
NOTIONAL GPRA MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE

The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) aims to improve governmental effectiveness by setting program goals, and measuring program performance against those goals.¹ While providing GPRA measures for most other defense activities, the current Report to the President and Congress (the Annual Defense Report, or ADR) includes no such measures for homeland security.

This appendix provides a consolidated listing of the measures of performance identified for each homeland security task area described in Chapters Four through Seven, measures that might be considered by the Army and DoD for use in their GPRA reporting for homeland security activities.²

DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS AGAINST WMD

The measures of performance that should be considered for the domestic preparedness task area break out into three classes: those associated with prevention activities, those associated with pre-

¹In the area of Domestic Preparedness, performance measures can be derived in part from the 1997 Counterproliferation Program Review Committee report, which provides potential measures for proliferation prevention; strategic and tactical intelligence; battlefield surveillance; NBC weapons and their means of delivery counterforce; active defense; passive defense; and countering paramilitary, covert delivery, and terrorist NBC threats. See CPRC, 1997, Table 1.1, reproduced as Table L.4 in Appendix L.

²Unlike most of the GPRA measures used by the Department of Defense, which are in terms of such inputs as the number of units of various kinds, we tried to design our measures to relate to performance outcomes or impacts.

paredness, and those associated with response.³ Each is discussed separately.

Prevention Activities

Performance in terrorism and WMD prevention activities could be gauged by such quantifiable measures as

- terrorist incidents prevented;
- ratio of known preventions to known incidents;
- deaths possibly prevented;
- amount of damage possibly prevented;
- arrests/extraditions of terrorists; and
- proliferation incidents prevented.

These measures must be considered in the context of the base rate of terrorist and WMD-related activity, such as

- terrorist plans detected;
- domestic terrorist incidents;
- suspected incidents;
- deaths caused by domestic terrorism; and
- damage sustained in domestic terrorism.

They also would have to be considered in the context of hoaxes, idle threats, and other “noise.”

³The Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction posited four national goals, for each of which required operational capabilities were identified. The national goals were proliferation prevention/denial, WMD deterrence (short of military action), WMD military action (including active defenses and/or retaliation), and WMD consequence management. See Commission (1999), Appendix H, pp. 155–167.

Preparedness Activities

Preparedness and response activities could be assessed by any number of measures.⁴ To illustrate, consider the following:

- Estimated responsiveness, i.e., time until specific capabilities can be at the scene of an incident or increase in responsiveness since last employment or exercise.
- Estimated capacity of specific response units or overall response system to mitigate consequences (e.g., deaths and injuries) or increase in capacity.
- Assessed overall performance of response capabilities in training and field exercises.
- Number of hazmat (or other first responder teams) trained to a high level of capability for WMD.
- Number of U.S. cities trained to a level that provides highly responsive and capable WMD preparedness.
- Percentage of U.S. population that is covered by highly responsive and capable WMD preparedness.

Response Activities

Response activities could be assessed by such measures as the following:

- Percentage of mitigation attained, i.e., the number of deaths or injuries that otherwise would have occurred in an incident prevented as a result of response capabilities.
- Responsiveness, i.e., time until specific capabilities can be at the scene of an incident or increase in responsiveness since the last exercise or employment.

⁴As a practical matter, many preparedness and response activities blend together—the preparedness training and equipping that occurs well in advance of an actual incident favorably affects performance when employed.

- Actual capacity of specific response units or overall response system to mitigate consequences (e.g., deaths and injuries) or increase in capacity since the last exercise or employment.

COG

FEMA's most recent circular suggests a number of relevant performance measures in its discussion of the objectives and planning considerations for COG activities. Stated objectives for continuity of government include

- ensuring the continuous performance of an agency's functions/operations during an emergency;
- protecting essential facilities, equipment, records, and other assets;
- reducing or mitigating disruptions to operations;
- reducing loss of life, minimizing damage and losses; and
- achieving a timely and orderly recovery from an emergency and resumption of full service to customers.

Planning considerations suggest that a viable COG capability

- must be maintained at a high level of readiness;
- must be capable of implementation both with and without warning;
- must be operational no later than 12 hours after activation;
- must maintain sustained operations for up to 30 days; and
- should take maximum advantage of existing agency field infrastructures.

Generally speaking, then, the key performance measures for COG are the degree to which the consequences of emergencies can be mitigated, and the speed with which government functions and services can be restored. Our recommendation is that planning should aim

to reestablish a sort of nominal or basic level of civil authority within 12 hours, as suggested by FEMA.⁵

CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS

Performance measures for continuity of operations and COG activities appear to be somewhat similar, although the specific activities depend on which aspect of this problem set is considered.

Prevention Activities

Because the threats are assumed to overlap with those in the domestic preparedness task area—state and nonstate sponsors of terrorism and disaffected domestic groups—the same sorts of prevention-based performance measures apply, e.g., the number of actual attacks, the number of known, credible attack plans discovered, and the number of preventions.

Preparedness Activities

Threat and risk analyses would lead to a prioritization of potential mission-critical targets, whether focused on the continuity of headquarters operations, critical facilities, or critical systems and networks. A wide range of preparedness activities could then be undertaken, including improving defenses (e.g., hardening for facilities, improved network security for systems) and contingency planning for relocation.

Measures for preparedness activities would aim to reduce the level of damage and the time that any set of mission-critical assets was unavailable. These measures could include

- percentage of mission-critical facilities that have a high capability to withstand attack (e.g., blast effects or introduction of chemical or biological attack);

⁵As in the discussion of performance levels for domestic preparedness activities, policymakers might set lower or higher performance criteria.

- expected maximum time that normal operations of mission-critical organizations or facilities are likely to be disrupted;
- expected maximum time mission-critical facilities are unavailable; and
- expected maximum time until mitigation or reconstitution capabilities are deployed.

Response and Reconstitution Activities

Some of the operational measures associated with responses in the domestic preparedness area also would apply to response activities. Added to these, however, would be the speed at which headquarters could be relocated to alternative sites where they would be at lower risk.

In addition to response performance, one also needs to consider performance in terms of the speed with which basic functions and services can be restored. Perhaps the best measure would be time, i.e., the time until operations can resume at their normal tempo.

Threat Campaigns

An additional measure of performance would be the ability to sustain the full range of continuity operations over a sustained threat campaign that involved multiple attacks in dispersed locations.

BORDER AND COASTAL DEFENSE

Measures of performance are analogous to the measures described in our earlier discussion of domestic preparedness. As in that case, activities should be measured in terms of their responsiveness, i.e., the time until core capabilities can be on-scene and, once on-scene, their capacity to capture, neutralize, destroy, or otherwise eliminate the threat of WMD and other potentially mass casualty-producing weapons:

- The probability of detecting WMD before it enters the United States, whether on land, sea, or in the air.

- The time until smugglers can be located and targeted.
- The time until WMD can be secured, rendered safe, and safely transported to a secure location.
- Both measures of actual preventions (e.g., preventions or arrests for smuggling such weapons, planned attempts that were disrupted), and measures of the apparent base level of threat activity (e.g., suspected smuggling attempts).

Preparedness activities for border and coastal defense thus need to be measured by the national capability to detect weapons and agents of interest before they can be introduced into the United States, and the ability to secure them, render them safe, and transport them to a secure location.

Refugee Resettlement Operations

The key measures of performance for refugee management operations are capacity measures, both in terms of the total number of refugees that can be processed and in terms of the rate at which they can be processed. See Table 7.2, which provides several different measures of processing capacity for six past Army resettlement operations.