



A Community-Based, Focused-Deterrence Approach to Closing Overt Drug Markets

A Process and Fidelity Evaluation of Seven Sites

Appendix G

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This project was supported by Award No. 2010-DJ-BX-1672, awarded by the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Justice.

Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.

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Overview

For this process evaluation, we collected data from a number of sources using a variety of methods (e.g., site visits, interviews with all of the team members, and observation of Bureau of Justice Assistance [BJA] trainings, conducted by Michigan State University [MSU]). The RAND evaluation team hired on-site data collection coordinators, typically graduate students, at each of the seven sites: Zachary Bryan, Robert Farley, Viola (Simone) May, Michael McCloskey, Alexis Norris, Mary Perrilloux, and Robert Stallings.

These coordinators spent approximately one day a week observing implementation at each site (which ranged from six to 15 months, depending on the site). Each on-site data collection coordinator was local to the area and chosen with input from each local team to increase acceptance. Under the supervision of RAND evaluation team members, the on-site data collection coordinators recorded objective fidelity measures of implementation processes of the BJA strategy to reduce overt drug markets (inspired by the High Point Drug Market Intervention) and systematically elicited subjective feedback from team members on treatment integrity and implementation problems.

Earlier versions of these site reports were sent to the sites and their feedback was considered—and, in some cases, led to changes. The larger process evaluation is based on information from a variety of sources; the site reports presented here are just one source.

Abbreviations

BJA	Bureau of Justice Assistance
DMI	drug market intervention
FACT	Flint Area Congregation Together
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FPD	Flint Police Department
GED	General Educational Development
GIS	geographic information system
HHS	Department of Health and Human Services
MSP	Michigan State Police
MSU	Michigan State University
HMIS	Homeless Managing Information System
JSO	Jacksonville Sheriff's Office
MOU	memorandum of understanding
NOPD	New Orleans Police Department
POC	point of contact
RICO	Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
TAP	Total Action for Progress
YEP	Youth Empowerment Program

1. Flint, Michigan

Status

The Flint team completed all phases of the High Point-inspired intervention it was exposed to at the BJA trainings and held a total of three call-ins during our observation window.

Motivation for the Intervention

The program in Flint went through a few iterations and rebranding over the past few years—starting as FLINT Ceasefire and evolving into Flint Lifelines. Team members attended the training and incorporated what they learned into their already evolving plans to create a program tailored to their unique needs and strengths.

Efforts to control the growing violent crime problem have been hampered by the significant decline in the city budget over the past decade and the corresponding reduction in the size of the police force. According to the Flint Police Department (FPD), the economic challenges and budget restrictions led Flint to become more strategic in its approach to responding to and reducing violent crimes in the community by using data-driven crime analysis and developing community collaborations. Budget restrictions have created difficulties even within these strategic efforts, including the challenge of developing and regularly analyzing data from their crime information system. A Project Safe Neighborhood grant that the FPD counted on in its fight against crime no longer received funding. As a result, the department did not have extra help to lend to special projects. Before implementation of the intervention, the police recognized that they might have to embark on the efforts with no extra staff available to dedicate to the effort.

Discussion of implementing a new crime prevention strategy in Flint began when members of the Flint Area Congregation Together (FACT) went to the mayor and city council to suggest they try the program. Although skeptical of the potential of the drug market intervention (DMI) to turn around the lives of drug dealers, the police chief also pushed for Flint's involvement in the program because he saw it as a way to get the community involved in its own protection and clean-up. Others expressed skepticism about the program because the department had previously tried many other programs with little success; however, these individuals were hopeful because they wanted to see a change in the community.

At the time of this push for a new strategy to address crime, several individuals were also recommending adopting the Ceasefire model, another focused deterrence approach to reducing

crime.¹ After receiving BJA funding for the training, the team decided to refer to the program as “FLINT Ceasefire” instead of the DMI, mainly because the team found the “Ceasefire” name to be appealing. Although they eventually changed the name of the program to Flint Lifeline, the intervention was referred to as FLINT Ceasefire throughout the first implementation.

The team was fairly large, consisting of members of the FPD; the local prosecutor; members of the Michigan State Police (MSP); members of the local U.S. Attorney’s Office; representatives from the City of Flint, including the mayor and members of the city council; representatives from a variety of social service agencies; the probation department; representatives from local schools; representatives from local churches; and representatives from other local government agencies (e.g., City of Flint Human Relations Commission, City of Flint Department of Human Services). In total, representatives from 21 organizations attended the meetings, either on a regular or semiregular basis, and another seven agencies agreed to participate in the intervention but did not attend the team meetings. The implementation team was able to garner signed memoranda of understanding (MOUs) from 16 social service agencies willing to serve B-listers.

Phase I: Planning for the Intervention

On May 24, 2010, Flint officials publically announced the establishment of the program. The public announcement was made in the hope of assuring the community that the local government was taking steps to address crime in the area. Although the media expressed skepticism about whether the program would have a significant impact on area crime, the media reports covered the previous success of the DMI in High Point, North Carolina, and Ceasefire programs in other cities such as Boston and Chicago.

Once plans to participate in the intervention were finalized, the implementation team was anxious to proceed so it could reach out to the community with news of a new program that would address some of Flint’s crime problems. Team members reported being under pressure to get this initiative off the ground quickly, despite the fact that they had received no formal training on any of the proposed programs and were still considering various elements of the Ceasefire and Cure Violence programs from Boston and Chicago, respectively. Very early in the process, even before attending any of the Michigan State University (MSU) training sessions, the team set a call-in date for December 2010. Although team members were enthusiastic in their efforts, several issues impeded their ability to conduct the call-in and it was rescheduled for April 2011.

After attending the first MSU training session in March 2011, team members realized they were not ready to conduct the call-in in April. They learned that there were a number of recommended steps that they still needed to complete before the call-in, including the

¹ Ceasefire uses many of the same concepts as the DMI with the goal of reducing gun violence. It was piloted in Boston in the 1990s. (“Operation Ceasefire: Boston Gun Project,” undated).

development of a systematic approach to identify the call-in candidates. After attending the first training session, team members reached consensus about how to proceed and began studying the training step-by-step guide to make sure they put the recommended steps in place before holding the call-in. The call-in was rescheduled again, this time for July 2011—a full year and a half after the first scheduled call-in, but still before the training was complete.

Because of the long lag time between the original announcement and the call-in, the media, as well as members of the community interviewed in the articles, criticized the program for the delay in implementation. In addition, several articles criticized the program for not communicating what specific outcomes the community could expect (Angus, 2010; Heller, 2010). Despite voicing criticism, the articles almost always agreed that new strategies to address crime were sorely needed and expressed hope that FLINT Ceasefire would be successful.

Phase II: Targeting the Drug Market

The team identified the Second Ward, an area in northwest Flint, as the target area. The western border of the target area has a number of gas stations, fast-food restaurants, and other commercial activity. There is also a large garden apartment complex that is in decline and has a number of vacant units. By and large, however, the area consists primarily of single-family homes, occupied, according to police, by a mix of owners and renters. Nine in ten residents are African-American and most are poor, elderly, or both. Many homes are boarded up; there are also empty lots, and whole vacant blocks where homes have been torn down. According to the FPD, the target area was chosen through an analysis of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Part I crimes and selection of the area that was the “darkest red,” meaning it had one of the highest concentrations of Part I index crimes in Flint. The crime analysis also showed the target area to be one of the most-active drug markets in the city. The team did not identify a discrete market within this area; rather, it designated the entire ward to be the target zone.

According to the police, the main drugs sold in the area at the time were cocaine and heroin. Heroin customers were thought to be mostly outsiders, while cocaine was sold to locals and people from outside the neighborhood. The police believed that the majority of drug sales occurred inside some of the abandoned houses throughout the neighborhood.

The team was unable to survey police officers to identify active drug dealers in the target area due to the fact that the FPD had so few officers and the officers did not have their own beats. The FPD set up a hotline for community members to report drug dealing but indicated that no one called it. The team was also unable to rely on undercover informants. Therefore, the police were forced to rely on what they were able to observe through undercover buys conducted by their own officers. There were a number of difficulties conducting the investigations, including the timing. According to the FPD, “there aren’t many people out on the streets making deals in four feet of snow.” Additionally, the decline in the police force further complicated matters; there were only four to six officers to devote to the intervention.

Finally, the drug market operations in the city also made investigations difficult. The FPD believed dealers in the targeted area often moved around to other markets in the city. Also, they reported that Detroit gang members were mainly responsible for much of the narcotics operation in Flint, setting up the supply chain and then hiring locals to handle the street-level transactions. When police activity intensified in one area, dealers would relocate to other places to continue their work.

Despite these difficulties, the FPD was able to gather enough evidence on more than 20 individuals to proceed with the program, although they reported that they “missed” some dealers who should have been on both the A-list and B-list. Once candidates had been identified, law enforcement members of the implementation team decided who should be placed on the A-list or the B-list. It was decided that individuals who had a violent criminal history would be placed on the A-list. There was not always consensus by the law enforcement team as to who should be included on the B-list. Some members of the team thought they should let individuals caught with guns participate in the call-in as long as they did not have prior felonies or violent criminal histories; others disagreed. Eventually, the team decided who was to be included on the B-list on a case-by-case basis; seven individuals were eventually placed on the B-list.

Phase III: Working with the Community

As mentioned previously, very early in the process, several announcements about the roll-out of FLINT Ceasefire were made within the community. The team also hosted several community meetings throughout the year before the call-in to educate the public about the project. At one of these meetings, held on July 13, 2010, the High Point police chief who oversaw the first DMI program was a guest speaker. According to media reports, about 250 people attended.

As the call-in date set for July 2011 began to approach, the team also organized two town hall meetings to mobilize the community. The first was held on June 30, 2011, at a church in Flint. The meeting lasted for several hours and included about 65 target area residents. The second town hall meeting was held directly before the call-in on July 14, 2011. Approximately 125 members of the community signed in at the meeting, but according to team members, even more attended. There was more media coverage for the second town hall meeting, as newspaper reporters and ABC 12 Flint covered the event live.

Before the call-in, the team went door to door within the targeted area to describe the project and ask residents to get involved. Residents were encouraged to call either the police or a member of the implementation team with information about drug sales or other crimes. About six community leaders and police officers participated in this effort. One of the pastors on the implementation team also made announcements at churches. Other implementation team members reported asking their pastors to make announcements, as well as putting up fliers about the town hall meeting on church bulletin boards. The team also sent out media blurbs before the town hall meetings and the call-in.

Phase IV: Preparing for the Call-In

The first call-in was held on July 21, 2011. The call-in was conducted in three phases: (1) a community forum for members of the community and the B-listers, (2) a call-in phase for the B-listers and their family/support members, and (3) a social services phase to conduct an initial intake with B-listers who chose to participate in the program.

The team decided to hold the call-in at a community center, which contained separate rooms for each of the three phases. The general meeting, which the team referred to as the “community forum,” was held on a basketball court that could accommodate a large group of people. The call-in phase with the B-listers and their families was held in a separate, smaller room at the center. Finally, a third room was devoted to meetings with service providers.

The team decided to hold a press conference the day after the call-in, which they hoped would keep the community informed and would demonstrate that they had followed through on their promises.

Days before the call-in, invitation letters were delivered by hand to the candidate dealers or, more frequently, to their family members. The team reported that family members seemed very responsive to the invitations, and most said they would be at the call-in and would make sure the candidates attended as well.

Although a number of social service agencies were on board with the program, the implementation team selected one—One Stop House Resource Center—to be present at the call-in to do an initial assessment of the participants’ needs. It was decided that the participants would be contacted after the call-in to conduct a complete assessment. Also present at the call-in were the Metro Community Development program and the Boys and Girls Club, which offered bus passes and free memberships to the candidates. Community turnout was high, with more than 95 individuals in the audience. Six of the seven B-listers attended.

Meetings were set up with the participants for the following week so the social service providers could fully evaluate what services were needed. The next day, the team held a press conference to inform the community about what happened during the call-in and to outline the next steps for the B-listers who agreed to participate in the program.

Phase V: After the Call-In

Enforcement. Law enforcement reported that they did not have the manpower to conduct strict enforcement in the area after the call-in. Police officers reported doing the best they could to stay active in the area and conducting initiatives when they had the time. Both before and after the call-in, the MSP had extra cars patrolling the area. MSP officers conducted stops to look for guns but were not exclusively to team activities. The FPD also was unable to give priority to calls for service from the targeted area, again due to manpower issues. Members of the community were able to contact one of the team members about maintenance issues within the

area (e.g., street lights out, graffiti, unkempt yards), and the team member said he would forward their concerns to the appropriate city department.

B-Lister Follow-Up. Ultimately, the Flint team included individuals in the B-list with more serious criminal histories than had been the case in other DMI communities, including weapons charges. As a consequence, they modified the model to require B-listers to participate in programming after the call-in. Four of the six B-listers who attended the call-in ultimately chose not participate. To assist in apprehending nonparticipants, law enforcement conducted one search per week, and the fugitive and road patrols sections were alerted of the search. The team also arranged for nonparticipants to be featured on “Fugitive Files,” a television program that runs every Monday in the area. Nonparticipants were also featured in the Crime Stoppers section of the newspaper.

Ultimately, all offenders who did not enter the program were arrested. Upon arrest, nonparticipants were arraigned and released on bail. Following these events, team members expressed concern that the program was not “showing teeth” because the arrested individuals were quickly back on the streets. Law enforcement members said this could not be avoided because if B-listers could make bail, the police could not hold them indefinitely before their court date.

During team meetings, members also often expressed concern that when nonparticipating B-listers were arrested, the judges would not give the B-listers tough sentences. The team originally had a prosecutor on board who was supposed to handle all cases related to the intervention. By the time of the call-in, however, the district attorney’s office did not assign all cases to the designated prosecutor.

After the call-in, the team created a review board to determine how to measure participants’ success and how to deal with noncompliance issues. This committee was made up of a smaller group of individuals from the implementation team. The review board decided that for participants to stay in the program, they would have to (1) have no new drug offenses or violent offenses during the review period, (2) check in with a member of the review board every Monday before noon to give an update on how they were doing, and (3) complete drug and alcohol screenings. Although the team was unsure as to whether it would be able to actually conduct drug and alcohol tests with the B-listers, team members decided to keep this requirement in the hope that the threat of potential testing would deter B-listers from substance use. Noncompliant participants would be terminated from program and services. The team decided to provide the B-listers with a one-year timeline to comply.

Community. Following the call-in, the implementation team organized two main events with the target community; however, these events were somewhat delayed. The implementation team did not realize the importance of following up within the community until after attending the third training session, which occurred after the first Flint call-in.

The first event organized by the team involved a park clean-up, which was held on October 24, 2011, approximately three months after the call-in. The team reported that about 20 people

from the community came out to aid in the clean-up. The community outreach group organized a second event a week later that it called “Trunk or Treat,” an event on Halloween at the same park where the team had held the clean-up event. According to the team, dozens of people showed up. The team reported that the community responded positively to the event. The FPD sergeant showed up at this event, and the team was again pleased to have the police present in a positive manner, handing out candy to kids.

The team also attempted to connect with the community by attending various other events not organized by the implementation team. For example, a prayer vigil was held for three children who were killed, and members of the Ceasefire team attended. One of the faith-based representatives reported giving a presentation at a church about the program and giving out brochures to the congregation. At the weekly implementation meetings, announcements were also made about various events in the community; for example, a “walk down crime and violence march,” in which team members were encouraged to participate.

Despite these efforts, members of the team often expressed concern during the weekly meetings that they were not connecting with the community enough and asserted that they needed to do more. Some felt that team members needed at least to communicate with the community to tell residents what they had already done and where they currently stood.

Additional Call-Ins. By summer 2013, the Flint team had conducted two additional call-ins. Because law enforcement experienced difficulties gathering intelligence on potential candidates for the first call-in, the second round was conducted in the original target area, Flint’s Second Ward. Following the second call-in, all four B-listers invited to the call-in renounced drug dealing and entered the program.

The third-round target area was expanded to the edges of the second ward to increase the pool of B-listers. Of the four B-listers invited to the third call-in, only one attended, subsequently agreeing to participate in the program. As of September 2013, all five B-listers in the second and third rounds continued to participate in the program. The team planned to continue implementing the intervention on a continual basis, with the goal of conducting a call-in every four to six months.

In subsequent rounds of the intervention, the team made an effort to improve aspects of the process it felt were lacking during the first implementation. The team created written plans for key components of activities after the call-in to facilitate quickly getting back out into the community after a call-in. The team also created a written plan for service providers. The resulting community outreach implementation plan put together steps for tracking volunteers, doing community outreach for residents, promoting resident/neighborhood empowerment, conducting Flint Lifelines member assessments, and assigning specific tasks for community outreach subcommittee members. The service provider plan includes provisions for reviewing and renewing the MOUs in place before every call-in, securing new MOUs, scheduling regular meetings with the service providers for updates, creating a case management tool for agencies that are not linked to the Homeless Managing Information System (HMIS) system, and

confirming the follow-up process for each service provider so they know the time frame of the program and the expected outcome.

The team also put a plan in place to ensure that B-listers were contacted immediately following future call-ins.

Finally, the court's lack of follow-through with the threatened punishment toward the first round nonparticipants highlighted the need to ensure that prosecutors and judges are on board with the program. Therefore, the team scheduled meetings with the district attorney to garner their cooperation, and have had representatives from the prosecutor's office attend the team meetings.

Remarks

The team in Flint was consistently aware of budgetary issues and demonstrated creativity in moving the program forward in spite of financial obstacles. Members continued to plan program efforts that would work within their budgetary constraints and to leverage current resources to the extent possible. During meetings, team members spoke about the need to get the faith-based community more involved in engaging and mentoring the probation/parolee population and to establish relationships with other like-minded organizations. They also decided that they needed to form a fundraising committee and come up with a fundraising plan in case they do not receive outside funding to continue the program. The team applied for several grants to offset the costs of the program and assist with its manpower needs. However, team proposals were not funded. Law enforcement, particularly, expressed discouragement at not receiving funding, because they need money to hire more officers and get updated surveillance equipment.

The Flint team faced multiple challenges throughout the first implementation of the intervention. The team reported a great deal of pressure to move forward with the program without full preparation or complete knowledge of the steps. Delays of more than a year in holding the call-in following the first media announcement about the DMI in Flint led to distrust from both the media and area residents. Pushing forward with the program without a full understanding of the program resulted in skipped or incomplete steps throughout the process.

While law enforcement was fully committed to the process, lack of manpower and resources within FPD hindered the targeting and follow-up processes. As a result, the FPD felt it was not able to identify all key candidates within the target area, nor were they able to prioritize calls for service or patrolling in the area after the call-in. While the district attorney's office was initially supportive of the program, budgetary issues prevented it from being able to assign a special prosecutor to handle all intervention-related cases as originally planned. As a result, some of the prosecutors assigned to these cases did not know about the intervention and pled out the cases for lower sentences. These issues likely diluted the impact of the both the targeting and maintenance stages of the process.

The team needed to think creatively to overcome numerous implementation difficulties, and the overabundance of ideas may have distracted them from the program “recipe.” The resulting program, Flint Lifelines, became a blend of the DMI and other program components that the team felt were more appropriate for their communities. Therefore, their implementation of the intervention did not strictly follow the model on which they were trained.

Since the team started the intervention before the official trainings, the team did not complete all of the steps in sequential order; rather, the team went back to retroactively complete some of the steps after learning more about the intervention at the trainings. The team also chose an unusually large area to target, approximately one square mile, against the advice of the TTA providers. Such a large target area, combined with the lack of resources to conduct undercover investigations, leads to questions as to whether the team was able to identify a specific drug market, completely target all major dealers, and identify lower-level players involved in drug dealing in the area. Finally, other steps were skipped. For example, the team was unable to survey the target area to identify A-listers and B-listers; instead, the lists were compiled from existing warrants.

While the team continued to reflect on past performance and adjust program elements accordingly, aspects of Flint’s program still did not align with the standard protocol. Of particular issue was the initial identification of candidates. Across implementations, the team did not keep track of the people arrested during undercover buys who were not candidates for the program. Therefore, these individuals were not specially handled as A-lister candidates and instead received normal treatment by the court system.

One of the innovative changes the team made was to track the B-listers. The team developed a systematic way to track the services used by current and future B-listers by adding the intervention program as a service provider within the HMIS, a database used in Michigan that allows service providers to track services by provider or by individual.

One of the major positive lessons to be learned from Flint is that creativity and ingenuity can be used to overcome budgetary and manpower issues. The team was also extremely motivated and enthusiastic about conducting Flint Lifelines within the community. The team held regular meetings, which were very well attended, and Flint was among the few sites to procure MOUs from service organizations from the outset. The team was also very willing to reflect on its past performance and worked to improve performance on future implementations of the program. When asked how Lifelines was able to sustain over the years with the lack of resources and constant turnover, team members credited their strong commitment to the community and improving community safety. Many of the people who attended the weekly team meetings did so voluntarily during their lunch hour. One individual said team members also use connections they have or leveraged resources through their workplaces to help make up for the lack of resources. They are always looking for grants or other funding opportunities.

2. Guntersville, Alabama

Status

The Guntersville team completed all phases of the High Point-inspired intervention it was exposed to at the BJA trainings.

Motivation for the Intervention

Interest in DMI stemmed from the failure of traditional law enforcement tactics to make a permanent dent in the drug and crime problems in the community. According to team members, arrests of individual sellers had not had much effect on the market for illicit drugs, and an effort to work cooperatively with the community to reclaim a park used by drug sellers was unsuccessful because the community never took ownership of the project. Interest in DMI began when the prosecution member of the core team escorted home a young boy he mentors within the target area. Not far from the boy's home, the team member witnessed a drug transaction occurring in the open. This occurrence was the catalyst for researching programs and applying for grants to implement a program. Guntersville did not ultimately receive any additional funds; rather, existing resources were used to support DMI-related activities.

Phase I: Planning for the Intervention

The intervention in Guntersville enjoyed support at the highest levels of local government. An initial kick-off meeting was held in the fall of 2011, attended by the mayor, city attorney, an FBI special agent in charge, a representative of the U.S. Attorney's Office, and the district attorney. The intervention working group in Guntersville consisted of the district attorney, the police chief, a lieutenant heading narcotics investigations, a representative from the Marshall County Court Referral Services, and the pastor of a local church. The team held regular meetings approximately every three weeks leading up to the call-in, and fairly regular meetings after the call-in. The team did not get MOUs from participating organizations or produce written implementation plans.

Phase II: Targeting the Drug Market

The Guntersville team members came to the table already having identified their target neighborhood because they said it was the only overt drug market in their jurisdiction. The police narcotics unit surveyed residents of the Lakeview Community to identify drug offenders. Although the team acknowledged that more information from the community would have been helpful, narcotics officers were able to build cases against a number of individuals. To gather intelligence, the police department conducted undercover buys and videotaped the transactions.

According to the team, three-quarters of the residents of the six-by-seven-block area are African-American. Community members span a broad age range, and most residents rent their homes or live in a housing authority building. There are six churches in the target area, as well as a community park, where numerous events, programs, and gatherings occur. The Guntersville Public Library sits just outside the target area and holds numerous events for residents throughout the year.

The community park in the target area is well known for illicit drug activity and other types of criminal behavior. Historically, relationships between community residents and the police have been strained. Residents have expressed a high degree of distrust against law enforcement, and two well-publicized lawsuits were filed against the police for excessive force incidents and civil rights violations from October 2008 to May 2011 (Moore v. Guntersville, 2011).

The core team decided upon the criteria for distinguishing between A-list candidates and B-list candidates. To be considered a B-lister, a candidate had to have little to no history of violent behavior and no felonies. The team also established a few less-objective criteria for B-lister status, which included having a history of cooperating with the police and appearing to the team as if he or she would benefit from the program. Conversely, individuals were categorized as A-listers if they had previously expressed extremely negative attitudes toward law enforcement and had not shown a proclivity to be helped by the program. Seventeen individuals were on the initial A-list and six on the B-list (a handful of potential A-listers were arrested before the program, and were thus not part of the final A-list). At the time of the categorization, three A-listers had already been indicted. The team decided that the remaining A-listers would be indicted shortly before the call-in. The preference was for prosecuting the A-listers. However, in consultation with the U.S. Attorney's Office, the team determined that prosecution at the state or federal level would depend upon the quantity of drugs seized.

Phase III: Working with the Community

Because of the tension between some residents and law enforcement, enlisting community involvement was perceived to be a challenging task and community mobilization efforts greatly benefited from technical assistance support from previous DMI sites. The plan for enlisting community involvement centered on four churches. The pastor on the team enlisted the cooperation of the other three ministers. Ministers each submitted a list of 15–20 people they felt would be willing to help with community outreach. In a subsequent series of community meetings and events, these opinion leaders tried to overcome the community's historic apathy, fear, and mistrust of the police.

Several of the meetings to enlist community support were held on one day, August 18, 2011. In the first of these meetings, several members of the team met with the Guntersville City Council as well as numerous pastors within and outside of Guntersville city limits. The meeting was held to inform the council and pastors of the program and to ask others to get involved. About 18 individuals attended the meeting, including the four pastors from churches in

Guntersville. According to team members, the meeting was positive and individuals expressed a willingness to help.

The second meeting included officials from charitable organizations. The goal of this meeting was to involve charities that would be able to offer other avenues for B-listers, such as referrals for jobs and other activities. Representatives from several area groups attended the meeting, including someone from a General Educational Development (GED) program, Cooperative Extension, the Guntersville attorney's office, school system, police department, and city council. At the meeting, a short video about DMI was shown, and an individual who participated in implementing DMI in Middletown, Ohio, shared her experience with the process. One of the team members then informed each individual of his or her role and possible ways to help with future plans and decisions.

Later that day, pastors and other members of the community were invited to attend a stakeholder meeting. Team members believed that active members of the community had the capability to influence and change the community and the individuals coming out of the program. The meeting was held at a local church, and approximately 30 people attended. The team emphasized the need for bold, strong, committed community members and emphasized that the intervention was a process, not an event; they explained that it does not promise a complete turnaround, but an improvement. Next, community members gave feedback and shared their concerns, which included relations between police and community members, experiences of harassment, and past encounters with drug dealers.

Following the meeting, the team formed three subcommittees from the 25 stakeholders who attended the meeting: (1) police community relations, which was charged with developing a formal process to begin a dialogue about community relations, assess the concerns of the community and law enforcement, and seek implementation; (2) community assessment, which would assess the needs of the community and create a plan for community development that includes property development, maintenance, and renovations, while also seeking resources to assist with development projects; and (3) community education, which was charged with looking at ties between the community and educational organization, and working to determine and improve the community's educational needs. Team members subsequently held a meeting with each subcommittee chairperson to discuss the purpose of his or her subcommittee. Following the initial meetings, subcommittees held regular meetings to discuss their assigned tasks.

To enlist wider community support, the team held a community meeting on November 28, 2011, attended by approximately 50 individuals. The police chief acknowledged the department's past imperfections and asserted the department's desire and commitment to do better for, listen to, and work with the community. Many residents asked about the police's response to crime and loitering in the park. Community members also expressed interest in creating a neighborhood watch, beautifying the city, and creating a youth center or a Boys and Girls Club. The team was particularly concerned about cleaning up the community to improve the landscape and environment. The team employed several strategies to address neighborhood appearance: It

targeted several houses that were noncompliant with code enforcement and organized a clean-up event, held October 22, 2011.

The team also conducted a community survey to gather information on local residents, including whether they rent or own property, how many children younger than 18 resided in the home, and whether they had any concerns or needs about the community. The survey administrator also took this as an opportunity to tell residents about a new program to reduce crime and violence in Lakeview and gain their support. In response to the survey, many residents reported no concerns, while others described the need for brighter lights, a community center, improvements at the community park, and less traffic on street corners.

Phase IV: Preparing for the Call-In

The call-in date was pushed back several times, mostly because team members felt they needed more time to be fully prepared. The call-in date was finally set for December 13, 2011, at the Guntersville Public Library, just outside the target area.

The team formed a notification group consisting of invested community members who were felt to have the best shot at reaching out to the B-listers and their families and would be able to encourage them to attend the call-in. The original notification team consisted of two pastors within the community. They were able to notify all of the B-listers and/or their families over the course of several days. The team, along with several other police officers, a judge, a representative from the U.S. Attorney's Office, a federal prosecutor, and representatives from United Way and the Guntersville GED program attended the call-in. All six of the B-listers participated, each accompanied by at least three relatives. Approximately 50 community members also attended the call-in.

The meeting began with a description of the intervention. The pastor addressed the B-listers and explained the program and the plan laid out for them if they chose to participate. The supervisor of the U.S. Attorney's Office in Huntsville then gave an overview of the charges and sentences facing the A-listers pictured on the wall. She reminded the candidates of the opportunity to change their lives and live a life outside of prison, unlike the A-listers. The police chief spoke next, asserting that his job was to keep the streets clean and safe. Subsequently, selected community members spoke about their love and support for each of the candidates. Most speakers were religious, so they also spoke about God's love for them and about God's ability to change their lives. Some community members spoke about their family members' involvement with drugs.

The team originally had planned to show the videos taken of the undercover buys with each of the B-listers, but the faith-based team leader announced that, in the spirit of the meeting, they would not be showing the videos. He encouraged participants to speak with the social service providers who were at the meeting. United Way screened B-listers for social service needs, such as drug treatment, employment, GED classes, temporary housing, etc. B-listers were provided

with verbal guidelines for participation, but the team did not require a signature on a written agreement.

Phase V: Post–Call-In

Enforcement. Law enforcement reported prioritizing calls for service to the target area and planned to create a shift captain who would have an open phone line for community members to call when they encountered a problem or have questions. However, they also reported that not all the police officers in the department fully understood the program and that they could have used additional education to prioritize after enforcement.

B-Lister Follow-Up. A week after the call-in, three team members attempted to reconnect with the call-in candidates. The team did not have a formal process in place for monitoring B-listers or formal requirements for participation. There was no record of the B-listers reaching out to social service agencies that participated in the intervention. A representative from the Snead State Community College, located in a neighboring city, offered to help one of the candidates obtain his GED, but the team was not able to locate him. Several noncandidates asked to join the program and receive GED training and substance abuse treatment.

As of one year after the call-in, five of the six B-listers are still in Guntersville and, according to the team, most are staying out of trouble. One B-lister reportedly continued selling drugs after the call-in and was arrested. While awaiting sentencing, he was not allowed back into the target area. He has since plead guilty and was sentenced. Several residents and the candidate's family members expressed displeasure with the B-lister's arrest, but the team felt it was important to follow up on its promises.

Community. Following the call-in, the team organized several community events, including a second community clean-up event and a communitywide after-school block party, which was sponsored by the owner of a carwash in the area. Guntersville Police and Fire participated, as did a representative from an HIV/AIDS organization. The summer after the call-in, the Guntersville Police Department sponsored a basketball camp that was attended by about 20 children. Finally, the Guntersville Public Library has partnered with the Community Development subcommittee, organized by the team, to create a book club open to community residents.

The team also held a community meeting at a church three months after the call-in, attended by about 45 people, including several team members. The meeting was directed by the pastor on the team. At the meeting, the team provided an overview of activities conducted thus far and described the team's present focus.

The three subcommittees continued to meet regularly. The police-community relations group set up a neighborhood watch, and a book group was started by the community education group. The groups remained quite active during the year following the call-in. They are still engaged building police-community relations through basketball camp and community meetings. The team has also continued to condemn and demolish houses within the target area.

Remarks

One of the greatest advantages for the Guntersville team was the high level of support received from local leadership, including the Marshall County District Attorney's Office. As a result, the team was effectively able to target candidates and prosecute A-listers and the one noncompliant B-lister. The team also received a great deal of support from community leaders, including religious leaders, local business owners, and social services. As a result, a number of community events were held both before and after the call-in.

Support from the top, however, did not necessarily lead to support from target area residents. Perhaps the greatest challenge the Guntersville team faced was a lack of community buy-in, as there is a great deal of distrust of the police. There were two open lawsuits against the police department from residents in the Lakeview Community for excessive force and racial discrimination prior to the intervention, and another one was filed less than a year after the call-in.

The team members who did not represent the criminal justice system also found it extremely difficult to involve the community. Participants at community events consisted mostly of team members and community leaders, with comparably few target-area residents in attendance. There was also some talk in the community that the faith leaders involved in the intervention were working for the police and ran a "police church." One of the key church leaders on the team was not from the Lakeview Community or Guntersville, and thus was perceived as an outsider by many members of the community.

3. Jacksonville, Florida

Status

The effort in Jacksonville stalled during the second phase (Targeting the Drug Market) of the High Point-inspired intervention that the team was exposed to at the BJA trainings.

Motivation for the Intervention

The Jacksonville intervention project grew out of the city's existing Weed and Seed program, which was being defunded when the project started (U.S. Department of Justice, undated). According to the Weed and Seed team members, East Jacksonville is afflicted with high rates of criminal activity, poverty, unemployment, teen pregnancy, high rates of infant mortality, sexually transmitted diseases, and other health problems. The area comprises 3 percent of the city's population, yet accounts for 8 percent of violent crimes and 7 percent of prostitution arrests. While the city's homicide rate decreased from 2008 to 2009, murders in the area increased during that time. Drug use is a recurring problem, and many of the incidents of assault and murder that occur within the area involve drug transactions. Much of the drug activity involves gun violence: In 2009, there were 556 separate incident reports involving a gun.

This area consists primarily of single-family homes with some apartment buildings and public housing complexes mixed in. Most residents are African-American, including many elderly people who have lived in the area their whole lives. A neighborhood of historic homes within the area is undergoing gentrification with help from the city, which is installing bike lanes and other amenities to attract redevelopment efforts. In the poorer parts of the area, Operation Hope, a service provider implementing a Ready4Work model of community development, is playing an important role in rehabbing housing for low-income residents.

Phase I: Planning for the Intervention

The Weed and Seed coordinator was the impetus behind the intervention in Jacksonville. She initially learned of the DMI program through an email she received about a federal grant opportunity to participate in the program. The project planned to build upon the work that community organizers have accomplished with Weed and Seed grant funds. The team reported that efforts to organize the community were difficult and that there was significant distrust of the police among community residents. However, they were encouraged that attendance at community meetings increased from three or four residents to roughly a dozen. Organizers planned to increase efforts to involve the community and to identify local citizens willing to lead community organizing efforts.

The original team consisted of the Weed and Seed coordinator, a representative from the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office (JSO), the state's attorney's grants manager, a local bishop and head of a local church-based community organization, and a longtime and respected retired school teacher. Early on, the team hoped to add several new members, including representatives from the probation and parole agencies, the local U.S. Attorney's Office, and community-based organizations, including Operation New Hope, Work Services, the Jacksonville Reentry Program, Fresh Ministries, and other church groups.

After the first MSU training in 2011, the team initially met at least every other month to discuss status and next steps. During the meetings, team dynamics were positive, with all members contributing during the planning and strategizing. However, not all members participated at the same level. Some members who participated during the meetings and helped plan the program reportedly did not perform any work outside the meetings.

Phase II: Targeting the Drug Market

Police crime analysts identified a number of drug and violent crime hot spots within the Weed and Seed area that could serve as potential targets, and much of the focus of planning meetings of the team was defining a target area. Two areas were identified as good candidates for the program using data analysis: one of roughly 0.04 square miles, another of roughly 0.1 square mile. Relative to the rest of the city, residents in both of these areas tended to be poorer, less educated, African-American, and living in poverty.

There was some disagreement about the size of the target area: The police argued for a broader area (about a half-mile square) to ensure that they could identify a sufficient number of high- and low-level dealers for the project. Others on the team advocated a smaller area based on their understanding of the program from the first training. The JSO insisted that the area selected could not be a target of any current federal investigations. In the end, the team settled on an area of eight square blocks. According to members of the team, the main drugs sold were crack cocaine and marijuana. The team stated that the markets maintain low visibility, often selling only to known local customers, with little evidence of drug transactions visible from the street.

The JSO was able to perform some undercover work to identify potential targets. Roughly 40 hours of undercover work were conducted by the Narcotics Division and the Zone 1 Task Force of the JSO to identify potential gangs and individuals for the program. However, during this effort, budget cuts, layoffs, and reorganization led the JSO to withdraw its support from the program and no targets were definitively identified. The team briefly discussed criteria for separating A-listers from B-listers, but never developed criteria for who would be prosecuted and how the prosecutions would be conducted. Similarly, the team never discussed a specific social service plan for the B-listers or attempted to seek the cooperation of local social service providers.

Phase III: Working with the Community

The team never reached the point of planning community activities or soliciting involvement in the intervention. There were discussions about the program during town hall meetings and other community gatherings, and the team determined that there was sufficient community interest in the intervention. However, the program never progressed to the stage of planning events within the community.

Remarks

The Jacksonville effort suffered from a lack of commitment by a law enforcement agency that was undergoing budget cuts and short on staff. Reorganization within the sheriff's office led to turnover among the law enforcement members of the team. Initial law enforcement representatives were supportive of the project, but were concerned about an apparent lack of commitment by the prosecutor's office. However, the sheriff's office stated openly that it had other priorities placed before the intervention.

Although initial meetings were optimistic, the initiative began to unravel over time. Throughout the program, there was a clear lack of commitment from the State's Attorney's Office, which contributed a grant writer, but not a prosecutor, to the effort. When the State's Attorney representative was laid off due to budget cuts, a new State's Attorney representative did not actively participate in the process.

The lack of commitment by the State's Attorney's Office led to a diminishing commitment by the JSO, which had concerns that it might be using man-hours and performing work that might never be acted upon. The assistant chief, who was a big booster of the intervention and had been designated as the initial team POC, was transferred to a new assignment several months into the process. He was replaced by another assistant chief who was less familiar with the area and the objectives of the intervention but still committed to the program. The JSO, struggling with budget cuts and diminished manpower, assigned yet another new representative to the effort. Unlike her predecessors, she decided that her diminished resources, badly needed elsewhere, would not allow the JSO's continued participation in the intervention.

The final demise came when Weed and Seed funding was cut. The POC had to take on another position that did not allow her to lead the intervention. At about the same time, the community representative became ill and was unable to participate further in the process. Although the POC identified at least two community members interested in being involved in the program, there were no plans as of this writing to resurrect the process.

4. Lake County, Indiana

Status

The Lake County effort stalled during Phase II (Targeting the Drug Market) of the High Point-inspired intervention that the team was exposed to at the BJA trainings, and did not advance to the steps to work with the community or hold a call-in.

Motivation for the Intervention

The Lake County team was led by a deputy prosecutor, and initially enjoyed strong support from the prosecutor's office. The deputy prosecutor initiated the program after she found information about DMI online and thought it would be a great fit for the area. The other team members included a Gary Police Department narcotics police officer, a community police officer who coordinated a network of local pastors and teachers, a second deputy prosecutor, and a staff member of the Center for Workforce Innovations, whose role was to direct and coordinate placement into the workforce or other needs for B-listers.

Team members expressed interest in bringing in representatives from the mayor's office, city council, and the local university. The team also planned to solicit other nonprofits as implementation progressed, including Adonia Community Services (a community-based organization that cleans up vacant lots and rehabs buildings), the Community Development Center (which trains women in the construction trades), and Apostolic Youth and Family Services (which provides counseling about receiving public benefits).

Phase I: Planning for the Intervention

The team met every two weeks for the first several months of the project, but met increasingly less frequently as time went on. Early meetings were upbeat and optimistic. The team discussed developing a community survey and visited a successful DMI site—Rockford, Illinois—to learn about key ingredients for an effective implementation. Team members came away from the site visit enthusiastic about what they had seen and excited about achieving similar change in Gary.

One of the team's first tasks was to establish a target area. The team used statistical data compiled from several sources to determine a geographic location inside Gary that would afford the best possible return from the implementation of the intervention. The team compiled statistics from drug hotline calls and detective reports of investigation locations. It also used geographic information system (GIS) maps, calls for service, and other historical information to come up with a location. Eventually, the target area was identified, and the team sought to garner more support from political officials, through meetings with the Gary chief of police and other

officials. The team also conducted a survey of residents that was distributed with utility bills. More than 400 surveys were completed, but they were not analyzed, according to the RAND on-site data collection coordinator.

The team believed that a strong social service component was key to a successful program. They had talked about putting together individually tailored plans once they had candidates for the program, and the team's social service coordinator had good connections to networks of service providers in local and state government. The team's social service coordinator would have been tasked with leading a subcommittee to address B-lister issues and design a social service plan around them. However, the team never developed a formal social service plan.

The team made an effort to use code enforcement as an additional tool for attacking the drug problem. Recognizing that abandoned structures provide a haven for drug dealers, the team established a liaison with the South Bend Code Enforcement Office to learn how to use code enforcement to assist with its efforts. The team also explored working with the local utility company to make sure that street lights were working, with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and other parties to seek demolition of vacant structures, and with a local bank to seek funds for purchase of playground equipment.

Phase II: Targeting the Drug Market

The team targeted the Glen Park neighborhood in Gary. The team felt that the area was ripe for development because it contains a university, a medical center, and the local Urban League headquarters. Team members felt that if they were able to mitigate the drug problem, the university would attract more students and businesses. Team members hoped to make Glen Park a Promise Zone similar to the Harlem Children's Zone, in which children are given incentives and mentoring and caretakers are given parenting classes to encourage kids to stay in school.

The area of approximately 20 square blocks is about five miles from Gary's central business district. It is primarily made up of single-family homes with a few low-rise apartment buildings. It has some commercial activity, including liquor stores, a barber shop, restaurants, groceries, gas stations, and a flea market. There is also a strip mall, but no retail chains have opened stores in the neighborhood. According to one team member, an average 1,500-square-foot house sells for less than \$20,000. There is widespread abandonment of property, but in pockets. The city has a policy of razing abandoned homes, but lack of funds makes this a slow process.

According to team members, the area has a high rate of violent crime and drug activity as well as a number of drug houses; however, there is no central chain of command for dealers or much gang involvement in selling illicit drugs in the area. Markets are said to operate primarily indoors, but outdoors as well during the warmer months, especially at gas stations. The police relied on identifying dealers and then using confidential informants to make undercover buys. Once the target market was defined, the police narcotics unit pledged to cooperate with the team in building cases against key individuals. However, disagreements ensued about how to conduct the investigations. The prosecutor's office felt that undercover officers should be used rather than

confidential informants to conduct investigations, but police resources were already stretched thin. The prosecutor's office also wanted audio of the undercover buys in order to build stronger cases, but audio equipment was in short supply. A few individuals were identified by police as potential candidates for the program. The team worked on defining who would be prosecuted and who would be given a chance to renounce drug dealing. The criteria they set for B-listers included no violent criminal history and no gun-related offenses. A-listers would be those with violent criminal histories or firearms violations.

The police drug task force began making undercover buys to build cases for the project, but political changes in the mayor's office and the police department stalled the team's targeting progress early on. The task force leader was reassigned. Then, with an election coming up, the mayor and police chief, who were on their way out of office, were reluctant to allocate the undercover resources needed to conduct the investigations. This political uncertainty hampered the investigation process for the better part of six months as a new mayor was elected, and a search was conducted to replace the police chief. Both the new mayor and police chief had verbally agreed that the intervention should be given a chance, yet it slowly became evident that there were higher priorities for both the mayor and chief. By this time, the team was starting to lose cohesion. When the point of contact (POC) and team leader resigned her position in the prosecutor's office, the program disintegrated.

Phase III: Working with the Community

The team recognized the importance of gauging community sentiment and winning community support by working through local churches. Therefore, the team planned monthly community meetings where members would meet with residents in the target area to discuss issues, trends, and concerns. At an initial community event, social service providers and local residents were invited to a breakfast to listen to the team present the concept and to ask questions. About 30 people attended, including Gary's newly elected mayor, and feedback was positive. Attendees were primarily social service providers and heads of community organizations. Later in the project, several smaller meetings were held with community leaders where the team described the intervention and solicited support.

Remarks

While the team members were committed to the program and had signed MOUs, their commitment and good intentions were not sufficient to lead to a successful implementation. In hindsight, it is clear that this program, conceived and led by the prosecutor's office, ultimately was not a priority for a police department short on resources and technology. The effort was brought to a halt by prolonged political uncertainty followed by lack of active engagement on the part of the new mayor and police chief. The Lake County experience makes clear that the intervention must be a police priority to succeed.

5. Montgomery County, Maryland

Status

The Montgomery County team in Maryland completed all phases of the High Point-inspired intervention it was exposed to at the BJA trainings. The team reported that it shut down the only overt drug market in its jurisdiction, although there was also talk of trying the program in other locations.

Motivation for the Intervention

The impetus behind the intervention in Montgomery County was a county council member, who heard about the program and suggested it to the police chief. The chief asked one of his captains to look into it, and both the chief and captain became enthusiastic supporters. The police had been trying for years to shut down the drug market in the Damascus Gardens apartment complex through conventional law enforcement means—a combination of arrests resulting from undercover buys and nuisance abatement statutes to evict drug sellers. The efforts had met with little success, and drugs continued to pose a significant problem to the community.

Damascus is a small, unincorporated town in the rural northern part of Montgomery County. The apartment complex is a densely populated arrangement of seven residential buildings and contains approximately 90 units, all of which are designated as Section 8 housing; thus, all the residents are low-income and a high percentage are on disability.

The Montgomery County team initially comprised representatives from the county police (the drug enforcement commander, a community services officer, and a crime analyst), an assistant state's attorney, and the county Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Neither county nor federal rental assistance officials were part of the implementation committee, but a local church leader attended some of the meetings. Although the apartment complex manager was not part of the core team, the police consulted with her during the planning and targeting processes leading up to the call-in.

The committee met for the first time in May 2011 to plan the intervention. The core team initially met with the chief drug court judge; however, since charges against the A-listers would be too serious to qualify for drug court and the B-listers would not be formally charged, there was no real role for the drug court in the project.

Phase I: Planning for the Intervention

The team met regularly during the planning and targeting phases of the initiative. One issue that caused controversy during the planning phase was the potential eviction of targeted individuals who had been identified by a key informant as participants in the drug market.

Conversations with management of the complex led to an agreement that they would not evict B-listers in connection with any discovered past drug use or sales.

Phase II: Targeting the Drug Market

The Montgomery County Police Department identified potential targets based on information gleaned from calls for service, intelligence gathered from residents and informants, traffic offenses, and officer recommendations. The effort was well-coordinated, spearheaded by a lieutenant in charge of drug enforcement, the local district commander, the district crime analyst, and community service officers.

Still, the targeting effort faced early challenges. When the investigation started, there was a paucity of police resources due to efforts on another big county investigation and scheduled training for a number of investigative staff. The police installed a confidential informant as a resident in the complex to build cases against individuals identified as dealers or who allowed their premises to be used in drug deals. The informant worked closely with law enforcement to develop the evidence necessary to build prosecutable cases against the individuals. When the eight-month investigation concluded, Montgomery County police, assisted by the neighboring Howard County SWAT team, raided the complex and arrested the A-listers in the early morning hours on one day. It should be noted that approximately 10 percent of the units were raided in one night as a coordinated effort by the police to apprehend the A-listers.

The team based the criteria for differentiating A-listers from B-listers on criminal histories. A-listers included individuals with past violent crimes or felony drug offenses. B-listers were defined as sellers with minor criminal histories and no lengthy history of complaints against them. One exception to the rule was made for a woman who had been the subject of complaints for ten years for allowing her apartment to be utilized for drug dealing, which is a felony offense in Maryland. In all, the team identified eight A-listers and nine B-listers. The charges (or potential charges) against all targeted individuals involved the sale of narcotics, with the exception of the A-lister who allowed dealers to use her apartment.

Phase III: Working with the Community

The physical makeup of the community and the sensitivity of the investigation precluded the team from planning any events before the call-in. Other than seeking community participation in the call-in, full engagement with the greater community around the intervention did not begin until after the call-in. The district police station commander, community services officer, and resident manager sought community participation in the call-in and then in three subsequent meetings with Damascus Gardens residents. At the meetings, the police gave updates on cases and talked about social service programs that were scheduled to begin. Several team members described the community as “very complacent” and accepting of drug dealing before the call-in. Team members thought that the community response to the call-in was very encouraging; they felt that lines of communication between the community and the police had opened up and

residents had become more trusting in the police. They also thought that the community had become engaged on the issue of selling illegal drugs because they actually believed that it was possible to make a difference in crime and disorder in the apartment complex.

The HHS representative on the team made efforts to gain the trust of the community before the call-in. He held a meeting with selected community residents and started a youth boxing program at the complex several months before the call-in. He also sponsored pizza parties and held workshops on developing life skills.

Phase IV: Preparing for the Call-In

According to the reports of team members, the call-in was a success. Community interest was high, with the estimated number of attendees ranging from 80 to 120, representing both people from the targeted complex and the broader community. All members of the core team attended. Also in attendance were the police chief and six officers of varying ranks, the Montgomery County State's Attorney, the Damascus Gardens property manager, a local pastor, several staff of the county HHS, and a representative of Montgomery Works (a local job training and placement nonprofit organization). All eight B-listers who were invited attended, each with at least one family member. No members of the media were invited. The meeting, lasting about 75 minutes, was led by the Montgomery County State's Attorney and the police chief. The message of the speakers was that, in order to make Damascus Gardens a better place to live, the police and property owner would no longer tolerate drugs on the premises. Speakers told the B-listers that they had a choice: Join in the effort to make the community a better place to live or face arrest and prosecution like the A-listers whose mugshots and charges were prominently displayed. Audience members were allowed to voice questions and complaints.

The Montgomery County team never seriously considered encouraging B-listers to participate in social services as part of the deal offered to them; thus, there was little planning in this area. Substance abuse services were offered at the call-in, although no one signed up for them, and there were several discussions about job training and placement services. The only requirement of the B-listers was that they stay "out of trouble with the law" for 12 months or risk being arrested on the charges that the police had prepared. B-listers were informed of the consequences of continuing to deal, and told that the police would be following up at a later date. They were shown the evidence against them, along with an unsigned arrest warrant, which they were told would be destroyed after a year if they avoided arrests and complaints and did not allow their apartments to be used for drug selling. B-listers were not asked to sign pledges or participate in service programs.

Phase V: After the Call-In

Enforcement. For 90 days following the call-in, the Montgomery County police dedicated four officers to the area surrounding Damascus Gardens. The officers were relieved of responding to calls for service in order to conduct proactive work with the community, including

regular talks with the B-listers. The officers also contacted the several new families that moved into Damascus Gardens during the period to welcome them and inform them of the antidrug initiative.

During the follow-up period, the community police officer inspected the condition of the property every two weeks and reported physical disorder problems (e.g., street lights out, trash, graffiti) to the resident manager. The team published a news update that piggybacked on the resident manager's weekly newsletter and provided information about the intervention and reported on progress made on noise abatement and other social disorder issues.

According to the team, the property owner agreed to make improvements to the complex and to conduct better vetting of tenants. Improvements included lighting upgrades, a new fence to keep outside dealers from entering the property, upgrades to the playground, and security cameras. All team members described residents as reporting significant positive changes in safety and the quality of life at Damascus Gardens. Changes included an absence of cars belonging to outsiders and fewer youths hanging out in the complex. The consensus from the team was that there was no longer an outdoor drug market.

B-Lister Follow-Up. The B-listers were not required to participate in any social services and were not followed by the team. Nevertheless, we are aware of only one complaint that was made against a B-lister after the call-in. All A-listers but one were convicted and sentenced (see Appendix B), and all were evicted from the complex—including any family members who shared a lease.

Community. The community follow-up in Damascus Gardens was qualitatively different than at other sites because it was focused on one apartment complex. The team held four community meetings in Damascus Gardens after the call-in and coordinated with several social service and charitable organizations to conduct events where the residents could access services. There was a National Night Out event, and the Christian Life Center held a job preparedness class, donated sports clothing, and repaired community recreation equipment within the complex. While some of the team members reported initial problems in engaging the community after the call-in, they all feel very strongly that they are still connected to the community, even two years after the call-in.

Remarks

The Montgomery County intervention was unique because it targeted such a small geographic area—only about one square block—and all of the targeted A-listers and B-listers lived within the same apartment complex. It is also the only intervention that focused solely on a Section 8 housing complex, and deviated from the original training script in that there were few efforts to engage the community in the process before the call-in. Furthermore, because of the small size of the target area, the large number of A-listers arrested, and the lack of community engagement before the call-in, it was not until after the call-in that community members became

aware of the purpose of the intervention and that it was more than a coordinated police raid. In fact, about 10 percent of all the units were raided in one evening to arrest the A-listers, which is a much more concentrated effort than was seen in any of the other sites. The team held several follow-up meetings with the community in the six months after the call-in, the police worked with the property manager to address disorder, and the HHS representatives visited the community regularly to offer a variety of services to adults and adolescents.

6. New Orleans, Louisiana

Status

The New Orleans team was not able to successfully plan and hold a DMI call-in as of late 2013.

Motivation for the Intervention

In New Orleans, interest in DMI was first sparked by the opportunity for a free DMI training seminar for the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD). In the beginning of the process, the team consisted primarily of members of law enforcement, including narcotics sergeants from both the 5th and 6th districts and a 5th district community affairs officer. Higher-ranking NOPD officers joined team meetings intermittently. The prosecution arm of the team included an assistant district attorney and an assistant U.S. attorney. Over time, the team added community, prosecution, and social service members.

Within the community portion of the team, the Associated Neighborhood Development provided a team representative from the beginning and a representative continued to attend meetings regularly. A longtime member of the community also attended the team meetings. Within social services, a New Orleans Parks and Recreation representative attended meetings intermittently. The Youth Empowerment Program (YEP), the main social services group, initially had representatives attend meetings regularly, although their attendance waned.

Phase I: Planning for the Intervention

Initially, progress in planning the DMI program in New Orleans was slow. While three NOPD sergeants and a New Orleans assistant district attorney were chosen to attend the training, it was some time before social service and community representatives were added to the team. In addition, final approval to move forward with the intervention from higher-ranking officials within the NOPD was not initially secured. One difficulty the team faced was a change of leadership within the NOPD. The new police chief was aware of the DMI model as it was used in Nashville, Tennessee, while he was the police chief in that jurisdiction. However, the district sergeants working on the intervention were unaware of whether the chief knew if they had attended the BJA/MSU training. In addition, the new NOPD administration was focused on the city's high murder and violent crime rates, as well as addressing the monumental task of overhauling the departmental infrastructure. The DMI was not considered an intervention that could address the homicide problem, and was therefore put on the back burner as the other priorities took precedence. Other activities, including events and festivals in New Orleans, also required NOPD manpower and resources to provide security.

Eventually, the team planning for the intervention was able to gain traction. Spurred by an MSU site visit requested by the U.S. Attorney's Office, team meetings began in August 2011, and the team was built up from the three original NOPD sergeants and state prosecutor to include key players representing social services, city services, the community, and New Orleans district attorney. The initial team meeting was held on August 24, 2011, and subsequently biweekly team meetings were held on a fairly regular basis. Eventually, the team received support from higher levels of NOPD and other leaders within the city of New Orleans, as well as continued support from the U.S. Attorney's Office. The 6th district commander attended one of the meetings and advised the chief about the support for the program. In addition, a representative from the mayor's office attended several team meetings and expressed support for the program.

During the planning phase, the team also began discussions of the services to be offered to B-listers who agreed to participate. After MSU suggested that a service provider coordinator or case manager be used to set up resources and ask that B-listers be given priority, the team began identifying resources and attempting to secure commitments from social service agencies.

The team contacted YEP, a target area provider, which attended several team meetings and expressed enthusiasm about participating in the program. YEP's focus was to tailor a plan to help juveniles with community issues and family issues (education, employment, addiction, etc.). The program offers around-the-clock mentoring and case management to participants. YEP's services would be available to young adult or juvenile B-listers; older B-listers would need to obtain services elsewhere. The U.S. Attorney's Office provided YEP with Department of Justice Ceasefire funds to facilitate services for B-listers after the call-in. Upon receiving the funds, however, YEP stopped attending team meetings and the team was unable to determine whether the funds were specifically earmarked for B-lister services, and if so, how the funds were used.

Disagreement ensued between team members about the level of focus and effort that should be placed on assisting participating B-listers. An agreement had not been reached as a call-in had not transpired.

There was some discussion during team meetings about whether to prosecute A-listers at the state or federal level. The team decided that once the cases were submitted, both the U.S. attorney's office and the district attorney's office would review them to determine which court would offer the best option for prosecution. The team hoped that the most-serious offenders would be prosecuted at the federal level.

Phase II: Targeting the Drug Market

Originally, NOPD wanted to conduct interventions simultaneously within two districts with the highest crime rates in the city, the 5th and 6th NOPD districts. Ultimately, the team decided against implementing in two districts at the same time and chose to focus first on conducting it within the 6th district. The team did not use crime mapping to select the target area; rather, the team decided to focus on the NOPD 6th district because there was already an ongoing narcotics racketeering investigation in one of district's high crime neighborhoods, the Hoffman Triangle.

Enforcing the state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) law against drug dealers, officers in the area had already documented two primary RICO criteria: that dealers in the area were part of a group and that they engaged in a pattern of criminal activity. Officers were taking action to prove that these individuals also were working together to further the interest of the group. The plan was to use arrestees from this ongoing RICO investigation to constitute the A-listers and B-listers. An additional factor in the decision to choose the target area was the solid and active neighborhood development association in the Hoffman Triangle area.

The Hoffman Triangle neighborhood, formerly known as “back of town” by locals, is bounded by three streets that form a triangle. Drug gang members from the gang known as 3nG organize and operate drive-through overt drug markets in the area. The one-way configuration of roadways enabled drug dealers to evade detection by law enforcement. It was also believed that a communication system between the dealers aided in avoiding detection by police. In addition to the established drug market, the area experienced problems with illegal dumping of tires, copper theft, disinvestment, and open and abandoned residences. Dominant drugs in the target area were heroin and crack cocaine, with less common drugs being marijuana, powder cocaine, and prescription pills. Other crimes in the target area presenting a problem for the neighborhood and law enforcement included murder, prostitution, and burglary.

There are strong community organizations and associations in the Hoffman Triangle working to reduce blight, demolish properties, reduce crime, and revitalize commercial business in the area. Signs of neighborhood neglect and criminal activity are viewed as obstacles to the revitalization of Hoffman Triangle. Some community members are already proactive and call in crimes to the NOPD; however, they feel discouraged because suspects are often tipped off that officers are *en route* and have fled the scene before officers arrive at the crime location. The police believe there may be a communication system among the criminals, and that perhaps someone is listening to a police scanner or using a phone application.

The team did not conduct a survey of drug dealers in the area because it relied on a list of dealers provided by the ongoing RICO investigation. To conduct the investigation, officers relied on surveillance work from unmarked cars and local residents, and they amassed more than 3,000 photos documenting those individuals connected with the drug sales in the target area. Many of those involved in the drug trade in the area do not live in the area, and they are believed to belong to a gang representing the Third and Galvez area.

Although the RICO investigation was well under way at the time the intervention was initiated, it took more than a year for NOPD to complete the necessary paperwork to be submitted to the district attorney for prosecution. Once higher-ranking officers were aware of the delay, officers associated with the intervention were given full-time responsibilities for finishing the paperwork, which was then completed fairly quickly. NOPD submitted RICO charges to the district attorney’s office for prosecution.

The team determined the criteria for categorization as an A-lister to be multiple drug charges, firearms charges, or crimes of violence; status as a B-lister was limited to individuals who had

solely misdemeanor charges. Initially, the team identified 15 suspects as part of the RICO investigation to target for the intervention: ten A-listers and five B-listers. As the investigation continued, however, the expected B-listers continued to be involved in criminal activity and some were arrested for other nonrelated felony charges, moving them from the B-list to the A-list. In March 2013, two years after the first trainings, only one person remained on the B-list.

Phase III: Working with the Community

There had been little formal announcement of the intervention within the target area. There were plans for a public announcement of the program at the neighborhood's annual Night Out Against Crime in October 2011; however, the expected funding to support a formal announcement was not received, although the team distributed information about the intervention to community members during the event.

The intervention was later announced at an area neighborhood association meeting. To achieve more widespread awareness, the team planned to conduct a door-to-door campaign before the call-in. Although not formally linked with the intervention, the Neighborhood Associated Development representative reported that after learning of the plans, she organized large-scale volunteer efforts aimed at attacking blight and uplifting the area, including gardens, tree plantings, trash pickup, street light replacement, lawn care, and even a mural.

Phase IV: Preparing for the Call-In

Although the team hoped to hold a call-in in late 2012, it learned that there was only one individual on the RICO investigation list who still qualified as a B-lister. At that point, the team felt it would be unnecessary and ineffective to hold a call-in and momentum waned. NOPD discussed the possibility of identifying and locating probationers in the area who could be called in as B-listers and "put on notice" that violence and criminal activity in the area would no longer be tolerated by law enforcement or the community. In that case, the call-in would include a presentation of criminal history and any surveillance evidence to convince the probationers that they are being monitored. In June 2013, the individuals investigated as part of the RICO investigation were indicted, but the team had not yet held a meeting to discuss how to handle the single B-lister.

Remarks

Many of the obstacles New Orleans encountered focused on not securing support and involvement from higher-ranking NOPD officials. Although the New Orleans initiative began in the police department, it began at a managerial level, and team members did not know whether higher-ranking officials in the department supported the program. As a result, NOPD team members did not feel confident moving forward, and such activities as putting together cases for submission to the district attorney took much longer than expected. In addition, significant

reorganizations within NOPD created even more uncertainty about support for the intervention and detracted from related activities, while resources that could have been devoted were often diverted because of the significant time and resources that the NOPD provides to festivals and events in New Orleans throughout the year.

In its present state as of this writing, it would be very difficult to categorize the efforts in New Orleans as following the training model. The program relied on ongoing RICO investigations to identify potential candidates, and, 24 months after initiating the intervention, the team has failed to involve the larger community or inform them of the program. Because of the loss of all but one B-lister to A-lister status, the team could not conduct a call-in.

7. Roanoke, Virginia

Status

The Roanoke team completed all the phases of the High Point-inspired intervention it was exposed to at the BJA trainings and was working to institutionalize the program within the city. The first implementation in Roanoke took place during summer and fall 2011, culminating in a call-in during December of that year. A second intervention call-in took place in a different neighborhood in January 2013.

Motivation for the Intervention

The Roanoke police chief was the impetus behind the intervention, having read stories about the success of this approach in High Point, North Carolina. The original team was headed by a police lieutenant, and consisted of a Commonwealth's Attorney prosecutor, the president of Total Action for Progress (TAP), a representative of Virginia Cares, and a resident of Hurt Park. The team was aided by two police crime analysts. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives shared information to help in the targeting process. The team had conversations with the local U.S. Attorney, who agreed to prosecute some cases against A-listers, as well as with the probation and parole departments that would be supervising A-listers after they were released into the community.

The core team started with a consensus that traditional methods of attacking a drug market were insufficient and all preferred the strategy, which members felt was pro-neighborhood and, in the long run, could help the neighborhood develop a more pro-police attitude.

The police chief strongly supported the team's efforts and made additional resources available, such as overtime for increased patrols and police presence. According to team members, there was a sense of cohesion and common purpose in the group. In addition, while the police department provided strong leadership, decisions were made in consultation with the entire team.

Phase I: Planning for the Intervention

The Roanoke Police Department drew up a detailed written implementation plan for the project based on the MSU instructional model. Roanoke held weekly team meetings starting in August 2010. Early meetings discussed the nine steps in the implementation plan and the specific commitments made by each participating organization.

The Roanoke team selected as its target the Hurt Park neighborhood, an area of 2,785 residents in the city's historical district near the commercial center of town. Hurt Park is a mixed-use neighborhood, containing a concentration of industrial as well as residential

properties. Residential properties are almost exclusively single-family homes, with many converted into multifamily apartments. The limited retail in the area consists primarily of a couple of convenience stores and markets. There is a smattering of abandoned buildings owned by a single landowner, primarily along one block. Residents are predominantly African-American, and more than 80 percent of households have incomes under \$35,000 per year.

The area has a long history of drugs and violent crime that have proven resistant to traditional law enforcement approaches (e.g., undercover buys, knock and talks), nuisance abatement, and community policing bike patrols. Identification of this area as a high-crime neighborhood was corroborated by analysts within the Roanoke City Police. According to the crime analysts, the target area had a drug crime rate six times the city average and a violent crime rate seven times the city average. Police reported that the main drugs sold in the neighborhood were marijuana and crack cocaine. Before the intervention, the drug market in Hurt Park operated primarily from outdoor and indoor locations along a major thoroughfare. The targeted area experienced a disproportionate amount of drug-related criminal activity centered around one block.

One of the reasons the team focused on Hurt Park as its first target area was its tradition of community organizing, started by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and Southern Christian Leadership Conference, as well as a large revitalization effort by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Team members stressed that there was strong support among community residents for projects aimed at developing a better quality of life. Over the two years leading up to intervention, a great deal of money and resources were spent in Hurt Park to improve the overall condition of the neighborhood. The TAP program encouraged economic vitality by strengthening and empowering the community by mobilizing individuals' good will and resources while expanding access to existing opportunities.

A major topic of discussion in the early meetings was whether the program should demand a 12-month absence from any criminal activity by B-listers, or whether that period would ensure a high rate of failure. Other team members argued for a six-month period. Ultimately, the team decided that, after six months, the police would reduce the amount of time spent monitoring these individuals.

One problem the team faced early on was manpower allocation. Finding officers with time to work on intervention-related tasks (targeting, community organizing) when the project got under way in the summer was challenging. To ensure that the program was treated as a priority, the team coordinator suggested that a core police team be created that would devote time exclusively to the effort. Roanoke police initially found a way to incorporate activities without creating a dedicated team during the planning and targeting phase; however, a special team was subsequently formed during the maintenance plan following the first Roanoke call-in, facilitated by a grant that funded additional bicycle patrols.

Before the intervention, the police surveyed Hurt Park residents in April 2010 to help the team understand the needs of the target community. The survey of 103 residents was completed by police officers going door to door in the neighborhood. Nearly 80 percent of survey

respondents reported being satisfied with the neighborhood as a place to live and work, and a majority rated the quality of life as “good” or “very good.” Drug dealing and drug abuse were identified as the most prevalent crime issues. The team sent a mailing to property owners in the area to inform them of the effort and to offer them a chance to participate in a landlord-tenant training designed to educate property owners on the legal aspects of owning property in Roanoke.

The Roanoke team developed a comprehensive plan (to be conducted by TAP) to provide social services to individuals who renounced dealing at the call-in. The plan called for a nine-day program to be held at a location outside Roanoke. Individuals would be bused there daily to participate in a “Life College” created for the project that included aptitude testing; job or educational placement; sessions with community elders, faith leaders, and ex-offenders; parent and relationship training; and pairing with a mentor from churches in the community. After the requisite nine days, the Life College would transition into regular peer group meetings that would continue into the future. The cost of the program was estimated at \$1,500 per person, funded by the City of Roanoke as well as by a grant given to them by the Kiwanis Club, an organization that assists local causes that combine fellowship, community service, and personal development. However, TAP was able to deliver the services for only \$4,000 rather than the estimated \$7,500. The curriculum for the Life College is included in Appendix F.

Phase II: Targeting the Drug Market

The police targeted 15 individuals and planned to meet with the Commonwealth’s Attorney to determine which would be A-listers and which B-listers. The team faced an initial problem trying to find informants to purchase drugs within the target area, so it was forced to rely on special operations to catch drug buyers and turn them into informants. Ultimately, the use of informants was successful in identifying the drug dealers in the target area; however, one informant conducted most of the buys. Three of those targeted turned out to be juveniles 17 to 18 years of age. The team was divided about whether to include them in the group of B-listers, but eventually did include them. Ultimately, due to delays in the call-in, the police were able to get undercover buys on these individuals after they had turned 18, making it possible to charge them all as adults.

The criteria that the team eventually settled on to distinguish B-listers included (a) no weapons charges and (b) no violent acts against persons. The final group of B-listers included five adults; there were ten individuals placed on the A list.

The call-in was originally scheduled to occur in August 2011; however, targeting issues, a high-profile murder case in the city, and the grand jury schedule pushed the actual date of the call-in back to just after Christmas that year. Indictments of the ten A-list candidates began on December 1. Two of the A-listers were charged federally and eight faced state charges. All of the A-listers were prosecuted and, as of this writing, are serving their sentences.

Phase III: Working with the Community

An initial article about the DMI concept (but not the target location) appeared in the *Roanoke Times* in February 2011 (Codispoti, 2011). The team sought the support of local community churches through briefings from pastors. Meetings were held with Hurt Park church leaders, neighborhood watch groups, and members of the Hurt Park Neighborhood Alliance.

In August of that year, the team held a community meeting with church and neighborhood watch groups from the Hurt Park area. The police chief gave a presentation on the project covering the process, goals, and concerns for its success. None of the early meetings disclosed the target location because the undercover buys were still taking place and the Roanoke police did not want to jeopardize the initiative.

Community leaders at the meeting noted some concerns. One was whether B-listers who opted to join the program might be considered “snitches,” thus putting them at risk of retaliation. A second concern was whether residents in Hurt Park might be reluctant to participate in the program because of strained police relations in the community. In mid-September, another meeting with Hurt Park residents was held where residents were informed for the first time that their neighborhood had been chosen as the first target.

The team also solicited support from homeowners to encourage absentee landowners to exert greater control over possible illegal activities occurring on their premises. A question-and-answer period allowed the attendees to ask about local laws and nuisance ordinances.

As planning progressed, Roanoke police officers attended a series of ongoing Hurt Park community meetings during which community residents voiced their concerns about crime, trash, poor street lighting, and other quality-of-life issues in the neighborhood. This process reinforced the ongoing Department of Housing and Urban Development initiative to improve the neighborhood through the construction of townhouses and the remodeling of older, abandoned homes in the area. The team created a communitywide newsletter for the project and distributed it door to door throughout Hurt Park. However, after distributing the first issue, the team subsequently discovered that social media was a more effective news source for the residents, especially young adults. Facebook and Twitter accounts were created by a community leader to spread the word about intervention and provide updates.

Phase IV: Preparing for the Call-In

Before the call-in, each B-lister and his or her family members received an agenda outlining the format and speakers. Before the call-in, two significant and unanticipated issues arose with the B-listers. First, one of the B-listers on probation was arrested the day of the event for violating his probation. The offense was nonviolent so officers determined he was still eligible for the program. Roanoke police attempted to get this individual out of jail so he could attend the call-in, but they were unsuccessful. This individual’s family still attended the call-in and sat behind where he would have been sitting. The second issue involved one of the B-listers in

attendance. He was under investigation for a possible violent incident with his girlfriend that occurred the Friday before the call-in. The team worried that if he ended up being prosecuted for this crime, he would no longer be eligible for the program. Still, they decided to invite him. In the end, this incident did not result in a prosecution, and had no impact on this individual or his involvement with the intervention.

The Roanoke call-in took place on December 27, 2011. The list of speakers at the call-in included the police chief, the police lieutenant who was the team member, the U.S. Attorney, the Commonwealth's Attorney, a defense attorney, a social service representative, and several community leaders. Each of the four B-listers who were invited and not incarcerated attended. Community interest was high as well, and more than 100 people in total attended the event. The team had considered allowing community members to speak during the call-in but decided against it because of worries that residents' anger could get out of hand.

The speakers put forth rules and guidelines, and emphasized a number of key points, including the ground rules of the intervention, support from the community, and the opportunity B-listers were being given.

Following the presentations, all the B-listers opted to go into a private meeting room to look at the evidence against them. Upon viewing the evidence, all expressed a desire to change their lifestyles and work with social service providers. The B-listers spoke with social service representatives and reportedly were receptive to entering the Life College program. After the call-in, the majority of the community made a point to personally introduce themselves to the B-listers, express their support for the initiative, and offer to help them in any way possible.

Part V: After the Call-In

Enforcement. The Roanoke team began planning its follow-up strategy several weeks before the call-in. The team had several meetings with police dispatchers in which the dispatchers were instructed to give priority to calls from the Hurt Park. Roanoke police set up multiple one-hour training days with the dispatch teams to teach them about the intervention and get them familiar with the target area. The dispatchers cited concerns over the availability of officers to respond, and, as a result of these concerns, the police chief decided to hand-pick a cadre of officers who had shown the greatest enthusiasm about the intervention to improve response time in Hurt Park. The department also received community development funds to pay officers for additional overtime that might result from the program. A subsequent meeting was held with the Emergency Management 911 team to go over how to handle community calls originating from the target area.

In addition, the Roanoke police added a few enforcement resources, including bike patrols, closed-circuit cameras, and license plate readers in the belief that these additional resources would demonstrate to the public that police were monitoring the target area and cared about what happened there.

B-Lister Follow-Up. According to the social service coordinator, the B-listers did not initially take the Life College seriously, believing that they were not actually in trouble and thus should not be forced to attend the sessions. A representative of the Roanoke Police Department involved in the intervention attended one of the Life College sessions to, as the social service coordinator described, put the “fear of God” into them and enlighten them on the seriousness of the situation. Since that time, he reported that two of the individuals had become devoted to the program, while there were still doubts about the other two.

Initially, four of the B-listers completed the two-week Life College course. A graduation was held for them, during which social services and police personnel and members of the community voiced their support. The fifth B-lister, incarcerated for two months for violating his probation, was set to begin the course at the end of his sentence. Following his release, this individual successfully completed the Life College. There was concern that one of the B-listers might still be dealing crack and hanging out with the same group of individuals as before. This B-lister also reportedly had a bad attitude about the intervention and essentially thought the program was a “get out of jail free card.”

A maintenance team of seven officers was created and was the pool from which mentors were assigned. The officers were to act as “big brothers” to help the B-listers succeed in the program.

Community. According to the Roanoke Police Department, there was a noticeable change in the Hurt Park community several weeks after the call-in. Support from the residents had grown, with a number of residents coming up to officers to thank them for the initiative. Roanoke police reported that there were rumors in the community that a few dealers were attempting to establish themselves in the target area. However, with the maintenance team constantly patrolling the area, a few arrests were made that shut down these attempts. In addition, a database was created that lists the addresses from which most of the calls for service originated. Using this tool, the team planned to assign each officer in the aforementioned maintenance team to a particular hot spot to make constant patrols of the area and create a relationship with community residents.

Other community programs complemented enforcement of the intervention and helped create neighborhood cohesion. The Hurt Park neighborhood is part of a larger urban renewal and revitalization movement. There is a strong neighborhood alliance that holds community events and encourages residents to get involved. The neighborhood is also part of the New Horizons Initiative, which uses federal funds to revitalize Hurt Park through the construction of new townhomes; adding curbs, gutters, and sidewalks; and improving a variety of other housing and neighborhood conditions.

The intervention also received attention in the local media. There were stories outlining the program early on, before targeting began (e.g., Codispoti, 2011) and there were multiple media mentions after the call-in (e.g., Hurst, 2011; Tate, 2011; Valencia, 2011; Valencia, 2012). The coverage was favorable and suggested that the program could make a significant difference in reducing crime and drugs in the targeted area.

Additional Call-In. The team coordinator began thinking about a new target area for the project soon after first call-in. This second initiative targeted an area in Northwest Roanoke. In August 2012, the team began planning for a second round of the intervention in Melrose-Rugby. The team's implementation in Melrose-Rugby was similar to that of the first intervention in Hurt Park, with only a few notable differences. The largest difference was in the target neighborhood itself—Hurt Park was part of a designated urban revitalization effort, and community mobilization was already under way before the intervention came to the neighborhood. Melrose-Rugby, on the other hand, had not received a large federal investment. Another difference was that the target area was leaked to the public in a media report before the team was ready to announce it. The team was concerned that the announcement would affect undercover buys, but the team was eventually able to gather evidence against 15 A-listers and five B-listers in Melrose-Rugby.

The second call-in was held January 29, 2013. Approximately 160 individuals attended the event, including all of the five B-listers. Following the call-in, all five B-listers attended the Life College program. The only difference here was that the B-listers stayed at the Life College facility for the entire week rather than commuting in and out of the city. The team hoped that staying for the week would isolate the B-listers from the peer influences back in the target area. The fifth B-lister, who had mental health issues, did not attend the Life College, but the team coordinated with various social service providers for her to receive the same type of help as the rest of the B-listers. Following Life College, each B-lister was assigned to his or her own police officer to act as a mentor.

Remarks

Perhaps Roanoke's greatest asset was the presence of a police chief and a police lieutenant who were dedicated to the initiative's ideals and strategy. It was their leadership and willingness to do whatever was needed to help the team that laid the groundwork in Roanoke. Although disagreements and differences of opinion were expected and did occur, the team was united in a common goal of doing what was best for Roanoke and the initiative. The police lieutenant coordinating the intervention went to great lengths to explain to residents, officers, dispatchers, and others what it was—and did so with passion. He was able to explain why it should be implemented and how it would improve the city. In the process, he demonstrated to the community that the police truly did care about the neighborhood.

The core team recognized the history of poor relationships between the public and police in Hurt Park and Melrose-Rugby and the importance of community involvement to the success of the intervention. Keeping this in mind, the core team strived to have continual involvement within the target area to show residents the city's dedication to improving the neighborhood. The intervention reinforced the other revitalization efforts that Roanoke was implementing in the Hurt Park neighborhood.

Another noteworthy and innovative aspect of the intervention was the unique contribution of TAP and Virginia Cares, which created a new tailored program for the B-listers. These two organizations provided the B-listers with key social services and life training. Additionally, there has been a large federal redevelopment effort in that neighborhood since 2006.

The Roanoke initiative, however, was not without some impediments. In spite of police efforts to engage the community, residents remained skeptical of the intervention and to a certain extent were simply waiting for fallout from the program or for the neighborhood to revert back. But the team responded by continuing a strong police presence in the neighborhood to get the residents familiar with the officers. In addition, revitalization attempts to improve the quality of life continued. Although the initial struggle to unify the target area could have been crippling to the success of the program, the efforts of the core team allowed the problem to be resolved for the benefit of all residents.

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