Chapter Seven

PROTECTING SOVEREIGNTY: BORDER AND COASTAL DEFENSE

The fourth task area of homeland security is border and coastal defense. Included in this are the following two high-priority activities:

- Operations to prevent WMD from being smuggled into the nation (counterproliferation and nonproliferation).
- Activities undertaken to manage large-scale refugee flows that could create threats to national security.

We exclude from this task area the following three types of activities because, although they may have military involvement, they seem not to rise to the level of national security concern that makes them a part of homeland security:\footnote{We note, however, that some of the same capabilities used for homeland security missions also may be used for these missions.}

- Routine enforcement of immigration and naturalization laws, which should be handled by civilian law enforcement organizations.
- Management of routine hazmat incidents at the border or off the U.S. coastline, which would be handled under the National Response Team (NRT) concept.\footnote{The NRT addresses oil and hazmat incidents, and includes EPA, FEMA, DOE, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Department of the Interior, Department of Labor, Department of State, GSA, U.S. Coast Guard, DoD, Department...}

\footnote{We note, however, that some of the same capabilities used for homeland security missions also may be used for these missions.}

\footnote{The NRT addresses oil and hazmat incidents, and includes EPA, FEMA, DOE, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Department of the Interior, Department of Labor, Department of State, GSA, U.S. Coast Guard, DoD, Department...}
• Counterdrug operations.³

WMD SMUGGLING

Perhaps the preeminent challenge for border and coastal defense will be the ability to detect and prevent the entry into the United States of WMD and other weapons (e.g., man-portable, shoulder-launched missiles, such as Stingers) capable of producing mass casualties.

Threats and Risks

The threats and risks are generally described in Chapter Four. Although it is difficult to establish the degree of threat posed by these weapons, the “nightmare scenario” of a nuclear weapon smuggled into the United States captures well the essence of the problem at the high end.⁴ Because of this, and because chemical and biological defense were discussed in Chapter Four, this is the focus of the discussion that follows.

Measures of Performance

Measures of performance are analogous to the measures described in our earlier discussion of domestic preparedness. As in that case, activities should be measured in terms of their responsiveness, i.e., the time until core capabilities can be on-scene and, once on-scene,
their capacity to capture, neutralize, destroy, or otherwise eliminate
the threat of WMD and other potentially mass casualty-producing
weapons:

• The probability of detecting WMD before it enters the United
States, whether on land, sea, or in the air.
• The time until smugglers can be located and targeted.
• The time until WMD can be secured, rendered safe, and safely
transported to a secure location.
• Both measures of actual preventions (e.g., preventions or arrests
for smuggling such weapons, planned attempts that were dis-
rupted) and measures of the apparent base level of threat activity
(e.g., suspected smuggling attempts).

Preparedness activities for border and coastal defense thus need to
be measured by the national capability to detect weapons and agents
of interest before they can be introduced into the United States and
the ability to secure them, render them safe, and transport them to a
secure location.

**Notional Performance Levels**

For border and coastal defense activities involving the potential
smuggling of WMD, notional performance levels might be an ability
to reliably detect and prevent a very high percentage (e.g., 99-plus
percent) of efforts to smuggle WMD or other potential mass
casualty-producing technologies into the United States.\(^5\) To achieve
such a capability, however, might require a substantial amount of
RDT&E or units dedicated to surveillance and reconnaissance of the
threat at borders and coastlines.\(^6\)

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\(^{5}\)Of course, as with the other task areas, the performance level chosen by policymakers
could turn out to be lower or higher than the illustrative one provided here. Further, a
fixed performance level should be used as a guide for planning and program
development only after cost-effectiveness and tradeoff analyses have identified the
most cost-effective means of providing the needed level of performance, and as it
becomes clear where “the knee of the curve” is, i.e., where additional resources are
unlikely to much improve performance.

\(^{6}\)Exercises and tests could be used to establish the sensitivity and specificity of detec-
tion capabilities to various radiological and nuclear threats.
Program Design Issues

The Federal Context. The principal program design issue involves the current arrangements and respective roles of the civilian departments and agencies charged with border and coastal defense and, in the case of radiological and nuclear weapons, managing specific types of WMD, as well as the military services’ contributions to these activities (see Table 7.1). The case of radiological and nuclear threats will be used to illustrate the responsibilities.  

Table 7.1
Capacity for Border and Coastal Defense: WMD Smuggling

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department of Justice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FBI (LFA in domestic incidents)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI Critical Incident Negotiating Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of State (LFA in foreign incidents)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Military Applications</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Laboratories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOE Communicated Threat Credibility Center (at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Radiological Monitoring &amp; Assessment Center (FRMAC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accident Response Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF (Army Special Mission Units (SMUs))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52d EOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Technical Response Group (DTRG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy EOD units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We address the nuclear threat here because RDT&E and operational capabilities for chemical and biological threats were addressed in some detail in Chapter Four.
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Table 7.1—continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOF</th>
<th>U.S. Coast Guard (DOT/DoD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other Agencies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Customs Service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Secret Service</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. Marshals Service</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. Border Patrol</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Detection Capabilities. The long-term R&D of surveillance capabilities for smuggled nuclear weapons and materials appear primarily to be the purview of the Department of Energy:

DOE’s efforts to prevent and detect smuggling . . . are focused on securing nuclear material at its source, detecting stolen material in transit, responding to threatened and actual events, and determining the origin of intercepted material . . . To deal with materials in transit, DOE works closely with DoD, U.S. Intelligence, and others in the interagency community providing technology support for detection and interdiction of stolen nuclear materials . . . Planned funding for these activities in FY 1998 is $43.5 million, up from $31.0 million in FY 1997. (CPRC, 1997, Section Six, “DOE Nonproliferation Programs.”)

The DOE program includes development of a wide variety of detection capabilities, including the following:

- The Surveillance Accident Nuclear Detection System includes various nuclear radiation detection systems developed for the DOE Office of Military Application for use in surveying an area for lost or diverted nuclear weapons and special nuclear material (DOE, 1999).
- The Wide-Area Tracking System (WATS) was developed to detect and track ground-delivered nuclear weapons and cue interdic-

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8For an overview of DOE’s RDT&E nonproliferation program, see CPRC (1997), Section Six, “DOE Nonproliferation Programs.”

sensors (radiation and vehicle detectors) strategically deployed within the area to be protected. The sensors relay their information via standard communications protocols to a central computer at a control station. WATS can detect the entry of a nuclear device or radioactive material into the protected area, track its movement, and coordinate interception by security forces (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 1999).

Operational Responses. The Atomic Energy Act directs the FBI to investigate all alleged or suspected criminal violations of the Act in the United States and, under the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), the FBI is legally responsible for locating any nuclear weapon, device, or material and for restoring nuclear facilities to their rightful custodians (NRC, 1996).

The FBI has concluded formal agreements with the Lead Federal Agencies under various circumstances that provide for interface, coordination, and technical assistance in support of the FBI’s mission. Accordingly, memoranda among FBI, DoD, and Department of Energy (for domestic incidents) have been signed, as have memoranda among DoD and the Departments of State and Energy (for foreign incidents), each of which provides additional clarification of roles and missions (“Joint Federal Bureau of Investigation,” 1980; “Joint Department of State,” 1982).

The FBI coordinates and manages the technical portion of the response and activates or requests assistance under the FRERP for measures to protect the public health and safety and relies on the DOE for radiological monitoring and assessment assistance and on the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) for additional support:

Made up of several components, NEST capabilities include search and identification of nuclear materials, diagnostics and assessment of suspected devices, and disablement and containment programs. NEST personnel and equipment are deployable at all times. They can be quickly transported by military or commercial aircraft to any location worldwide. NEST possesses the capability to render a rogue device safe and package it for transport to a secure location for follow-on disassembly operations. This program consists of an all-volunteer community composed of scientists, engineers, and technicians from the nuclear weapons design laboratories. The
operational capability deployed in response to an incident of nuclear terrorism varies in size from a five-person advisory team that supports specialized classified programs, to a NEST deployment with as many as 800 searchers and scientists, complemented by their technical and logistical equipment. (Gordon-Hagerty, 1997.)

DOE maintains several emergency assets postured to respond to events that may occur should proliferation efforts fail. DOE conducts analyses and provides operational and technical support in response to nuclear emergency and terrorism events worldwide. This includes the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST), which has primary responsibility for responding to acts of nuclear terrorism or other incidents involving nuclear weapons or devices. It can be deployed under the authority of the FBI for domestic incidents and the Department of State for foreign incidents. Requested funding for DOE emergency management and response programs in FY 1998 is $41.1 million up from $35.3 million in FY 1997. (CPRC, 1997, Section Six, “Nonproliferation Programs.”)


It is DoD policy to assist the lead Federal Agency during an IND incident. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is the lead Federal Agency for IND incidents in U.S. territories and possessions. The Department of State . . . is the lead agency for acts not under FBI responsibility. When the Department of Defense responds to an IND incident, operational control over DoD assets is exercised by the DoD senior representative.

The 1997 Counterproliferation Program Review Committee report provided an elaboration on DoD and other agency roles:

DoD responsibilities include designating military personnel and equipment to perform emergency technical response missions, such as NBC sample collection, analysis, and identification of on-site contaminants; decontamination; air monitoring; medical treatment; and securing, transporting, and disposing of NBC devices “when beyond the capability of an otherwise cognizant agency” (i.e., the FBI, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for CW/BW, or DOE or EPA for nuclear and radiological materials).
DOE responsibilities include "analyzing threat messages . . . for technical content, nuclear design feasibility, and general credibility, and for providing such analyses to the FBI"; designating personnel and equipment to provide technical and scientific advice and recommendations, including risk/consequence assessments, to the on-scene commander; and designating Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) units to assist in locating and identifying nuclear materials and assessing and disabling suspected nuclear devices. Both DoD and DOE counterterrorism responsibilities directly assist the FBI in its role as on-scene commander for NBC terrorist incidents in the U.S. (CPRC, 1997, Section Eight, "DoD, DOE, and U.S. Intelligence Programs for Countering Paramilitary and Terrorist NBC Threats."

More specifically, DoD activities and programs to counter paramilitary and terrorist NBC threats are described as follows:

In coordination with the FBI and other U.S. Government counterterrorism components, DoD is continuing to pursue several activities to counter paramilitary and terrorist NBC threats. These efforts include supporting, training, and equipping DoD teams to detect, neutralize, and render safe NBC weapons and devices in permissive and nonpermissive environments both in the U.S. and overseas. These DoD teams include the Army’s Technical Escort Unit (TEU) and the 52d Ordnance Group, the Navy’s Defense Technical Response Group (DTRG), Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal units, and SOF units. (CPRC, 1997, Section Eight, “DoD, DOE, and U.S. Intelligence Programs for Countering Paramilitary and Terrorist NBC Threats.”

The basic procedures that are expected to prevail in IND incidents are outlined in DoDD 3050.5:10

1. When the National Military Command Center (NMCC) is notified of an IND incident, the Operations Team shall notify the lead federal agency, the appropriate service or CINC, and other appropriate agencies.

10The two DoD mission documents that guide DoD counterterrorism responses are the CJCS’s Counterproliferation 0400 CONPLAN and the Counterterrorism 0300 CONPLAN. Each CINC reportedly is developing such documents for his Area of Responsibility (CPRC, 1997, Section Eight, “DoD, DOE, and U.S. Intelligence Programs for Countering Paramilitary and Terrorist NBC Threats”).
2. The Operations Team within the NMCC shall interface with non-DoD organizations and shall facilitate interservice support required for such operations. When the U.S. government responds to an IND incident in a foreign country, the U.S. ambassador shall coordinate U.S. response operations with the host government.

3. In U.S. territories and possessions, the FBI Senior Agent in Charge shall be the senior U.S. government official and shall coordinate and communicate with local authorities.

4. The DoD response team shall be prepared for deploying within four hours of notification of an IND incident. The DoD response team shall be under the command and control of the DoD senior representative, provided by the lead federal agency. In accordance with the joint agreement, the lead federal agency shall be responsible for establishing coordination with non-DoD response agencies. The DoD response team shall establish secure communications, when possible, with the NMCC or the respective CINC and Service Command Center. The DTRG shall deploy at the discretion of the DoD senior representative or the NMCC.

**The Army Role.** We do not see a substantial future role for the Army in surveillance and reconnaissance of U.S. borders and coastlines.

Nevertheless, DoDD 3050.5 directs the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to provide resources to address responsibilities in accordance with the memoranda of understanding and implement the directive. The Secretary of the Army is further instructed to take the following actions:

- Provide a trained response team of EOD personnel and other required support for responding to IND incidents on Army installations in the CONUS, the CONUS land mass (except for those installations specifically assigned as a responsibility of the Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps), and other areas as directed by the . . . NCA through the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

- Submit IND countermeasures technology and training requirements to the Executive Manager for DoD Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology and Training . . . in accordance with DoDD 5160.62;
Fund Army IND response team training, exercises, and operations; and
Participate in joint working groups, NEST technical working groups, and interdepartmental exercises.11

Finally, the services and CINCs are made generally responsible for funding the incurred costs of operational and joint deployments under the directive.

It is easy to envision an Army role in at least three types of operations, although in each case, other civilian or military organizations also may be able to take that role:

- Using force to secure WMD is a task that probably would be given to elements of the JSOC. We would anticipate that Army SOF SMUs in JSOC would be used for land-based threats, and Navy SMUs in JSOC would be used for seaborne efforts to smuggle WMD.12

- "Render safe" WMD on the ground is a task that probably would be performed by the Army's TEU or an EOD team, although the DOE's NEST also has such a capability; sea-based "render safe" activities probably would be performed by properly configured Navy EOD teams.

- "Technical transport" also would probably be performed by an Army TEU or an EOD team, but it also could be performed by the DOE NEST or EPA or, in the case of seaborne threats, by a comparable Navy team.13

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11DoDD 3050.5, DoDD 5160.62, titled “Single Manager Assignment for Military Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology and Training (EODT&T),” and dated November 24, 1971, assigns the Secretary of the Navy to be the Single Manager.

12The 1997 CPRC Report indicates an “access phase,” i.e., physically gaining access to the weapon or device before such specialized mission units as the TEU or NEST arrive to begin disabling the device, and indicates that EOD teams have the capabilities for these activities (CPRC, 1997, Section Eight, “DoD, DOE, and U.S. Intelligence Programs for Countering Paramilitary and Terrorist NBC Threats”).

13Table II-1, “Identification of Lead Federal Agency for Radiological Functions,” of the FRERP identifies the EPA as the lead federal agency for transportation of radioactive materials in cases involving “shipment of materials not licensed or owned by a Federal Agency or an Agreement State.” See NRC (1996).
Budgeting Issues

Detection, Prevention, and Response Capabilities. Beyond some of the specific unit costs described in this chapter and Chapter Four, budgeting for these capabilities is rolled up in various budgetary aggregates associated with combating terrorism and WMD and counterproliferation.14

R&D. The R&D activities for operations that aim to prevent the smuggling of WMD into the United States are part of the broader range of counterproliferation-related RDT&E activities—undertaken predominantly within the Army, DoD, and DOE—to detect and respond to potential WMD incidents.15

LARGE-SCALE REFUGEE FLOWS

Threat and Risk Analyses

According to presidential statements, large-scale refugee flows can create threats to national security. Consider President Clinton's justification for the U.S. intervention in Haiti in September 1994:

Now the United States must protect our interests—to stop the brutal atrocities that threaten tens of thousands of Haitians, to secure our borders and to preserve stability and promote democracy in our hemisphere and to uphold the reliability of the commitments we make, and the commitments others make to us.

. . . But when brutality occurs close to our shore, it affects our national interests. And we have a responsibility to act. Thousands of Haitians have already fled toward the United States, risking their lives to escape the reign of terror. As long as [Haitian General Raul] Cedras rules, Haitians will continue to seek sanctuary in our nation. This year, in less than two months, more than 21,000 Haitians were rescued at sea by our Coast Guard and Navy. Today, more than 14,000 refugees are living at our naval base in Guantanamo [Cuba].

14For a functional breakdown of federal and DoD spending, see the data in the tables in Appendix L.

15See Appendix L, Tables L.4 through L.6 for a summary of the resources allocated to counterproliferation activities and CPRC (1997), Appendix C, for program element-level detail on RDT&E.
The American people have already expended almost $200 million to support them, to maintain the economic embargo, and the prospect of millions and millions more being spent every month for an indefinite period of time loom[s] ahead unless we act. Three hundred thousand more Haitians, five percent of their entire population, are in hiding in their own country. If we don’t act, they could be the next wave of refugees at our door. We will continue to face the threat of a mass exodus of refugees and its constant threat to stability in our region and control of our borders. (White House, 1994a.)

The scale of refugee flows can be overwhelming, particularly when they are the consequence of war and civil strife:

- The number of Indochinese refugees who left Vietnam after the fall of Saigon in the spring of 1975, for example, is estimated at 1.2 million, and spending on their resettlement by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees alone was an estimated $1.5 billion (Ogata, 1995).
- And the number of Afghan refugees was estimated by the UNHCR at 5.5 million, with another 2 million to 3 million internally displaced (Rubin, 1996).

And in the Western Hemisphere:

- The number of Cubans in the Mariel exodus beginning in April 1980 was estimated at over 125,000 (Unzueta, 1981), approximately 2,500 of whom were criminals who were held for subsequent return to Cuba.\(^{16}\)
- The number of Haitian refugees in 1994 appears to have been in the tens of thousands,\(^{17}\) and the number of refugees fleeing Cuba at the same time reportedly was nearly 30,000, 12,000 of whom were processed at Guantanamo (Close Up Foundation, 1999).

\(^{16}\)The total number of such “excludable” aliens appears to have been around 2,500, most of whom were returned to Cuba in the late 1980s.

\(^{17}\)For example, the number of Haitian immigrants admitted in 1994 reported by the INS was 13,200, the number of Haitian refugee arrivals was 3,766, and the number of Haitians offered asylum was 1,060. The State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, reports that between July 5 and September 19, 1994, 21,000 Haitians were granted safe haven (U.S. Department of State, 1997).
Most recently, during Operation Allied Force, Kosovar refugees were airlifted to the United States and temporarily received shelter in the United States.

One easily can envision future such large-scale refugee flows, for example, from Haiti or Cuba again,\textsuperscript{18} and even Mexico, which occasionally has experienced political unrest (e.g., in Chiapas). In such large-scale flows of refugees, refugee processing operations could be required.

The U.S. Army and the other services—particularly the U.S. Marine Corps—frequently have been called on to help manage large-scale refugee flows and resettlement operations:\textsuperscript{19}

- After the fall of Saigon, the Army assisted in Indochinese resettlement to Guam, Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, and Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, from April to November 1975. More than 100,000 refugees from Indochina passed through the refugee center at Point Orote, Guam, which, at its peak on May 14, 1975, held more than 50,000 refugees.

- In the wake of the Mariel boatlift, from May to September 1980, the Army assisted in the resettlement of over 54,000 Cubans to Fort Chaffee, Fort Indiantown Gap, and Fort McCoy, Wisconsin.

- Navy and Marines reportedly cared for 50,000 Haitian and Cuban asylum-seekers over the 18 months from September 1994 (Federation of American Scientists, 1999b).

Not only did these operations process substantial numbers of refugees, but they also involved significant Army resources:

- The Indochinese refugee resettlement operations in Guam involved a total of 2,103 active-duty Army personnel, devoting a

\textsuperscript{18}In the former case, if the high (70 percent) unemployment, grinding poverty, and modest economic growth continue, and in the latter case, if the departure of Fidel Castro is not followed by a “soft landing.”

\textsuperscript{19}The data that follow are from U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency (1991, pp. 2-2, 2-3, 3-21, and pp. 3-49 through 3-54). In addition to Army and Marine Corps involvement, the Navy and Coast Guard are involved in interdiction and seaborne processing activities. Additionally, the U.S. Merchant Marine assisted in the repatriation of Vietnamese after the fall of Saigon.
total of nearly 386,965 man-days, and 32 Army Reserve personnel spent a total of 6,175 man-days on the operation, and those in Fort Indiantown Gap, involved 1,705 active-duty Army personnel for 381,915 man-days and 185 Army Reserve personnel for 9,315 man-days.

- Fort Chaffee processed more than 50,000 Indochinese refugees and involved 1,804 active-duty Army personnel for a total of nearly 444,000 man-days and 57 Army Reserve personnel for a total of 14,022 man-days.

- Fort Indiantown Gap processed more than 22,000 refugees and involved 1,705 active-duty Army personnel and nearly 382,000 man-days and 185 Army Reserve personnel for a total of 9,315 man-days.

- An estimated total of 1,200 personnel (including 300 Marines, more than 700 Army, 150 Air Force, and local personnel from the Navy base and Marine barracks) reportedly participated in the 1994 Haiti and Cuban refugee processing operations (Federation of American Scientists, 1999c), while an unidentified number of Navy and Marine Corps personnel cared for the refugees thereafter.

The Mariel refugee resettlement operations also involved substantial Army involvement:

- Operations at Fort Chaffee processed more than 21,000 Cuban refugees and involved 3,889 active-duty Army personnel for 117,797 man-days, 672 Army Reserve personnel for a total of 8,923 man-days, and 2,140 Army National Guard personnel for a total of 37,482 man-days.

- Operations at Fort McCoy processed 14,360 refugees, and involved 1,618 active-duty Army personnel for 217,560 man-days, 135 Army Reserve personnel for 20,100 man-days, and 732 Army National Guard personnel for 10,248 man-days.

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20 At its peak, the temporary camp at Guantanamo reportedly held over 12,500 Haitians.
Operations at Fort Indiantown Gap processed 19,094 refugees and involved 3,587 active-duty Army personnel for 92,832 man-days, 1,235 Army Reserve personnel for 17,142 man-days, and 1,647 Army National Guard personnel for 45,146 man-days.

In fact, of the 49 combat and noncombat operations studied, refugee resettlement operations accounted for a total of six of the 49 operations and more than 19 percent of the total man-days in Army deployments from 1975 to 1990.21

Measures of Performance

The key measures of performance for refugee management operations are capacity measures, both in terms of the total number of refugees that can be processed and in terms of the rate at which they can be processed. Table 7.2 provides several different measures of processing capacity for six past Army resettlement operations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Refugees per Troop</th>
<th>Refugees per Man-Day</th>
<th>Refugees per Day</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indochina (1975)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Point Orote, Guam</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>518.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Chaffee</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>203.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Indiantown Gap</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>106.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba (1980)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Chaffee</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>97.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Indiantown Gap</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>139.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort McCoy</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>108.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>195.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


21In the Concept Analysis Agency’s computations, each local refugee resettlement operation constituted a separate operation, resulting in three operations for Indochinese resettlement (Guam, Fort Chaffee, and Fort Indiantown Gap) and three for Cuba (Fort Chaffee, Fort Indiantown Gap, and Fort McCoy).
Notional Performance Levels

An illustrative performance level for this area would be a capability to manage a refugee processing situation of approximately 125,000 refugees and be able to process them at the historically observed rate for processing refugees, which, as shown in Figure 7.1, suggests a capability for processing more than 500 refugees per day.22

Program Design Issues

The Federal Setting. The principal program design issues involve the respective roles of the civilian departments and agencies charged with border and coastal defense and the service contributions to these activities (see Table 7.3).

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22Policy deliberations might lead to establishing a lower or higher stated performance level.

Figure 7.1—Rate of Refugee Processing Versus Number of Refugees
The State Department is the lead federal agency for refugee affairs and large-scale refugee incidents. The Department of Defense is a supporting agency to the State Department for refugee operations, with Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements having primary DoD responsibility for policy on DoD disaster relief assistance.

**The Army Contribution.** The sorts of Army capabilities that have been associated with performance in refugee settlement activities relies both on considerations or scale (or mass), and specific capability mixes.

**Scale (mass) issues.** Figure 7.2 plots the manpower requirements in terms of man-days of activity against the rate at which refugees were processed. Unlike Figure 7.1, the figure does not suggest a clear linear relationship. Instead, it either suggests a curvilinear relationship or the possibility that the operations varied in their effectiveness or the efficiency with which they processed refugees.
Capability mix considerations. The outlying case—the Guam resettlement operations—can be used to identify the sort of capability mix required to achieve the more than 500 per day processing rate observed in that operation (see Table 7.4).23

In the Indochinese resettlement operations in Guam, about one-third of the man-days were attributable either to the infantry (IN) battalions or the Medical Service (MS) units (34.8 and 32.5 percent, respectively), while almost one-quarter (24.9 percent) of the total level of effort was contributed by Combat Support (CS) units (U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency, 1991, p. 3-21). One interpretation is that the most effective force mix is one consisting of IN, MS, and CS units in the proportions just described.24

23 More detailed analysis of the other operations could reveal additional insights into key capabilities responsible for performance.

24 Of course, other variables, such as the size and nature of the facilities available, also would be important. No information on this is available, however.
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Table 7.4
Army Units in Guam Indochinese Resettlement Operations

<table>
<thead>
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Budgeting Issues

Between 1997 and 1999, the State Department's Migration and Refugee assistance program spent approximately $700 million on Migration and Refugee Assistance and Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance, with the latter accounting for between $20 million and $50 million over the same period; the State Department Migration and Refugee Assistance account funds 105 positions in the State Department.

Army refugee resettlement operations are contingency operations, i.e., they typically are not funded prior to the operation.25 We have

25Rather, efforts to recover the costs of contingencies typically are made through requests for emergency supplemental appropriations or, failing that, in the next year's President's budget submission. For example, the FY 1996 President's budget request included the costs of Haiti contingency operations, the deployment to Kuwait, operations in Bosnia, and Cuban refugee relief operations (Deutch, 1994).
CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has provided an overview of two illustrative activities that constitute the homeland security task area of border and coastal defense.

The analysis has suggested that the border and coastal defense task area overlaps both nonproliferation and counterproliferation activities, along with humanitarian assistance operations or, more specifically, refugee resettlement activities. The analysis also showed that, as in most of the other task areas of homeland security, border and coastal defense activities are undertaken in a broader federal context in which DoD capabilities support civilian authorities—in this case, the State Department. Additionally, in the case of refugee resettlement, the analysis was made somewhat more tangible through the use of actual data, enabling an exploration of historical performance levels and the Army capabilities associated with a high performance level. Finally, as a general observation, it appears that border and coastal defense is an area of homeland security in which the Army does not have the lead military role, although large numbers of Army personnel and equipment can be used for certain operations.

The next chapter provides a number of illustrative planning vignettes to assist in identifying key Army roles and responsibilities, and key areas where additional Army efforts are needed.

26The FY 1997 request included a total of about $1.1 billion for total contingency funds, with $590 million set aside for Southwest Asia and $541.7 million set aside for Bosnia. These funds were for contingencies already under way because Congress is generally loath to set aside such funds in advance, since it would compromise their “power of the purse” (Garamone, 1996).