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Soviet Economic Policy Towards Eastern Europe

Keith Crane

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PREFACE

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SOVIET ECONOMIC POLICY TOWARDS EASTERN EUROPE

Keith Crane

Introduction

The Soviet Union faces several dilemmas in choosing its policy goals for its relations with its East European allies. It wishes to retain political control over Eastern Europe, yet foster popular support for local regimes. It would like to use Eastern Europe as a security buffer and for military support, as an example pointing to the superiority of its ideology and politico-economic system, and for political support in international forums, yet it simultaneously wishes to maintain tight control. It also faces the economic dilemma of wishing to increase its gains from trade with Eastern Europe, yet prevent further deterioration in the region's economic situation.

The primary source of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe has been military might, the ultimate guarantor that Eastern Europe will remain a Soviet security buffer, but that is an unwieldy instrument for pursuing other Soviet objectives. The traditional political and economic instruments of foreign policy have therefore dominated in recent years. Economic policies, exercised within bilateral relations and under the auspices of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), have been an important mechanism for making Eastern Europe dependent on Soviet markets and Soviet sources of supply. These policies include trade agreements, credits, joint investment projects, target programs (a way of inducing specialization and thereby, it is hoped, increasing gains from trade), and a plethora of mechanisms for transferring technologies. They have been used to weave a tight web of economic dependence on the Soviet Union.

Unfortunately for the Soviets, these policies have been only partly successful. They have made Eastern Europe economically dependent on the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is both the primary export market for all the
East European countries and the primary supplier of raw materials and energy, especially oil and gas. Yet these policies have failed to produce an alliance that is politically stable, economically dynamic, and militarily strong. The imposition of a Soviet type of system in Eastern Europe has resulted in economies that are slow to adapt to new conditions. Although these systems may have generated satisfactory growth in output, they function inefficiently: They use far more inputs (capital, labor, raw materials, and energy) to generate a unit of output than do Western, and even many Third World, economies. Unsatisfactory economic performance has led to domestic discontent and political instability, and has limited East European military expenditures. Consequently, although Eastern Europe is now closely tied to the Soviet economy, its value to the Soviet Union is much less than had Eastern Europe performed as well as Western Europe.

Not only have Soviet benefits from Eastern Europe probably been less than the Soviets had hoped, but the Soviet Union has paid a high price for these benefits in recent years. The East Europeans frequently state they are eager to engage in trade with the West on "mutually beneficial" terms. With the Soviet Union they seem to drop the adjective "mutually." The Soviets have given the East Europeans more favorable terms of trade than those prevailing on world markets. One estimate of the opportunity cost of this favorable treatment runs 110 billion 1984 dollars for 1970-1984, although this may be excessive. The Soviets have also provided Eastern Europe with trade credits of roughly 14 billion rubles since the mid-1970s, during a period when resource constraints on the Soviet economy have been tightening because of slower rates of economic growth (Table 1).

Given the magnitude of these estimates, why have the Soviets treated Eastern Europe so generously over the past decade, and are they likely to continue to do so? If not, what are the implications for the countries of Eastern Europe of a reduction in assistance, and what policies can the leaderships adopt to cope? How can Soviet leaders resolve the dilemma of reducing Soviet assistance without exacerbating East European economic and political problems?

This chapter provides possible answers to these questions. It presents measures of the costs of current Soviet economic policies with regard to Eastern Europe and discusses the methodology used to compute them. This is followed by a discussion of why the Soviets have adopted their present economic policies toward Eastern Europe. The chapter then assesses Soviet economic policy options for dealing with Eastern Europe and their implications for the East European economies. It concludes with an analysis of three alternatives open to the East European governments for coping with potential Soviet policy changes: restructuring trade toward the Soviet Union, economic reform, and increasing investment.
The Costs of Soviet Foreign Economic Policies Towards Eastern Europe

Like all countries, the Soviet Union engages in trade to improve its material well-being. Goods in which the Soviet Union has a comparative advantage, such as lumber and oil, are exchanged for goods it finds relatively more expensive to produce. Also, like most other countries, the Soviet Union uses economic policies to pursue noneconomic goals. Soviet officials claim that trade and economic cooperation "strengthen the material basis of detente" with Western countries and explicitly endorse the creation of what they see as politically useful "economic complementarities" between East and West. The Soviet Union also uses economic leverage to exert pressure on other countries. For example, the Soviets totally embargoed trade with Yugoslavia after falling out with Tito and halted economic aid to China after the ideological split with the Chinese leadership. They also provide grants and low-interest long-term loans to Vietnam and Cuba to foster allegiance to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union's economic relationship with Eastern Europe is more complex than with any other region of the world. The potential for using economic policies to pursue political or ideological goals is correspondingly greater. Although all these policies entail costs, those involving intra-CMEA terms of trade, bilateral trade balances, and joint investment in the Soviet Union seem to be among the largest or most readily quantifiable. Estimates of costs of policies in these three areas are assessed below and compared with other transfer payments to other areas of the world.

Trade Subsidies

The most noted estimates of the opportunity costs of Soviet ruble trade with Eastern Europe have been computed by Michael Marrese and Jan Vanous (Table 2). They calculate these subsidies by computing dollar/ruble price ratios for Soviet ruble and hard currency exports and imports for six commodity groups: machinery, arms, raw materials, fuels, foodstuffs, and manufactured consumer goods. These ratios are derived by calculating implicit prices for Soviet exports to socialist and nonsocialist countries and taking the ratio to obtain an exchange rate for each commodity group. The same procedure is used for imports. Marrese and Vanous then use these ratios, or exchange rates, to convert trade flows to the CMEA into dollars. For example, Soviet energy exports are converted to dollars by means of the implicit exchange rate for fuels, and machinery exports are converted with a different rate for machinery. Soviet imports in dollars are then subtracted
from exports in dollars to obtain a dollar trade balance. If ruble trade is in balance, this dollar balance equals the subsidy, the difference in the dollar value of ruble trade flows. If ruble trade is not balanced, the deficit or surplus has to be factored out of the equation before the subsidy is computed by converting the ruble trade deficit to dollars with the average dollar value of Soviet ruble imports. The dollar value of the deficit is then subtracted from the dollar trade balance; the difference equals the subsidy.4

Both Western and East European scholars have criticized these estimates for exaggerating the size of the subsidy.5 Most of the disagreement centers on the dollar/ruble exchange rate ascribed to intra-CMEA trade in machinery which generates much of the subsidy.6 A comparison by Dietz of changes in actual Soviet dollar terms of trade and the hypothetical terms of trade with Eastern Europe using Marrese-Vanous exchange rates shows that Soviet terms of trade with Eastern Europe would have improved much more than with the West if the Marrese-Vanous rates would have been used. Because Soviet exports to the West contain a much higher share of energy than to Eastern Europe, this result is implausible; even trading at world market prices, Soviet terms of trade with Eastern Europe should have improved less than they did with the West. Consequently, it appears that that the M-V estimates in Table 2 are significantly biased upward and should be considered a firm upper bound on the size of the implicit subsidy.

Trade Credits

The Soviet Union also incurs large opportunity costs when granting ruble loans. This subsidy is two-fold. First, nominal interest rates on ruble loans run about two and one half to three percent,7 less than the Soviet discount rate (10 percent), the rate of increase in Soviet export prices to the CMEA (over 9 percent per year since 1980),8 and market interest rates in the West. Thus, ruble loan recipients receive a large interest rate subsidy.

Second, because of intra-CMEA price ratios, East European countries enjoy a trade subsidy when they repay the loans. At world market prices the goods they use to repay the loans are worth substantially less than the goods they received on credit; the Soviet Union absorbs the difference.

For example, assume the Soviet Union has a trade surplus of 600 million rubles with East Germany (as it did in 1982), covered by a loan. The bulk of Soviet exports that constitute the surplus consist of goods that could easily be sold on world markets for hard currency (petroleum, iron ore, etc.). East Germany agrees to repay the Soviets for these exports in the future, but repayment will primarily consist of "soft" goods, low quality machinery for which the Soviet Union pays a higher relative price than if it purchased similar machinery from the West. The Soviet Union loses twice: once
because it exchanges more valuable goods today for less valuable goods in the future, and once because the interest rate the East Germans pay on the loan is less than the rate of return the Soviets could obtain if they sold their exports to hard currency markets and deposited the proceeds in Western banks.

Table 3 contains estimates of the value of these subsidies for Eastern Europe between 1974 and the present. The estimates were calculated by converting estimated new ruble debt into 1984 dollars using the dollar/ruble conversion ratios for Soviet exports and dollar deflators in M-V.\(^9\) Loans were assumed to be granted for a period of ten years at a three percent rate of interest.\(^10\) Annual payments (interest and principal) on the loans were then converted into 1984 dollars using the dollar/ruble conversion ratios for Soviet imports and the deflators cited in M-V.\(^11\) These payments were present-valued using a 3.2 percent discount factor\(^12\) and then subtracted from the value of the original loan. The difference equals the credit subsidy.

Because these figures were calculated using the M-V exchange ratios, they suffer from the same upward bias as the M-V estimates. The estimates for Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany may also be biased, probably upward, because the debts of these countries were estimated from trade data. Czechoslovakia and East Germany have probably run surpluses in service trade with the Soviet Union because of transit charges on Soviet-West European trade. Nevertheless, rankings in terms of credit subsidies are probably correct, as is the conclusion that these subsidies have been large.

**Other Potential Economic Foreign Policy Costs**

Aside from providing its partners with favorable terms of trade and balance of payments loans, the Soviet Union also uses several other instruments in its economic foreign policy, many of which have been fashioned and are wielded under the umbrella of the CMEA. They include: specialization agreements, target programs, cooperation in planning, joint ventures, and agreements on sharing the results of scientific research and technological development.

Specialization agreements are nonbinding accords directing individual countries to specialize in particular products. Several hundred bilateral agreements have been signed within the CMEA; multilateral agreements numbered over one hundred in 1977.\(^13\) They cover a large portion of machinery trade in the CMEA. These agreements are implemented at the discretion of the participating governments; they often merely formalize the existing pattern of trade.

Although all parties probably benefit from these agreements, an exact calculation of net gains is beyond the scope of this report. The agreements
can generate economic losses, however, if a partner fails to uphold its side of the agreement. This has been especially costly for the smaller countries in the bloc, because they often rely completely on imports for particular commodities. For example, the Hungarians agreed to specialize in the production of large buses and the East Germans in small buses. The East Germans failed to fulfill their part of the bargain and Hungary was forced to renew production of uneconomical quantities of smaller buses.\textsuperscript{14} The Soviet Union generally uses imports from Eastern Europe to supplement domestic production, so it is better insulated from these shortcomings.

The CMEA also sponsors target programs in which participating countries either coordinate or jointly initiate investments in an economic area of major joint concern. These investments have been concentrated in the Soviet Union and have been designed to provide raw materials to Eastern Europe. They also provide a mechanism for transferring capital in the CMEA. Capital is transferred physically, rather than financially. Contracts stipulate physical quantities of steel, manpower, and machinery to be provided by the Eastern Europeans and the amounts of raw materials the Soviets will ship in return. The East Europeans also often commit themselves to purchasing Western machinery, paid for in hard currency, for these projects.

These projects are expensive and entail a substantial investment commitment on the part of the East Europeans. The most famous and the largest of these projects has been the Orenberg Gas Pipeline with an estimated cost of almost $12 billion. Given the cost of these projects and the need for the Soviets to pressure their partners to participate, one wonders whether the East Europeans have been subsidizing Soviet economic development through these programs.

The answer in the case of the Orenberg pipeline appears to be No. Both the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have benefited from the transaction; the Soviets obtained the capital necessary to develop gas reserves at a time when pressures on investment were increasing, and the East Europeans obtained annual rates of return of 19.5 to 31.5 percent, comparable to rates of return on similar projects in the West.\textsuperscript{15} Nonetheless, few new projects have been undertaken since the Orenberg pipeline, in part because the East Europeans have found it so difficult to determine the payoff from the projects. The distribution of project costs and overruns is not determined ahead of time, and the prices of output are also ambiguous during the period of construction.\textsuperscript{16} Moreover, investment has been squeezed in every country in the bloc, so leaders are reluctant to make commitments to large international projects when domestic producers are undergoing cuts.

The Soviets also push the East Europeans to cooperate in planning. Although both parties could conceivably benefit from more integrated
investment policies, plan fulfillment has been mixed in all countries and CMEA suppliers tend to be unreliable, so leaders are reluctant to depend heavily on decisions made outside the country. Soviet success has been poor in this area, possibly because the costs of poor decisions would be borne disproportionately by the East Europeans, who are more dependent on sole sources of supply.

The CMEA also encourages transfers of technology between countries. The net beneficiaries of this policy are hard to determine. On the one hand, the less developed members of the bloc, such as Romania and Bulgaria, would benefit from designs and discoveries of the more advanced countries. On the other hand, these designs are supposed to be transferred free of charge, so the inventors have little incentive to make the transfers, and the less developed countries may be denied technologies they would have been willing to purchase were commercial licensing arrangements more widespread in the bloc. Possibly because of this bottleneck, in recent years more licenses have been sold on a commercial basis within the bloc, which has probably facilitated transfers of technologies.

There is little evidence to show that this policy leads to a one-way transfer of Soviet technology to Eastern Europe. In several areas (pharmaceuticals, robotics, computer peripherals, shipbuilding) Eastern Europe is as advanced as the Soviet Union, or more so. The benefits of scientific exchanges flow both ways.

Why Has the Soviet Union Been Subsidizing Eastern Europe?

This section examines a series of hypotheses explaining the Soviet Union's willingness to incur these costs. These hypotheses are in general found wanting. A better explanation for the subsidies, explored in the next section, appears to be Soviet preferences for the present CMEA trading system coupled with the desire to temper the cost of East European economic adjustment to higher energy prices.

Soviet Perceptions of the Size of the Subsidies

One possible explanation for Soviet willingness to absorb these large opportunity costs is that the Soviets and the East Europeans have not perceived a subsidy; therefore there has been little pressure to eliminate it. Dietz notes that the Soviets made no complaint about the costs of inferior terms of trade until 1979, and then again in 1981 during the Polish crisis.
Moreover, Soviet terms of trade with Eastern Europe have improved very rapidly since 1975 (Table 4), and in a manner consistent with the CMEA system of setting prices. Although in real terms the East Europeans have not had to pay as much for oil as the rest of the world, they now ship almost 50 percent more goods to the Soviet Union for the same quantity of imports as in 1975. Bloc leaders may perceive transfers of wealth as having been from Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union, rather than in the reverse direction. However, the East Europeans have consistently pushed for increased deliveries of Soviet oil, even when reducing oil imports purchased for hard currency, indicating that they, and most probably the Soviets also, have been well aware of the differences between ruble and dollar prices for oil and the ensuing opportunity cost to the Soviets of oil exports to Eastern Europe.

The subsidy is, however, the result of the difference between relative prices for energy, especially oil, and machinery in CMEA trade and those on world markets, not differences in dollar/ruble prices for energy. Bloc leadership perceptions of high relative ruble prices for machinery are probably more mixed. Despite the acknowledgment by many East European manufacturers that the quality and servicing of their equipment are not at world market levels, the extent of the difference is open to dispute. Naturally, East European exporters tend to believe their products are closer to Western quality and performance levels than would a more objective judge. Although the Soviet buyer may feel the gap is wider, in the absence of parallel production lines using Western machinery the Soviets cannot know what the difference is and have no way of measuring the subsidy. Even if a measure existed, the Soviets and the East Europeans would argue over its use. Thus the East Europeans probably do not perceive as large price differentials in machinery trade as M-V nor as large a subsidy.

The Polish, Hungarian and Romanian leaderships are aware that the cost of earning a ruble of foreign exchange is less than earning a dollar. In 1984, Hungarian exporters received 45 forints for each dollar of exports, and only 26 forints per ruble. In other words, the Hungarians valued the ruble at less than 60 percent of official Soviet rates; the ratio in Poland is similar. These exchange rates, coupled with the oil price differential, indicate that although bloc leaders probably do not know the magnitude of Soviet opportunity costs in intra-CMEA trade, they are aware that such costs exist.

**Price Differentials as a Payment for Sharing Risk**

Another possible explanation for the differences between relative prices in the CMEA and world markets and the resulting opportunity costs is Soviet willingness to sign long-term contracts at fixed prices to offset price
fluctuations. Long-term contracts are a standard feature of international trade. Exxon and Mobil have contracted with Saudi Arabia to purchase oil at fixed prices. The two parties trade potential short-run gains for long-run certainties. Thus when spot market prices fall below contract prices, Exxon is not subsidizing Saudi Arabia but is paying an opportunity cost for fixed prices and supplies.

In the CMEA, most trade is conducted under several such long-term contracts. In fact, the Soviet Union and its partners originally set up the CMEA pricing system during the Korean War commodity boom to safeguard against sudden changes in prices to spread this risk.

Soviet willingness to trade potential short-run gains from price fluctuations for stability is not surprising. Soviet planners prefer such a system because it provides them with the fixed quantities and commodity schedules they need to construct material balances. The Soviet government can also push for large joint projects in the CMEA more easily if it can assure East European governments that it will provide the needed raw materials in requisite quantities at a fixed price and will also purchase the output at a set price.

If this argument explains the subsidy, over the long run CMEA contract prices should fall somewhere in the middle of the range of spot prices, for if spot market prices are consistently above or below the contract price, one party always loses and therefore has no incentive to enter into the contract. I have attempted to test this hypothesis by comparing dollar/ruble price ratios as calculated by M-V with the dollar/ruble ratio that would prevail if intra-CMEA trade were conducted at spot market prices, i.e. the official exchange rate. If the subsidy is really a price for risk-bearing, not a grant, the official exchange rate should bracket the M-V ratios over the long run.

For the 1970-1983 period this hypothesis can be rejected for all commodity groups except raw materials and Soviet imports of energy. Risk aversion could be used to explain trade prices in these commodity groups only; another rationale has to be sought to explain pricing for the other commodity groups.

Unconventional Gains From Trade

Marrese and Vanous argue that the Soviet Union provides anticipated (planned) trade subsidies to Eastern Europe to secure the "allegiance" of the bloc. Furthermore, the Soviets set the level of per capita subsidies for each country in accordance with the level of allegiance the country provides. The Soviet and East European countries' leaderships have adopted this cumbersome way of transferring resources to disguise the transactions from their citizenry. The Soviets wish to hide from their people transfers of
wealth to the ungrateful East Europeans, and the East European elites want to cover the sale of national honor for a few barrels of oil.

Few would argue that one reason the Soviets set up and participate in the CMEA is to foster political control over Eastern Europe. Specialization programs, the construction of interlocking power grids and gas pipelines, and long-run trade agreements tie Eastern Europe to Soviet markets and Soviet sources of supply. The Soviets also use trade to favor selected countries. For example, Cuba receives very favorable prices for its sugar and pays concessionary prices for Soviet oil. Within the CMEA the Soviet Union appears to have rewarded Bulgaria by selling oil for rubles, some of which the Bulgarians then reexported to the West for dollars. Romania appears to have been penalized for its foreign policy independence, because it must pay world market prices in hard currency for Soviet oil.

This said, the M-V argument is unsatisfying. First, the magnitude of the subsidies is not an operational foreign policy instrument. The Soviets can and do control the price and quantity of crude oil exports; political factors doubtless play a role in determining at least quantity levels. The second side of the subsidy, the Soviet Union's willingness to purchase East European manufactures at prices that are higher than prices for Western goods, relative to the ruble price of oil, cannot be so easily ascribed to a conscious policy decision. Thousands of prices are set in machinery trade in sessions between Soviet and East European trade negotiators who use reference prices obtained from alternative Western suppliers, such as Siemens, the West German electrical and electronics concern, and MAN, the German truck manufacturer. Unfortunately for the Soviets, these reference prices are for Western machinery, which tends to be more reliable, has better servicing, and often has higher operating rates than the East European products. Although Soviet negotiators may know this, it is extremely difficult to arrive at a "correct" quality discount, because they lack alternative base prices from which to bargain.

Although minor, cultural and systemic factors may also combine to increase machinery prices paid by the Soviets. Some East European negotiators reportedly take gifts of high-quality consumer items (wine, liquors, appliances, and clothes) with them to Moscow before negotiations begin. The Soviet negotiators are expected to reciprocate by accepting higher than warranted prices for East European exports. Because Soviet trade negotiators work for the foreign trade organizations, not the factories that purchase the equipment, they suffer few, if any, repercussions if the purchased machinery is of lesser quality than promised. Given endemic excess demand for manufactured goods in the Soviet Union, Soviet factory managers would feel compelled to accept the imported goods rather than do without. The reverse situation, Soviet bribes to East European negotiators to
pay higher prices for Soviet machinery, may also exist; but they would not be of such import, because machinery exports are proportionally smaller for the Soviets.

Why should the Soviet and East European leaderships go to such lengths to disguise the subsidy? Surely, the East European citizenry finds the Soviet military bases in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and Poland a far more blatant affront to sovereignty than the knowledge that they are receiving payments under the table for providing political support to the Soviets. Moreover, disguising the subsidy through concessionary pricing makes it nigh impossible for the Soviet and East European leaderships to know its size, especially as such a large share of the subsidy comes from machinery trade. How can a deal be made if neither side knows what it is getting in exchange?

Third, as Brada points out, M-V fail to define the supply curves and the composition of Soviet demand for "allegiance" in an operational manner. They fail to explain how changes in Soviet perceptions of economic, political, and security concerns affect the size of the subsidy. Presumably the Soviets equalize the marginal benefits and marginal costs of "allegiance" across countries. A flatter supply curve for Bulgarian "allegiance" may explain why the Soviets purchase more from the Bulgarians than from the Romanians. It seems strange, however, that the Soviets failed to increase their expenditures on Polish allegiance more rapidly in 1980 and 1981 than in other, more stable countries such as the GDR or Czechoslovakia (Table 2), because the marginal cost of Polish unrest was doubtless very high. Without specifying the determinants of Soviet demand for "allegiance" in more detail, the model is not testable; we cannot predict how subsidy levels will respond to changes in the political and military environment.

Customs Union Effects

Holzman and Brada have argued that the differences in CMEA and world market terms of trade and the resulting subsidies are due to customs union effects. They argue that the CMEA can be considered a customs union that promotes intragroup trade through administrative means (joint planning, a state monopoly on foreign trade, import permit schemes, etc.), rather than tariffs. Brada points out that according to the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of the determinants of international trade, relative prices within such a union may differ from those on the world market because of differences in factor endowments. However, even countries that suffer from inferior terms of trade within the union may still find it economically advantageous to participate, because gains from trade due to increases in trade volume generated by the union may swamp the terms of trade losses.

This argument is buttressed by many of the characteristics of CMEA
trade. Because energy has been fairly abundant within the CMEA and capital fairly scarce, the implicit prices Marrèse and Vanous computed for machinery and oil are consistent with this theory. The union also appears to have generated substantial increases in intragroup trade. Trade with other members of the CMEA, especially Soviet trade, has expanded very rapidly since the union's formation in 1949. Moreover, countries that suffer the greatest terms of trade losses within the CMEA tend to trade most outside the union (Romania and the Soviet Union); those that benefit the most conduct the greatest share of their trade inside (Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria). These countries are behaving as predicted by the model.

If this hypothesis is true, the pattern of subsidies by country in the bloc should correspond to factor endowments. To test this hypothesis, I regressed per capita subsidies on capital/labor ratios, energy self-sufficiency, and the ratio of CMEA to world market oil prices.\textsuperscript{32} I then used this equation to predict per capita subsidies for the CMEA Six.

Table 5 records the regression results. Based on the results of the regression, we may reject the hypothesis that the variation in subsidies is not due to customs union effects. The coefficients on the independent variables are of the right sign and are all significantly different from zero.

Table 5 also compares the sum of per capita subsidies by country between 1970 and 1982 with the sum of subsidies predicted by the model. Because of the poor quality of the capital data from these countries and the lack of confidence intervals for the M-V calculations, it is difficult to test whether these estimates are significantly different from the M-V calculations. Significant differences could stem from omitted variables (for example, a variable for endowments of agricultural land) or errors in measurement of the capital stock.

Of more import are the rank orderings. All the countries switch orderings, although none jumps rank. Tests indicated that the two series were at least correlated.\textsuperscript{33}

The statistical evidence for this hypothesis is strong; leading to another question: Why do the Soviets participate in a trading system in which their terms of trade are so inferior to what they could get elsewhere? It is hard to believe that the gains to the Soviet Union from the increased volume of trade due to the creation of the CMEA surpass the opportunity costs of trading at CMEA relative prices, if the M-V subsidy estimates of 1/5 to 1/2 the value of Soviet exports to the region are to be believed. A much stronger argument is that the Soviets have a preference for trading with CMEA for security and political reasons. The next section examines this argument in detail.
East European Economic Problems
and the Soviet Union

Another Rationale for Subsidies

To answer why the Soviets are willing to incur these opportunity costs it is useful to analyze two separate Soviet policy decisions: (1) the decision to adopt the trading system used within the CMEA, and (2) specific decisions made by the Soviets and East Europeans on prices and quantities traded within this system.

Although the Soviet Union has suffered unfavorable terms of trade within the CMEA, it has important strategic, ideological, bureaucratic, and political stakes in the system. Soviet interest in using the CMEA to avoid both Soviet and East European economic dependence on the West is evident in both the 1984 CMEA summit conference communiqué "Statement on the Main Directions of Further Developing and Deepening the Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation of the CMEA Member-Countries" and in former Politburo member Grigorii Romanov's speech at the 1985 Hungarian Party Congress. The first document says:

The planned development of the national economies of the CMEA member-countries and their mutual cooperation have made it possible in many fields...to counteract the aggressive course of the imperialist circles and the attempts of the U.S. and some of its allies to pursue a policy of economic pressure and discrimination.

Romanov's speech to the Hungarians contains the following warning:

The strategic decisions it (the CMEA summit) took are of tremendous economic and political significance for each fraternal country and for the community as a whole...Political importance inasmuch as they lead to an improvement in the standard of collaboration and cooperation and to consolidation of our states' economic independence from the West.34

These statements show that the Soviets see the CMEA and the economic mechanisms used to integrate the community as strategically important because they prevent the West from dominating the bloc economically.

The Soviets also have an ideological stake in the CMEA. For example, the CMEA forms the socialist counterpart to the Common Market in Western Europe. The Soviets also point to the CMEA as proof of the superiority of planning over markets. Although the importance of ideology in
Soviet decisionmaking is open to question, it may be large enough to make the leadership willing to bear some costs to preserve the foreign trading system employed in the CMEA.

Csaba and Koeves both trace the pattern of intra-CMEA trade, which gives rise to the subsidies, to Soviet preferences, based on ideology, for the Stalinist development model. Both the Soviet and East European leaderships interpreted economic development as the construction of heavy industry. In some cases, most notably Czechoslovakia, the Soviets pushed heavy industrial development harder than the local party leadership. Because the East Europeans lacked the raw material base on which to construct such industries, this strategy implied continuous large imports of Soviet raw materials and the present pattern of trade. In the 1950s and 1960s this ideological bias started a pattern of higher internal and external prices for manufactures, and shortages of raw materials through the neglect of investment in mining and agriculture. Koeves argues further that the present CMEA system has evolved in response to a bloc development policy based on growth through import substitution and central planning. Notwithstanding policy statements to the contrary, this policy has been pursued at the expense of "an active participation in the world economic division of labor," i.e., these countries have paid a high price in forgone efficiency because they were unable to exploit gains from trade.

Soviet planners also have a vested interest in the present trading system. Gosplan, the central Soviet economic control organ, has had a strong preference for material balancing. The present system of annual trade agreements negotiated under the auspices of the CMEA fits neatly into that system.

Finally, the Soviets use the CMEA to foster the integration of the East European economies with the Soviet Union. In other words, the CMEA is an economic tool for political control. Within the confines of the CMEA the Soviets are able to influence East European industrial development through long-term trading agreements. They also tie these countries to Soviet sources of supply through infrastructure investments and through trade and credit subsidies.

The Soviets have a great deal invested in the preservation of the CMEA trading system, and a great deal of the subsidies can be explained as a by-product of this system. Holzman's and Brada's argument that CMEA terms of trade differ from those on the world market because of different factor endowments is one logical outcome. So is the insistence on the use of world market prices as a base for intra-CMEA prices. These prices should minimize the costs of participating in the customs union. However, they also introduce a negotiating advantage for exporters of machinery, since West-East price comparisons are so much more difficult in this area.
Soviet preferences for the CMEA trading system do not, however, explain why the Soviets acquiesced to the continued use of the five-year moving average price system, which was so disadvantageous for them. Although the fall in world market prices of petroleum in the mid-1980s allowed the Soviets to partially recoup some of their previous losses, on balance the Soviets have lost from this arrangement. A plausible rationale for this policy decision is that the Soviets have tried to forestall domestic unrest in Eastern Europe, and the resulting military and economic costs of stamping it out, by gradually phasing in the costs to Eastern Europe of higher energy prices. Further, Soviet leaders found this cost tolerable because the rapid improvement in Soviet terms of trade with nonsocialist countries provided them with windfall gains, which lessened domestic economic pressures to increase oil prices to Eastern Europe to the same extent.

The Soviets are well aware that economic grievances have generally sparked political crises. The 1953 strikes in the GDR were set off by increases in work norms. The Hungarian revolution was spurred by the fall in living standards experienced under the Rakosi regime. The 1956, 1970, 1976, and 1980-1981 crises in Poland were set off by strikes in response to policies that workers feared would lead to a fall in the standard of living. The 1968 reforms in Czechoslovakia were in part a response to poor economic performance. The hypothesis that Soviet willingness to trade at disadvantageous terms with Eastern Europe stems from the desire to forestall political unrest is examined below.

**East European Economies in the Early 1970s**

The Soviet Union had little cause to subsidize Eastern Europe in the early 1970s. Economic growth in these countries was proceeding at a rapid rate; increases in national income surpassed those of the early 1960s in most of the bloc. Marer traces part of these increases to expanding trade within the CMEA. For example, substantial increases in Soviet exports of petroleum contributed to the development of the petrochemical and motor vehicle industries, two of the most dynamic sectors in Eastern Europe at the time.

Marer also notes that Eastern Europe was given an economic boost in the 1970s through rapidly expanding trade with the West. Import-led growth was most noticeable in Poland and Romania; but even in orthodox Czechoslovakia, increases in the share of total trade conducted with the West coincided with accelerated economic growth.

Initially, expanded trade with the West helped to fuel large increases in investment in the region (Table 6). This investment drive not only expanded the capital stock but substantially improved its quality, because much of the new stock was composed of more productive Western machinery.
Overt signs of Soviet economic assistance are minor in this period. All the countries of Eastern Europe recorded trade surpluses with the Soviets between 1970 and 1974. Moreover, in 1975 the Soviet Union broke the terms of the Bucharest accords and raised the price of oil exports, indicating it thought the East Europeans could afford to pay higher prices for oil. Subsequently, the Soviets were able to reach an agreement with Eastern Europe to replace the old price setting system with a system whereby prices were adjusted annually according to a moving five-year average of the world market price. The new system, the Moscow formula, adopted in 1975, was much more favorable to the Soviets than the old Bucharest formula, although it continued to cushion the shock of the abrupt rise in the price of energy and raw materials in 1973-1974.

**Economic Decline in the Late 1970s**

**The Road to Ruin**

Eastern Europe continued to grow rapidly through 1977-1978, although some countries began to lose macroeconomic control. Trade accounts, both hard currency and ruble, were the first indicators of serious imbalances. The region had turned to international capital markets in a major way in the early 1970s, but initially loans had been designated for capital imports. Planners, especially in Poland and Romania, hoped that the new investments would generate high-quality manufactures that could be exported to pay off the debts. By 1975 the entire bloc had significant hard currency debts, but only Bulgaria showed signs of finding its debt burden becoming unmanageable.

Responding to deteriorating terms of trade with the Soviet Union and on world markets, borrowing accelerated following the 1974-1975 recession in the West. Initially, the Soviets were willing to forgo much of the increase in its terms of trade by advancing ruble trade credits. In the West, banks and governments were happy to fill hard currency current account gaps until 1980-1981.

Much of the new lending, dollar and ruble, was balance of payments loans directed toward financing imports of agricultural goods and raw materials and components, not investments. For example, the large increases in Romanian debt in 1978-1980 stemmed from increasing imports of oil needed to fuel its newly constructed refineries. Most new Polish loans went for agricultural products, raw materials, and debt service. Hungary and the GDR experienced similar patterns. As loans were redirected from investment to debt service and consumption, they provided less of a boost to growth.

Credit terms began to harden for the entire bloc in 1980, in part because
of worries about Poland. Higher risk premiums on top of rapidly rising interest rates on international financial markets put great pressure on the hard currency balance of payments. When new credits began to dry up in 1981 and disappeared altogether in 1982, first Poland and then Romania requested a rescheduling. The GDR and Hungary reduced imports rapidly and frantically sought sources of funds to stave off a similar fate.

The hard currency credit squeeze coupled with an acceleration in the deterioration in terms of trade with the Soviet Union led to the 1981-1982 recession in Eastern Europe. With the exception of Poland, these countries had to rapidly increase the volume of exports to the Soviet Union to pay for diminishing imports of oil. Simultaneously, hard currency imports were slashed to close the hard currency trade deficit; Poland and Romania cut them by half. Most of the countries adopted import curbs by default; banks and suppliers were no longer willing to provide import credits. Exports also declined in most countries (the GDR being the notable exception) but less rapidly than imports, so hard currency trade balances were forced into the black.

Stabilization

Import curbs worked. The credit crisis was over by 1984 for every country except Poland, although Hungary continues to be overborrowed. Bulgarian and Hungarian hard currency export performance began to improve, but Polish and Romanian hard currency export levels in 1983 still lagged their previous peaks. The price for balance on the hard currency current account was a large fall in utilized national income, the goods and services consumed by a country. Declines in the standard of living in various years caused part of this reduction, but the brunt was borne by investment (Table 6). By and large, the East European governments traded future economic growth for external equilibrium and the preservation of the current standard of living.

Soviet Policies to Temper the Decline

The Soviets had good reason to be wary of the political consequences of economic decline in Eastern Europe. Throughout the bloc, dissident groups gained in strength after the signing of the Helsinki accords. More threatening was recurrent labor unrest. Major strikes broke out in Romania in the coal-mining region in the Jiu valley in 1977 and in Poland in Radom in 1976. The Romanians successfully quashed their strike. The Polish strike was followed by the rise of unofficial labor unions, which became the precursors of Solidarity. Strike demands concerning wages and working conditions were symptomatic of the widening differential between
expectations and actual increases in living standards, as per capita consumption increases slowed to a crawl after the substantial rises in the first part of the decade.

Soviet foreign economic policies were structured to solve two difficult types of problems associated with Eastern Europe's economic decline: The first is to prevent the economic situation from deteriorating to where it would spark political challenges to local Communist rule; the second to manage crises when they develop.

Crisis Prevention

Many Soviet foreign economic policies during this period appear to have been designed to temper the costs of economic adjustment in Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{44} Soviet energy export policies are a case in point. The Soviets continued to adhere to the Moscow formula for setting oil prices despite the large price rises on the world market in 1979 and 1980.\textsuperscript{45} Given the very favorable improvement in their terms of trade in Western markets, they seemed not to need to accelerate the improvement in terms of trade or CMEA markets. Apart from this passive policy, they also increased the quantity of oil exported to the bloc in the late 1970s, even as their extraction costs rose and world market prices were rising. The Soviets also used energy policies to support the hard currency balance of payments of favored countries. A large share of Bulgarian exports to the developed West have consisted of crude petroleum or refined oil products, over 60 percent in 1983.\textsuperscript{46} In the late 1970s four-fifths of these exports were provided by the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{47} West German economists claim that East Germany was also able to use this device to generate hard currency,\textsuperscript{48} over a quarter of East German hard currency exports have consisted of petroleum products in the 1980s. This is a very high ratio for a country that produces no oil of its own. Hungarian scholars also claim that Hungary reexported refined Soviet oil.\textsuperscript{49} Other bloc members may have refined Soviet petroleum and exported these products in 1983 and 1984.\textsuperscript{50} The Bulgarians were able to use this advantage to move from the position of the most heavily indebted member of the bloc in 1975 to a net hard currency creditor in 1984.\textsuperscript{51}

Aside from small increases in oil exports in the late 1970s, the Soviets also encouraged the East Europeans to substitute gas for oil. The Orenberg gas pipeline, built under the auspices of the CMEA, has enabled the East Europeans to increase energy imports from the Soviets despite constraints on increased crude oil output in the Soviet Union.

Soviet acquiescence to large ruble trade deficits also appears to be a policy designed to soften the shock of deteriorating terms of trade. Between 1975 and 1982 Soviet terms of trade with Eastern Europe improved by 50
percent (Table 4). 1983 and 1984 saw further improvements. During the early 1980s, years when East European terms of trade deteriorated most rapidly and Eastern Europe suffered the greatest pressure on its hard currency balance of payments, the Soviets permitted the East Europeans to run up increasingly large ruble trade deficits (Table 7). In the late 1970s, Eastern Europe increased its borrowing from both the Soviet Union and the West; only in the early 1980s did Soviet lending rise as Western lending fell. The Soviet Union has also directly assisted East European countries with their hard currency balance of payments problems. Hungary has run hard currency trade surpluses with the Soviet Union since the early 1970s. Although this trade is mutually beneficial, the Soviets have simultaneously permitted Hungary to run deficits in bilateral ruble trade. The value to Bulgaria of reexports of Soviet oil for hard currency was noted above.

The Soviets have also not rushed to harden Eastern Europe's terms of trade. The Eastern Europeans have paid for the increasingly expensive Soviet oil primarily by expanding exports of machinery and other manufactured goods, not "hard" goods. The estimates of Marrese and Vanous indicate that these are precisely the goods on which the differential between world market and CMEA prices is now the greatest.

Crisis Management

The Soviet Union's most difficult problems with Eastern Europe have been periodic popular political challenges to the Communist regimes. The Soviets perceive these challenges as threatening Soviet security: militarily, because they could lead to the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviets' Western security buffer; ideologically, because they challenge the thesis of the inevitability of the triumph of Marxist-Leninism; and politically, because they threaten Soviet domination of a bloc of countries.

The Soviets have resolved many of these conflicts through force, either through invasion or through the use of national police and troops. But the Soviets have also used economic policy instruments to stabilize the political situation.

Increased exports, especially of industrial inputs and consumer goods, and acceptance of lower return shipments have been important policy tools for stabilizing crises. For example, after the military takeover Polish leaders lauded the economic assistance the Soviets were providing to get the country back on its feet. The Hungarians also made great mention of Soviet aid following the revolt in 1956.

Trade statistics buttress these assertions. Soviet trade surpluses with Hungary and Poland increased sharply in 1957, following the autumn upheavals in 1956. Surpluses also increased with Czechoslovakia in 1968, and
Poland in 1971, 1976, 1980, and 1981 (Table 8). In all these cases the Soviets increased exports to these countries and agreed to reduced imports. The Soviets have also provided infusions of hard currency to stabilize the economic situation. In 1981, although the umbrella did not go up, an edge was extended to Poland. Poland received substantial hard currency loans from CMEA banks and the Soviet Union, besides ruble trade credits.53

Trade subsidies as computed by Marrese and Vanous show no change between 1970 and 1971 or 1975 and 1976 for Poland. They did increase by $300 million between 1980 and 1981, but then declined rapidly, falling by $600 million in 1982, the year the Polish economy reached its nadir (Table 2). Subsidy calculations for Czechoslovakia also fell in real terms in 1969, following the 1968 crisis.54 Thus implicit trade subsidies do not appear to have been used as economic policy instruments for defusing political crises.

Changes in the volume of Soviet oil exports appear to have been used in only a limited fashion for solving political crises in Eastern Europe. According to Teske, the Soviets agreed to boost crude oil shipments to Poland from 11 to 13 million tons annually in 1977-1980 after the Polish crisis of 1976.55 However, in 1981 the volume of oil exports to Poland stagnated at the same level as 1980.56 In 1982 Poland’s oil imports were cut by only one percent rather than the 10 percent in Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and Hungary, but in 1983 they were cut an additional three percent.

The 10 percent reduction in oil exports to the other countries indicates limited Soviet willingness to use energy deliveries to bail out allies in crisis. Eastern Europe’s hard currency balance of payment crisis peaked in 1982: Poland and Romania defaulted on their loans, and Hungary and East Germany escaped rescheduling by a whisker. Yet this is the year in which the Soviets reneged on their commitment to keep oil shipments level for the 1981-1985 five-year plan.

The Soviets also appear not to manipulate oil prices to bail out countries in distress. According to Vanous, prices paid by Poland for Soviet oil have not been reduced in years of unrest and have generally remained higher than those for Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and the GDR.57

To sum up, the Soviet Union manipulates trade and credit flows to solve short-run crises in Eastern Europe. Its most important economic policy instrument for crisis management appears to be to allow the troubled country to let its trade balance deteriorate, both by increasing imports and decreasing exports. Implicit trade subsidies appear to have no role in solving short-run crises. Soviet willingness to accept less favorable terms of trade within the CMEA than in nonsocialist trade appears to stem from its desire to temper the effect of higher world market energy prices on the East European economies and thereby forestall unrest in the bloc. The differences in terms of trade within the CMEA and on the world market are not just a
consequence of a Soviet decision to give Eastern Europe a break on energy prices. These differences also stem from a Soviet decision to adhere to the system of pricing and trade within the CMEA that the Soviets have preferred for political, military, and ideological reasons.

The Soviet Union and the Economic Future of Eastern Europe

Why the Soviets Want a Change

Soviet Policy Goals in the 1980s

The Soviets' willingness to bear large opportunity costs in their economic relations with Eastern Europe appears to have worn thin. The conference communique of the 1984 CMEA summit meeting "Statement on the Main Directions of Further Developing and Deepening the Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation of the CMEA Member-Countries" listed several new goals for the CMEA. Of particular interest are those contained in the following paragraphs:

In order to create economic conditions ensuring the carrying out and continuation of deliveries from the Soviet Union of a number of types of raw materials and energy sources to satisfy import requirements in amounts determined on the basis of coordination of plans and long-term accords, the interested CMEA member-countries, within the framework of agreed-upon economic policy, will gradually and consistently develop their structure of production and exports and carry out the necessary measures to this end in the field of capital investments, reconstruction and rationalization in their industries, with the aim of supplying the Soviet Union with products that it needs—in particular, foodstuffs, manufactured consumer goods, some types of building materials, and machinery and equipment that is of high quality and meets world technical standards. Mutually acceptable decisions on these questions will be worked out with consideration for the objective economic conditions of the USSR and the other CMEA member countries, as well as for the structure of these countries' production and mutual trade turnover.

This statement appears to have been written by Gosplan rather than the Soviet foreign policy establishment. The final document implicitly contains the following Soviet policy goals:
1. A reduction in East European trade deficits.\textsuperscript{58}
2. Continued improvement in Soviet terms of trade, especially through deliveries of better quality goods for Soviet exports of raw materials.
3. Increased East European participation in the development of Soviet natural resources.\textsuperscript{59}
4. Restructuring the East European economies so that they are better attuned to Soviet needs.

The Soviets have also put the East Europeans on notice that future supplies of raw materials and energy will depend on Soviet domestic demand and the availability of supplies.

Soviet Reasons for Wanting a Change

The Soviets' new emphasis on their own economic needs within the CMEA is probably a product of two factors. The first and most important is the Soviet economic slowdown that characterized the 1980s, caused in part by a decline in the rate of increase in capital and labor inputs, the primary sources of growth in the Soviet economy over the past several years. More worrisome from the Soviets' point of view has been a decline in factor productivity, which has been traced in part to transportation bottlenecks, especially problems with the railroads, the accelerated depletion of natural resources coupled with rapidly increasing costs of developing new deposits, and the concomitant shortages of raw materials.\textsuperscript{60} These problems have been worsening and no easy solutions are in sight.

Changes in trade and credit policies toward Eastern Europe would mitigate these problems. Reductions in energy and raw materials deliveries, if coupled with unchanged deliveries to the West, would ease pressures on supplies in the Soviet Union and diminish demand for investment in the development of new deposits. Improvements in imported machinery from the bloc, which now account for a considerable share of Soviet machinery investment, could help reverse the decline in factor productivity.

The second potential factor is the lack of effectiveness of past Soviet policies. Eastern Europe has been a flawed asset in recent years.\textsuperscript{61} Trade credits and favorable terms of trade have been rewarded with civil strife in Poland, greater foreign policy independence in Hungary and the GDR, and continued Romanian unwillingness to conform to the Soviet foreign policy line. Economic growth in the region has been slow; Poland has had to reschedule its debts with the Soviet Union as well as with the West, and the quality and technological levels of East European manufactured exports now
lag those of the NICs. The Soviet Union may rightly be wondering what benefits past economic assistance have brought.

Soviet Potential for Achieving These Goals

The easiest Soviet goal to achieve will be closing transferable ruble trade deficits. With the exception of Poland and Hungary, the bloc has been running hard currency current account surpluses. Hard currency balance of payments problems are no longer a compelling argument for continued Soviet trade credits. The acquiescence of the East European citizenry to stagnating living standards has also weakened arguments for subsidies to forestall unrest. The Soviets may now believe that a crack of the whip does a far better job of controlling dissent than improvements in the standard of living. The slowdown in Soviet output growth, reductions in hard currency imports, and continued excess demand imply that Eastern Europe will continue to find Soviet markets for almost any goods they may export, so lack of demand will not be a constraint. Moreover, the Soviets appear to have no intention of increasing shipments to Eastern Europe, so balancing ruble trade appears feasible.

Further hardening of Soviet-East European terms of trade is unlikely, unless world market prices of oil rise. In 1985 at the official dollar/ruble exchange rate, Soviet oil export prices to Eastern Europe were roughly on a par with world market prices. In fact the recent decline in world market prices of oil lead to a period where Soviet prices were higher than world market prices at the official rate of exchange. As a result of declines in world market prices, Soviet prices have also been reduced, even if with a lag, which has lead to an improvement in East European terms of trade with the Soviets. Machinery prices continue to be relatively higher in CMEA trade than on the world market, but, as argued above, the way in which these prices are negotiated imparts an upward bias that will not be easy to eliminate. Moreover, at a time when the East Europeans are being pushed to balance their trade, it is difficult to imagine that Soviet trade negotiators would start to refuse East European export offers because of delivery or quality considerations.

The Soviets have also requested more food, building materials, and high quality manufactures than in the past. Increasing exports of these goods will be difficult, except possibly for food, because production is often costly and faces tight capacity constraints. This request could perhaps be fulfilled, but it would entail further cuts in domestic consumption or diversion of hard currency exports to the Soviet market.

The East Europeans have agreed to participate in the construction of a new natural gas pipeline, which will rival the Orenberg project in size. They
are also involved in the construction of two nuclear power plants in the
Ukraine, which will export electricity, and an iron ore processing plant at
Krivoi Rog. I am skeptical, however, that the East Europeans will agree to
many more such investments in the Soviet Union. Domestic pressures for
investment are far too strong. Over the past five years, as investment has
fallen a backlog of investment needs has piled up. Machinery has become
even more obsolete, and infrastructure bottlenecks in communications and
transportation systems have tightened. Excess demand for housing remains
endemic. Given the level of bureaucratic and popular pressures for domestic
investment, as manifest in the increases in investment incorporated into the
1986-1990 five-year plans, and limited prospects for rapid growth, it is highly
unlikely that Eastern Europe will invest much in the Soviet Union outside of
projects to which the countries have already agreed.

The Soviet demand that Eastern Europe restructure its economy more in
line with Soviet needs sounds like a bad joke. With the exception of
Romania, Eastern European economic development has long been
integrated with Soviet needs. Poland’s shipbuilding industry, East Germany’s
oil equipment industry, the Hungarian bus industry, and Czechoslovakia’s
nuclear reactor industry are among the most important in these countries.
They all export substantial percentages of their total output to the Soviet
Union; in the case of Hungarian buses the share exceeds three quarters.
They all face problems in marketing products produced in these industries in
the West. The new Soviet demands really reflect dissatisfaction with the
quality and variety of products produced from past East European attempts
to satisfy Soviet demands.

The problem is then one of improving variety, quality, and delivery times
rather than restructuring East European economies away from a hypothetical
bent toward Western markets. Soviet prospects for succeeding in this
endeavor are problematic. The same sluggish pace of technological change
exists in such new industries as computers and robotics as plagued motor
vehicles and machine tools in the past. The causes of Soviet dissatisfaction
are systemic, not simply poor planning.

**East European Policy Alternatives**

Although the declines in ruble and hard currency terms of trade have
moderated, energy shortages, hard currency debts, uncompleted investment
projects, and low factor productivity continue to constrain economic growth
in the region. As most of the economies emerge from recession, reductions
in Soviet subsidies confront East European policymakers with some
unpleasant choices. Three of the more important will be discussed below:
- Redirecting trade toward the Soviet Union.
- Reforming the economic system to improve factor productivity.
- Increasing investment to accelerate growth.

Redirecting Trade

One possible solution to declining levels of Soviet assistance is to redirect trade from the West to the Soviet Union and the rest of the CMEA. Theoretically, this could satisfy Soviet demands for better terms of trade and induce the Soviets to increase energy exports, thereby loosening this constraint on growth. It could also loosen the hard currency balance of payments constraint, if imports from the CMEA could substitute for hard currency imports.

This policy appears to be possible only in theory. Although the Poles and Czechs have stated that they are pursuing such a policy of redirecting trade from the West toward the CMEA, in practice the Eastern Europeans have tried to increase trade with the West as much as possible. Every country provides extra bonuses for managers of enterprises that increase hard currency exports or exceed hard currency export targets, and every country emphasizes increasing hard currency exports in annual plans.

Bloc trade patterns also fail to indicate a turn to the East. Exports to the Soviet Union have risen, but imports from the Soviet Union to the bloc have more or less stagnated. Bulgaria, the GDR, and Hungary have reduced their share of total trade conducted within the CMEA since 1979; the GDR has increased the share of its total exports going to the developed West by over nine percentage points during this period.63 The share of Polish and Romanian imports originating in the CMEA has risen dramatically. But this change is primarily a consequence of balance of payments crises. Western suppliers simply stopped shipments and have yet to resume them on credit. Thus it appears the Poles have made a virtue of necessity by declaring that they want to rechannel trade toward the East; actual policies for reducing East European trade with the West have yet to be implemented.

These countries emphasize exporting to the West, because hard currency imports are vital for the operation of their economies. Agricultural products no longer take such a large share of hard currency imports. Raw materials, components, and semi-manufactures, necessary inputs for industrial production, now constitute the overwhelming share of these imports. As shown by the case of Poland and Romania, when these imports fall, output plummets. The GDR, Hungary, Poland, and Romania also have to export more to service their hard currency debts. The last three remain overborrowed in the sense that the pressure of servicing hard currency debt is a binding constraint on output growth.64 The GDR’s debt burden is
somewhat more manageable, but it too faces balance of payments constraints. Hard currency debt service will necessitate increasing hard currency exports for the foreseeable future.

Another reason why the East Europeans are unlikely to deemphasize trade with the West is the realization that neither the Soviet Union nor the other members of the CMEA can provide the quality or level of sophistication of Western-made capital equipment, nor do they possess the requisite licenses or technical expertise. Without access to Western technologies, most of the technical elites believe that the productivity gap between East and West will widen. Although machinery imports have fallen, if investment is to rise once again, Western imports will play an important role, otherwise much of the new investment will be obsolescent upon installation.

Despite recent increases in Soviet oil production, long-term Soviet oil production appears to be headed down. Soviet exports of oil to Eastern Europe are likely to follow. The East Europeans have responded to past Soviet reductions in oil shipments by substituting Soviet gas, domestic sources of brown coal, and nuclear energy. As these alternatives are exhausted and world market prices have fallen, the East Europeans have made a few purchases of oil on the world market, indicating that imports of oil for hard currency may become a practical alternative for some countries, especially since hard currency balance of payments pressures have eased somewhat. This implies a greater, not lesser, emphasis on Western markets. For this reason, a turn to the East is unlikely.

A final reason for a continued emphasis on Western markets is the stimulus provided by Western competition. Hungary and the GDR especially see the ability to market in the West as a prerequisite for improving the competitiveness of their domestic industries. The very task of marketing in the West teaches their firms new management and production techniques that they hope will carry over into the domestic economy.

The Soviets may, however, apply pressure on Eastern Europe to reduce trade with the West. Soviet attitudes on trade between Eastern Europe and the West are ambiguous. On the one hand, the CMEA summit communiqué and the speech by Romanov cited above warn of the dangers of becoming overly dependent on the West. On the other hand, Soviet leaders continue to speak of the potential benefits from expanding East-West trade. Even if the Soviets would prefer less trade, it is difficult to see how they would enforce such a policy when they are curbing exports of "hard" goods. Moreover, their emphasis on regional integration through plans rather than markets is unlikely to be any more successful in facilitating trade in intermediate goods, the most important East European imports from the West, than it has in the past.
Systemic Reform

Bornstein cautions that "reform" is used in two contexts in Eastern Europe. The first he classifies as administrative decentralization: the devolution of decisionmaking power to lower levels of the economic hierarchy. The second is economic decentralization, which implies replacing administrative allocation of resources with allocation through markets in which independent enterprises respond to such indirect instruments as prices, tax rates, and subsidies. This definition is adopted in the discussion below.

Western scholars, probably more than the East Europeans, often tout economic reform as a solution to the low level of productivity and slow rate of adaptation seen in these countries. Observation of the Yugoslav and Hungarian reforms indicates that the process is more difficult and the economic side-effects more damaging than had generally been imagined by Western scholars. Nonetheless, half of the East European countries are currently attempting to reform their economic systems.

These countries see systemic reform as a means of accelerating factor productivity growth, improving hard currency export performance, and lowering energy consumption/output ratios. If Soviet subsidies are reduced, economic reform should also facilitate increasing ruble exports and adjusting to stagnating deliveries of energy and raw materials.

Past performance of reformed centrally planned economies gives some grounds for hope that economic decentralization will loosen the constraints on economic growth in these countries. Hungary has been the most efficient user of energy in the bloc. Poznanski argues that it has also been one of the most successful technological innovators. Hard currency export performance in Hungary and Yugoslavia has also been better than that of most other centrally planned economies, although hard currency debt problems have been as severe, or more so. Thus, successful reform could provide an answer to a decline in Soviet subsidies.

The Reformers

Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland made considerable changes in their economic systems in the 1980s. They have concentrated on increasing the decisionmaking power of managers and providing incentives to increase profits, rather than concentrate on increasing output or sales. This new emphasis on lower level decisionmaking has necessitated revision of the price system. All three countries purport to link domestic prices of raw materials and other tradeables with world market prices. Interest rates are supposed to govern allocations of credit to some extent.

Another area of change has been the private sector. Some restrictions on
private enterprise have been removed, and all three governments have stated their commitment to the continued existence of some private enterprise, which ostensibly provides entrepreneurs with a government commitment to regulatory stability.

Despite these changes, the prospects that reform will be successful are highly uncertain. Hungary and Poland have introduced far-reaching and fairly coherent changes. In Hungary the new measures, although sometimes inconsistent, are directed at the major flaws in the 1968 mechanism: the lack of competition on the domestic market and the "soft" budget constraint, ministerial willingness to finance poor investment decisions and loss-making operations. The Hungarians have tried to increase competition by breaking up large firms and trusts, encouraging firms to set up subsidiaries or subcontract out work to small cooperatives organized inside the firm. They have also encouraged private firms to enter markets by lessening tax burdens and permitting them to hire more employees than in the past. They have attempted to increase enterprise independence by replacing ministerial supervision of most firms with a workers' council, which elects the general manager. The banking system is also being decentralized, and the rudiments of a capital market are being constructed. These measures ought to "harden" the enterprise budget constraint and make managers more responsive to the world market.

The 1982 Polish reform outline contained some inconsistencies but was far more coherent than the Bulgarian reform blueprint. Market forces were to have an important role in price formation, exports and imports were to be primarily regulated through the exchange rate, and enterprises were to make decisions on output and investments more or less independently from the center.

This reform provides the only plausible hope for Poland to resolve its hard currency balance of payments problems and improve living standards. Proper implementation could lead to increased exports, more rational use of investment, and more efficient use of energy, thereby loosening many of the current constraints on economic growth. It would also permit Poland to weather the elimination of Soviet trade credits with little effect on the economy.

Unfortunately, the Poles have done a poor job of implementing the reform. Central allocation of resources has been preserved by "temporary" measures. Central control of enterprises continues through decisions on the allocation of inputs, special tax and subsidy dispensations, and the reemergence of associations, industrial organizations that allocated investments and inputs in the 1970s. Price controls have been reimposed in response to high rates of inflation, which can be traced to the creation of money to finance the national budget deficit. Budget deficits, in turn, are the
result of the willingness of the authorities to provide open-ended subsidies to many industries and plants. Consequently, Polish enterprise managers operate in an environment of endemic excess demand, constantly shifting regulations, and inconsistent incentives. In this environment it is not surprising that the reform has shown such poor results.

In the fall of 1987 the Polish Parliament passed a new round of reform legislation including a reduction in the state bureaucracy and the creation of a two-tier banking system. These measures and official pronouncements indicate that the Polish leadership has made a renewed commitment to introducing the reform. However, given poor performance in implementing past reform measures, the successful introduction of the new measures remains highly uncertain. Poland's Western creditors and membership in the IMF may succeed in pushing the leadership toward more forceful implementation, but in its present guise, the economic reform will probably not loosen constraints on growth or soften the effect of the elimination of Soviet credits.

The outlook for the Bulgarian reform is bleak. The Bulgarians have introduced the most incoherent reform of the three countries. Compulsory plan targets continue to exist with incentives to maximize profits. This proviso was one of the crucial weaknesses in the Polish changes in the economic system introduced in the early 1970s, when managers were told to maximize value-added and fulfill plans. Because managers could not do both simultaneously, the hoped for improvements in efficiency did not materialize, especially as managers gave plan target fulfillment precedence over increases in value-added. Cost-plus pricing continues to be the favored mode for setting prices in Bulgaria; markets are explicitly rejected. Such a system provides the wrong signals to firms that produce exports or use imports and is unlikely to lead to improvements in factor productivity.

One plus for economic reform in Eastern Europe is the attitude of the new Soviet leadership. In the past the Soviets had an ambivalent position concerning economic reform in Eastern Europe. Romanov's speech at the Thirteenth Hungarian Party Congress contained the following statement:

The Party performs all this work (intensification of production) making creative use of fundamental criteria of socialist economic activity like planned management, the consolidation of socialist ownership, and the priority of the social aims of economic development...

Although Romanov has since been relieved of his seat on the Politburo, these remarks probably reflect the preferences of others in the Soviet leadership who feel that central planning and state ownership are the
hallmarks of a socialist system. An article in Pravda on June 21, 1985 took a hard line on economic reform, claiming that markets, private enterprise, and a smaller role for central planning destabilizes "the foundations of socialist economic management" and also leads to the "violation of social justice."^63

However, now that the Soviet leadership has adopted its own reform package, the shoe is on the other foot. Hungarian and Polish leaders now have no fear that the Soviets will criticize or attempt to reverse proposals for systemic changes. In fact, leaders of countries which have abhorred reforms, Czechoslovakia and Romania, are now under pressure to improve their economic systems. Consequently, those East European leaders who wish to introduce more market-oriented measures no longer face external opposition to these moves, although internal resistance may still block major changes. Opposition to economic reform often appears to come more from domestic sources than from Moscow.^70

Aside from the new support for economic reforms from the Soviet leadership, other Soviet policy concerns support the implementation of reforms. The Soviets are primarily concerned with stability in these countries, and, to a lesser degree, reducing the economic burden they impose on the Soviet Union. If the East European leaderships perceive systemic change as the only route to improved economic performance, and improved economic performance as the only safeguard of stability, the Soviets are likely to welcome reforms.

The Traditionalists

Romania and, to a lesser extent, Czechoslovakia have adhered to the Soviet model. In Romania none of the main features of the Soviet model have been tampered with. Enterprise managers continue to be evaluated according to output plan fulfillment. Investment and output decisions continue to be made at the association (centrala) or ministerial level. The exchange rate has little effect on export or import decisions. Relative prices differ from those on world markets. For example, energy prices remain far below world market levels despite IMF pressure for further increases.

Czechoslovakia has clung less tightly to the Soviet model. In 1980 a "Set of Measures," not an economic reform, was introduced to provide better signals and incentives for improving efficiency. These measures include closer links among domestic and foreign trade prices, bonuses for increasing hard currency exports, and enterprise profits. Wages were also to be more tightly linked to productivity. Plan targets continue to be set by the center and emphasize gross targets, although value-added has become a more important indicator. No move has been made toward market prices, and relative prices diverge from those on world markets."^71 However, after
Gorbachev's 1987 visit to Prague, Czech leaders have begun to speak of economic reform for the first time since 1968. The Czechs may join the reformers yet.

Given their adherence to the Soviet model, it is not surprising that neither country has been able to accelerate factor productivity growth. Increases in output in both countries appear to be predicated on increases in inputs. Surpluses in hard currency trade have been earned by reducing imports and curtailing domestic investment and consumption. Increases in hard currency exports have been won by reducing domestic consumption of raw materials, food, and energy, and exporting the surplus.

Past experience is probably a good guide to the future of these two countries. Improvements in the hard currency balance of payments, especially in Romania, imply that current account adjustment will probably not place a binding constraint on growth in the second half of the 1980s unless both governments persist in trying to repay their entire debt. Output increases will probably depend on increases in investment and the transfer of labor from agriculture to industry, not accelerated factor productivity growth. Because Czechoslovakia has reduced investment and can expect little growth in the industrial labor force, economic growth will be slow. Romania has been able to reduce consumption in the past to increase investment and has some reserves of labor in the countryside, so its prospects for growth are somewhat better. If, however, the Ceausescu government persists in attempting to liquidate Romania's hard currency debt without regard to the domestic costs of energy and food shortages, further declines in living standards and falls in output are likely. Neither country appears to be seeking a long-term solution to loosening past constraints on growth.

A reduction in Soviet subsidies and credits would have little effect on Romania, but could damage the Czech economy. Romania is not permitted to purchase Soviet oil except with hard goods, so it does not benefit from the preferential terms of trade granted to other members of the bloc. Czechoslovakia, however, has benefited handsomely from Soviet trade subsidies and has also received large ruble credits in recent years (Tables 2 and 7). Closing its ruble trade deficit has cost the country a tangible share of utilized national income.

The GDR--A CMEA Success Story?

In recent years the GDR has shown the best economic performance in the bloc. It has put its hard currency current account into surplus by rapidly increasing hard currency exports. It has also successfully reduced energy and input use per unit of output. Reported growth rates have been faster than those of the mid-1970s. It has not achieved these successes by adopting an
economic reform along the lines of either the Hungarian or Yugoslav models. It has benefited from large hard currency payments by West Germany (approximately $1 billion annually) for transit privileges to West Berlin, payments for the release of political prisoners, and from an interest-free "swing" trade credit. But West German payments have been fairly constant over time; they fail to explain the dramatic turnaround on East Germany's hard currency trade balance.

East Germany's quick change from trade deficit to surplus in 1981-1982 was achieved by following Romanian policies. Imports were slashed and exports increased with little regard to cost. Some of the increases in exports in those years can be traced to destocking. East European enterprises have far larger inventories of inputs than Western firms. Consequently, they can often continue production longer following a reduction in imports. In the case of the GDR some stocks of raw materials may actually have been reexported to raise cash. Dr. Jochen Bethkenhagen of the Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung argues that reexports of Middle Eastern oil also played an important role in improving East German liquidity. In the early 1980s East Germany had the highest share (after Bulgaria and Romania) of raw materials and energy in its exports to the OECD in the bloc. Energy accounted for 30 percent of GDR exports to the OECD in the early 1980s. To the extent that the GDR was able to purchase this oil with exports of manufactures, its trade performance improved, but some of these purchases may have been on credit.

Since the initial destocking, better inventory control, bonuses for reductions in materials and energy usage, and administrative curbs on consumption and investment probably account for the country's continued ability to run hard currency current account surpluses.

The GDR's improved hard currency balance of payments owes little to East German technology. East Germany's reputation for being the technological leader of the bloc is undeserved in terms of its hard currency export performance. The share of machinery (SITC 7) in East Germany's exports to the OECD actually declined from 15.7 percent in 1975 to 13.0 in 1981, while other members of the bloc succeeded in increasing the share in their exports. Furthermore, the share of machinery in East Germany's exports to the OECD falls in the same range as other members of the bloc, except Romania's (which is lower), around 11 to 13.5 percent. East German unit values (a proxy for prices) of machinery exports (SITC 7) to the OECD have been the lowest in the bloc in recent years. Hungarian unit values are almost double; East German values even fail to exceed Bulgaria's.

Dietz argues that some of East Germany's superior performance in economic growth can be traced to statistical changes. East German enterprises were merged into giant kombinates in the late 1970s and early
1980s. Simultaneously, net output replaced gross output as the most important plan target, and central planners stopped disaggregating plans below the kombinate level; the kombinates disaggregated plans themselves below this level. Central planners also gave the introduction of new products more emphasis. This combination of more new products, greater emphasis on net output, and the concentration of enterprises may have led to more hidden inflation in new product prices, as small modifications are made in products that are then released at higher prices, and enterprises are able to manipulate cost figures to increase reported value-added.

The extent to which these factors have inflated East German growth figures is an open question. Melzer argues that the changes mentioned above have led to more rapid real economic growth. The emphasis on rewarding managers for reducing the use of materials and energy has led to reductions in per unit use. Melzer also argues that grouping enterprises in kombinates and giving kombinates the power to disaggregate plan targets among constituent enterprises improves allocative efficiency. Kombinate managers can reallocate inputs more efficiently than central planners because they have better access to information and shorter chains of command. Ministries also have better control because on the average they oversee 11 kombinates whereas previously they had to supervise tens of firms. These systemic features may permit the East Germans to continue to achieve improvements in efficiency, especially as hard currency balance of payments pressures have eased, permitting more imports of Western machinery and higher levels of investment.

East Germany appears to have weathered closing its trade deficit with the Soviet Union. Ruble trade surpluses may rise as the country pays off its ruble debt, but the resulting economic adjustments will probably be slight. More worrisome are long-term prospects for economic growth. As noted above, East Germany's hard currency export performance in machinery and other manufactures has been poor. The country does not have a comparative advantage in raw materials or energy. As long as it depends on raw materials and energy for much of its hard currency export earnings, it will probably be subject to recurring balance of payment crises, and economic growth will lie hostage to supplies of these goods for export.

**Investment**

Table 6 documents the severity of the investment cutbacks in Eastern Europe over the past several years. 1984 marked the first year in which Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania increased investment. Declines in Hungary and the GDR moderated.

The East European leaderships may perceive increased investment, again,
as a means of improving factor productivity and loosening energy supply constraints. After the reductions experienced in recent years, the number of projects with large potential returns has probably increased. Soviet demands for higher-quality manufactured goods and more competition in traditional hard currency export markets put pressure on these countries to increase investment by importing and installing new machinery that incorporates more efficient technologies.

Improvements in factor productivity and fuel consumption will have to be juxtaposed against a deterioration in the hard currency balance of payments. 1984 was the first year that the region, with the exception of Poland, felt hard currency balance of payments pressures ease significantly. Deterioration in the next few years would destroy much of the credibility on international financial markets that has been so painfully restored.

Increases in ruble exports will also curb the incipient investment boom. Countries that still run large ruble trade deficits with the Soviets are likely to face demands to pay off ruble debts before embarking on a full-scale investment boom.

Probably the tightest constraint on rapid increases in investment will be consumer demands for higher real incomes. Living standards have fallen or stagnated in most bloc countries during the past few years. In most cases the populace has peacefully, if complainingly, acquiesced to this state of affairs. If output begins to grow more rapidly, bloc leaderships, with the exception of Ceausescu, will probably feel compelled to increase incomes almost as fast as investment.

The worrying aspect of another investment boom is that with the possible exception of Hungary and Poland, none of the countries have implemented new methods by which to choose investment projects nor new instruments with which to keep the boom under control. Although neither Western nor Soviet bankers are likely to finance a boom of the duration of the last, Eastern Europe will probably soon find itself in the middle of another investment cycle.

Conclusions

Western scholars generally concur that Eastern Europe has benefited from large implicit trade subsidies, subsidized trade credits, and in at least one case hard currency loans from the Soviet Union during the past several years. Although the size of these subsidies is disputed, most scholars concur that they have totaled many billions of dollars. In that case, why have the Soviets acquiesced to such unfavorable terms of trade and why have they
permitted CMEA countries to run persistent ruble trade deficits? And why have per capita subsidies differed from country to country?

After examining several hypotheses, I conclude that trade subsidies have been granted to ease the transition to higher relative energy prices in the CMEA. The incidence of these subsidies has been determined primarily by factor endowments within the CMEA and Soviet decisions on oil export volumes. Although the Soviets have included political factors in their calculus on oil export volumes, there is little evidence to indicate that the volume of implicit trade subsidies has been used as a policy instrument to extort political concessions. Trade credits appear to have been granted to soften the effect of higher energy prices as well, but the Soviets appear to have used them more often for immediate political objectives, especially to bolster states in political turmoil.

Slow economic growth in the Soviet Union, the very large opportunity costs currently incurred, and the limited effectiveness of these policies for curbing unrest may have contributed to a Soviet reassessment of its present economic relationship with Eastern Europe. Stagnating (and now declining) Soviet petroleum production coupled with falling world market prices of oil have also probably encouraged the Soviets to reassess past policies. A change in these policies appears to have been marked by the 1984 CMEA summit meeting, which concluded with a call for improved Soviet terms of trade, more East European investment in the Soviet Union, and a restructuring of East European economies to better serve the Soviet Union.

The probability that the Soviet Union will be able to achieve these goals is limited. Soviet statements at the CMEA summit may have been more a "wish list" than an operational policy change, for the political costs of forcing hard-pressed East European regimes to increase exports may exceed the economic benefits of reducing Soviet balance of payments loans. Moreover, although the Soviets can coerce the East Europeans into closing their ruble trade deficits and eventually repaying their ruble loans, they will face determined opposition to increasing investment in the Soviet Union. Improvements in Soviet terms of trade are also unlikely, unless the present system of determining prices in intra-CMEA trade is changed, an improbable eventuality.

If the Soviets force Eastern Europe to close the trade deficits, Eastern Europe will have to increase ruble exports, while economic growth continues to be constrained by declines or limits on imports of Soviet energy, hard currency debt service, small additions to present stocks of capital and labor, and low levels of factor productivity. Of the policy options available to the East European leaderships for accelerating economic growth in the face of Soviet reductions in subsidies, three stand out: (1) diverting trade from the West to the Soviet Union and the rest of the CMEA, (2) reforming the
economic systems, and (3) embarking on another investment boom.

None of the three policies offers much promise. Difficulties in obtaining increased imports of intermediate goods from other countries in the CMEA coupled with continued large debt service payments on hard currency loans implies more, not less, East-West trade. Falling world market oil prices will also narrow the difference between the cost of imports of Soviet oil and Middle Eastern imports, making world markets more attractive to the East Europeans. Reform has great potential for improving productivity and export performance, but bloc leaderships have seemed incapable or unwilling to implement coherent reforms, except in the case of Hungary. This may be changing, however, with a renewed commitment on the part of the Polish leadership to implement its economic reform, and with Gorbachev's drive to reform the Soviet system itself. Present hard currency loans levels, the need to increase exports to the Soviet Union, and domestic demand for higher standards of living place sharp limits on Eastern Europe's ability to pursue growth through another investment boom. Slow growth and ad hoc measures to increase East-West trade appear to be the order of the day in the 1980s.

The long-run implications of this analysis are continued or increasing political unrest in the bloc. If living standards continue to stagnate or rise only slowly, popular discontent may increase. The probable response, at least as indicated by current practice in Czechoslovakia and Poland, will be greater reliance on the police. However, continued poor economic performance could provide a push to the Polish and Bulgarian reforms and an impetus for systemic change in Czechoslovakia after the replacement of the current leadership. An expanded private sector and a more demand-oriented state and cooperative sector made possible by economic reforms could considerably improve the quality of life in these countries and provide a safety valve for popular discontent.

The Soviet dilemma is unlikely to go away. The Soviets may well succeed in reducing the economic costs of supporting Eastern Europe by pushing these countries to pay their ruble debts. Trade subsidies may also fall as the world market price of oil declines. But the Soviets show no signs of refusing to assist regimes with internal political problems. They will continue to incur large economic costs to preserve political control.

Present Soviet economic problems, its desire to reduce expenditures, Eastern Europe and Gorbachev's own reform program are providing a great deal of leeway in economic policymaking for East European leaders. The Soviets' own supply problems will prevent them from increasing exports to Eastern Europe or insisting on a decline in trade between Eastern Europe and the West. As long as they remain wedded to integration through plans, rather than markets, the increases in trade in intermediate goods needed to foster greater gains from trade in the CMEA are unlikely to be forthcoming,
and the East Europeans will need to emphasize trade with the West if they wish to exploit these gains. Moreover, Gorbachev's own efforts at reform imply the Soviets are no longer likely to reimpose their own model on Eastern Europe. Thus the East European leaderships have some freedom to maneuver. Whether they take advantage of it is an open question.
APPENDIX

STATISTICAL TEST OF THE CUSTOMS UNION HYPOTHESIS

To test the customs union hypothesis, I assumed that the CMEA is endowed with three primary factors: capital, labor, and energy. I then regressed per capita subsidies as calculated by Marrese and Vanous in 1984 dollars on measures of relative factor endowments: capital/labor ratios and the percentage of energy consumption produced domestically. Because much of the increase in per capita "subsidies" in the 1970s was due to increases in differentials between CMEA and world market oil prices, the ratio between these two prices was also included in the equation. These measures were calculated for the CMEA Six (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania). The results of the regression are given in Table 6.

Capital labor ratios were calculated by converting measures of productive capital into dollars using purchasing power parity exchange rates constructed by Alton et al. These figures were then divided by total employment figures given in the statistical handbooks of the various countries. The capital stock figures for Romania and Bulgaria are probably biased upward; the exchange rates used are also questionable, but the resulting estimates are probably the best capital stock figures available.

CMEA and world market oil prices converted to rubles were taken from Dietz. The percentages of energy consumption produced domestically were calculated from data in CIA and Vanous.
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Table 1
OUTSTANDING SOVIET RUBLE LOANS
TO EASTERN EUROPE
(Millions of rubles)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Bulgaria</th>
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<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Romania</th>
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Sources:
Bulgarian, Czechoslovakian and East German Debt--Cumulative trade deficits with the Soviet Union (Vneshniaia Torgovlia SSSR: statisticheeski sbornik, various years).
 Romania--Economic Memorandum, Romanian government

Notes:
(a)First three quarters of 1984 only.
Table 2
MARRESE-VANOUS ESTIMATES OF SOVIET TRADE SUBSIDIES TO EASTERN EUROPE
(millions of 1984 dollars)

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<th>GDR</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Poland</th>
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Table 3

SOVIET SUBSIDIES ON EAST EUROPEAN RUBLE DEBTS *

(Millions of 1984 dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Subsidy</th>
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<th>GDR</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Romania</th>
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<td>130</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>17420</td>
<td>3020</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>5270</td>
<td>2570</td>
<td>4380</td>
<td>260</td>
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*Discount rate--10%, Interest rate--3%, Loan length--10 years, no grace period, deflator--implicit Soviet trade deflators from Vneshniaia Torgovlia SSSR.
Table 4

SOVIET OIL EXPORT PRICES AND TERMS OF TRADE
(per metric ton)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Soviet Oil Prices</th>
<th>Soviet Terms of Trade</th>
<th>Ratio of (3) to (4)</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CMEA (Transferable Rubles)</td>
<td>World Market with the CMEA</td>
<td>with the West</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Predicted</td>
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<td>Cumulative Per Capita Amounts--1970-1982</td>
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<td>M-V Estimates</td>
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<td>980</td>
<td>530</td>
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<td>Predicted</td>
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<td>1300</td>
<td>1550</td>
<td>1340</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>530</td>
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<td>Regression Equation</td>
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<td>Per Capita Subsidy = -92.21 + 68.1 x KL - 138.23 x E + 40.2 x OP</td>
<td>(-2.85)</td>
<td>(2.78)</td>
<td>(-5.0)</td>
<td>(3.63)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

where KL is the capital/labor ratio, E is the percentage of energy consumed produced domestically, and OP is the ratio between CMEA and world market oil prices in rubles. Figures in parentheses are T statistics. The number of observations was 78. The F statistic was 16.7 which was significant with a probability of over one in 10,000.
Table 6
INCREASING INVESTMENT, NMP AND UNI IN EASTERN EUROPE
(In percent)

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<tr>
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<th>GDR</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Poland</th>
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<tr>
<td>1971-75&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
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<td>1976-80&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
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<td>0.3</td>
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<td>4.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
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<td>5.9</td>
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<td>5.0</td>
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<td><strong>Utilized National Income</strong></td>
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<td>6.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
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<td><strong>Net Investment (Accumulation Fund)</strong></td>
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<td>2.9</td>
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</tr>
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<td>3.7</td>
<td>-15.0</td>
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<td>6.0</td>
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**SOURCES:** 1971-83: National Statistical Yearbooks (for all countries except Romania) and unpublished official Romanian statistics as reported in **WEFA**, Vol. 5, No. 25-26, March 27, 1985.
1984-85--National Statistical Yearbooks
<sup>a</sup>Average annual rate of growth.
### Table 7
SOVIET TRADE SURPLUSES
WITH EASTERN EUROPE
(Millions of rubles)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>Poland</th>
<th>Romania</th>
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Hungary—Calculated from the difference between Soviet trade, socialist trade, trade with Yugoslavia, China and North Korea, and ruble trade in the Hungarian Foreign Trade Yearbook (Kutikereskedelmi Statisztikai Evkonyv), various years.

All other countries—Trade deficits recorded in Vneshniaia Torgovlia SSSR: statisticheskii sbornik, various years.
Table 8
SOVIET TRADE SURPLUSES WITH EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN CRISIS
(millions of rubles)

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Source: *Vneshniaia Torgovlia SSSR: statisticheskii sbornik*, various years
Notes

The author wishes to express his appreciation for the insightful comments and criticisms provided by Abraham Becker, Harry Gelman, A. Ross Johnson, and Benjamin Zycher of the Rand Corporation, Paul Marer of Indiana University, John Van Ouderen of the Wilson Center, and Gur Ofer of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.


3. Ibid.

4. An example should make this procedure clearer. Suppose Bulgaria imports 1 billion rubles of fuel and 1 billion rubles of machinery from the Soviet Union and exports 1.5 billion rubles of machinery in return. M-V obtain a dollar equivalent for Soviet fuel exports by multiplying 1 billion rubles worth of fuel by the dollar/ruble exchange rate for fuel, say 2. They do the same for machinery, this time using the dollar/ruble exchange rate for machinery, say 0.5. The dollar value of Soviet exports would then be 2 billion dollars for energy plus 500 million dollars for machinery, for a total of 2.5 billion dollars. The same procedure is used to calculate the value of imports from Bulgaria. Assuming the same exchange rates, these imports would be worth 750 million dollars. Something must be done about the ruble deficit, however, because supposedly this credit will eventually be repaid. M-V convert this into dollars and then subtract it from the subsidy. The deficit is converted to dollars using the dollar value of a ruble of a market basket of imports from the country. In the example, this equals 0.5, the dollar value of a ruble of Bulgarian exports to the Soviet Union. Thus the total subsidy in this case is 2.5 billion dollars (Soviet exports) minus 750 million dollars (Soviet imports) minus 250 million dollars (the dollar value of the deficit) for a total of 1.5 billion dollars.

5. Paul Marer and John Michael Montias, East European Integration and East-West Trade (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980); Raimund Dietz, "Advantages/Disadvantages in USSR Trade with


12. This equals average real return on U.S. 10 year bonds during the period when the loans were granted.


20. If CMEA trade was conducted at world market prices and these prices were converted at the official rate, the dollar/ruble ratio for each commodity group would be identical to the official rate. Therefore, the extent to which the M-V ratios differ from the official rate reflects the difference in CMEA and world market prices.

21. One problem with this approach is that CMEA prices are supposed to be moving averages of world market prices. During a period of large changes in relative prices, such as the 1970s, windfall gains or losses may accrue to one party over a substantial period of time, which would make the system appear one-sided.

22. A binomial test was used with a one percent region of rejection. When the official exchange rate exceeded the M-V rate it was assigned a value of one; when below, a value of zero.

23. M-V differentiate between the total subsidy, (which is partially determined by changes in the world market price of oil, and the anticipated subsidy, equivalent to the amount the Soviets would presumably have planned to transfer if relative world market prices had been stable. Marrese and Vanous, "Soviet Trade Relations," op. cit. p. 4.


26. Evidence that ruble prices are varied from country to country on political grounds is not as clear. Ruble prices for planned deliveries of oil may be the same for each member of the bloc. Differences noted in average prices may be due to above plan purchases or other commercial arrangements.

27. The domestic cost of manufacturing the products is also taken into consideration.

28. Conversations with East European economists.


32. The data and rationale for the form of the regression are given in the appendix.

33. To judge whether the shift in ranks was highly significant, I conducted a Spearman rank order test of the hypothesis that the two orders were uncorrelated. Although this hypothesis was rejected at the 10 percent level of significance, this test merely indicates that there is a positive correlation between the two patterns, not that they are the same.

34. Pravda, 27 March 1985, p. 4.


39. The Bucharest accords, adopted in 1958, stipulated that prices in intra-CMEA trade were to be fixed for the entire five-year plan period on the basis of average world market prices during the preceding five-year period.


44. This is not to argue that economic policy instruments have not been used to pursue other Soviet foreign policy goals. Aside from the differences in Soviet treatment of Bulgaria and Romania noted above, the Soviets reportedly express their unhappiness with East European domestic and foreign policies by reducing export supplies or by delays in signing import contracts for goods from major East European industries.


50. Comments by Soviet economists.


55. Gary R. Teske, "Poland's Trade with the Industrialized West," Joint


59. The document contains the passage, "planning and foreign-trade agencies...should coordinate...measures to increase mutual deliveries of goods, the main proportions and structures of reciprocal trade turnover," which I interpret as calling for balanced trade.

60. The "Statement" goes on to say, "They [the member countries] will carry out appropriate measures, including the participation of interested countries in capital investments and in providing exporter countries with other economic incentives on a bilateral or multilateral basis by the interested countries." Policy goal three seems implicit in this passage.


68. Price controls were to remain in many industries, and fixed prices were to be set for many inputs. This ruling sharply limits the effectiveness of prices as a guide to what to produce and in what to invest.


74. Ibid.


77. It is hard to imagine economic reform in the GDR. Comparative economic performance has been good, and the *raison d'etre* of a socialist Germany disappears if central planning is replaced with markets. Ceausescu's highly personal rule in Romania makes political predictions for that country very difficult.

78. Marrese and Vanous, "Socialist Trade Relation," op. cit.

79. Total capital in the cases of Romania and Bulgaria.


81. Dietz, "Advantages/Disadvantages in USSR Trade with Eastern
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Europe," op. cit.
