NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING IN AN ERA OF UNCERTAINTY

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PREFACE

This paper was developed for a conference entitled "Conventional Forces and Arms Control: Technology and Strategy in a Changing World," organized by the Center for National Security Studies at the Los Alamos National Laboratory and held September 25-26, 1989. The paper draws on work accomplished in the RAND Strategy Assessment Center (RSAC), which is part of RAND's National Defense Research Institute (NDRI), a federally funded research and development center.
SUMMARY

This paper describes an approach to national security strategy that begins by characterizing the future environment in terms of a core part and uncertainties, and then describes a strategy with three components: a core strategy, an environment-shaping strategy, and a hedging strategy. The purpose is to give at least one view of how the United States may wish to plan in a period of great change and uncertainty.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many of the ideas presented here were developed in collaboration with Paul Bracken of Yale University, who serves as a RAND consultant, and William Schwabe of the RAND Corporation.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The original subject of this paper was to be "regional threats," the idea being that a region-by-region survey would be a useful stage-setter in a conference. The problem, however, is that this is not a period during which it is natural or effective to focus discussion on "threats" in the traditional sense. It is especially inappropriate and discordant to talk in terms of a "capital T threat." Instead, this is a time to think in terms of planning under uncertainty in an era of change. This is a time to rethink interests as well as strategies. It is a time for strategic planning on a global scale. This paper, then, summarizes one set of suggestions about United States strategic planning. It makes no attempt to prove anything; instead, it seeks to lay out coherently the highlights of a particular perspective. Some of the assertions or hypotheses will be provocative and even controversial.¹

A good place to begin is with a definition of "strategic planning," since the phrase is used in different contexts to mean quite a number of different activities. What is meant here is shown in Fig. 1, where "strategic planning" is shown as one of the interrelated processes that constitute national security planning more generally. In this image, the purpose of strategic planning is not to pose and analyze cosmic issues for decision, but rather to shape the intellectual framework within which policymakers work. The purpose includes assuring issue familiarity so that when actual decisions are made, whether as part of routine management such as the development of defense programs or in a time of crisis, top policymakers can start with a good foundation that includes a sense for the alternatives and the variables that should be considered. This is especially important in an era of change and uncertainty because it will be essential for policymakers to adapt strategy as time goes on—sometimes quickly as a result of shocks, whether in the form of threats or opportunities. The key to successful adaptation is, in all domains of human endeavor, prior familiarity with appropriate concepts and building block activities.

¹The material presented here draws heavily upon recent work accomplished in an ongoing DoD-sponsored project, directed by the author, which is concerned with future challenges and options for national military strategy. The project has included strategic planning exercises, numerous interviews and seminars, the review of past and current national security strategy studies, and participation in and review of PATH games sponsored by the DoD and conducted by Mr. Francis West of GAMMA Corporation and Dr. Kleiber Masterson of Booz Allen and Hamilton. The opinions expressed here are, however, the personal views of the author.
Fig. 1—Strategic planning as part of national security planning

This view of strategic planning is common in modern business practice, which can also be used for ideas about how to structure strategic planning in a period of uncertainty. My colleagues and I have been looking to business theory and practice for such ideas, and also for useful metaphors that may help to remind us of the instruments available that go well beyond resource allocation. The principal themes we have found useful are:2

- It is important to simultaneously appreciate the constancy of the environment and the importance of uncertainties.
- It is useful to conceive of and plan for the core environment, but to plan also for adaptations.
- Similarly, one should develop three strategies:
  — Core strategy
  — Environment-shaping strategy
  — Hedge strategy

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• Recognize that strategy is more than resource allocation.

The first notion attempts to strike a balance between underestimating and overestimating the significance of change and uncertainty. Even today, in a period that may produce momentous changes in international relations, most of what will exist ten years from now will be a mere extrapolation of what we know today. At the same time, failure to appreciate the changes would be highly unfortunate.

The second notion involves distinguishing between two types of planning under uncertainty: that which deals with uncertainties that will "come to a head" or be resolved at a more or less predictable time, and that associated with stressful events that could "happen at any time," forcing relatively rapid and "unprogrammed" adaptation (see, for example, Herbert Simon, New Science of Management, Prentice-Hall, 1965).

The third notion is that we should develop and discuss separately core, environment-shaping, and hedging strategies. The core strategy focuses on the continuous aspects of the environment. The environment shaping strategy is designed to counter the passiveness that might otherwise exist: We are not passive actors in this world, waiting merely to see what the future holds. To the contrary, we wish to mold the future. This concept, however common at an implicit level, is nowhere to be found in the typical DoD planning study. It is interesting to note the observation by Stanford's James March that successful businessmen often use studies more to identify actions to make things turn out well than as a basis for deciding whether to proceed. They are less interested in the alleged odds than in knowing where the stumbling blocks might be.

The need for hedging strategies is evident as soon as one lists it. Less obvious, probably, is the comment that strategy is more than resource allocation. While obviously true, what does it mean? Drawing again on business theory, one can identify a great many activities that serve as metaphors for activities that we might at least consider in national security planning. These include: (1) redefining the business; (2) assessing, cooperating with, or trying to drive out the competition; (3) retraining operating managers; (4) revising incentives; (5) revising the process of overall management; (6) retooling; (7) restructuring in the sense of centralization vs decentralization; (8) diversification; (9) divestiture and acquisition; and (10) investing in the future with R&D. Many of these seem especially relevant metaphors in 1989.

It can be argued, certainly, that the United States has been in the business of containment; is that the right way to think of our national security activities as we look ahead? Perhaps, perhaps not. Some would argue that this is a time to press our
competitive advantages and leave the Soviet Union in our wake, essentially driving them out of the competition. To be sure, there are many differences between national security planning and business planning, but the metaphors are still interesting.

It is with this background that I shall sketch out a landscape that might form the basis for national security planning in the years ahead. It is only one of many landscapes that might be painted, but it represents a serious view nonetheless, and one contrary in many ways to conventional wisdom. In sketching the landscape I shall use the language introduced above. Following the approach that has been found useful in many strategic planning exercises, I shall make no attempt at comprehensiveness. Instead, I shall merely list and discuss briefly a series of assertions. The purpose is not to prove anything, but rather to provide a coherent picture that one may judge for himself—perhaps appreciating some of the figures and tones better than others.
II. CHARACTERIZING THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

THE CORE ENVIRONMENT

Figure 2 gives an overview of the global environment. In this and the subsequent figures, the underlined items are ones that seem to be controversial or unusual. They are not necessarily the most important.

![CORE ENVIRONMENT](image)

- Soviets remain unique competitor—able to threaten fundamental security interests.
- E. Europe is most likely origin of conflict
- W. Europe is economically sound and politically stable. German question remains, but replay of previous European history is unlikely:
  - Democratic nations tend not to start wars (with peers)
  - Nuclear weapons cast a large shadow
  - Territorial conquest is not what it used to be
- Europeans, not U.S., will probably decide future of Western Europe
- Pacific Rim nations will probably prefer economic and social growth with U.S. having unique role as stabilizer. Biggest threat: "shocks" handled poorly followed by buildup of Japanese strength (militarily weak Japan is desirable but historically unnatural)
- Soviet threat to Persian Gulf has become nearly incredible for the time being, but Persian Gulf oil remains critical to "West" and regional threats also exist.

Fig. 2

The first item is not controversial, but needs restating, especially since there has been relatively little objective change in the Soviet Union's military capabilities so far, and there is no prospect that she will give up her superpower status as a strategic-nuclear and Eurasian military superpower, even in the event that her economy collapses altogether, leaving her a virtual third-world nation by the beginning of the next century.

The next several items focus on Europe, not because of my colleagues and I being unremitting Europeanists, but because momentous changes are underway there and there are many risks and uncertainties. At the same time, we depart from many observers in
that we are not impressed by certain aspects of the "German question." In particular, we
tend to discount a future military threat to the Soviet Union (or to France) of a unified
Germany. Further, we tend to doubt that either the Soviets or the other Western
Europeans would find themselves worrying about military security if the Germanies did
reunite. There are, however, sensitive and important concerns about Germany's future
economic clout and related matters regarding the organization of a viable Central Europe.

In thinking about the United States role in Europe, we agree that our dominance in
military matters buys us influence that we might wish to retain, especially with the events
of 1992 on the horizon. However, we reject strategic discussions that act as though the
United States can determine its own future role in Europe. If any nation there wants our
forces out, we will leave "the next day." Period. That changes the way we frame options.
In fact, we think it somewhat likely that the Western Europeans will wish to continue with
NATO and to welcome United States forces in Europe. That depends, however, on
exogenous events, principally the behavior of the Soviet Union.

In the Far East, trends are excellent. The principal problem is that from a historical
perspective it is highly unusual for a superpower such as Japan to be satisfied with a
minimum military capability and dependence for her security on another superpower.
Thus, it is plausible that any of several "shocks" might begin a process of Japanese
rearmament. However, given the objective interests of Pacific Rim nations in economic
and social growth without military competition, the United States has a natural role as a
friendly stabilizer that seldom has to "do anything" with its military forces.

Figure 3 describes the core military environment in which the likelihood of general
war—or even a mid-level war such as the invasion of Iran—seems very low for the next
decade. This has many resource-allocation implications, although the key decisions must
await major and actual Soviet reductions. By contrast, the likelihood of lesser
contingencies remains fairly high if history and recent problems in Panama and Lebanon
are any guide. In fact, limited contingencies have always been a part of the DoD business
but, all too often, a neglected part except where one could imagine Soviet involvement.
As the principal author of a major 1979 OSD(PA&E) study, "Capabilities for Limited
Contingencies in the Persian Gulf," I can testify that the number of interested readers

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3It is virtually impossible to publish on issues of strategy without being preempted during
the publication process by current events, given the pace of change. When the paper was written,
German reunification was still widely considered to be a sensitive subject that would surely be
suppressed for some years. By the time of editing in early October, 1989, however, there was
widespread discussion of the subject because of the mass emigration of East Germans to the Federal
Republic and events elsewhere in Eastern Europe, notably in Poland.

**CORE MILITARY ENVIRONMENT**

- General war remains extremely unlikely for at least 10 years
- Mid-level war is highly unlikely for at least 10 years (except perhaps in Korea)
- Nonstandard contingencies are more likely (e.g., 1 or 2 per decade)
- Importance of virtual war and U.S. intervention capability remains high in promoting stability
- Military presence deterring crisis remains preferable to intervention
- Thresholds for U.S. intervention remain very high:
  - Especially for regular ground forces
  - Less so for assistance with intelligence, logistics, and reconnaissance
  - Perhaps less so for "safe" air strikes
- There is no "increasing threat" to be found
- R&D opportunities and requirements are many

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Fig. 3

The concept of the virtual war, due to Albert Wohlstetter, and mentioned in Fig. 3, is useful here, since the relationships among nations often depend in part on military realities that are never made manifest by having actual wars. Explicitness on this can help us anticipate threats to stability and identify elements of environment shaping strategy.

The comments about intervention capability reflect the view that any interventions will probably be strictly limited to avoid loss of American life or hostages.

In some circles it is fashionable to argue that the services should refocus their efforts on non-Soviet threats, or at least threats outside Europe. There are claims that these "other" threats are increasingly serious and worthy of resources. In our view, that is nonsense. The shape and texture of these "other" threats change regularly over time, but
their magnitude is not growing and there is no basis in such "other" threats for "requirements" of large force structure. We should attend seriously to the nonstandard-contingency part of the business, but not by crying wolf. Indeed, the environment cries out more for R&D and modernization than for structure.

UNCERTAINTIES: BRANCHPOINTS AND POSSIBLE SHOCKS

Figure 4 summarizes some of the major uncertainties that can be conceptually viewed as involving branchpoints in United States strategy over the next decades. Before long, for example, we will have a much better sense than we do today about where CFE is going and what kinds of post-CFE options are worth worrying about. Further, once the shape of the CFE agreement begins to tighten, we will have a much better sense of the military threat for which we must prepare. The next few figures elaborate on this.

![MOST IMPORTANT MID-TERM UNCERTAINTIES WITHIN CORE ENVIRONMENT](image)

Fig. 4

Whereas Fig. 4 dealt with uncertainties with which we can associate branchpoints in time, there are other uncertainties that can be associated with possible shocks, shocks that could arise at any time. Figure 5 shows a partial list. People are notoriously poor at
judging whether or when such shocks will occur. Who would have predicted a year ago that China would have its recent problems, which must be regarded as at least a minor shock? Who, in 1978, predicted the fall of the Shah of Iran? It follows that we should avoid complacency, try to head off deleterious shocks well in advance, and hedge.

**POTENTIAL SHOCKS**

- Violent upheavals in Baltic states or E. Europe
- Overthrow of Gorbachev followed by reactionary regime perceiving U.S. involvement in internal and E.European problems
- Bilateral reunification of the Germanies
- Korean war
- Overthrow of Communist Party (e.g., by Gorbachev and the military)
- Anti-U.S. political shocks in Korea, Philippines, or Japan
- Soviet-Chinese reapproachment
- Middle Eastern war arising from state-supported terrorism
- In longer run, decision by Japan to rearm (and/or develop nuclear weapons)

Fig. 5
III. A POSSIBLE STRATEGY FOR AN ERA OF CHANGE AND UNCERTAINTY

CORE STRATEGY

Transitioning from description to prescription, Fig. 6 describes our suggested core strategy. In the spirit of strategic planning exercises, it avoids comprehensiveness and itemize only actions worthy of special mention.

The top planning priority should be on Europe because of its potential for momentous change. A CFE agreement or its equivalent in terms of reciprocal unilateral efforts could greatly improve European stability and provide peace dividends, or it could undercut the NATO alliance and endanger Western stability. Details matter.

As will be clearer when we discuss environment shaping, we see events in Europe as an opportunity. Our core strategy, however, must be measured and cautious. We should encourage Gorbachev's efforts, pursue CFE actively as our top arms control priority, minimize loss of flexibility in and legitimacy for nuclear deterrence, and maintain the ability for NATO to restore defense capabilities quickly should events warrant it. By contrast, we want Soviet and Pact demobilization measures to be irreversible.
In considering core strategy elsewhere, we have concluded that the rhetoric about the United States having to retrench strategically has been overdone. If the threat remained high and we were severely constrained economically, then there would be difficult choices, but with a receding threat and moderate financial constraints, we can focus on quantitative rather than qualitative changes—making incremental quantitative reductions without reducing commitments or the general nature of our forward deployments.

Intervention capabilities will remain important, although the challenges are considerable. However, we also believe there should be new roles and missions for the peacetime military forces, roles and missions focused on peaceful applications (more on this later).
CORE STRATEGY, CONT'D

- Cut active force structure to protect quality of remaining forces, R&D, modernization, and some aspects of readiness
- Maintain and strengthen reserves and mobility
- Remain adamant about role of extended deterrence, but show great flexibility in technical details of "theater-relevant nuclear weapons" (numbers, FOTLs, AFAPs, ...)
- Pursue alternatives for theater-relevant nuclear systems, using exercises and doctrine to change perceptions about credibility
- Increase relative emphasis in planning on nonstandard contingencies. Make room by de-emphasizing more traditional scenarios temporarily.
- If feasible, partially restructure presence forces and rapid-deployment forces for greater emphasis on peacetime roles and missions and nonstandard contingencies (still not well defined!)

Fig. 6a

Next, a few relatively specific suggestions (Fig. 6a). First, our assumptions about the core environment and uncertainties argue for taking budget cuts by reducing active force structure rather than research, development, modernization, the quality of our manpower, or certain aspects of readiness (e.g., readiness for various limited contingencies). This is contrary to current trends in the DoD, especially in the services. How much to cut? That depends on threat and budget levels, but it is not absurd to consider paring back to, say, 12 active divisions if and only if reductions in threat warrant it (with comparable cuts to the other Services). We are not sanguine that circumstances will warrant more than modest cuts, but we should be prepared to make them, while attempting to maintain and strengthen the reserves and related mobility assets.

Second, some comments about the nuclear component of strategy. In our view, the nuclear component of deterrence will remain extremely important, regardless of the outcome of CFE. However, the most important component of extended deterrence is the overarching fear of general nuclear war. Although the United States would surely prefer a broad range of TNF improvements (Lance modernization, etc.), we believe the United
States should be more cautious about alliance devisiveness and less hard-over on the
details of our TNF posture. The President should be slowly encouraged to modify his
stance on TNF, which is more rigid than can be justified by military or deterrence-theory
analysis. The United States should introduce new options such as increased visibility for
the SLBM component of SACEUR's nuclear force and multilateral offshore options. We
should emphasize "theater-relevant nuclear forces" rather than theater nuclear forces, and
conduct regular military exercises in which SLBMs and other "central forces" are used in a
strictly limited manner so as to change perceptions about what is credible. There is a
belief strongly held by political scientists to the effect that one must deter TNF with TNF,
but the basis for that belief is dubious and results based on war gaming and decision
modeling do not support it (Davis, unpublished). It may be that self deterrence is more
likely if one has to use central systems for limited theater-nuclear applications, but that
also is something that can be affected, at least in degree, by exercises, doctrine, and
planning.

It follows also from our discussion of the core environment that the part of our
national security "business" that deals with nonstandard contingencies has been
neglected—the stepchild problem we mentioned at the outset. However, to spend more
time and money on such contingencies it will probably be necessary to reduce—
somewhat—what is expended in preparation for general war. As part of this reorientation
in terms of missions and capabilities, we should specifically seek changes that would make
the military forces more useful in peacetime roles. This would presumably involve
engineering units, language-trained specialists, emergency action teams, and medical
teams. It might also involve educational experts, since the DoD is a world leader in
educating and training people with diverse, and often underprivileged, backgrounds.

ENVIRONMENT-SHAPING STRATEGY

Figure 7 discusses our environment-shaping strategy for Europe, beginning with
controversial objectives quite different from the more passive damage-limiting objectives
usually assumed. We believe that we have opportunities and the United States should try
to be on the right side of history, indeed molding that history. From a security viewpoint,
the key is getting the Russians as much out of Europe as possible—while avoiding
catastrophes and establishing a sound post-CFE regime. Interestingly, if we succeed, a
new objective will arise: the objective of deterring Russian reentry. Today, almost no one
would run even small risks of general war to protect Eastern European states, but the
situation would be different if the Russians were mostly gone but thinking about returning.
First, for NATO this return might restore the highly adverse military balance of the last several decades. Second, by the time of a reentry crisis, there would probably be closer social ties between Eastern and Western Europe, and some Western European states would be very concerned about their neighbors' dilemma. Also, what national leader would want to be part of "giving Eastern Europe to the Russians the second time"?

Prescriptively, the United States should be a leader in the CFE process and parallel activities. We should be seen by our European allies as concerned ultimately about their well-being rather than as an impediment to normalization. By "giving" the Europeans something they want (i.e., a more normalized Europe), however, we should be able to bargain for a rational post-CFE security environment. This means zero-basing the location of national forces, command-control, the details of operational strategy, and so forth. Further, it means sensible stabilizing measures in CFE. In the realm of military strategy, it means developing a variety of relatively detailed political-military contingency plans, well in advance, for actions in crisis to deter Soviet reentry. This, in turn, might affect the military posture we seek.

**ENVIRONMENT-SHAPING STRATEGIES**

- **Set as major objectives:**
  - "Managing" Soviet military withdrawal (partial or complete) from Eastern Europe
  - Assuring a militarily sound post-CFE NATO force posture
  - Managing well the transition to a much enhanced European role
  - Deterring Soviet reentry **New objectives**

- **Take lead in CFE and the forging of sound post-CFE security structure**

  *Sometimes, things must change in order that they stay the same*

- **Refine CFE agreements with "stabilizing measures," without which:**
  - Short-mob scenario has NOT gone away
  - Force-generation asymmetries could be severe
  - Larger reductions (e.g., to 50% of NATO's current levels) would be dangerous

- **Plan explicitly to deter Soviet reentry** in the post-CFE era

Fig. 7
ENVIRONMENT SHAPING STRATEGY, CONT'D

- Maintain balance of power in East Asia; maintain U.S. influence:
  - Dampen Japanese (and Chinese) incentives to rearm is primary, more important than Japanese increasing defense burden
  - Integrate U.S. and Japanese force operations
- Take measures to avoid shocks:
  - Initiate arms control regime in Korea? Offer superpower guarantees?
  - Create new command-control structure in Korea (extract U.S.)
  - Preemptively eliminate nuclear weapons from surface ships (maintain redeployment option, but increase role of SLBMs and bombers)
  - Seek new access / basing arrangements to reduce perceived Filipino leverage

Fig. 8

For the Far East, our most important environment-shaping objective is to maintain a balance of power with the United States continuing to have the stabilizing role and the influence that buys. If we must choose between having the Japanese increase further their defense burden and discouraging rearmament, the tilt should be toward avoiding their rearmament. Increased Japanese spending does not translate simply into decreased United States spending, although it does reduce United States influence. Further, the Japanese industrial base is well-suited for a rapid rearmament. A danger here is incremental rearmament. For example, aircraft carriers justified for air defense would have inherent power-projection capability.

A major objective here is to avoid shocks. We suggest a number of measures. For example, we propose an arms control regime for Korea, a mechanism for slowly winding down the hostilities and backing the sides away from war readiness. This has not been adequately studied and might require measures such as superpower guarantees to both North and South Korea. Less radically, we recommend restructuring Korean command-control so as to remove the United States from a conspicuous and potentially inflammatory
role that is more resented by South Korean young people than generally recognized by Americans (the United States is assumed to support repressive measures using Korean forces).

Preemptively removing surface-ship nuclear missiles would remove a prime target for anti-United States political groups and have little effect on core capabilities. Nuclear deterrence is not much of an issue currently in the Far East, but exercises and doctrine could be tailored to make use of other weapon systems credible (e.g., B-52s, SLBMss, and SLCMs). Further, redeployment of theater nuclear weapons would be possible if necessary.

Finally, developing new access arrangements would both provide us hedges and reduce Filipino perceptions about the degree to which they can call the shots on bases.

A few words are necessary about Latin America even though we have given it short shrift in our study. Latin America is a problem for United States strategymaking. It continues not to loom so large as Europe or even the Far East, even though it is in our own hemisphere. We have long taken for granted the relative stability on our own border with Mexico and the absence of shooting wars in Central and South America requiring large-scale United States intervention. Complacency seems inappropriate. On the other hand, it is not evident that there is a large role for the DoD in dealing with the recurrent problems of that region, many of which are fundamentally political and economic. Drug issues may be an exception. Figure 9 lists possible measures of a more fundamental nature. Again, however, we have not addressed these matters in depth.
ENVIRONMENT-SHAPING STRATEGIES, CONT'D

- Improve Latin American political stability with diversified and improved economies:
  - Increase professionalization of military with civilian control
  - Build consensus for intervention against states sponsoring narcotics or terrorism, or conducting aggression against neighbors
  - Consider ending "benign-neglect" period and starting high-morale alliance-for-progress-like strategy, possibly tying debt-crisis relief with security objectives

Fig. 9

HEDGING STRATEGY

Transitioning to hedge strategy, there are numerous items to consider as indicated in Fig. 10. First, it would be highly desirable to strengthen our capabilities for mobilization. Given modern technology this should be more feasible than in the past, since much production can now be software-controlled and there are many potential sources among our Far Eastern allies for critical parts. This is a chronically underdeveloped aspect of United States capabilities.

The second item hedges against success in recognition that past demobilizations have usually been extremely unpleasant, with many mistakes and dislocations that might have been mitigated by prior economic planning and prior orchestration of measures to protect reserves and mobilization capabilities.

The phrase "Mobile FOFA" in the third item is not quite right, since in lesser contingencies we would not be attacking large-scale follow-on echelons, but the basic imagery is correct. These capabilities could be useful in many contingencies and could compensate, in deterrent terms, for our inability to deploy large numbers of forces quickly.
The fourth item is self-evident. The fifth item is controversial. There is increasing sensitivity to the hypothetical threat of Japanese rearmament, but there is little detailed knowledge to inform discussion. Suppose, for example, that between 2000 and 2010 the Japanese fielded a much more capable and modern navy with power projection capability, offensive capability against other fleets, and so on. What could the United States have done in R&D, technology transfer, and modernization that would assure maintaining clear superiority? This deserves attention, even though military problems with the Japanese remain unlikely and highly undesirable.

The last item deserves priority, because the related contingencies could arise much sooner than we expect. We have in mind here thinking through in some detail the pol-mil "game" of working solely with the FRG in crises involving the GDR and the Soviet Union as a minimum.

**FIG. 10**

**GENERIC ELEMENTS OF HEDGING STRATEGIES**

- Strengthen military and military-industrial mobilization
- **Develop plans for rapid demobilization in event CFE “takes off”**
- **Develop operational forces specialized for rapid deployment of massive conventional firepower** (mobile FCFA, but not necessarily for interdicting next-echelon forces)
- Seek **new access and basing opportunities**
- **Conduct off-design planning exercises for next century assuming Japan becomes major military competitor**
- **Develop options for limited FRG/US protection-reaction steps in event of threatened Soviet reentry**

Figure 11 list repeats some earlier items and will be refined in our subsequent work. Let us comment here on only two of them:
• In the TNF realm, we are concerned about the political trend toward exclusive dependence on air-delivered weapons (TASMs) on a relatively few vulnerable bases. We should be pursuing alternatives. Harriers are an interesting option, as suggested by RAND's Peter Wilson, because they would not require deployment early in crisis. The offshore options include not only increased dependence on and exercising of SLBM and SLCM as theater-relevant nuclear weapons, but also new options for multilateral nuclear forces (e.g., on surface ships or submarines).

• Deterring chemical use against United States forces in limited contingencies is a special and important issue. It is complex, in part because the mindsets of potential adversaries are different from our own (e.g., Quaddafi). Other problems include the longstanding dislike of chemical programs by the Congress and American public and the possibility that retaliatory chemical use of a sort that might plausibly be approved would not always be an effective deterrent because the first user would have a unique advantage. As one hedge here, we suggest developing operational capabilities to use precision standoff weapons with conventional munitions against "value targets" of potential adversaries. These might include power stations and grids, specialized oil facilities, and a variety of other targets that have not previously been considered relevant.

SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF HEDGING STRATEGIES

• Mobile FOF (or, better, mobile units with capability for maneuvering massive amounts of firepower accurately and into considerable depth)
• Rapidly deployable C3I capability (e.g., USAF's Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center deployable in EC-130s)
• Harrier and offshore options for TNF
• Strategic mobility for rapid redeployment (e.g., more fast sealift)
• Plans and capabilities for dramatic conventional retaliation for chemical use against U.S. or allied forces (e.g., against economic targets in enemy homeland)
• Across the board: protect R&D and modernization

Fig. 11
IV. CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this paper has been to set the stage for more extended discussions. A few of the more important hypotheses offered have been the following:

- United States and Western European interests will change as Eastern Europe becomes increasingly detached from the Soviet Union, especially if the CFE process or unilateral equivalents result in large-scale withdrawals of Soviet forces. If the Soviets should then consider reentering Eastern Europe in force to reestablish their controls, it will be in the interest of the NATO nations to deter that reentry—even, perhaps, at considerable risk. This seems unimaginable today but may within a few years become a commonplace.

- The military security of Western Europe will be strongly dependent on the details of any CFE agreement and associated unilateral measures, including especially details affecting relative force-generation potential and the percentage of Pact forces that are Soviet. If a second CFE agreement involves reductions well below NATO’s current levels (e.g., 50%), security may be enhanced or worsened relative to that obtaining at parity at NATO’s current levels. This will depend on details of NATO’s post-CFE force posture and the sides’ relative ability to generate forces for war in Western Europe if they are willing to draw on out-of-area forces.

- Nuclear deterrence will remain fundamental to overall deterrence, perhaps even more so as the force levels in Europe are reduced. Given public attitudes, however, a new approach will be necessary for extended deterrence. More efforts should be expended on expanding and making credible the use of central systems in theater warfare (replacing the concept of theater nuclear forces with theater-relevant nuclear forces) and on developing alternative theater nuclear forces such as multilateral offshore systems and survivable on-continent forces such as rapidly dispersible aircraft (e.g., Harriers).

- The principal task in the Far East is to maintain its current stability and trends. Avoiding shocks should be a priority objective and the United States should consider preemptively defusing a number of problems involving Korea, nuclear weapons on surface ships, and existing base arrangements. It is worthwhile to contemplate moving slowly toward new security arrangements for the Far East that would build around a set of mutual interests that might bind friendly Pacific nations together for many decades.

- Although no general or mid-level wars appear likely in the next ten years, smaller nonstandard contingencies remain highly plausible, although thresholds for intervention are increasing.

- This is an excellent period for the United States to focus attention on improving its capabilities and competence for nonstandard contingencies worldwide. This will require specialized weapons, training, and command-control arrangements, as well as more extensive gaming and simulation.
• This is an excellent period for the United States to emphasize research, development, innovative prototypes and experiments, and high readiness for relatively small nonstandard contingencies. If budget cuts occur, active force structure is a far better candidate than it has been in the past, especially if events in Europe justify the United States reducing its commitment there.

• It is also a period in which it will be important, albeit difficult, for the United States to increase its reliance upon and the competence of reserve forces. Even in the most hopeful of scenarios, in which short mobilization Soviet threats to Europe and the Persian Gulf are drastically reduced (e.g., those involving weeks rather than months), severe long-mobilization threats will remain and the United States has historically found it difficult to prepare for large-scale force generation measured in months.

In general, the strategy described in this paper encourages the United States to be proactive, forward looking, optimistic, and innovative—in both its foreign relations and its development of defense capabilities. Great changes are on the horizon, and the United States should be shaping those changes in accord with our long-term interests.