INTRODUCTION

An ongoing civilian humanitarian relief operation in central Africa has gotten caught in the midst of ethnic civil war brought about by Tutsi refugees fleeing the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The refugees’ plight has elicited a relief operation of food and supplies from the industrialized countries, coordinated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Over the course of several months, this has become a major undertaking involving 500 Western aid workers and several thousand Westerners and locals employed by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) assisting hundreds of thousands of refugees in feeding centers. Meanwhile, emboldened by their victory in the DRC, Hutu rebels in Burundi have been increasingly active. They have seized control over several towns and are moving in closer to the capital, Bujumbura. The minority Tutsi-dominated government has responded with brutal, indiscriminate repression, causing many Hutus to flee to the Congo and Tanzania. In a vicious spiral of increasing violence, both sides are committing massacres. Militants are actively recruiting in refugee camps, and they dominate what little structure these camps have. The killing appears to be going out of control, Western citizens are trapped in the midst of the escalating violence, and perhaps a million people are in danger of starvation or epidemic disease. “Another Rwanda” appears to be in the making, and the call goes out for massive and rapid intervention to stop the killing, protect Western citizens, and provide massive
quantities of relief to hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).

The hypothetical passage above could have come out of today’s headlines and may yet appear in tomorrow’s. In the previous chapter, we saw how access and basing issues could affect the USAF’s ability to deter or prosecute a major theater war. But not all future challenges will be of that ilk. Many—indeed, most—overseas operations will likely be of the kind often referred to as military operations other than war. This class of military action—which includes humanitarian aid, peace operations, crisis response, enforcing sanctions, and even military intervention in less developed countries—will almost certainly dominate the day-to-day agenda of operators and planners alike, as it has for most of the past decade.

Although MOOTWs have been steadily increasing in frequency, the Department of Defense has been inclined to view them as lesser-included cases for force planning and basing arrangements.\footnote{Builder and Karasik (1995), p. 4.} This has been a reasonable response given two assumptions: First, in the past policymakers have paid only sporadic and limited attention to the implications of likely future crises in areas that are of minimal direct strategic importance to the United States.\footnote{Nowhere has this been more clearly reflected than in sub-Saharan Africa. Events in Africa have received little attention owing to a perception that there is little political interest in potentially costly interventions in an area so far from U.S. borders and of limited strategic interest. Then–Secretary of Defense William Perry, commenting on U.S. operations in Rwanda, argued: “Our concerns [in Africa] are primarily moral and symbolic. That does not make them less relevant, but it does help define the limits of feasibility. Our objective should be to ameliorate catastrophe and meet basic human needs. As soon as the humanitarian operation is up and running effectively, we want to get out and turn things over to relief agencies.” See Schmitt (1994).} Second, recent experiences in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa have reinforced the prevailing perception that the vast majority of MOOTWs can be accomplished by ad hoc deployments of several C-130s and a handful of personnel from bases in Germany or the continental United States (CONUS).\footnote{For example, Operation Noble Response required two Marine KC-130s and 34 Marines to deliver two million pounds of food assistance to Kenya in January–March 1998.}
However, one can conceive of a plausible and much more stressful scenario in which the United States might be involved—a major peacekeeping and humanitarian mission in a remote area with relatively little intelligence or logistical support and limited infrastructure. Without adequate planning, this type of mission could present a daunting challenge in terms of both rapid deployment and manageable sustainment. Keying off recent experiences in Somalia (1992–1993) and Rwanda (1994), we created the above scenario for a peacekeeping and humanitarian mission centered in Burundi but spilling into the entire Great Lakes region of Central Africa, an area that is remote and largely characterized by bare bases and complex politics. This scenario serves to illustrate the types of challenges that Air Force planners can expect to face in a truly complex MOOTW.

THE CHALLENGE OF COMPLEX OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

Postmortems on the United States' and Western response to the 1994 events in Rwanda have suggested that initially the United States and its partners grossly underestimated the peril that the average Rwandan citizen faced. Subsequently, then-President Clinton and other members of his administration publicly pledged that the world would not permit a repeat of such a scenario—that there will not be "another Rwanda."

Thus, while Africa has been and continues to be viewed as peripheral to any direct or vital Western strategic interest, a credible threat of another massive ethnic conflict, particularly in an area of such geographic proximity to Rwanda, is likely to attract the attention of U.S. policymakers. Under such circumstances, the call might well go out to the military services to lead an intervention to stop the killing and facilitate the provision of basic humanitarian assistance.

While on the surface this appears to be a relatively limited mission, analysis of current regional dynamics, previous experience in intervening in ethnic conflicts, and historical experiences in Rwanda and Somalia raise serious logistical and operational questions. Tasked

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with significant participation in a MOOTW in Central Africa, for example, the USAF would face a tradeoff between the political impossibility of allowing another massacre to occur and the operational obstacles to preventing it.

**Sizing the Force: Lessons from Somalia and Rwanda**

The size of the forces required in any scenario will, of course, vary from circumstance to circumstance but is also likely to vary across time within a given scenario. An initial intervention force may need to be small, fast-moving both strategically (to arrive at the scene in a timely manner) and tactically (to make its presence felt where and when needed), and highly capable. A larger force may subsequently be needed to handle relief and rebuilding over the longer term.

The situation we are considering is one in which confusion is rampant, infrastructure is sparse, and no friendly forces are on the ground. Under such circumstances, accomplishing the tasks set forth—to head off or end the killings and to secure the distribution of relief supplies and medical care—will likely require a sizable force.

Although the military capabilities of potential adversaries in these missions are limited, one of the lessons from interventions such as Operation *Restore Hope* in Somalia is that preponderant force serves an important purpose. As one analyst wrote, “During conflict, parties regard humanitarian assistance as a means to enhance their power and degrade their adversaries. Only strong military force can prevent them from diverting and misappropriating assistance.”

In the five months that the United States participated in *Operation Restore Hope*, it deployed forces that included two brigades of the Army’s 10th Mountain Division as well as extensive divisional and nondivisional support, a Marine Expeditionary Brigade, a carrier battle group, an amphibious-ready group, and a Maritime Prepositioning Squadron. Coalition forces reached their peak in January

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6 The Somalia experience also serves notice that even poorly equipped paramilitary forces can be formidable adversaries under the right—or wrong—circumstances. It was, after all, a lucky rocket-propelled grenade that brought down a U.S. Army helicopter in Mogadishu and touched off “Bloody Sunday.” See Bowden (1999).

1992, when personnel numbered more than 38,000, of whom 25,426 were U.S. troops.\textsuperscript{8}

A thought-provoking paper by Scott Feil argues that a properly configured and enhanced brigade of the U.S. 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) could have forestalled the Rwandan genocide had it been rapidly deployed in early April 1994.\textsuperscript{9} The force envisioned by Feil would have consisted of nearly 5800 troops and more than 70 helicopters.

**Anticipating Demand for Airlift**

In a complex MOOTW, the USAF could be called upon to deploy its own assets to bare bases in the area of operations, to provide airlift for U.S. and regional-coalition ground troops, to support noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), and to transport some quantity of humanitarian supplies. What might these requirements be?

The first response to a regional crisis is likely to be the search for a local solution. In Africa, for example, there have been several proposals by African states, the United States, and France to establish and train a force of 5000–10,000 troops for peace operations on the continent.\textsuperscript{10} At the insistence of South Africa and Kenya, these forces would be African-led, African-manned, and capable of both peacekeeping and crisis response. Setting aside concerns regarding the implementation of this training program, these troops would lack the airlift to arrive on site in a timely manner and would be so limited in size that they could constitute only a small proportion of the ground troops required for a truly difficult contingency.

Table 4.1 indicates the number of airlift sorties required to move various U.S. ground force units. If the area of operations is inland and remote, forces either would have to be airlifted in or would have to conduct a potentially arduous road march from an available sea port. Given the poor transportation infrastructure in much of sub-

\textsuperscript{8}Hirsh and Oakley (1996).
\textsuperscript{9}Feil (1998).
\textsuperscript{10}Christian (1998).
Table 4.1

Airlift Required to Move U.S. Army Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Type</th>
<th>C-141</th>
<th>C-5</th>
<th>Approx. C-17 Equivalents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airborne division</td>
<td>1125</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air assault division</td>
<td>1330</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light infantry division</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light armored cavalry regiment</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separate infantry brigade</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separate mechanized brigade</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theater support assets</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Saharan Africa, just getting to the operational area could prove extremely difficult under such conditions.

While contract carriers would likely be employed to move the bulk of needed humanitarian aid, some urgent or specialized cargo might need to be transported by the USAF. For example, U.S. military airlift might be used to deploy water purification equipment or to bring in initial supplies of food and medicine to sustain refugees and IDPs until commercial services could be set up to take over this task.

Minimum water needs vary with each situation but increase markedly with raised air temperature and physical activity. Table 4.2 lists some rough factors used for humanitarian relief planning. A U.S. Army water purification detachment, which deploys in six C-141 and four C-5 sorties, can produce 30,000 gallons of water per hour. This could supply about 70,000 people (assuming approximately 10 gallons per person per day for personal and feeding-center consumption) if the water could be distributed in a timely and effective manner. In most cases, establishing a reliable distribution process will represent the biggest challenge to providing refugees/IDPs with adequate water, and providing the equipment necessary to set up such a system—such as tanker trucks—could prove an additional burden on airlift.
In terms of food, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) recommends a ration based primarily on cereals, pulses such as lentils and beans, and vegetable oils. Such a menu can deliver a reasonably balanced, 2100-calorie “survival diet” that weighs only about 540 grams. The U.S. military has developed a humanitarian daily ration (HDR) that provides “full day’s sustenance to a moderately malnourished individual.”11 To make it palatable across the widest possible range of cultures, the HDR contains no meat or animal products and no alcohol.12 An HDR weighs in at about a kilogram, and 48 cases of ten HDRs each can fit onto a standard cargo pallet. A C-17 can carry 18 pallets, so a single sortie could lift 8640 HDRs.13 Multiple airlift missions, then, might be needed just to provide an adequate initial stockpile of food.14

12Even the moist towelette provided for cleanup is specified as alcohol-free.
13A seven-day supply for 20,000 people, or 140,000 HDRs, would require about 16 C-17 sorties. Reports from the initial stages of Operation Enduring Freedom indicate that even larger numbers of HDRs can be air-dropped from C-17s using the tri-wall delivery system. Two C-17s are reported to have delivered about 35,000 HDRs over northern and eastern Afghanistan on October 8, 2001. See Mitchell and Fidler (2001).
14Malnourished children, pregnant or lactating women, the elderly, and the ill often require a supplementary ration. We do not have any data available from which to calculate the airlift requirements for providing these to a sizable refugee population.
In absolute size, these demands for airlift—a dozen or so sorties to deploy water purification equipment and another 10 to 20 for foodstuffs—hardly compare to the requirements for a major deployment. However, airlift resources have proven to be heavily tasked on a day-to-day basis over the past ten years, and there is little to suggest that this situation will soon change for the better. A sudden need for 30 to 40 immediate strategic mobility missions, in addition to however many missions are needed to deploy U.S. and other forces, could significantly stress the system. Add to this the limitations of available basing, a possible lack of fuel at the receiving end, and poor infrastructure to support the onward movement of supplies that have been flown in, and the potential for delay—perhaps with tragic consequences—appears very real.

Timing for Deployment: Lessons from Rwanda

The deployment of 28,000 U.S. troops to Somalia for Operation Restore Hope required a long lead time for the Air Force to establish strategic air bridges to U.S. bases and other facilities worldwide. However, the experience of Rwanda suggests that an intervention to halt a genocide may require much more rapid response. The violence in Rwanda was a planned and systematic massacre conducted by lightly armed militias and civilians occasionally assisted by the gendarmerie, or army. Within hours of the death of President Habyarimana on April 6, 1994, violence had broken out. By May 5, a month later, Hutu-controlled radio proclaimed a “cleanup day”: “The final elimination of all Tutsis in Kigali.” Within three months between half a million and 800,000 Rwandans, most of them ethnic Tutsi, were dead, another half million were displaced within Rwanda, and more than two million had fled to surrounding countries. Clearly, a very prompt deployment would have been needed to prevent any substantial portion of the violence.

Demand for these supplementary foods is difficult to predict, but a significant proportion—perhaps 20 percent or more—of refugees from an ethnic conflict in a less developed country may require them.

As mentioned earlier, Feil argues—and General Roméo Dallaire, commander of UN forces in Rwanda in 1994, concurs—that a modern force of 5000 troops drawn primarily from one country, willing to take combat risk, and sent within the first three weeks could have significantly altered the outcome in Rwanda. This force would have been tasked with seizing, at one time, key objectives all over the country and would thus have stemmed the violence in and around the capital, prevented its spread to the countryside, and created conditions conducive to a cessation of civil war.\footnote{Feil (1998).} How rapidly could such a force have moved into Kigali?\footnote{Whether a rapid force deployment would have been decisive in curtailing the Rwandan genocide is the subject of some debate. For a contrarian view, see Kuperman (2000), pp. 94–118.}

We used standard U.S. Army and USAF reference materials to assess the airlift that would be necessary to deploy a task-organized brigade of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and to estimate how quickly this brigade could move into Central Africa.\footnote{Military Traffic Management Command (1997) provides an estimate of the airlift required to move the individual elements. AFPAM 10-1403, \textit{Air Mobility Planning Factors} (U.S. Air Force Air Mobility Command [1997]), allowed us to use those requirements as a basis for time-to-close calculations.} Our results suggest that approximately 297 C-141 and 60 C-17 sorties would be necessary to move a force consisting of

- Five air assault infantry battalions
- One assault aviation battalion of UH-60 helicopters
- One medium-lift helicopter battalion of CH-47s
- One AH-64 attack helicopter battalion
- One forward support battalion
- One military intelligence company
- One signals company
- One military police (MP) company
• One chemical warfare defense company
• One headquarters company.

In addition, approximately nine charter flights of Boeing 747–class aircraft would be needed to move some 3000 personnel who could not be accommodated on the military transports.20

How rapidly these aircraft could move their cargo into the area of operations would depend on the number and quality of the aerial ports of debarkation (APODs) available there. This timeline is especially sensitive to three factors:

• The number of transports that can be on the ground loading or unloading at any given time, referred to as the “maximum on ground” (MOG).
• The number of hours each day the APODs are operational.
• The number of airlift aircraft committed to the mission.

Our calculations show that each constraint can dominate the result under certain circumstances. For example, if the MOG were 1 (that is, if only a single transport could be loading or unloading at any given time) and the APOD were capable of only daylight operations—a situation that could arise if all traffic had to move through a single underdeveloped international airport—it would take about 40 days to close the force. Under such conditions, throughput on the receiving end would simply be too limited to permit a faster deployment regardless of how many airlifters are available. Conversely, if the MOG were 3.0 and the APOD or APODs were running 24 hours a day, the number of transport aircraft would become the driver. If 40 C-17s were available—a full third of the originally planned C-17

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20These figures assume, as does Feil, that the CH-47 battalion would self-deploy. Given that the cruising speed of the Chinook is between 120 and 140 knots and its ferry range—carrying full fuel but no payload—is 1111 nm, this could take quite some time even if the helicopters come from Europe. Aircraft data are from the U.S. Naval Institute (USNI) Periscope database, http://www.periscope.ucg.com/weapons/aircraft/rotary/w0004511.html (1999). Also, sustaining the force in action would require that further combat and combat service support elements be deployed. As configured, the brigade task force could probably operate for no more than seven to ten days without further support and resupply. (From conversations with retired U.S. Army officers at RAND.)
buy—the force could close in 18 days. A middle case—a MOG of 2.0, 18 hours of APOD operations per day, and 30 C-17s committed—would require 24 days to close the force, driven by APOD limitations.\textsuperscript{21}

Using this last scenario as a not-unreasonable estimate and assuming that the first transport serial launched on April 8, one day after the organized violence began in Kigali, the brigade would have finished deploying by around the first of May. By then, tens of thousands of Tutsis would almost certainly have perished—perhaps more if knowledge of the impending Western intervention motivated the \textit{genocidaire}s to increase the pace of their work so as to be more nearly done by the time the foreign soldiers arrived.\textsuperscript{22} While many lives might in the end have been saved, even a heroic deployment effort would likely have been “too little, too late” for many victims of the Hutu genocide.

Simply establishing the necessary infrastructure to begin such a force movement could prove difficult and time-consuming given the shortage of suitable runways or support facilities that the USAF would confront in Central Africa. Even the limited level of activity required for Operation \textit{Support Hope} to the Congo and Rwanda in 1994 required that the USAF Air Mobility Command (AMC) deploy tanker airlift control elements (TALCEs) to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; Entebbe, Uganda; Mombasa, Kenya; Goma, Zaire; Harare, Zimbabwe; Kigali, Rwanda; and Nairobi, Kenya.\textsuperscript{23} The luxury of flowing most men and materials into a single well-equipped airhead as was done in Saudi Arabia during Operation \textit{Desert Shield} simply does not exist in this part of the world.

\textsuperscript{21}Note that in actual operations, APODs would likely be further stressed not only by the need to transship cargo from strategic airlifters to smaller aircraft such as C-130s but also by the limitations of the local distribution networks.

\textsuperscript{22}That the perpetrators would have been encouraged to step up their homicidal rampage rather than be deterred by imminent Western military action might have seemed ridiculous to many in 1994. After witnessing the Serbian reaction in Kosovo to the onset of NATO’s air campaign, it somehow seems more plausible.

\textsuperscript{23}Pirnie and Francisco (1998), pp. 64–65.
Limits on Basing

What are the basing options that the Air Force would have to cultivate in order to plan and conduct a large MOOTW in a remote region such as sub-Saharan Africa? We examined suitable airfields and runways on the continent using unclassified airfield data and screening them against published planning factors for aircraft airfield restrictions. Not surprisingly, options are significantly constrained by the limited infrastructure. Specifically there are only eight airfields in six countries that are suitable for operating KC-10s and only 16 bases in nine countries that could handle C-17 or C-5 aircraft. This sparse set of basing alternatives for large transport aircraft means that the USAF might have to set up one or more hub bases at a significant distance from the theater of operations. The last leg of the trip would then be made by theater airlift (C-130s) or via ground transport. As Figure 4.1 suggests—using Burundi as the ultimate destination—some of these residual distances could be quite large.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

As we worked through our scenario for intervention in Burundi, several things became clear.

24U.S. Air Force Air Mobility Command (1997). The figures used were: 6000-ft runway length, 147-ft width, and 80 load capacity number (LCN, a metric for runway pavement strength) for a C-5; 3000-ft runway length, 90-ft width, and 94 LCN for a C-17; and 7000-ft runway length, 148-ft width, and 102 LCN for a KC-10. These are minimum landing lengths for a fully loaded aircraft and assume that the transport will be taking off mostly empty or at least substantially below its maximum possible weight. If the airlifters were required to fly out more fully loaded, runway requirements would be stricter, and many if not most of these fields might wind up being unsuitable. For political reasons we did not include airfields in Libya or Algeria in our survey.

25These include Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Egypt, Malawi, and Nigeria.

26These include Burundi, Kenya, Egypt, Uganda, Nigeria, South Africa, Malawi, Burkina Faso, and Cameroon.

27They could also be quite short; as Paul Killingsworth points out, in the Rwanda crisis the hub was established as Entebbe Airport in Uganda, just 200 miles from Kigali. As with most factors we have dealt with in this analysis, the specifics are unpredictable, which again militates in favor of maximal flexibility in USAF planning and operations.
The Likelihood of “Mission Creep”

First, halting genocide and providing for basic human needs (food, water, and shelter) may be neither a limited nor a simple mission. If Burundi descended into a civil war such as that which Rwanda experienced, simply ensuring that food was reliably available throughout the country would require a significant military presence on the...
ground with sizable demands for Air Force lift and logistical capabilities.

The missions facing the Air Force in such a MOOTW are likely to be divided between those that have immediate priority and a second phase or tier of missions that would be essential to the long-term achievement and maintenance of the first-order goals. First-tier missions seem likely to include

- Evacuation of Western citizens, possibly including those from multiple remote sites where fighting may be ongoing;
- Ensuring free passage of humanitarian assistance for refugees and IDPs as well as those who are in border camps;
- Securing major airports and lines of communication;
- Securing personnel and equipment of NGOs;
- Providing logistics support to NGOs; and
- Providing strategic lift to deploy U.S. and other forces and intratheater airlift for regional forces such as the Organization of African States (OAS) or African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) forces.

These initial operations would be aimed at immediately halting large-scale killing and ensuring that the basic needs of the refugees and IDPs were met. However, as the West becomes increasingly involved in providing for the security of refugees and the distribution of humanitarian assistance, it is likely to face pressure to ensure that the situation will not immediately revert to crisis when the troops depart. To prevent this, at least some forces are likely to face additional missions. These could include

- Gaining freedom of movement and demonstrating overwhelming force to warring factions;
- Dismantling unauthorized checkpoints and suppressing banditry;
- Conducting disarmament as necessary to establish a secure environment;
• Repairing or upgrading key infrastructure to support operations; and
• Providing surveillance of the area of operations, including border camps.

The Need for Rapid Response

Second, there would be a sense of urgency in getting the forces and support elements in quickly, ideally within two to three weeks from the moment the crisis heats up. This timetable might well come to grief given the realities of preparing forces to move and actually moving them, particularly in the absence of adequate advance planning. These problems would also be exacerbated in an area such as Central Africa, where the infrastructure to support a major airlift is limited.

Based on previous interventions of similar scale, USAF force elements that could be called on for deployment include

• Strategic airlift (C-5, C-17, C-141);
• Intratheater-lift assets (C-130);
• Air-refueling aircraft (KC-135, KC-10);
• Reconnaissance elements (Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System [JSTARS], etc.);
• Electronic combat aircraft (COMPASS CALL, COMMANDO SOLO);
• Special operations squadrons (AC-130, MC-130);
• Multiple TALCEs;
• Air intelligence assets;
• Airborne medical evacuation squadrons;
• Multiple aerial port units;
• Engineer units (RED HORSE); and
• Multiple security forces (SF) flights.  

In cases such as Burundi, where the area of operations is landlocked, an even greater strain may be placed on the Air Force.

**Limited Infrastructure and Politics Play Havoc with Access**

Finally, the limited infrastructure in this region—few runways and airfields capable of supporting large aircraft, limited ramp space, and a shortage of refueling facilities—could require multiple bases at a significant distance from the area of operations. This would present an intensive demand on specialized USAF units (engineers, SF, aerial port squadrons, and the like).

In the specific case of an intervention in Burundi, the Air Force would face the challenge of a limited and largely primitive infrastructure. While the airfield in Bujumbura can accommodate KC-10s, there is only one landing surface and only limited refueling capabilities are available. This makes the operational difficulties similar to those encountered in Somalia, where the Mogadishu airport was able to handle only two aircraft at a time. Furthermore, the Bujumbura airport is the only one in Burundi with a paved runway, although there are two other unpaved airfields that could accommodate a C-130. Burundi has no railways and only 1000 km of paved roads.

Multiple bases can be problematic politically as well as logistically. Particularly as the timeline for operations stretches out longer and longer, political complications associated with particular basing choices are likely to become increasingly salient. Ethnic and political divisions run deep, and not just among the locals; France, for example, remains interested in former colonies such as Rwanda and would look askance at any intervention that appeared to slight its preferred party or parties. Planning even at the conceptual level for operations such as those we have described herein must take these

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cross-cutting sensitivities into account if it is not to run afoul of them.

SUMMING UP

Our work suggests that future complex MOOTWs could be highly demanding for the USAF and should probably not be dismissed as lesser-included contingencies. Instead, more planning may be called for to ensure that the USAF is both operationally and politically prepared to mount the rapid and sustainable deployments that are integral to such missions. In Africa and elsewhere, flexibility will be the key.\(^30\) Maintaining existing strategic relationships with key actors such as Egypt and Kenya will be a vital component of ensuring adequate access, but the United States should also seek to strengthen its relationships with other potential hosts. In Africa, candidates might include South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Ethiopia, among others.

Achieving a degree of flexibility in planning and operations is one critical element of an overall strategy for ensuring that needed access and basing are available for future USAF expeditionary operations. In the next and final chapter, we will outline one such strategy.

\(^{30}\)While this chapter has focused on Africa, similar logic and conclusions would apply in other areas of the world, such as Latin America.