contrast, at four-year colleges, which generally require a larger cost to try out, more students go on to complete degrees. We discuss this issue at greater length below.

Although it is true that a large number of high-quality youth attend two-year colleges, targeting two-year college students in general would not be a productive recruiting strategy. This is because two-year college students are likely to be older and are slightly more likely to be female than the typical freshmen entering college. Only about half (52 percent) of two-year college students are under age 25, in contrast to four-year students, about 60 percent of whom are less than 25 (U.S. Department of Education, 2001). College students in general are more likely to be female than male: About 57 percent of two-year students and 55 percent of four-year students are women (U.S. Department of Education, 2001).

**Increasing Demand for High-Quality Recruits in the Military**

A second trend that points to the value of targeting college-bound youth is the changing nature and pace of military operations after the end of the Cold War. Operations have shifted away from preparing
for a conflict with the Soviet Union toward such activities as peacekeeping and other “operations other than war.”

Personnel deployments have increased in this new environment as well (Hosek and Totten, 1998). Continuing a long-term trend that predated the AVF, the military has maintained its shift toward the utilization of high-technology methods in everything from weapon systems to procurement systems. In addition, as part of the drawdown, the services redesigned numerous career fields, requiring personnel to undertake more tasks and tasks of greater complexity (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1998). The services maintain that these trends require recruits of increasingly higher aptitude. As Figure 1.4 shows, over the last two decades, recruit

![Figure 1.4—Percentage of Non-Prior Accessions Who Were “High Quality,” by Year](image-url)

SOURCE: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD), 1998 and personal communications, Accession Policy, OASD.

NOTE: High-quality accessions are those who graduated from high school and scored in the top half of the AFQT distribution.
quality has in general risen above the quality of the recruits at the in-
ception of the AVF. Previous research has shown that individuals of
greater aptitude are more likely to be interested in attending college
(Kilburn and Klerman, 1999, Kilburn, 1994). Hence, the military is
likely to increasingly try to enlist college-bound individuals.

THEORETICAL REASONS FOR RECRUITING YOUTH IN THE
COLLEGE MARKET

Critics of the idea of recruiting individuals in the college market
sometimes make the following argument: *We're having a difficult
time attracting young people who have only a high school diploma;
how can we expect to attract those with some college who might have
even better labor market opportunities?*

Although college-bound youth may have better civilian opportuni-
ties, which could make a given individual more difficult to recruit,
targeting some of these individuals may still make sense from an ef-
ficiency standpoint. The real question is: What mix of traditional high
school graduates and college-bound youth should be targeted for re-
cruitment?

Economic theory suggests that the efficient mix of traditional and
college-market recruits is the one that equalizes the marginal cost of
their recruitment. Figure 1.5 shows two notional marginal cost
curves, one for the traditional market and one for the college-bound
market. The marginal cost curve indicates the increment in recruit-
ment costs associated with inducing an additional youth to enter the
military. Recruitment costs include the costs of the various resources
used to recruit youth such as advertising, enlistment bonuses, and
college benefits. The marginal cost of recruitment is assumed to vary
with the number of recruits, denoted as Q on the X-axis. We assume
that the curves slope upward in a convex fashion. This implies that
recruiting more youth from a given market (traditional or college-
bound) gets increasingly more difficult as more recruits are needed.
The difficulty increases because when more recruits are needed, the
military must draw into service not only those individuals with a
relatively strong taste for military service but also those who have
weaker tastes or even a negative taste for service. As the requirement
rises, more youths with less interest in the military must be recruited.
Figure 1.5—Hypothetical Marginal Cost Curves for College Market and Traditional Market

While information regarding the precise location of these curves is not available, it is likely that the marginal cost curve for the college-bound market lies above the marginal cost curve for the traditional high-school graduate market at any number of recruits, \( Q \), because the former individuals generally have better civilian opportunities than the latter. Consequently, the recruitment of any number of youth will have a higher marginal cost if those youth come from the college market than recruiting the same number of youth, but from the traditional market. For example, recruiting \( Q_C \) number of recruits entirely from the college market would entail higher marginal costs than recruiting quantity \( Q_T \) of recruits entirely from the traditional market. The curves in the figure demonstrate that even if the marginal cost of recruiting from the traditional market is lower than the marginal cost of recruiting from the college market at a given \( Q \), it would be most efficient to recruit from both markets rather than to recruit exclusively from the traditional market. Say the military wants
to recruit a given number of recruits, $Q_N$. The efficient mix of college-bound and traditional youth is the level of each such that the marginal costs of each are equal (at $C^*$ in the figure) and such that $Q_C + Q_T = Q_N$.

To see why this is the optimal mix, examine the costs of recruiting $Q_N$ but obtaining one more individual from the traditional market, $Q_T + 1$, and one less individual from the college market, $Q_C - 1$. In this case, the military could lower recruiting costs because the marginal cost of the last traditional recruit would be greater than $C^*$ whereas one more college-bound recruit would only cost $C^*$. Hence, the optimal mix involves the recruitment of some college-bound youth despite the fact that the marginal cost curve for this group is higher than for the traditional market. However, because the marginal cost curve for the college market is above the marginal cost curve for the traditional market, the optimal mix will include more traditional youth than college-bound youth.

The reason it makes sense to recruit some college-market youth despite their higher marginal cost is that the traditional market is already well penetrated. Recruiters have already tapped those in the traditional market with a strong taste for service and are forced to tap those with a weaker taste, a group that is difficult to recruit. In contrast, because the college-bound market has barely been penetrated, recruiters are more likely to find college-bound youth with a taste for military service—a group that is easier to recruit, all else equal. Hence, recruiting a combination of the traditional market and college market is likely to be less costly than recruiting everyone from the traditional market, the strategy the military has primarily relied upon in the past.

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4Note that it is theoretically possible that recruiting a mix of the traditional market and the college-bound market would be less efficient than exclusively recruiting from the traditional market. This would be the case if the recruiting goal, $Q_N$, were sufficiently low that this number could be reached on the traditional marginal cost curve at levels everywhere below the lowest point on the college-market cost curve.

5Our analysis does not suggest that the military should exclusively recruit from the college market. Rather, it implies that a mix of recruits from both the college market and the traditional market is desirable for DoD overall. It is possible that one or more of the services may continue to focus on the traditional market; across the services, however, it makes sense to recruit from both.
One might argue that an individual drawn from the college market could not possibly have a stronger taste for military service than a youth from the traditional market. After all, those who attend college or plan to attend college have already ruled out as an occupational choice not only the military but also civilian employment following high school. Why would they change their mind?

Decision-reversal, whereby individuals face alternatives, make a choice, then change their course of action, is a common phenomena. The decision-reversal model was originally developed in the field of economics to account for the fact that workers sometimes switched jobs (Johnson, 1978). The model can be adapted to any decision where individuals make a choice among alternatives under uncertainty and imperfect information—marriage, where to live, or whether to attend college. The common trait of these decisions is that the desirability and suitability of the choice for a particular individual cannot be completely known in advance—a person has to experience the choice in order to be able to make a fully informed decision. In the case of employment, the suitability of a job for a certain worker or that worker’s abilities with respect to that job are revealed after some time on the job.

Attending college has been characterized as the type of choice whereby an individual learns about the desirability of the choice only after trying it (Manski, 1989, Altonji, 1991). Prospective students may not have complete information about how well they would like a particular school—or even if they would like college in general—until they attend. Similarly, a person may not know whether he or she is really "college material" until attending college.

Another important feature of attending college that figures into models of decision reversal is the fact that after making the choice, one can change one’s mind and go back and choose one of the other alternatives. This leads to what could be called the “option value” feature of attending college: You can attend college and still leave open the option of going back and undertaking one of your other alternatives. Given that the potential payoff to college attendance is currently so high, it would be prudent for young people who are uncertain about whether they could perform well or would like college to give it a try. If they succeed, the payoff is great; if they fail, they are not much worse off because they can simply go back and
pick up one of their other alternatives (see Dixit, 1992, for a discussion of option values). In other words, military service might seem relatively more attractive to such people once they have tried college and have more information.

**ORGANIZATION OF THIS VOLUME**

In a previous report, *Attracting College-Bound Youth into the Military* (Asch et al., 1999), we documented demographic trends that point toward college-bound youth as a potential market that could be tapped to supplement traditional recruiting. This report further explores the recruiting potential of college-bound youth by examining in more detail features of the college-bound population and their implications for designing recruiting policies. The next three chapters examine different aspects of the college-bound youth market. Each chapter approaches the topic from the viewpoint of the young person who is making the decision to enlist or pursue some other post–high school activity. Hence, the individual decisionmaking model (see Kilburn and Klerman, 1999, and Hosek and Peterson, 1985) is the guiding principle in each of the chapters. In this model, individuals select the alternative—in this case, military enlistment, college attendance, or labor force participation—that yields the highest expected lifetime utility. This model is discussed in more detail in Chapters Two and Four.

Chapter Two, “Trends in Intentions to Enlist and Attend College,” by Chris Bourg, examines the individual choice to enlist for individuals very early in the decision process. Bourg examines trends in youth’s plans to attend college or enlist in the military before they have even graduated from high school, using the Monitoring the Future (MtF) data. The MtF data report the enlistment and college-going intentions of nationally representative samples of high school seniors each year between 1976 and 1995. These data permit several advances over enlistment intentions derived from another common survey of enlistment intentions, the Youth Attitude Tracking Survey (YATS). First, these data include intention questions regarding both college attendance and enlistment. Consistent with the large rise in college attendance mentioned earlier, the first portion of Chapter Two documents dramatic growth over the past two decades in the
number of high school seniors who report strong intentions to attend a four-year college after high school.

These data also enable Bourg to analyze not only the trends in college intentions over time, but also the relationship between college and military intentions. This relationship is important to understand because the implications for recruiting policy of the rising interest in college depend on the relationship between college and military intentions. If preferences for military service rise as preferences for college grow, then an increase in the fraction of youths interested in college may not be detrimental to recruiting. However, if interest in the military drops when intentions to attend college rise, then an increase in the fraction of recent graduates attending college is likely to make recruiting much more difficult. Bourg finds an inverse relationship between college intentions and military intentions, which validates the individual decision model’s characterization of enlistment and college attendance as competing alternatives. Bourg also finds that the individuals most interested in the military are the least interested in attending four-year college and vice versa.

Chapter Three of this volume compares the costs of attending college for veterans and non-veterans. In terms of the individual decision-making model, the relative cost of attending college versus enlisting is a key factor in the choice to enlist versus to attend college. This chapter, “Paying for College: A Survey of Military and Civilian Financial Aid Programs and Postsecondary Education Costs,” by C. Christine Fair, begins by examining trends in federal financial aid opportunities and military educational benefits over the past decade. The trends she identifies include some that are beneficial to recruiting: The average federal financial aid award dropped, and there has been a major shift from grant aid to loans. In terms of the individual decisionmaking model, these trends are beneficial to recruiting because they raised the net cost of nonveteran college attendance relative to military service, which would make military service relatively more attractive. Fair also observes some financial aid trends that are detrimental to recruiting: State and institutional aid grew at faster rates than college tuition, and more students received some financial aid. Again, in terms of the individual decisionmaking model, these changes made enlisting less attractive relative to attending college because they reduced the relative cost of college attendance.
Subsequently, Chapter Three investigates the fraction of college costs that military education benefit programs cover. Fair reports that the answer to this question depends largely on what type of school one is examining—public or private—and what type of costs one is considering—tuition only or total costs, which also include room and board. She finds that the College Funds go much farther toward funding a college education than the less-generous MGIB. In general, the MGIB covers all tuition costs at public schools whereas the College Funds cover total costs at public schools and about half of costs in the majority of private schools. Fair also discusses some of the interactions between different types of financial aid.

Chapter Four examines the recruiting potential of students who have already entered college. This chapter, “The Enlistment Potential of College Students,” by Beth J. Asch and M. Rebecca Kilburn, discusses which segment of the college market—entrants, dropouts, or graduates from two-year or four-year colleges—has the greatest enlistment potential. The chapter uses data on individuals who entered college for the first time in 1989. These data, from the Beginning Postsecondary Students Study (BPS), followed a sample of students until 1995. Using characteristics that were found to predict individuals’ enlistments in earlier studies (Kilburn and Klerman, 1999), Asch and Kilburn investigate which segment of the college market is most likely to have the characteristics associated with enlistment. They find that two-year students, and dropouts from two-year colleges in particular, are likely to be the most promising source of recruits among individuals who started college. In addition to drawing on the individual enlistment decision model, this chapter also draws on the decision-reversal model. Since this analysis examines the likelihood that individuals who initially chose to attend college would change course and enter the military, their empirical model examines factors that might lead individuals to revise their post–high school choices.

Later in Chapter Four, Asch and Kilburn examine some of the policy options available to target the college population, such as loan repayment programs, paying higher wages for more education, paying for tuition, or enlistment bonuses. They analyze these policy options from the perspective of the individual decision model outlined above to assess whether improvements could be made to the incentives aimed at this population. They find that existing programs are gen-
erally small in scale and suggest a number of ways to strengthen the programs.

In sum, recruiting strategies and policy tools used today largely resemble those devised in the mid-1970s at the advent of the AVF. Although these strategies have largely been effective at countering business-cycle fluctuations over the past two decades, the policies have not been adapted to reflect longer-term trends in both the civilian labor market and the changing nature of the military. The changes in the civilian labor market and the U.S. military have been neither subtle nor unrecognized by young people. The premium a college graduate receives in the labor market relative to a high school graduate has nearly doubled since the AVF began. Young people have responded by enrolling in college programs in record numbers despite skyrocketing college costs. In addition, the military, like the civilian sector, has increasingly incorporated technology into its workplace, leading some to predict an ever-increasing demand for advanced skills in the military.

The main point of this volume is to encourage military policymakers to recognize that the dramatic change in the civilian labor market and the military in the past two decades requires a new approach to recruiting. Designing policies to target the college market is a first step toward better aligning recruiting practices with the realities of today’s labor market and today’s military.

REFERENCES


