
AFTERWORD

This monograph was completed before the tragic events of September 11, 2001—a second “date which will live in infamy.” Less than a month later, as the campaign in Afghanistan was just beginning, it was not possible to predict with certainty the effects that the ensuing major changes in international politics will have on the role of the European Security and Defense Policy, or on its relationship to NATO. However, a number of developments and trends can already be discerned.

Following the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, the focus of attention in transatlantic security relations—including the role to be played within these relations by European institutions—turned first and foremost to NATO. On September 12, for the first time in NATO history, the North Atlantic Council

agreed that if it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.¹

In fact, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty does not obligate any ally to do anything, except to decide to

¹*NATO Press Release (2001)124*, September 12, 2001.

assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, *such action as it deems necessary*, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area [emphasis added].²

This critical qualifier—“such action as it deems necessary”—was included in the treaty, at U.S. insistence, when it was negotiated in 1949 to preserve the right of the U.S. Congress to declare war, just as the United States also insisted on limiting the scope of the treaty’s application to areas and forces in or abutting allied territories.³ Indeed, in the period after September 11, the United States was not looking for the alliance as a whole to become engaged militarily against Osama bin Laden and his associates (although, in the longer-term prosecution of the war against international terrorism, such a request could materialize); and only the United Kingdom joined the United States in the first phase of the attacks on Afghanistan. Instead, the United States was primarily concerned about having the full *political* support of the allies—the true import of Article 5, from its inception—as well as some practical steps in the overall effort to

²Full text of Article 5 of the *Treaty of Washington*, April 4, 1949:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

³Article 6 of the *Treaty of Washington*, April 4, 1949 (as amended):

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack: on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on . . . the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories . . . or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

counter terrorism.⁴ The first tranche of U.S. requests to the full alliance was agreed upon by the North Atlantic Council on October 4, and it consisted mostly of indirect military assistance (e.g., overflight rights, movement of the Standing Naval Forces and Airborne Warning and Control aircraft); combined efforts at countering terrorism in nonmilitary ways; and, perhaps most important for this discussion of ESDP, the “backfill [i.e., replacement of U.S. military assets by] selected Allied assets in NATO’s area of responsibility that are required to directly support operations against terrorism.”⁵ This

⁴As President George H.W. Bush had done in 1990–91 in *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*, the most important objective of the overall coalition—NATO and beyond—built for prosecuting the campaign against Osama bin Laden was political—to demonstrate to peoples of the Islamic world that (1) the United States was not acting alone and (2) it was also gaining the support of legitimate Islamic countries and leaders. In the Persian Gulf War, this political tactic was designed to counter Saddam Hussein’s claim that he represented the “Arab Street” against the “Zionists and imperialists.” Coalition with NATO countries also shows the American people that they are not alone in this effort, but have the support of critical allies for whom the United States has done so much and who share fundamental humane and democratic values.

⁵NATO Headquarters, October 4, 2001, *Statement to the Press by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, on the North Atlantic Council Decision on Implementation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty following the 11 September Attacks against the United States*:

Following its decision to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty in the wake of the 11 September attacks against the United States, the NATO Allies agreed today—at the request of the United States—to take eight measures, individually and collectively, to expand the options available in the campaign against terrorism. Specifically, they agreed to:

- enhance intelligence sharing and co-operation, both bilaterally and in the appropriate NATO bodies, relating to the threats posed by terrorism and the actions to be taken against it;
- provide, individually or collectively, as appropriate and according to their capabilities, assistance to Allies and other states which are or may be subject to increased terrorist threats as a result of their support for the campaign against terrorism;
- take necessary measures to provide increased security for facilities of the United States and other Allies on their territory;
- backfill selected Allied assets in NATO’s area of responsibility that are required to directly support operations against terrorism;
- provide blanket overflight clearances for the United States and other Allies’ aircraft, in accordance with the necessary air traffic arrange-

“backfilling” most clearly related to some combination of the three NATO deployments in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia.

At the time of this writing, it was not clear what the full impact of this agreement by the NATO allies on backfilling would be—including how extensive it would be and for how long. In Washington, there was some pressure for the United States to remove all of its forces from these three NATO Balkan deployments, as had already been discussed earlier in the year, before September 11 and unrelated to issues of terrorism. Afterward, certainly the highest priority for the United States in terms of protecting its own security was to use whatever military resources it needed for the immediate effort against Osama bin Laden and other perpetrators of the September 11 crime. But should all U.S. military participation with other NATO allies and partners in the Balkans thus cease, even beyond the initial stages of the overall fight against international terrorism emanating from the Middle East? The implications of doing so would be clear: the emergence of an implicit—or even explicit—division of labor within the alliance, regarding which allies would do what. And, within the context of European NATO deployments and operations, there would be at least a technical breaking of the doctrine of shared risks (although in the Balkans, the risks have for some time been relatively minor). Thus, for the United States to turn all of its attention, in terms of mili-

ments and national procedures, for military flights related to operations against terrorism;

- provide access for the United States and other Allies to ports and airfields on the territory of NATO nations for operations against terrorism, including for refuelling, in accordance with national procedures.

The North Atlantic Council also agreed:

- that the Alliance is ready to deploy elements of its Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean in order to provide a NATO presence and demonstrate resolve; and
- that the Alliance is similarly ready to deploy elements of its NATO Airborne Early Warning force to support operations against terrorism.

Today’s collective actions operationalise Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. These measures were requested by the United States following the determination that the 11 September attack was directed from abroad. These decisions clearly demonstrate the Allies’ resolve and commitment to support and contribute to the U.S.-led fight against terrorism.

tary engagement in practical operations, away from Continental Europe and to the Middle East might have a strong pull; but it would not be without costs, and those would have to be measured, over time, in terms of the way in which the alliance sees itself as being “one for all and all for one.”

Of course, there is a reverse side to this argument: With the invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, there ensued at least a moral and political obligation on the part of the other allies to assist the United States in dealing with the aggression to which it had been subjected. Even though this article was originally designed to engage the United States, morally and politically, in the defense of Europe if continental allies were attacked by the Soviet Union (during the cold war) or by someone else afterward (e.g., Turkey by Iraq), the Washington Treaty does apply to all the allies. It is a historical irony, perhaps, that it is the traditional, principal guarantor state for whom the guarantee was first invoked—although not at its specific request. The added irony, of course, is that the Washington Treaty originally envisioned that a collective response to aggression, at least prior to the initiation of nuclear hostilities, would be primarily *in situ*, that is, in Europe, presuming that a Soviet military attack would be against allied territory and forces in Europe. This was the burden of the subclause of Article 5: “to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” On this occasion, the initial military action (leaving aside what the locus of military action against international terrorism could be in the future) was some 7,000 miles from where the aggression was committed, and certainly beyond any definition of the territorial limits of Europe, or even of the extended territories embraced by the Partnership for Peace in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The Washington Treaty is silent on where the riposte should take place; it speaks only of the site of the initial aggression.

But even if there were no moral, political, and legalistic basis for allied support of the United States in responding to the aggression of September 11, there were compelling reasons for the Europeans to join with the United States. Indeed, the latter had little choice but to respond, not just to avenge those who were killed and wounded—and not just to try to reduce or end the scourge of international terrorism—but also to preserve its credibility as a major power. This issue was more existential than volitional: If the United States failed to take appropriate action in direct response to aggression against the

homeland—and to do so successfully—then who in future would be willing to put full trust and confidence in U.S. pledges and engagements? Who would be confident that the United States could not be deterred from acting in its own or its allies' interests?

Furthermore, the European allies also had to consider several other factors:

- The assault was upon common values and, in fact, was a true “crime against humanity,” in no small part because nationals of some 60 or more nations were killed.
- The United States had stood with the European allies in time of need for nearly a century, from 1917 onward, including the period following the cold war when its own strategic interests in Europe were less engaged than they had been before, and certainly less than those of virtually all European states; this included major U.S. responsibility for, and engagement in, peace-making and peacekeeping in the Balkans.
- The allies also had to reckon that, at a time when the American people were so clearly hurting, failure to respond could have long-term consequences for the willingness of the United States to continue its basic commitments to European security, beyond actions based solely on simple U.S. self-interest; this could also affect other parts, including economic components, of the transatlantic relationship.
- They had to understand that, if they were not responsive to U.S. needs beyond Europe, then there could be a permanent shift of U.S. attention beyond the European continent. Earlier concerns in Europe that the United States might turn its attention more to Asia than to Europe may have caused Europeans to feel a sense of loss, based on what the allies could argue was U.S. misperception of its own interests. But no European could argue that the United States, in putting more emphasis on the Middle East than on Europe (at least for the time-being), was in any way misunderstanding its true interests, because the homeland had been attacked.

These arguments clearly conditioned the response of European governments to the United States after September 11. The response was

also related to the “popular push” exerted by peoples of Europe who were, if anything, even more automatically sympathetic with what the United States was experiencing than were their governments. The sense of “we are all in this together” touched a critical nerve within these democratic societies.

But more was also involved. For some time, the alliance has been debating the range of its actions “outside of area,” as described elsewhere in this work. The author has argued that the 1999 Kosovo conflict was, for the alliance, “not a bridge too far,” in reference to the Arnhem offensive of 1944, but it was, to that point, certainly “the farthest bridge,” in terms of where the alliance, collectively, was prepared to become engaged militarily. If Kosovo nearly split alliance cohesion, the argument ran, there would be little point in trying to get NATO to take concerted action any farther afield, except under extreme compulsion directly affecting the bulk or even all of the allies—as was true of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991. This clear sense of limitation on the area where allies were prepared to act militarily, beyond the parameters of Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty, was obviously a major reason that the long-standing debate about alliance action beyond Europe was effectively shelved at the Washington NATO summit in April 1999, in favor of some very general language: “Alliance security must also take account of the global context,” which could include “acts of terrorism.”⁶

But with the events of September 11, the debate has reemerged—if so far only tacitly—and in a critical form. Even if the United States limits its requests for direct military support to a select few allies—such as British engagement beginning on October 7, and with

⁶NATO, *NATO Strategic Concept*, 1999 Washington NATO Summit, paragraph 24:

Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability affecting the Alliance. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, co-ordination of their efforts including their responses to risks of this kind.

pledges at that point of assistance by France, Germany, Italy, and Canada—as well as non-NATO ally Australia—the alliance perforce is now engaged “outside of area,” meaning beyond Europe, because of the effects of international terrorism on the United States, if not also on other allied states.⁷ The principle of the “outside of area” debate was thus settled by circumstances. The practical application of the outcome of this debate is yet to be decided, but there has been a decisive step forward. Or, if the European allies do not accept this point, the cohesion of the NATO Alliance would be in grave if not terminal trouble.

Nor should this shift in perspective have been entirely unexpected, except in terms of form and timing. In form, the argument for years was that an “outside of area” threat to the alliance (or to some of its members), to which the alliance would feel itself compelled to respond (i.e., Article 5 implications) would come in the form of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), not “terrorism” that did not employ such weapons. The World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks did not engage weapons of mass destruction, in terms of the physical destruction they caused, but rather were weapons of mass psychological disruption (WMPD), which obviously also have—and by their nature are designed to have—potent effects and consequences.⁸ In terms of timing, some observers argued that a WMD

⁷This would be true even without the invocation of Article 5; obviously, its invocation has even greater meaning.

⁸In debate about so-called asymmetrical warfare, emphasis is generally put on WMD, because it is only these weapons that could cause an amount of physical destruction to offset—at least to some significant degree—the military advantages of the country being attacked. “Terrorism” is a form of asymmetrical warfare that is less about physical destruction (although with WMD that could be sizable) than about the psychological and political effects, within the classical definition. By that definition, terrorism is an act or acts of violence against noncombatants, at random and usually without warning, such that the broader class of noncombatants will identify with those against whom the violence has taken place and will be led by fear of further violence against themselves or other qualities they hold dear either to act *far out of proportion to the original attack* against themselves (or their societies) in ways the terrorists desire (e.g., self-protection out of proportion to risk but damaging to the local economy, or erosion of civil liberties) or to press governments to act in ways the terrorists desire (e.g., to change policies, release other terrorists from prison, or—including in the current situation—to stigmatize Islam in general and to strike militarily in ways that will cause significant civilian casualties). Both asymmetrical warfare with WMD (destruction) and without (WMPD—e.g., the kind of terrorism of September 11) are military weapons, since both are designed to cause political effects desired by the terrorists.

threat could emerge in the relatively near future; but no government was entirely persuaded of this proposition, and certainly the alliance as a whole was not (and, indeed, still is not). The new shift in timing is principally in regard not to WMD but to WMPD—which, as we have already seen, has galvanized the United States to a major response and commitment to a long-term campaign against international terrorism, even without the additional element—which could come—of WMD.

The principle of “outside of area” activity for the Atlantic Alliance, even beyond Europe, must now be conceded—in some form, if only in political support, steps like the eight that were agreed upon in the North Atlantic Council on October 4, and the military participation of “coalitions of the able and willing.”

TOWARD A U.S./NATO–EUROPEAN UNION STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

However, the institutional expression of allies’ being engaged beyond Europe are different from the trends prior to September 11. Notably, the military emphasis after September 11 has been totally on NATO, and the idea of using ESDP was not even discussed, at least not publicly—and, it can be argued, it would not have been considered seriously even if the Headline Goal Task Force were already in being. This emphasis is true primarily because of two factors: first, the kind of military effort most likely required to deal with terrorism (more of a “special forces” nature—perhaps backed up with precision airpower—rather than of a rapid reaction corps nature); and second, the need for coordinated, coherent action engaging the United States and its allies. To the extent that military action would be taken on a multilateral basis, involving an institution, that perforce would have to be NATO (assuming that the United States, in this case, would want to conduct its military operation through NATO which, as in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, it has so far not wanted to do and would be unlikely to do). Thus, in the first test of U.S.-

Terrorism (according to this classical, and most valid, definition—not just acts of insanity or zealotry without a political goal) is thus, like classic warfare, a “continuation of politics by other means.”

European military-political cooperation beyond Europe, the primacy of NATO was asserted.

This lack of a direct role for ESDP might change during the longer-term campaign against international terrorism: There might be some situation in which the European Union would want to consider engaging the European rapid reaction forces on their own—a theoretical but perhaps not practical proposition.⁹ By contrast, the U.S. preoccupation both with Middle East-based international terrorism and with potential, perhaps unintended, consequences of the campaign (e.g., greater U.S. geopolitical responsibilities for the region or for particular countries—a sort of “East of Suez” orientation with attendant, semipermanent military deployments) could lead to a significant reduction in U.S. interest in the practical aspects of European security or in other regions nearby, such as North Africa. Then the EU’s rapid reaction forces could gain greater saliency and importance. However, as noted above, that could produce the risk that the Europeans (ESDP) could begin to “backfill” for the United States in ways that would intrude into areas where NATO has classically been engaged, or where Partners for Peace—expecting strategic engagement by the United States—would see a lessening of U.S. interest. All implications of such a shift cannot be ascertained at this point; but this shift should not be entered into lightly.

However, there is already a way in which the European Union’s efforts to create a foreign policy and security identity is engaged: It lies in the nexus between the two new entities—the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defense Policy. ESDP has not been involved in the post-September 11 crisis; but CFSP has been a centerpiece of EU action. In fact, it can be argued that a new strategic relationship between the United States and the European Union, such as has been promoted for some time by this author, has come into being since September 11.

This relationship began dramatically with the support for the United States shown by the EU, beginning immediately after September 11. Three days later, in the first-ever joint declaration by all the heads of

⁹Indeed, on September 14, the combined heads of state and government and heads of EU institutions said that: “We shall make the European Security and Defence Policy operational as soon as possible.” See the next footnote, below.

state and government of the EU, plus the heads of all of its key institutions, the union took a strong stand. Most important, it declared:

We will not, under any circumstances, allow those responsible to find refuge, wherever they may be. Those responsible for hiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators, organisers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable. This assault on humanity struck at the heart of a close friend, a country with which the European Union is striving to build a better world. But these terrible terrorist attacks were also directed against us all, against open, democratic, multicultural and tolerant societies. We call on all countries that share these universal ideals and values to join together in the battle against terrorist acts perpetrated by faceless killers who claim the lives of innocent victims. Nothing can justify the utter disregard for ethical values and human rights. Global solidarity is at stake. Together, irrespective of our origins, race or religion, we must work tirelessly to find solutions to the conflicts that all too often serve as a pretext for savagery. We call on all countries to redouble their efforts in the fight against terrorism.¹⁰

¹⁰*Joint Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of the European Union, the President of the European Parliament, the President of the European Commission, and the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, September 14, 2001:*

In Europe, and around the world, the horrific terrorist attacks on the United States have shocked our citizens. As an expression of solidarity with the American people, Europe has declared 14 September a day of mourning. We invite all European citizens to observe, at noon, a three-minute silence to express our sincere and deepest sympathy for the victims and their families.

On 12 September, the European Union condemned the perpetrators, organisers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks in the strongest possible terms. The European Union announced that it would make every possible effort to ensure that those responsible for these acts of savagery are brought to justice and punished.

The US Administration and the American people can count on our complete solidarity and full cooperation to ensure that justice is done. We will not, under any circumstances, allow those responsible to find refuge, wherever they may be. Those responsible for hiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators, organisers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable.

This assault on humanity struck at the heart of a close friend, a country with which the European Union is striving to build a better world. But these terrible terrorist attacks were also directed against us all, against open, democratic, multicultural and tolerant societies. We call on all countries that

share these universal ideals and values to join together in the battle against terrorist acts perpetrated by faceless killers who claim the lives of innocent victims. Nothing can justify the utter disregard for ethical values and human rights. Global solidarity is at stake.

Together, irrespective of our origins, race or religion, we must work tirelessly to find solutions to the conflicts that all too often serve as a pretext for savagery.

We call on all countries to redouble their efforts in the fight against terrorism. This is essential for security of our citizens and the stability of our societies. International organisations, and the United Nations in particular, must make this an absolute priority. We shall act with determination and ambition to overcome any obstacles in our path. To eliminate this evil, the police and judicial authorities of all our countries must, in the coming days, intensify their efforts. International law makes it possible to hunt the perpetrators, organizers and instigators of terrorism wherever they are. It is not tolerable for any country to harbour terrorists.

These tragic events oblige us to take urgent decisions on how the European Union should respond to these challenges :

- The European Union must commit itself tirelessly to defend justice and democracy at a global level, to promote an international framework of security and prosperity for all countries, and to contribute towards the emergence of a strong, sustained and global action against terrorism.
- We shall continue to develop the Common Foreign and Security Policy with a view to ensuring that the Union is genuinely capable of speaking out clearly and doing so with one voice.
- We shall make the European Security and Defence Policy operational as soon as possible. We will make every effort to strengthen our intelligence efforts against terrorism.
- The European Union will accelerate the implementation of a genuine European judicial area, which will entail, among other things, the creation of a European warrant for arrest and extradition, in accordance with the Tampere conclusions, and the mutual recognition of legal decisions and verdicts.

Our citizens will not be intimidated. Our societies will continue to function undeterred. But today our thoughts are with the victims, their families and the American people.

Guy Verhofstadt, Tony Blair, Nicole Fontaine, Wolfgang Schäussel, Romano Prodi, Gerhard Schröder, José-Maria Aznar, Tarja Halonen, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, Paavo Lipponen, Kostas Simitis, Antonio Guterres, Silvio Berlusconi, Jacques Chirac, Bertie Ahern, Lionel Jospin, Wim Kok, Göran Persson, Jean-Claude Juncker, Javier Solana.

In subsequent days, the EU took further practical steps in the fight against terrorism, including in the areas of attacking the flow of financing, cooperation in intelligence and through Interpol, and a host of other steps that added up to a robust package of cooperation.¹¹

¹¹See, for instance (all from *EU News* [Delegation of the European Commission, Washington, D.C.]), “EU Commission Calls for Common Instruments to Tackle Terrorism,” September 19, 2001; “European Union Steps up Fight Against Terrorism: The EU Council of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers,” September 20, 2001; and “EU Steps up Fight Against Financing of International Terrorism,” October 3, 2001.

“US-EU Ministerial Statement on Combating Terrorism,” *EU News* (Delegation of the European Commission, Washington, D.C.), September 20, 2001:

In the coming days, weeks and months, the United States and the European Union will work in partnership in a broad coalition to combat the evil of terrorism. We will act jointly to expand and improve this cooperation worldwide. Those responsible for the recent attacks must be tracked down and held to account. We will mount a comprehensive, systematic and sustained effort to eliminate international terrorism—its leaders, its actors, its networks. Those responsible for aiding, supporting or harboring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable. Given the events of September 11, 2001 it is imperative that we continue to develop practical measures to prevent terrorists from operating.

Our resolve is a reflection of the strength of the U.S.-EU relationship, our shared values, and our determination to address together the new challenges we face. The nature of our democratic societies makes it imperative to protect our citizens from terrorist acts, while at the same time protecting their individual liberties, due process, and the rule of law. The U.S. and the EU are committed to enhancing security measures, legislation and enforcement. We will work together to encourage greater cooperation in international fora and wider implementation of international instruments. We will also cooperate in global efforts to bring to justice perpetrators of past attacks and to eliminate the ability of terrorists to plan and carry out future atrocities. We have agreed today that the United States and the EU will vigorously pursue cooperation in the following areas in order to reduce vulnerabilities in our societies:

- Aviation and other transport security
- Police and judicial cooperation, including extradition
- Denial of financing of terrorism, including financial sanctions
- Denial of other means of support to terrorists
- Export control and nonproliferation
- Border controls, including visa and document security issues

While this one area of cooperation—on international terrorism, essentially focused on the Middle East—is not a sufficient basis on which to make broad generalizations, at least in this one area there is developing something of a strategic partnership between the EU and NATO (and, perhaps more pertinently, the EU and the United States), but this is through the CFSP, not ESDP. But, in terms of the EU's competence and efforts to build its institutions, there is nothing wrong with this: Indeed, from NATO's point of view, over the long term, it could be preferable to having to contend with competition from ESDP. The relationship with CFSP (supplementing but not replacing bilateral U.S. cooperation with countries such as the U.K. and France) is a natural fit; and it also has the virtue of helping to make up for a natural defect in NATO's development, discussed earlier, which is its lack of a true capacity for crisis management, other than specific tasks from time to time delegated to the secretary general, as in Macedonia during 2001. If ESDP goes into the deep freeze for a time, that would not be a bad thing from NATO's perspective; it would put aside the vexatious issues of competitive operational planning; it would restore primacy to NATO on issues of significant importance to allies; and it would help to ensure that the United States would see the relationship with the EU in this area as a matter of cooperation, compatibility, and complementarity, rather than competition. Of course, such an outcome might not last very long, or it may not apply to other aspects of foreign policy and security—since the terrorism issue, while important, is not the be-all and end-all of concerns in international relations, for either the United States or its European allies and partners.

There are some other preliminary lessons of September 11 for NATO's relations with the European Union, in regard to CFSP/ESDP, that are worth noting:

- There is now a greater premium on integrating different aspects of policy between the European Union and the United States (to the degree possible also embracing NATO as an institution, as in some of the tasks agreed upon by the North Atlantic Council on

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- Law enforcement access to information and exchange of electronic data.

October 4) including military, political/diplomatic, intelligence, finance, and judicial/police.

- Regarding the new emphasis on combating international terrorism and concomitant concerns about the capacity for different allies to act militarily beyond Europe, to at least some degree, there will be an added premium, as well, on the capacity of the allied militaries to be interoperable. This will be particularly true with regard to C³ISR, but certainly not limited to it.
- This lesson about interoperability also applies to the development of relations between defense and other security industries on both sides of the Atlantic; for one thing, the issue of transfers of high technology from the United States to allies now urgently needs to be resolved.
- In terms of being able to manage a complex and effective campaign against international terrorism, individual European allies will need to keep up relevant spending, although much of this might not be directly for the military services; comprehensive security budgeting will be increasingly important—a lesson for the United States, as well.
- As relationships develop among the various institutions—EU (CFSP/ESDP), NATO, and bilaterally across the Atlantic—there will be considerable value in developing a common locus for counterterrorism planning and coordination. This could consist of a permanent coordinating staff and council involving both the EU and NATO, and including all the relevant parts of governments. Given the special need for U.S. leadership, direct engagement of the U.S. National Security Council process with this new Transatlantic Counter-Terrorism Coordinating Council could pay major dividends.

THE LONGER PERSPECTIVE

Following the end of Phase 1—the campaign against Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda, other perpetrators of the September 11 crimes, and, by extension, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan—the nature of relations between the United States and its European allies and partners will necessarily shift. The United States was given almost *carte blanche* after September 11—although European leaders made

clear that their support for U.S. policy and actions was designed, in part, to gain themselves a “seat at the table” in determining future U.S. counterterrorism policy. Sustaining a coalition, even including Europeans, will be much more complex later on—as indeed the United States has already recognized.¹²

Several other factors, still developing, will also be important. They include the following:

- Different definitions of the terrorist “threat”—what is it and against whom is it directed. Is this indeed a “war” that engages all the allies in common?
- Will individual European allies seek U.S. support for a definition of international terrorism that includes their own preoccupations—e.g., the Provisional IRA and Basque separatist terrorism?
- When will the requirement of Article 5 be satisfied (“to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area”), and how will that be decided?
- What, in fact, will be the common allied definition of “victory”?
- Will the United States and its allies agree on the importance of trying to reduce the appeal of terrorists within their societies, regions, and cultures? This relates to the doctrine of Mao Zedong: creating a “sea for the [terrorist] fish to swim in,” and the role of trying to “dry up” that sea? For the Europeans, most important is consistent, even-handed, and deeply engaged U.S. leadership in trying to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.
- To what extent will the United States see the conflict against international terrorism as something to be centrally directed and controlled from Washington, as opposed to a genuine “multi-lateral” effort?

¹²See Donald H. Rumsfeld, *The New York Times*, September 27, 2001:

This war will not be waged by a grand alliance united for the single purpose of defeating an axis of hostile powers. Instead, it will involve floating coalitions of countries, which may change and evolve. Countries will have different roles and contribute in different ways. Some will help us publicly, while others, because of their circumstances, may help us privately and secretly. In this war, the mission will define the coalition—not the other way around.

- What will be the agreed upon importance within the alliance of acting against WMD—especially nuclear weapons and including such issues as arms control, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and ballistic missile defenses—and what strategies, broadly grouped into preventative, deterrent, and protectionist, could be agreed upon to counter proliferation?
- To what extent will the United States be able to count on continuing European support? Will it be past the point when Europeans, in the main are “satisfied” that efforts against international terrorism have been largely successful, as the Europeans press the United States to be “internationalist” in its overall outlook on international engagement (an extension of debates current during the latter Clinton and George W. Bush administrations prior to September 11)?
- To what extent will the campaign against international terrorism affect other aspects of the Atlantic Alliance, including the roles of NATO and the EU (CFSP and ESDP), other foreign policy and national security interests, and the whole corpus of transatlantic relations?

This last question may prove to be the most significant.