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DISSERTATION

Between Slogans and Solutions

A Frame-Based Assessment Methodology for Public Diplomacy

Michael Egner

This document was submitted as a dissertation in December 2009 in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the doctoral degree in public policy analysis at the Pardee RAND Graduate School. The faculty committee that supervised and approved the dissertation consisted of Eric Larson (Chair), Gery Ryan, and Bonnie Ghosh-Dastidar.



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ABSTRACT

Public diplomacy informs, influences and engages key international audiences to further the policy objectives of the USG. Current identified shortcomings in the practice of public diplomacy include: (1) a lack of coordinated research, (2) reliance on generic audience research rather than actionable data on the attitudes of specific targeted groups, and (3) performance metrics that are largely limited to process indicators and the evaluation of USG-sponsored programs. Taken together, this suggests an unmet need for a coordinated approach to design and measure targeted campaigns directed at mass audiences.

The objective of this research is to create and carry out an alternative assessment methodology treating public diplomacy not as a series of discrete programs, but as a coordinated system of producing USG-preferred frames emphasizing or de-emphasizing specific elements of current or future U.S. policies. By tracking these frames - from their presence in media coverage, to their resonance among foreign publics, to their influence in driving overall policy support - we conclude that: (1) the significance of certain frames in driving policy support varies by country, and (2) political beliefs and political opinion leaders play a critical role in the ability of the U.S. to improve international public opinion. The implication is that a country-by-country messaging strategy relying on local advocates is superior to a uniform global campaign rooted in the messages of U.S. officials.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....iii

LIST OF FIGURES.....vii

LIST OF TABLES.....ix

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....xi

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....xiii

1. INTRODUCTION1

 1.1. Defining Public Diplomacy2

 1.2. Study Motivation4

 1.3. Frame-Focused Assessment: A Tool For Coordinated Analysis ...6

 (A) Defining Frames6

 (B) Public Diplomacy as a Frame Production System7

 (C) Advantages of a Frame-Based Approach8

 1.4. Study Organization12

 1.5. Top-Level Conclusions15

2. BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH18

 2.1. U.S. Public Diplomacy: A Brief History18

 2.2. Previous Framing Literature23

 (A) Defining and Extracting Frames23

 (B) Framing and Public Opinion28

3. IRAQ: BASELINE TARGET AUDIENCE ANALYSIS33

 3.1. Background on U.S. Iraq Policy34

 3.2. Research Questions & Hypotheses37

 (A) Baseline Attitudes37

 (B) Identifying Promising Frames38

 (C) The Influence of News Consumption and National Leaders ...39

 3.3. Data40

 3.4. Methods41

 3.5. Results43

 (A) Baseline Attitudes43

 (B) Identifying Promising Frames44

 (C) The Influence of News Consumption and National Leaders ...48

 3.6. Chapter Conclusions49

4. IRAQ: FRAMES IN MEDIA REPORTING52

 4.1. Research Questions & Hypotheses52

 (A) Frame Identification53

 (B) Frame Messengers54

 (C) Opinion Leadership and Media Content55

 (D) Frame-Specific Debates56

 4.2. Data57

 4.3. Methods58

 4.4. Results59

 (A) Frame Identification59

 (B) Frame Messengers61

 (C) Local Opinion Leadership and Media Content62

(D) Frame-Specific Debates	64
4.5. Chapter Conclusions	66
5. IRAQ: MEDIA REPORTING AND FRAME RESONANCE	68
5.1. Research Questions & Hypotheses	69
(A) Levels of Frame Resonance	69
(B) The Effect of Media Content on Frame Resonance	70
(C) Sophistication, Ideology and Frame Resonance	70
5.2. Data	72
5.3. Methods	73
5.4. Results	74
(A) Levels of Frame Resonance	74
(B) The Effect of Media Content on Frame Resonance	76
(C) Sophistication, Ideology and Frame Resonance	77
5.5. Chapter Conclusions	79
6. IRAQ: FRAMING AND POLICY SUPPORT	81
6.1. Research Questions & Hypotheses	81
(A) Levels of Policy Support	82
(B) Frames as Drivers of Policy Support	82
(C) Sophistication, Ideology and Policy Support	84
(D) Considering Reverse Causality	84
6.2. Data	85
6.3. Methods	86
6.4. Results	87
(A) Levels of Policy Support	87
(B) Frames as Drivers of Policy Support	89
(C) Sophistication, Ideology and Policy Support	93
(D) Considering Reverse Causality	95
6.5. Chapter Conclusions	97
7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	99
7.1. Public Diplomacy Campaign Design and Assessment	99
(A) Message Targeting	100
(B) Local Advocates	103
(C) Ongoing, Multi-Level Assessment	106
7.2. Public Diplomacy and U.S. Foreign Policy	109
APPENDICES	113
Appendix A: Definitions of Public Diplomacy	113
Appendix B: Pew GAP Survey Details	118
Appendix C: Full Model Results, Chapter 3	119
Appendix D: Codebook	120
Appendix E: Pile Sort Results	148
Appendix F: Full Model Results, Chapter 5	152
Appendix G: Full Model Results, Chapter 6	153

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1 - Public Diplomacy as a Frame Production System..... 7

Figure 1.2 - Classifying Frames Through a Resonance-Importance Plot.. 10

Figure 1.3 - Study Organization..... 12

Figure 3.1 - Baseline Opinion of the U.S., By Country, July 2002..... 44

Figure 3.2 - Resonance-Importance Plot, By Country and Attitudinal
Driver of Support for U.S. Counter-Terrorism Policy, July 2002. 46

Figure 4.1 - Attributions of Pro-USG Frames, By Country and Time Period
..... 61

Figure 4.2 - Valence of Government Figures toward U.S. Iraq Policy, By
Country and Time Period..... 62

Figure 5.1 - Acceptance of Four Key Frames, by Country..... 75

Figure 5.2 - Frame Resonance for RETHRT, ALLOUT, TERROR and OIL, by
Political Sophistication and Self-Identified Ideology..... 77

Figure 5.3 - Effect of Self-Identified Ideology and Media Content on
Frame Resonance, by Level of Sophistication, November 2002..... 79

Figure 6.1 - Opinion of U.S.-Led Military Action in Iraq, By Country,
November 2002 and March 2003..... 88

Figure 6.2 - Resonance-Importance Plot, by Country and Frame Related to
U.S. Iraq Policy, November 2002..... 90

Figure 6.3 - Public Support for U.S.-Led Military Action in Iraq
(WARFAV), by Respondents' Political Sophistication, Self-
Identified Political Ideology, and Country..... 94

LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.1 - Key Frames, Based on Pile Aggregation.....	60
Table 4.2 - Significant Mismatches in Frame-Specific Debates.....	65
Table 6.1 - Frames Yielding Greatest Simulated Increase in Probability of Policy Support, by Country.....	92
Table 6.2 - Correlations Between Frame Acceptance Variables, by Country	96

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of this study is to demonstrate how a frame-based assessment methodology can mitigate analytical weaknesses in the design and evaluation of U.S. public diplomacy campaigns. Public diplomacy - informing, influencing and engaging key international audiences - can support U.S. coalition strategies by reducing international opposition to American policies. By viewing public diplomacy as a system that produces and distributes frames - cues or arguments that emphasize particular aspects of a policy, such as financial benefits or moral dilemmas - U.S. policymakers can better design, monitor, and refine messages in support of U.S. policy objectives and in response to policy critiques. For illustrative purposes, we apply this methodology to a specific policy issue - the 2002-2003 U.S. push for UN resolutions supporting the use of military force in Iraq. We conclude that U.S. messages were often not aligned with the key frames driving policy support among foreign publics, and the frame-related statements and positions of foreign political leaders ultimately mattered much more than what was said by U.S. officials themselves. Accordingly, we recommend a country-by-country messaging strategy relying on local advocates, rather than a uniform global campaign rooted in the messages of U.S. officials.

Chapter 1 sets forth this methodology in greater detail, dividing a public diplomacy campaign into discrete steps for assessment. These steps include: (1) baseline target audience research in support of initial frame design; (2) frame dissemination by the U.S. government (USG) and others; (3) the promulgation of these frames by foreign media and opinion leaders; (4) the acceptance of these frames by foreign publics; and (5) the impact of these frames on public support for U.S. policy. These steps will be analyzed in separate, subsequent chapters.

Chapter 2 provides necessary background on two topics. The first is a review of previous literature on framing, including the analytic process of identifying frames in media, and the relationship between

framing and public opinion. The second topic is a review of public diplomacy history, with particular emphasis on the issue of Iraq.

Chapter 3 uses the Iraq example to explore the first step of frame-based analysis: baseline target audience research to assess the potential effectiveness of alternative frames. We conclude, based on a statistical model using data available from the Pew Global Attitudes Project (GAP) in July 2002, that certain frames appeared particularly promising for generating policy support in specific countries (e.g., in France, framing U.S. policy as furthering the goals of the UN). Based on this same model, we also conclude that the impact of news consumption on policy support often depended on one's attitude towards local political leaders. This is of key policy significance: it suggests that the influence of media on policy-related public opinion may operate in conjunction with cues from local leaders, making such leaders an essential part of an effective communications strategy.

Chapter 4 evaluates the intermediate step of how well particular policy-relevant frames penetrated foreign media coverage. Through detailed analysis of media content in four key European countries, we conclude that (1) frames emphasized by local leaders were far more likely to be emphasized by a country's media than frames that were not, (2) "pro-USG" frames were generally put forth by US officials rather than by local leaders, and (3) the distribution of "pro-USG" frames did not match that of corresponding "anti-USG" frames, resulting in attacks on the U.S. position that went relatively unanswered. These findings are significant in that they alert policymakers to budding problems in the messaging campaign, such that shortcomings in message content or in local message advocacy could have been addressed.

Chapter 5 tests whether positive frame coverage in a country's media was associated with acceptance of the frame's underlying argument by that country's public (which we refer to as "frame resonance"). We conclude that country-level media coverage of a frame - measured as the percentage of statements in a country's media using a particular frame to discuss a particular issue - did have a significant association with the resonance of that frame in that country, based on a model predicting frame resonance from media coverage and other variables. However, the

association between media coverage and frame resonance was strongest when the media measure excluded USG statements, suggesting that the direct statements of U.S. officials were relatively ineffective in fostering frame resonance. The effect of media was also limited by the effects of political sophistication and individuals' self-identified political ideology, likely because sophisticated individuals were better able to selectively reject media messages they disagreed with in favor of those associated with their natural political leaders. This further emphasizes the advantages of using local advocates and country-by-country messages over a strategy of centralized message distribution by the USG.

Chapter 6 turns to the link between accepting the argument of a particular policy-related frame and actually expressing support for the policy. We again find that individual-level political variables and local political discourse exert important effects on policy support. By developing a model predicting policy support from frame resonance and other variables, we conclude that some frames drove policy acceptance more than others, and that certain frames relating to the consequences of - and motivations behind - U.S. policy may have been underutilized. This type of analysis provides direct policy recommendations regarding what to say about a policy, where, and to whom. We also conclude, based on low correlation among frame resonance variables, that it is not likely that reverse causality (policy support driving stated frame resonance) was at play.

Finally, Chapter 7 concludes by taking a step back from the Iraq example and discussing general design principles for future public diplomacy campaigns. These principles include (1) early identification of baseline attitudes and frames that are strongly associated with policy support among target audiences; (2) ongoing monitoring and diagnostics, such as identifying where in the framing process a problem occurred or may occur; and (3) refinements to strategy based on the importance of local political discourse and individual-level political variables in moderating the effect of frames on policy support.

1. INTRODUCTION

"In the area of politics and policy, our major obligation is not to mistake slogans for solutions."

-Edward R. Murrow, journalist and Director of the United States Information Agency (USIA), April 3, 1951

Until relatively recently in its history, the U.S. was unknown to much of the world. As late as the early 20th century, an American traveling in Western Europe could still encounter large groups of individuals who had never heard of the United States.¹ What knowledge did exist was often fragmented and incorrect; in 1865, an issue of the *Egyptian Army Bulletin* felt compelled to inform its readers that the American Civil war was taking place within the U.S. "and not between North America and South America."²

While there may still be some rare places in the world where the U.S. is unknown, more notable today is the number of people who know of the U.S. but appear not to like it. In the 24 nations surveyed in 2009 for the Pew Global Attitudes Project (GAP), more than 1 in 3 adults - representing nearly 700 million individuals - expressed an unfavorable view of the U.S., including some 230 million with a very unfavorable view.³ Although this represents a modest improvement over the previous year's poll, declarations that the 2008 U.S. presidential election had "turned America's image on its head" appear to be somewhat premature.⁴ In fact, in a number of countries of key strategic importance to the

¹ See, for example, "This Man Fed 6,000,000 Belgians: Capt. J.F. Lucey, Who Had Charge of the American Relief Work, Describes Conditions in Belgium." *The New York Times*, February 28, 1915, p. SM7; and "Grade A." *Time*, August 3, 1936, online at <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,770314-1,00.html>.

² *Egyptian Army Bulletin (al-Jarida al-'askariyya al-misriyya)*, Part 1 (1865). Cairo, Egypt, pp.32-34. Quoted in Ayalon, Ami. "The Arab Discovery of America in the Nineteenth Century." *Middle Eastern Studies* vol. 20 iss. 4 (Oct. 1984): pp. 5-17.

³ Author's calculations, based on The Pew Global Attitudes Project (2009), "Confidence in Obama Lifts U.S. Image Around the World: Most Muslim Publics Not So Easily Moved." Washington, DC: Pew.

⁴ Tutu, Desmond, "The Man of Tomorrow," *The Washington Post* 9 November 2008, p. B1.

U.S. - including China, Russia, Pakistan, Egypt, and Jordan - the percentage of adults rating the U.S. unfavorably either changed only marginally or actually worsened between 2008 and 2009.⁵ The numbers get notably worse when individuals are asked to state their opinion of U.S. policy, either generally or for specific policies such as the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan.

From a policy (and political) perspective, a great deal of the responsibility for improving these low opinion metrics is placed on the shoulders of U.S. public diplomacy.

1.1.1. DEFINING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Public diplomacy has been defined many times over,⁶ but a concise definition from the U.S. State Department defines it as "engaging, informing, and influencing key international audiences."⁷ In what may be its earliest modern definition, Foreign Service officer Edmund Gullion wrote that public diplomacy deals with the

influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies...the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication...between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of intercultural communications.⁸

⁵ Author's calculations, based on Pew (2009) and (2008), "Some Positive Signs for U.S. Image: Global Economic Gloom - China and India Notable Exceptions." Washington, DC: Pew.

⁶ The phrase "public diplomacy" was originally understood as a synonym for "open diplomacy" (i.e., a prohibition on secret treaties). In the 1950s, the meaning shifted as it was recognized that these open diplomatic actions carried with them the potential for showmanship and propaganda. See Cull, Nicholas J. "'Public Diplomacy' before Gullion: The Evolution of a Phrase." *Public Diplomacy Blog*, University of Southern California Center on Public Diplomacy, 18 April 2006, online at http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/index.php/newsroom/pdblog_detail/060418_public_diplomacy_before_gullion_the_evolution_of_a_phrase/.

⁷ "Senior Officials." U.S. Department of State. Online at <http://www.state.gov/misc/19232.htm>.

⁸ Edmund A. Gullion, quoted in Snow Jr., Crocker, "About America: Edward R. Murrow: Journalism at its Best," USINFO Publications (April 2006), online at <http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/murrow/snow.htm>.

Subsequent definitions of public diplomacy have trimmed this rather wide scope, although each definition emphasizes a different combination of activities and objectives. A review of 20 contemporary definitions of public diplomacy from government and academic sources (listed in Appendix A) yielded the following key elements:

- *Audience*: public diplomacy is almost always defined as directed toward a foreign audience; in the United States, public diplomacy agencies are prohibited by law from influencing U.S. public opinion.⁹
- *Functions*: as in the State Department definition on the previous page, public diplomacy functions generally fall into three groups: informing/educating, influencing/persuading, and engaging/exchanging.
- *Goals*: while informing or engaging are sometimes treated as goals in themselves, the majority of definitions see the ultimate goal of public diplomacy as furthering the national security and foreign policy objectives of the home country.
- *Actors*: a small number of definitions explicitly define public diplomacy as the domain of government, or as the responsibility of both public and private actors.

In FY2009, an estimated \$1.66 billion was spent by the State Department and related agencies on the three major arms of public diplomacy activities: educational and cultural exchanges (\$538 million), diplomatic outreach and information services (\$410 million), and broadcasting of U.S.-sponsored media abroad (\$716 million).¹⁰ Similar activities have also been conducted out of the Defense Department under the related efforts of Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (DSPD),

⁹ U.S. Code, Title 22, §1461-1a, online at http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode22/usc_sec_22_00001461----001a.html.

¹⁰ Congressional Research Service (CRS) (2009). *State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2010 Budget and Appropriations*. Washington, DC. CRS Report for Congress R40693, online at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40693.pdf>.

strategic communications, and information operations, for which approximately \$788 million was spent in FY2009.¹¹

1.2. STUDY MOTIVATION

This study is motivated by two different classes of policy problems. At the highest level are the problems that public diplomacy is intended to solve, which include low support for the U.S. and its policies among foreign opinion leaders and the foreign public. This problem can be particularly harmful in cases where the U.S. adopts a strategy based on international military and/or diplomatic coalitions, and potential coalition members weigh public sentiment in deciding whether or not to join the U.S. For example, lukewarm public support for continued military operations in Afghanistan among U.S. allies may make these allies less willing to provide continued military assistance, resulting in higher financial and human costs for the U.S. military. As documented in Chapter 2, U.S. policymakers believed that foreign public opinion would, in a similar manner, influence the willingness of UN Security Council members to support a U.S.-sponsored resolution regarding military action in Iraq.

At the operational level, this study is also motivated by problems in the current execution of public diplomacy. Recent but recurring official criticisms include the lack of coordinated research in support of public diplomacy, and the State Department's reliance on broad or generic audience research rather than actionable data on the attitudes of whichever specific targeted groups might be important to a particular campaign.¹²

There also appear to be shortcomings in public diplomacy metrics used by the State Department in its annual performance reports. Current

¹¹ U.S. House of Representatives, "Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2010," Report of the Committee on Appropriations, online at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_reports&docid=f:hr230.111.

¹² See, e.g., U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), "U.S. Public Diplomacy: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight", GAO-09-679SP (2009), and "U.S. Public Diplomacy: Actions Needed to Improve Strategic Use and Coordination of Research," GAO-07-904 (2007).

metrics primarily consist of process indicators (e.g., annual numbers of youth exchanges, commissioned polls, or press briefings) and localized program opinion impacts (e.g., whether participants in a particular public diplomacy program increased their understanding of U.S. society or experienced a decline in anti-American sentiment).¹³ Underlying most of these metrics is the (not unreasonable) assumption that the primary unit of analysis of public diplomacy is the "program" - some intervention designed to foster understanding of or friendship with the U.S. among a finite group of foreign participants. While these metrics are useful, they exclude the vast majority of individuals who have never participated in a State Department-sponsored program, but nevertheless receive messages about the U.S. and whose support (or opposition) to U.S. foreign policies should still be assessed. Nor do these metrics consider the role of local opinion leaders, or the link between opinion metrics and ultimate foreign policy objectives (whether broad or specific) of the U.S. government.

As far as measuring public diplomacy progress in reaching mass foreign publics - the vast majority of whom have never participated in State Department programs, but only learn about the U.S. through sources such as local media - the State Department does have at least one metric: the number of "placements of interviews and speeches given by U.S. Government officials in print and electronic media."¹⁴ However, this is a somewhat blunt instrument for measuring U.S. success; it misses stories covering the U.S. perspective but falling shy of a full interview or speech, and ignores the relative quantity of opposing perspectives challenging the U.S. message.

Taken as a whole, there appears to be an unmet need for a more action-oriented and coordinated effort in support of (1) designing public diplomacy messages more effectively tailored to specific target audiences, and (2) measuring the success of these messages beyond small groups of program participants. The key policy question - how to effectively meet this need - is addressed in this study.

¹³ U.S. Department of State, "FY 2007 Annual Performance Report & FY 2009 Annual Performance Plan." Washington, DC.

¹⁴ Ibid.

1.3. FRAME-FOCUSED ASSESSMENT: A TOOL FOR COORDINATED ANALYSIS

The central argument of this study is that these unmet needs in message design and diagnostics can be addressed through an alternative assessment methodology disaggregating public diplomacy campaigns into frames - cues or arguments that emphasize particular aspects of an issue, such as moral dilemmas or financial benefits. In particular, by treating U.S.-preferred frames as the primary units of public diplomacy - to be counted, tracked, and refined - U.S. policymakers can better design, execute, monitor, and tweak a campaign at the level of specific messages. This process can also be used to assess the influence of local political discourse and individual-level audience characteristics on the success of the campaign. As we will show, many of these influences can be significant, to varying degrees.

(A) Defining Frames

Like public diplomacy, "frames" and the process of "framing" have been defined many times over. The concept of a frame, generally co-credited to the separate work of the anthropologist Gregory Bateson and the sociologist Erving Goffman,^{15,16} essentially relates to the way in which an issue is discussed - with the dimensions of the frame defining what elements are, and are not, included in the discussion. Subsequent researchers have defined the term clearly and usefully as follows:

A frame is a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection among them. The frame suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue.¹⁷

To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal

¹⁵ Bateson, Gregory, *Steps to an ecology of mind: Collected essays in anthropology, psychiatry, evolution, and epistemology*, New York: Ballantine, 1972.

¹⁶ Goffman, Erving, *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*, London: Harper and Row, 1974.

¹⁷ Gamson, William A. and Andre Modigliani, "The changing culture of affirmative action," Richard G. Braungart and Margaret M. Braungart (eds.), *Research in political sociology* vol. 3 (1987): pp. 137-177.


interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.¹⁸

As will be described in subsequent chapters, Entman's distinction between using frames to promote a particular problem definition (i.e., that the issue boils down to the problem of X), as opposed to framing in order to promote a particular treatment recommendation (i.e., that the solution to the problem is Y), is one of particular importance.

(B) Public Diplomacy as a Frame Production System

Under a frame-based approach, public diplomacy can be understood not merely as a series of disparate small-scale programs, but as a coordinated system that produces and disseminates specific frames to build support for the U.S. and its policies. Figure 1.1, below, presents a simple illustration of this system.

Figure 1.1 - Public Diplomacy as a Frame Production System



¹⁸ Entman, Robert M. (1993), "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm," *Journal of Communication* vol. 43 iss. 4: pp. 51-8.

The USG might begin at the top left of this diagram, considering some new foreign policy initiative - for example, an increase in the number of troops in Afghanistan - and setting related public diplomacy policy objectives, such as increasing public support for the policy among U.S. military allies. Next, the USG could conduct baseline target audience analysis to identify key drivers of policy support or opposition (e.g., finding that Germans oppose the policy because they do not believe it will reduce the risk of terrorism) and design frames to target these drivers (e.g., emphasizing the new counter-terrorism elements of the policy). The USG could then disseminate these frames via the speeches and interviews of U.S. officials and allies.

The remaining three boxes along the bottom of Figure 1.1 represent three key outcomes in this system. First, the U.S.-preferred frames are subsequently repeated in varying degrees by foreign media outlets and opinion leaders, along with other (possibly adversarial) frames emphasizing alternative aspects of the policy. Second, after being exposed to these frames, individuals may or may not be persuaded to accept the central argument of the frame (e.g., that the new policy really will reduce the risk of terrorism). Finally, this frame resonance will, depending on the influence of the frame, drive whether or not the individual actually expresses support for the U.S. policy.

In addition, at all stages of the process, metrics and feedback on performance and effectiveness can be collected. If progress at any stage of the process is unsatisfactory, frames should be refined, replaced, or reassigned to different messengers, restarting the process depicted in Figure 1.1. The need for refinement will be larger if the USG chose its original messages on an *ad hoc* basis - which, as we will discuss in subsequent chapters, has sometimes occurred.

(C) Advantages of a Frame-Based Approach

There are several advantages of assessing public diplomacy through a frame-based process. First, this conceptualization provides early, precise, and action-oriented diagnostics as to why a particular public diplomacy initiative is failing, or why a certain policy remains

unpopular. Any link depicted as an arrow in Figure 1.1 could be broken, resulting in the following potential problems:

- the USG has not articulated objectives for public diplomacy;
- the USG has articulated objectives, but has not gauged the feasibility of those objectives by conducting baseline target audience research;
- the USG has conducted baseline target audience research, but has not translated that research into the design of effective and targeted frames;
- the USG has designed effective frames, but has not effectively disseminated them;
- the frames are being disseminated, but they are not being taken up by international media or in the relevant foreign political discourse;
- the frames are being taken up by the desired media and opinion leaders, but the frames are nevertheless not resonating among foreign publics; or
- the frames are resonating among foreign publics, but have only a weak or nonexistent relationship with the original objectives of the public diplomacy campaign.


Each of these failures would require a radically different policy solution, and so identifying which type of failure is to blame in which context would be of significant value in maximizing the success of U.S. messaging.

A second advantage of frame-based assessment is that it can provide direct policy recommendations for designing effective messages targeted to particular audiences. For each frame in support of a specific U.S. policy, two key measures can be taken for any target audience: (1) the level of frame resonance, or the acceptance of the frame's central argument (e.g., that policy X will yield benefit Y); and (2) the frame's importance in ultimately driving support for the policy (e.g., as measured by a regression coefficient in a model predicting policy support). For example, if the U.S. were trying to promote a new

Mideast peace initiative among foreign publics, one might find that in Lebanon, an economic frame - emphasizing the potential benefits of the initiative for the economies in the region - has high resonance (people believe this economic argument) but low importance (this argument ultimately does not play a significant role in driving support for the initiative). Thus, each frame for each audience can be plotted in two-dimensional space corresponding with these two measures, which we refer to as a resonance-importance plot.

Figure 1.2, below, divides this plot into conceptual quadrants based on the relative levels of a frame's resonance and importance.

Figure 1.2 - Classifying Frames Through a Resonance-Importance Plot



Different dots represent different possible frames emphasizing various pro-policy arguments (e.g., economic frames, national security frames, or moral frames). As was the case with diagnostics, the appropriate policy action varies significantly depending on where we look in this space:

- *High acceptance, high weight (upper right quadrant)*: Frames in this quadrant are the current drivers of policy support – they are both widely accepted and are significantly associated with policy support. These frames should remain a part of a messaging campaign, but since the arguments related to the frame are already widely accepted, they have limited potential for further increasing policy support.
- *Low acceptance, high weight (upper left quadrant)*: Frames in this quadrant represent major drivers of policy opposition. These frames are important, but the pro-USG argument is not widely accepted (e.g., policy support hinges on perceived economic impact, but few people believe the impact would be positive). Solutions here can include increasing frame resonance (persuasion, as shown by the "A" arrow in Figure 1.2), or trying to de-emphasize the importance of the problematic frame as a driver of policy support (as shown by the "B" arrow in the figure).
- *High acceptance, low weight (lower right quadrant)*: Frames in this quadrant have unrealized positive potential. The arguments underlying the frames are widely accepted, but the frames are not particularly important drivers of policy support. The messaging solution here is not an issue of persuasion, but is a matter of classic framing: giving the topic a more prominent role when discussing the policy at issue, to increase its role in driving policy support (as shown by the "C" arrow).
- *Low acceptance, low weight (lower left quadrant)*: Frames in this quadrant are not widely accepted, and are only weakly associated with policy support. They are neither damaging nor promising, and can generally be ignored.


In chapters 3 and 6, we will use these resonance-importance plots to offer policy recommendations on the design and refinement of messages in support of specific U.S. policies.

1.4. STUDY ORGANIZATION

This study is organized into seven chapters. The research in the four key analytical chapters (Chapters 3 through 6) is intended to parallel the research that would have actually been required in the frame-based assessment of a specific public diplomacy campaign: the U.S. effort in 2002-03 to build international support for military action in Iraq.

Accordingly, the study organization, as depicted in Figure 1.3, has been overlaid on the steps of the frame production process as illustrated in Figure 1.1.

Figure 1.3 - Study Organization



After the current chapter (introduction), Chapter 2 provides background information on the history of U.S. public diplomacy and relevant framing literature. Chapters 3 through 6 explore key steps in the frame-based assessment process for the chosen policy example of Iraq, and provide implications for message design and diagnostics.

As depicted above, Chapter 3 illustrates baseline target audience analysis to identify promising frames and design effective messages; Chapter 4 evaluates the intermediate step of how well particular policy-relevant frames penetrated foreign media reporting on Iraq; Chapter 5 tests whether positive frame coverage in a country's media was associated with resonance of the frame among that country's public; Chapter 6 turns to the link between accepting the argument of a particular policy-related frame and actually expressing support for the policy; and Chapter 7 concludes by discussing general design principles for the implementation and assessment of future public diplomacy campaigns.

As noted above, rather than explore these steps in the abstract, we will directly illustrate the assessment methodology by applying it to a specific example of U.S. public diplomacy in support of a key policy. The chosen example is the U.S. government's explicit mission, in 2002 and 2003, to secure the passage of new UN Security Council resolutions on Iraq by generating foreign public support of its Iraq policy among UN Security Council member nations.¹⁹ The Iraq example was chosen for a number of reasons: the scope of the USG's public diplomacy effort on this issue (discussed in Chapter 3), the availability of baseline public opinion data coinciding with the period of campaign design (also discussed in Chapter 3), the richness of competing frames surrounding the causes and consequences of the Iraq policy (discussed in Chapter 4), the availability of opinion data relating to the resonance of specific frames (discussed in Chapter 5), and their relationship with overall policy support (discussed in Chapter 6).

¹⁹ For an example of the USG making explicit its mission of securing passage of a UN resolution by influencing public opinion, in early 2003, the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs told journalists from Mexico (one of the members of the UN Security Council being courted to vote for the U.S. position) that "Mexico is a democratic country and I would assume that Mexico in its government would listen to public opinion" regarding Iraq. Source: State Department, February 11, 2003, "Grossman Calls U.N. Security Council Unity Critical to Iraq Solution; Under Secretary of State speaks to German, Mexican journalists." News from the Washington File, Accessed via LexisNexis.

The analysis of the Iraq case has been divided into three study periods, each of which ends with the collection of Pew Global Attitude Project (GAP) public opinion surveys.

The first period (July 2002) represented what U.S. officials considered to be the period of intensive planning for the U.S. public diplomacy campaign (and domestic political campaign) surrounding Iraq.²⁰ Although Pew data from this period does not ask respondents about Iraq specifically, these data can nevertheless be used to generate insights on how audience analysis could have informed the design and tracking of effective messages in support of U.S. policy.

The second period (September-November 2002) represents the launch of the campaign, beginning with President Bush's September 12th, 2002 speech to the UN General Assembly urging new disarmament demands on Iraq, and ending with the November 2002 Pew survey, which gauged both overall support for a possible war and resonance of a number of key Iraq-related frames.

The third period (February-March 2003) represents the conclusion of the campaign, beginning with Secretary of State Colin Powell's speech to the UN documenting alleged Iraqi deception regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and ending with the March 2003 Pew survey, which again gauged war support, but did not repeat the key frame-related questions. By covering multiple time periods, each at different periods of the U.S. public diplomacy campaign, we allow for an additional dimension of variation in our analysis, and provide a more complete narrative of how framing and media coverage changed throughout the course of the public diplomacy effort.

We focus on four key European countries - the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Russia - all of whom sat on the UN Security Council in the critical period before the war, and whose populations were therefore all prime targets for the U.S. effort to influence public opinion.

²⁰ Bumiller, Elisabeth. "Traces of Terror: The Strategy; Bush Aides Set Strategy to Sell Policy on Iraq." *The New York Times* 7 September 2002, p. A1.

Finally, it is worth noting that the analysis in this dissertation is neither intended to serve as an affirmation or an indictment of U.S. policy toward Iraq at this time. The Iraq policy example is used here simply to demonstrate the benefit of frame-based design and diagnostic tools for future public diplomacy campaigns.

1.5. TOP-LEVEL CONCLUSIONS

There are several major streams of top-level conclusions running through the chapters and analyses of this study.

The first set of top-level conclusions concern the importance of early identification - and continued monitoring - of target audience attitudes and frames that are most strongly associated with policy support.

In Chapter 3 (baseline target audience analysis) we conclude, based on a statistical model using the summer 2002 Pew GAP data, that certain frames appeared particularly promising for generating policy support in specific countries. For example, our findings suggest that support for U.S. policy among the French public might have been particularly aided by framing the U.S. policy as furthering the goals of the UN.

In Chapter 4 (frame reporting in media) we conclude from detailed analysis of media content that the distribution of "pro-USG" frames did not match the distribution of corresponding "anti-USG" frames - e.g., a relatively high frequency of frames focused on the risks of war for the Iraqi people was not matched by frames arguing the war would help Iraqis - resulting in attacks on the U.S. position that went relatively unanswered.

In Chapter 5 (frame resonance) we conclude that media content did have a significant association with frame resonance, based on a model predicting frame resonance from media content and other variables.

In Chapter 6 (policy support) we again conclude, based on a model predicting Iraq policy support from frame resonance measures and other variables, that some frames drove policy acceptance more than others, and that certain frames relating to the consequences of - and

motivations behind - U.S. policy may have been underutilized.²¹ This type of analysis provides direct policy recommendations regarding what might have been said (or not said) about U.S. Iraq policy, where, and to whom.

The second set of top-level conclusions concern the importance of local (foreign) political discourse and advocacy over a strategy of centralized message distribution by the USG.

In Chapter 3 (baseline target audience analysis) we conclude from the summer 2002 model that the impact of news consumption on support for U.S. policy depended strongly on one's attitude toward local political leaders. This suggests that the influence of media on policy-related public opinion may operate in conjunction with cues from local leaders, making such leaders an essential part of an effective communications strategy.

In Chapter 4 (frame reporting in media) we find that (1) frames emphasized by local leaders were far more likely to be emphasized by a country's media than frames that were not, and that (2) "pro-USG" frames were generally put forth by USG officials much more than by local figures. This combination should alert policymakers to fundamental limitations in their ability to drive the foreign media narrative while relying on American messengers.

In Chapter 5 (frame resonance) we find that measures of media content excluding USG statements had a stronger association with frame resonance than measures of overall media content, suggesting that the direct statements of U.S. officials were relatively ineffective in fostering frame resonance. The effects of media were also limited by the effects of respondents' political sophistication and self-identified political ideology, likely because sophisticated individuals are better able to selectively reject media messages they disagree with in favor of those associated with their natural political leaders.

²¹ In this chapter, we also conclude, based on low correlation among frame resonance variables, that it is not likely that reverse causality was at play (i.e., policy support driving stated acceptance of policy-related frames).

In Chapter 6 (policy support) we also find that individual-level political variables and local political discourse exert important effects directly on policy support. This further emphasizes the advantages of local message advocacy over a strategy of centralized message distribution by the USG.

Accordingly, we conclude with a number of general design and assessment principles for future public diplomacy campaigns. These principles include (1) early identification of baseline attitudes and frames that are strongly associated with policy support among target audiences; (2) ongoing monitoring and diagnostics, such as identifying where in the frame production process a problem occurred or may occur; and (3) refinements to strategy based on the importance of local political discourse and individual-level political variables in moderating the effect of frames on policy support.

2. BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH

This chapter provides necessary background on two topics. The first is a brief review of the history of American public diplomacy. The second is a review of previous academic literature on framing, including the analytic process of identifying frames in media content, and the relationship between framing and public opinion.

2.1. U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: A BRIEF HISTORY

Public diplomacy can be documented in the U.S. as early as 1774, four days after the first battle of the American Revolution, when the Continental Congress passed a resolution "to prepare an address to the people of Great-Britain" for sympathy and support.^{22,23} The public diplomacy campaign continued into 1775 with direct appeals to the people of Canada, Ireland, and again to the British themselves.^{24,25,26}

For the next 150 years, similar efforts would occasionally re-emerge, almost exclusively timed (as in 1774) with the outbreak of war. For instance, soon after South Carolina dissolved itself from the Union in 1860, it engaged in an appeal "to the people of the slaveholding states of the United States" for sympathy and support.²⁷

²² "Sullivan's Draught" in *Journals of the Continental Congress*, 14 October 1774. Accessed at [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field\(DOCID+@lit\(jc00132\)\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(jc00132))):. .

²³ "Address to the People of Great-Britain" in *Journals of the Continental Congress*, 21 October 1774. Accessed at [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field\(DOCID+@lit\(jc00138\)\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(jc00138))):. .

²⁴ "Letter to the Inhabitants of Canada," in *Journals of the Continental Congress*, 29 May 1775. Accessed at <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/contcong/05-29-75.htm>.

²⁵ "The Twelve United Colonies, by their Delegates in Congress, to the Inhabitants of Great Britain," in *Journals of the Continental Congress*, 8 July 1775. Accessed at <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/contcong/07-08-75.htm>.

²⁶ "Address to the People of Ireland," in *Journals of the Continental Congress*, 28 July 1775. Accessed at <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/contcong/07-28-75.htm>.

²⁷ Rhett, Robert B. "The Address of the People of South Carolina, Assembled in Convention, to the People of the Slaveholding States of the United States," in *Courier* (South Carolina), December 1860.

More well-known is the American effort at the onset of its involvement in World War I, when the Committee on Public Information (CPI) was established to communicate America's war aims and combat anti-American stereotypes.²⁸ George Creel, head of the CPI until its abolition in 1919, foreshadowed the phrasing of modern policymakers in describing an enemy ideology (German militarism) that "had to be fought out in the hearts and minds of people as well as on the actual firing-line."²⁹ In conjunction with a sizeable domestic propaganda campaign, the U.S. government attempted to influence foreign minds by printing millions of foreign language pamphlets and booklets, supplying articles directly to foreign media, creating goodwill societies to appeal to foreign elites, and exhibiting feature films about American society to foreign audiences.

After an inter-war lull, U.S. public diplomacy was resuscitated in an attempt to blunt growing Nazi propaganda activities in Latin America during the late 1930s. The U.S. efforts, which included the first bi-national cultural centers, were expanded and consolidated under the Office of War Information (OWI) after U.S. entry into the World War II. The Voice of America (VOA) radio service first began broadcasting to foreign audiences, in 1942, under the aegis of the OWI. At this time the OWI also mounted a significant effort to enlist Hollywood in the war effort, with OWI officials offering script suggestions designed to boost morale, and asking movie studios to consider a simple question: "Will this picture help win the war?"³⁰ Eventually, the OWI diverged from the practices of the CPI by de-emphasizing domestic propaganda; in response

²⁸ As with "public diplomacy" (see Chapter 1), the phrase "anti-Americanism" has changed in meaning over time. The phrase appears to have first been used in the mid-19th century, but as a synonym for engaging in activities not considered American (what now might be called "un-Americanism"). Only later in the 20th century would the term take on its present meaning.

²⁹ Creel, George. *How We Advertised America: The First Telling of the Amazing Story of the Committee on Public Information that Carried the Gospel of Americanism to Every Corner of the Globe*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1920.

³⁰ Koppes, Clayton R. and Gregory D. Black. *Hollywood Goes to War: How Politics, Profits and Propaganda Shaped World War II Movies*. Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1990.

to political pressure, domestic operations were whittled down to a mere ten percent of OWI's budget by 1944.³¹

More importantly, the nation's World War II foray into public diplomacy differed from its predecessors in that it managed to survive after the hostilities ended. Public diplomacy activities continued in occupied Germany and Japan, where the U.S. military offered its own newspapers and radio for the local population, sent officers to discuss democracy in towns and villages, and created cultural institutes and exchanges. While the effort in Germany was plagued by competing Soviet propaganda, the Japanese program suffered from the large cultural gap between the U.S. and Japan, as well as the trauma of the American nuclear attacks on the country.³²

Although the OWI was abolished in 1945 and ninety percent of its staff cut, an under-funded core was transferred to the State Department,³³ where it soon re-grew to meet the ideological threats of the early Cold War. The early postwar era saw the creation of the Fulbright Program of educational exchanges, as well as the launch of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation (later Radio Liberty) to more directly target audiences under Soviet control or threat. On the legislative front, the passage of the Smith-Mundt Act in 1948 provided statutory authority for much of today's public diplomacy efforts and declared that it was the official policy of the U.S. government to "promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries, and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries."³⁴ This purpose was further reinforced by the 1953 creation of an independent information agency,

³¹ Parry-Giles, Shawn J. *The Rhetorical Presidency, Propaganda, and the Cold War, 1945-1955*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001.

³² Dizard, Wilson P. *Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of the U.S. Information Agency*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004.

³³ Dizard (2004), p. 39.

³⁴ United States Government (1948). *Public Law 402 - The United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948*. Online at <http://www.ourstory.info/library/5-AFSIS/laws/Congress1.html> (as of December 5, 2007).

the United States Information Agency (USIA), to oversee and coordinate much of the nation's public diplomacy policy.

Over the next few years, the U.S. successfully supplemented its broadcast-based "air war" by enhancing its on-the-ground public diplomacy presence around the globe. By the mid-1960's, the United States Information Service (USIS) library system had established 168 libraries abroad, taught English to over 1.5 million foreign adults, and was assisting in the distribution of nearly 13 million books (and thousands of musical records) annually.³⁵ The USIA also became the world's largest periodical publisher, producing 79 newspapers and magazines with circulation of 110 million copies, and the agency gave tangible demonstrations of American culture, prosperity and technology at international trade fairs and performing arts venues abroad.³⁶

The Vietnam era presented a number of new challenges to the nation's maturing public diplomacy system. Among these were the need to maintain consistent messages with the military's psychological operations in the region, and the human and financial drain of allocating ten percent of the USIA's resources to Vietnam during the late 1960s and early 1970s, depriving other regions of manpower and money.³⁷ The former problem was remedied by the establishment of the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) to coordinate military and civilian operations, but the latter problem faded only as the U.S. withdrew its military forces from the region.³⁸ Meanwhile, the government's acknowledgment of CIA involvement with Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty prompted the creation of the Board for International Broadcasting (BIB), an independent oversight entity and predecessor of today's Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG).

The late Cold War featured a number of innovations, some controversial, in public diplomacy philosophy and practice. These

³⁵ Anderton, Lillian D. (1967). "U.S.I.S. Libraries: A Branch of U.S.I.A." *Peabody Journal of Education* vol. 45 iss. 2: pp. 114-120.

³⁶ Dizard (2004), pp. 70-71, 165, 192.

³⁷ Tuch, Hans N. *Communicating with the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990.: p. 30.

³⁸ Dizard (2004), pp. 98, 138.

included President Carter's call for "mutuality" in public diplomacy, in which current informational operations would be complemented by efforts to teach Americans about other countries;³⁹ the creation of the anti-Castro Radio Martí in 1983; and the launch that same year of Worldnet, USIA's live television venture. As the Cold War wound to a close, however, the drop in Soviet-era media restrictions and rise in cable news services chipped away at some of the most fundamental justifications for US-sponsored communications. No longer the sole news lifeline for Iron Curtain populations, and despite a useful role in educating its audiences about the transition to market democracy, USIA soon became a target for budget cutters within the USG. After adjusting for inflation, post-Cold War public diplomacy expenditures peaked in 1994 and subsequently dropped by approximately 50 percent by the year 2000.⁴⁰ Under pressure from lawmakers, the USIA itself was abolished in 1999 and its functions folded back within the State Department, albeit under the authority of new Under Secretary.

The 9/11 attacks reversed the trend yet again, as the question of "why do they hate us?" sharply increased American consciousness of the country's negative image abroad, driving a greater sense of urgency, innovation, and accountability to the U.S. public diplomacy system. After the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration boosted the State Department's public diplomacy budget by approximately 14 percent,⁴¹ and appointed advertising executive Charlotte Beers to the previously vacant position of Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy Public Affairs. These top-level changes were supplemented by the creation of the Office of Global Communications, a public diplomacy office located within the White House, with the mission of supplementing rapid response with initiatives to better publicize U.S. humanitarian efforts and (as

³⁹ The White House. *Memorandum for Director, International Communication Agency*, 13 March 1978. Cited in Tuch (1990), p. 32.

⁴⁰ Epstein, Susan B. *CRS Report for Congress: U.S. Public Diplomacy: Background and the 9/11 Commission Recommendations*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006.

⁴¹ Author's calculations, from U.S. State Department, "Department of State Budget in Brief", accessed at <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/bib/index.htm>.

discussed in Chapter 3) to garner support for the disarmament of Saddam Hussein.⁴² The State Department also launched a number of new initiatives and programs, including Radio Sawa and Radio Farda (2002), Alhurra television (2004), and an Office of Private Sector Outreach to engage non-governmental entities in public diplomacy (2005).

More discrete campaigns included the Department's \$15 million-budget "Shared Values" Initiative, airing "mini-documentaries" on the lives of American Muslims to audiences in Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Kuwait. The paid advertisements, produced by the McCann-Erickson advertising firm, were widely criticized, and several Muslim countries - including Egypt and Lebanon - refused to air the spots. The campaign aired for only one month before it was discontinued.⁴³ Tactical improvements elsewhere in the public diplomacy system included Coalition Information Centers (CICs), launched by the military in late 2001 to provide rapid response to enemy propaganda in Afghanistan.

2.2. PREVIOUS FRAMING LITERATURE

The relevant literature on framing can be broadly divided into two areas: the process of identifying frames present in media sources, and the relationship between media framing and changes in public opinion.

(A) Defining and Extracting Frames

The size, diversity, relevance, consistent structure, and easy availability of news reports have made them the frequent subject of content analysis. Credit for the first quantitative content analysis of news articles generally goes to Speed (1893), who studied the declining coverage of what were considered substantive news topics in New York newspapers.⁴⁴ By the 1930s, content analysis of media sources had

⁴² The White House. *New White House Office Coordinates Global Communications*, 21 January 2003. Online at <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030121-4.html>.

⁴³ GAO (2006), "U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges," GAO-06-535.

⁴⁴ Speed, John G. (1893), "Do Newspapers Now Give the News?" *Forum* 15, pp. 705-711. Credited in Krippendorff, Klaus (2003), *Content*

evolved to study not just *what* was presented but *how* particular subjects, such as stereotyped groups, were portrayed.⁴⁵ At this time, the political scientist and theorist Harold Lasswell made notable contributions by undertaking large-scale content analyses of mass communication, refining quantitative indicators, and recognizing the importance of elites in the communications process.⁴⁶

After the development of framing as a cognitive concept in the 1970s, as discussed in Chapter 1, other researchers quickly applied this concept to news media. Developments included observations on the unavoidability of framing in the process of crafting a news story;⁴⁷ as well as Gitlin's (1980) more targeted concept of a *media frame*:

Media frames are persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual. Frames enable journalists to process large amounts of information quickly and routinely: to recognize it as information, to assign it to cognitive categories, and to package it for efficient relay to their audiences.⁴⁸

Other useful definitions followed, including those quoted earlier by Gamson and Modigliani (1987) and Entman (1993), who defined framing (respectively) as explaining what a controversy is really about, or selectively emphasizing certain aspects of a problem in order to promote a particular problem definition or treatment recommendation. Framing has been similarly incorporated into media studies as a form of "second-level agenda-setting."⁴⁹ "First-level" agenda-setting refers to the

Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology (2nd ed.), Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, p. 5.

⁴⁵ Krippendorff (2003), p. 6.

⁴⁶ Janowitz, Morris (1968), "Harold D. Lasswell's Contribution to Content Analysis," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* vol. 32 iss. 4: pp. 646-653.

⁴⁷ Tuchman, Gaye (1976), "Telling Stories," *The Journal of Communication* vol. 26 iss. 4: pp. 93-97.

⁴⁸ Gitlin, Todd (1980), *The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making & Unmaking of the New Left*, Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 7.

⁴⁹ Ghanem, Salma (1997). "Filling in the Tapestry: The Second Level of Agenda Setting," pp. 3-14 in McCombs, Maxwell, Donald L. Shaw,

theory that the relative amount of coverage the media dedicates to competing issues (e.g., healthcare vs. Afghanistan) influences public perception of each issue's importance.⁵⁰ As stated by Cohen (1963), "the press...may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about."⁵¹ [Emphasis original.] Political elites can affect this relative coverage through their statements and actions. Second-level agenda setting (framing) refers to an identical but smaller-scale phenomenon, focusing on media coverage and public perception of different elements *within the same issue rather than across issues* (e.g., the risks of health reform vs. the problems of the current health system).

More recent work connecting media frames to public policy also includes the concept of a "valenced news frame," where media frames are noted as either "advantageous" or "disadvantageous" toward a particular political entity or policy position.⁵² Similarly, research has identified "valence issues" linking a political leader or party to objectively positive or negative consequences, such as peace or unemployment.⁵³ This addition of valence to the concept of framing echoes earlier work grouping frames into positive and negative categories and comparing their relative prevalence,⁵⁴ and will be of particular use in this study.

and David Weaver (eds.), *Communication and Democracy: Exploring the Intellectual Frontiers in Agenda-Setting Theory*. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

⁵⁰ McCombs, Maxwell E. and Donald L. Shaw (1972), "The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 36, pp. 176-187.

⁵¹ Cohen, Bernard C. *The Press and Foreign Policy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963.

⁵² De Vreese, Claes and Hajo Boomgaarden (2003), "Valenced news frames and public support for the EU," *Communications* vol. 28 iss. 4: pp. 361-381.

⁵³ Brody, Richard A. (1991), *Assessing the President: The Media, Elite Opinion, and Public Support*, Stanford CA: Stanford University Press.

⁵⁴ Hufker, Brian and Gray Cavender (1990), "From Freedom Flotilla to America's Burden: The Social Construction of the Mariel Immigrants," *The Sociological Quarterly* vol. 31 iss. 2: pp. 321-335.

Despite these clarifications and advances, a number of key ambiguities and disagreements remain on a media researcher might best identify the frames currently used by political elites.⁵⁵ Disagreements here include whether researchers should look for a small, common set of generic frames (e.g., moral or human interest frames) across all media frame analyses,⁵⁶ or if they should identify more specific frames tailored to the particular research topic (e.g., framing relations with Mexico in terms of the drug war).⁵⁷ A similar methodological choice concerns whether frames should be identified deductively (i.e., predefined in advance of data collection),⁵⁸ or inductively (i.e., emerging from the media content itself).⁵⁹ There are even disagreements about the value of these sorts of methodological disagreements - some authors blast them as evidence of inconsistency and vagueness in framing studies,⁶⁰ while others praise the diversity as necessary for a comprehensive and growing understanding of the subject.⁶¹

Once the individual media frames have been identified, they may then be extracted from news text via content analytic methodologies. Elite newspapers and/or newswire services are often chosen as sources for this analysis, based on their primary role in both directly providing information and in influencing coverage in other sources.

⁵⁵ The issue of how a policy analyst - using audience analysis - might identify and recommend promising frames political elites might use in the future will be addressed in Chapters 3, 6 and 7.

⁵⁶ Semetko, Holli A. and Patti M. Valkenburg (2000), "Framing European Politics: A Content Analysis of Press and Television News," *Journal of Communication* vol. 50 iss. 2: pp. 93-109.

⁵⁷ Brewer, Paul R., Joseph Graf and Lars Willnat (2003), "Priming or Framing: Media Influence on Attitudes toward Foreign Countries," *The International Journal for Communication Studies* vol. 65 iss. 6: pp. 493-508.

⁵⁸ Semetko and Valkenburg (2000).

⁵⁹ Lima, Julie C. and Michael Siegel (1999), "The tobacco settlement: an analysis of newspaper coverage of a national policy debate, 1997-1998," *Tobacco Control* 8, pp. 247-253.

⁶⁰ Scheufele, Deitram A. (1999), "Framing as a Theory of Media Effects," *Journal of Communication* vol. 49 iss. 1: pp. 103-122.

⁶¹ D'Angelo, Paul (2002), "News Framing as a Multiparadigmatic Research Program: A Response to Entman," *Journal of Communication* vol. 52 iss. 4: pp. 870-888.

While some studies analyze full transcripts or texts of news reports, a large number focus instead on headlines and/or lead paragraphs, which are intentionally structured to carry "the essence of a story,"⁶² and, in direct comparisons, do not significantly differ in frame content from the full text of news stories.⁶³

If specific words are used consistently in conjunction with a frame, it is possible to identify frames by the presence of these words.⁶⁴ An alternative way to hone in on frames is to focus on direct quotations, which are major carriers of frames within news text.⁶⁵ The balance of direct quotations in a news report can effectively sway reader opinions on controversial issues; there may also be a primacy effect, giving greater importance to quotes presented earlier in the story.⁶⁶ Tracking quotes in news reports is therefore a useful metric for tracking how well political elites or other opinion leaders succeed in getting their preferred frames picked up by the media and carried directly to the public.⁶⁷

The next section moves beyond the methodological issues of defining and extracting frames, and explores how previous research has connected media framing with public opinion.

⁶² Sieff, Elaine M. (2003), "Media frames of mental illnesses: The potential impact of negative frames," *Journal of Mental Health* vol. 12 iss. 3: pp. 259-269.

⁶³ Gan, Faith, Joo Leng Teo and Benjamin H. Detenber (2005), "Framing the Battle for the White House: A Comparison of Two National Newspapers' Coverage of the 2000 United States Presidential Election," *The International Journal for Communication Studies* vol. 67 iss. 5: pp. 441-467.

⁶⁴ Entman, Robert M. (1991), "Framing U.S. Coverage of International News: Contrasts in Narratives of the KAL and Iran Air Incidents." *Journal of Communication* vol. 41 iss. 4: pp. 6-27.

⁶⁵ Nelson, Thomas E., Rosalee A. Clawson and Zoe M. Oxley (1997), "Media Framing of a Civil Liberties Conflict and its Effect on Tolerance," *American Political Science Review* vol. 91 iss. 3: pp. 567-583.

⁶⁶ Gibson, Rhonda and Dolf Zillmann (1998), "Effects of Citation in Exemplifying Testimony on Issue Perception," *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly* vol. 75 iss. 1: pp. 167-176.

⁶⁷ Darmon, Keren, Kathy Fitzpatrick, and Carolyn Bronstein (2008), "Krafting the obesity message: A case study in framing and issues management," *Public Relations Review* vol. 34, pp. 373-379.

(B) Framing and Public Opinion

From the beginning of empirical framing research, it was clear that the phenomenon held great potential in swaying opinion regarding a preferred policy choice. In a seminal experiment by the psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman,⁶⁸ participants were asked to choose between one of two policy responses to the outbreak of a deadly disease potentially affecting 600 people; the first policy had only one possible outcome, while the second policy was a "gamble," having two possible outcomes. When the choice was framed in terms of lives saved (200 people will be saved for sure, versus a gamble of saving everyone or no one), 72 percent of individuals chose the sure thing. However, when the very same choice was framed in terms of lives lost (400 people will die for sure, versus a gamble of everyone or no one dying), 78 percent chose the gamble. The lesson was that individuals are more likely to choose a risky option when outcomes are framed in terms of losses than when framed in terms of gains.

It was not long before this empirical research program was applied specifically to media frames. Iyengar (1987, 1990) was an early pioneer in what has been called the "cognitive paradigm" of research into media frames and their effect on stated attitudes: using experimental research on small groups of participants to directly measure the impact of differently-framed news stories on issue beliefs.^{69,70} Alternatively, research in the "critical paradigm" explored the effect of framing on public opinion *en masse*, as measured through opinion surveys.⁷¹ For an example in this paradigm, Brody (1991) connected the popularity of U.S. Presidents with the balance of news coverage depicting either positive or negative policy results during the Presidents' years in office.⁷²

⁶⁸ Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman (1981), "The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice," *Science* vol. 211, pp. 453-458.

⁶⁹ Iyengar, Shanto (1987), "Television News and Citizens' Explanations of National Affairs," *The American Political Science Review* vol. 81 iss. 3: pp. 815-831.

⁷⁰ Iyengar, Shanto (1990), "Framing Responsibility for Political Issues: The Case of Poverty," *Political Behavior* vol. 12 iss. 1: pp. 19-40.

⁷¹ D'Angelo (2002).

⁷² Brody (1991).

Frames can affect public opinion via two basic routes: direct persuasion and importance effects.^{73,74} To illustrate using the earlier example - framing a new Mideast peace policy by emphasizing how it will benefit economies in the region - prominent placement of the frame in media coverage may simply convince the public that the policy will indeed lead to economic growth (persuasion). Alternatively, it may not change any minds, but may increase the role that economic consequences (as opposed to, for example, only national security considerations) play in contributing to the overall attitude toward the new policy (importance effects). The reader may recall that these two effects are identical to movements along the two axes of the resonance-importance plot presented in Chapter 1.

The mechanism by which importance effects operate remains the subject of debate about the relative merits of two theories: accessibility models and expected-value models. Accessibility models, as set forth in studies such as Zaller (1992), stress an individual's inability to consider more than a few competing considerations related to an issue at any given time; if a frame emphasizes a particular consideration, it may temporarily elevate the consideration into the small subset to be drawn upon if the individual is asked to state an opinion on the issue.⁷⁵ Expected-value models, on the other hand, theorize a more complicated process in which individuals assign weights (originally intended as probabilities of possible outcomes) to a number of competing considerations; if a frame emphasizes a particular consideration, it may increase the weight of that consideration in forming an overall opinion on the issue.⁷⁶

⁷³ Brewer, Paul R. (2001), "Value Words and Lizard Brains: Do Citizens Deliberate about Appeals to Their Core Values?" *Political Psychology* vol. 22 iss. 1: pp. 45-64.

⁷⁴ Slothuus, Rune (2008), "More than Weighting Cognitive Importance: A Dual-Process Model of Issue Framing Effects," *Political Psychology* vol. 29 iss. 1: pp. 1-28.

⁷⁵ Zaller, John (1992), *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

⁷⁶ Ajzen, Icek and Martin Fishbein (1980), *Understanding Attitudes and Predicting Social Behavior*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Regardless of these theoretical disputes, most students of media framing and public opinion recognize the importance of a number of factors that can moderate the framing-opinion relationship.

An obvious first factor is simply the *type of frame* being used; as the Tversky and Kahneman experiments suggested, different types of frames (gain frames vs. loss frames) can have very different impacts on public opinion. A great deal of research - particularly in health psychology - has explored the contexts in which certain types of frames work better than others, but extensions of this research into media framing are less common. One example of media frames studied in this manner are value frames (e.g., the media's framing of an issue in terms of values like equality); while such frames have been identified as effective,⁷⁷ they may not be as effective in affecting audience thinking as frames emphasizing more material concerns.⁷⁸

Another important factor is the *identity of the messenger* promulgating the frame (i.e., who is being quoted). Experimental research has validated the commonsense proposition that frames attributed to sources perceived as credible or trustworthy are more likely to significantly impact opinion than are frames attributed to less credible sources.⁷⁹ Similar research, systematically varying frame content and attribution, suggests that the effectiveness of frames is damaged when the frame is attributed to a controversial source.⁸⁰ Source credibility may depend on the match between a source's political, ideological, or religious affiliation and the self-identified beliefs of the viewer.

⁷⁷ Brewer, Paul R. and Kimberly Gross (2005), "Values, Framing, and Citizens' Thoughts about Policy Issues: Effects on Content and Quality," *Political Psychology* vol. 26 iss. 6: pp. 929-948.

⁷⁸ Domke, David, Kelley McCoy and Marcos Torres (1999), "News Media, Racial Perceptions, and Political Cognition," *Communication Research* vol. 26 iss. 5: pp. 570-607.

⁷⁹ Druckman, James N. (2001), "On the Limits of Framing Effects: Who Can Frame?" *The Journal of Politics* vol. 63 iss. 4: pp. 1041-1066.

⁸⁰ Joslyn, Mark R. and Donald P. Haider-Markel (2006), "Should We Really 'Kill' the Messenger? Framing Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Role of Messengers," *Political Communication* vol. 23 iss. 1: pp. 85-103.

A third key moderator is *political sophistication*, generally understood as an aggregate of three components - political interest, political knowledge, and cognitive skill - each of which are each are moderately (0.36-0.50) correlated with one another.^{81, 82} Political sophistication is believed to moderate the media-opinion relationship in a number of competing ways. On the one hand, more sophisticated individuals are more likely to be exposed to media messages and are better able to understand them, which strengthens the relationship. On the other hand, they are also better able to consider counterarguments and resist the message in favor of what they perceive to be the "correct" view of their perceived ideological affiliation. As a result, the media-opinion relationship may be strongest at moderate levels of sophistication, where individuals are sophisticated enough to encounter media messages but not sophisticated enough to resist them.⁸³

There is no clear methodological agreement on exactly how political sophistication should be measured, and research often uses proxies for the measure. An individual's education level is a common proxy or proxy component: early research identified education as "a prime predictor, and probably *the* prime predictor for the whole class of dependent variables reflecting political interest, participation, and mobilization" (emphasis original),⁸⁴ while a later review of research in this field noted that "[s]tudies showing association between education and sophistication, in particular, are legion."⁸⁵ While the association between sophistication and education may dissipate once controlling for items like intelligence and political interest,⁸⁶ this only reinforces

⁸¹ Neuman, W. Russell (1986), *The Paradox of Mass Politics: Knowledge and Opinion in the American Electorate*, Cambridge: Harvard University.

⁸² Guo, Zhongshi and Patricia Moy (1998), "Medium or Message? Predicting Dimensions of Political Sophistication," *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* vol. 10 iss. 1: pp. 25-50.

⁸³ Zaller (1992).

⁸⁴ Converse, Philip E. (1974), "Some Priority Variables in Comparative Electoral Research," pp. 727-745 in Rose, Richard (ed.), *Electoral Behavior: A Comparative Handbook*, New York: Free Press.

⁸⁵ Luskin, Robert C. (1990), "Explaining Political Sophistication," *Political Behavior* vol. 12 iss. 4: pp. 331-361.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

the value of education as a proxy in situations where variables measuring intelligence or interest are missing. Political interest is also strongly associated with levels of "no opinion" survey response to political attitude questions.^{87, 88}

A final class of important moderators is concerned with *ideological affinities*. Short-term influences like media framing operate in conjunction with phenomena such as religion, self-identified political ideology, and culture.⁸⁹ These factors exert influence over attitudes toward the U.S. and its policies, and should be included as covariates when evaluating the framing-opinion relationship.

⁸⁷ Blasius, Jorg and Victor Thiessen (2000), "Methodological Artifacts in Measures of Political Efficacy and Trust: A Multiple Correspondence Analysis," *Political Analysis* vol. 9 iss. 1: pp. 1-20.

⁸⁸ Francis, Joe D. and Lawrence Bush (1975), "What We Don't Know About 'I Don't Know's,'" *Public Opinion Quarterly* vol. 39 iss. 2: pp. 207-218.

⁸⁹ Iyengar, Shanto (1996), "Framing Responsibility for Political Issues," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 546, pp. 59-70.

3. IRAQ: BASELINE TARGET AUDIENCE ANALYSIS

"I don't spend a lot of time taking polls around the world to tell me what I think is the right way to act."

-President George W. Bush, November 7, 2002

This chapter addresses many of the challenges encountered in the first step of frame-based assessment: baseline target audience research to assess the potential effectiveness of alternative frames. The failure to conduct pre-campaign audience research can reduce or reverse the intended effect of a public diplomacy campaign.⁹⁰ However, audience research is not a silver bullet; as mentioned in Chapter 2, the Shared Values Initiative was terminated after a single month, despite the large amount of audience research that had been invested in it.

Accordingly, this chapter will investigate areas of audience research likely to aid in campaign success, including: (1) baselining the pre-campaign attitudes of the foreign publics followed throughout this study; (2) identifying effective frames in support of U.S. policy among these audiences; and (3) gauging the importance of external factors, such as the local political environment, in affecting campaign success. We conclude, based on a statistical model using data available from the Pew Global Attitudes Project (GAP) in July 2002, that certain frames appeared particularly promising in generating policy support in certain countries. The model also suggests that national political leaders exerted an effect on how their citizens processed international news. This implies that any analysis of the effectiveness of U.S. media messages should also take local opinion leadership into account.

⁹⁰ An interesting example of a backfiring message comes from the Cold War, when the film *Ninotchka* - which unflatteringly compared the dour Soviet lifestyle with the excitement of Paris - was shown to Iraqi audiences. Iraqis preferred the "somber" life in the USSR to the "immoral" way of life in France, shifting their attitudes in the opposite direction than was intended. Source: Battle, Joyce, ed., "U.S. Propaganda in the Middle East - The Early Cold War Version," *National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 78*, 2002.

3.1. BACKGROUND ON U.S. IRAQ POLICY

As explained in Chapter 1, the remainder of this study applies the frame-focused assessment methodology to the case of U.S. Iraq policy in 2002 and 2003. Accordingly, we begin with a brief review of key events surrounding this policy in both public and traditional diplomacy.

Following the 1991 Gulf War, the UN created an inspections regime to monitor Iraqi disarmament (the United Nations Special Commission, or UNSCOM). However, the regime broke down in 1998 after Iraq accused the commission of espionage and the inspectors withdrew from Iraq. In subsequent years, officials from both the Clinton and Bush administrations commented on the need to restart the inspections process. President Bush famously escalated the rhetoric in early 2002 by labeling Iraq, Iran and North Korea members of an "axis of evil" threatening the world by seeking weapons of mass destruction and partnering with terrorist groups.⁹¹

Early indicators of a new public diplomacy campaign (and domestic political campaign) centering on the objective of Iraqi disarmament and/or the removal of Saddam Hussein came to light in the summer of 2002. At the end of July, the White House announced the launch of the Office of Global Communications "to coordinate strategic communications overseas that integrate the President's themes while truthfully depicting America and Administration policies."⁹² The OGC began issuing a "Global Message of the Day" in support of this general mission; however, the 2002 archive of these messages reveals that 77 percent of them were exclusively concerned with Iraq.⁹³ In August 2002, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher noted that the Department was trying "to get the US message [regarding Iraq] out in a variety of ways to the region," including getting U.S. officials to make appearances on media outlets, and bringing Iraqi expatriates to Washington for media

⁹¹ A full transcript of the address is available at <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>.

⁹² White House Office of Global Communications. Online at <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ogc/>.

⁹³ Author's calculations, from White House Office of Global Communications. "Global Message of the Day." Online at <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ogc/global-messages.html>.

training to "help them become more effective spokesmen and spokeswomen on behalf of the real people of Iraq."⁹⁴ While U.S. officials stated that July was a period of intensive campaign planning and strategy, August represented something of a lull; White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card offered the frank explanation that "from a marketing point of view, you don't introduce new products in August."⁹⁵

The "centerpiece" of the messaging campaign launch occurred the next month, with back-to-back speeches by President Bush on September 11th (on Ellis Island) and September 12th (at the UN).⁹⁶ In his UN speech, President Bush presented foreign leaders with a number of arguments in favor of a new resolution demanding Iraqi disarmament, variously emphasizing the Iraqi regime's alleged development of WMD, its support of terrorist organizations, its human rights violations, and its threat to neighboring countries. The UN Security Council responded several weeks later by unanimously passing Resolution 1441, declaring Iraq in material breach of its obligations to disarm and warning Iraq of "serious consequences" if it continued to violate those obligations.⁹⁷

In October, the State Department launched several new public diplomacy initiatives associated with Iraq. The Department revived its Counter-Disinformation/Misinformation Team, closed since 1996, to help rebut false Iraqi claims about the U.S. that were circulating among foreign publics.⁹⁸ The Department's Foreign Press Center also began to host Iraq-specific briefings for foreign media, beginning with a presentation on "Iraqi Deception and Denial" on October 11.⁹⁹

⁹⁴ Daily Press Briefing, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, August 26, 2002. Accessed at <http://statelists.state.gov/scripts/wa.exe?A2=ind0208d&L=dosbrief&P=181>.

⁹⁵ Bumiller (2002).

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ United Nations Security Council. "Resolution 1441." Online at <http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/3765749.html>.

⁹⁸ Cass, Connie. "A Secretive Office Stands Up for U.S. Version of Events." *Washington Dateline*, The Associated Press, 11 March 2003. Accessed via Lexis-Nexis.

⁹⁹ U.S. State Department, Foreign Press Centers. "Iraqi Deception and Denial." Online at <http://2002-2009-fpc.state.gov/14337.htm>.

By February 2003, the diplomatic conversation on Iraq had turned to issues of measuring Iraqi cooperation with UN inspectors and alleged proof of Iraq's continued deceit. At issue was whether the UN Security Council would find Iraq in continued violation of its disarmament obligations, triggering the "serious consequences" of Resolution 1441. On February 3rd, the British government released a dossier on Iraqi WMD noncompliance; within days, the document was criticized for its plagiarism and exaggerations,¹⁰⁰ and dubbed the "dodgy dossier" by British press. Two days later, Colin Powell addressed the UN, providing detailed (but ultimately flawed) evidence of Iraqi WMD noncompliance and concealment.

After Secretary Powell's presentation, on February 6th, the State Department's Office of Public Diplomacy arranged for a follow-up video conference between Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman and reporters from Mexico and Germany, both of which filled temporary seats on the UN Security Council. Under Secretary Grossman made a number of comments directed squarely at the people of Germany and Mexico, explaining that (as mentioned in Chapter 1) because the Mexican government was a democracy, it would listen to the opinion of its people regarding Iraq.¹⁰¹

As February ended, the U.S. government - along with its allies in the UK and Spain - proposed a second new resolution declaring that Iraq "failed to take the final opportunity" to disarm.¹⁰² France, Germany and Russia opposed the measure, and on March 15th issued a joint statement that "nothing justifies...resorting to the use of force."¹⁰³ Within days, the second resolution was withdrawn and President Bush sent an official notification informing Congress that diplomacy had

¹⁰⁰ Rush, Julian. "Downing St. Dossier Plagiarised." Channel 4 News, 6 February 2003. Online at <http://www.channel4.com/news/article.jsp?id=253293>.

¹⁰¹ U.S. State Department (2003).

¹⁰² "Blix Says Promise To Destroy Missiles Could Be 'Very Significant.'" *United Nations Foundation* 28 February 2003. Online at http://www.unwire.org/unwire/20030228/32313_story.asp.

¹⁰³ Zitner, Aaron. "With War on Horizon, a Last Effort at Peace." *Los Angeles Times* 16 March 2003.

failed.¹⁰⁴ On the early morning of March 20th, 2003, the U.S. and UK launched military operations in Iraq.

3.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS & HYPOTHESES

The questions below are intended to parallel questions that could have been asked in the intensive planning phase of the Iraq messaging campaign (July 2002), and that could be asked during the planning of future public diplomacy campaigns. Because the U.S. diplomatic campaign on Iraq had not yet been fully launched in July 2002, survey answers regarding U.S. Iraq policy at this time would likely have been off-the-cuff, poorly considered, and unreliable; the issue of Iraq was low enough on the news agenda at this time that the July Pew survey did not cover it. As a result, the policy-specific analysis in this chapter explores drivers of support for U.S. counter-terrorism policy.

(A) Baseline Attitudes

Collecting baseline opinion metrics allows policymakers to (1) record pre-campaign opinion levels in order to test for changes over time, and (2) gauge the overall receptivity or hostility of potential audiences before a campaign launch. Since we cannot track changes at this stage in the assessment, our research questions will focus on the second of these two purposes. The hypotheses below consider audience attitudes across countries and within countries, respectively.

Research Question 1: In July 2002, how favorable were the attitudes of the four key audiences (UK, France, Germany and Russia) toward the U.S., its people, its policies generally, and toward a specific U.S. policy (U.S. counter-terrorism policy)?

We first test to see whether each of these attitude measures are equal across all four countries under study.¹⁰⁵ If the null hypothesis

¹⁰⁴ "Bush Officially Notifies Congress: Iraq Diplomacy Has Failed." VOA News 19 March 2003. Online at <http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2003-03/a-2003-03-19-71-Bush.cfm?moddate=2003-03-19>.

¹⁰⁵ Here and elsewhere, when we discuss testing for equality across countries or variables, we evaluate joint equality using Wald tests. These estimate the chance of collecting the observed data given that the "true" levels of attitudes are equal across all countries or variables.

is not rejected, the opinion environment is relatively similar across countries, and no country stands out as particularly receptive or hostile to the United States, its people, or its policies.

H1.1₀: For each attitude item (toward the U.S., its people, its policies, and a specific policy), mean levels will be equal across the UK, France, Russia and Germany.

H1.1_A: Attitudes on each item will not be equal across countries.

We next test to see whether all four opinion measures are equal within a single country (e.g., that in France, support for the U.S. equals support for Americans and U.S. policy). If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, attitudes toward different dimensions of the U.S. are relatively similar, and policymakers may be able to improve support for one dimension (e.g., U.S. policy) through messages discussing another dimension (e.g., the American people).

H1.2₀: Within each country, mean attitude levels (toward the U.S., its people, its policies, and a specific policy) will be equal.

H1.2_A: These four attitude levels will not be equal.

(B) Identifying Promising Frames

The next research question focuses on how pre-campaign research can identify important attitudinal drivers of support for U.S. policy. We again consider distinctions both across and within countries. We also consider distinctions between resonance (the acceptance of an attitude or frame, measured as the mean score of an attitudinal variable for a population) and importance (the strength of the relationship between the attitude and policy support, measured as the coefficient of the attitudinal variable in a regression model predicting probability of policy support).

Research Question 2: In July 2002, how did the resonance and importance of attitudinal drivers of U.S. policy support vary by country and by attitude?

The four hypotheses below systematically test for equality in resonance and importance scores across countries and within countries. For the inter-country tests, at issue is whether geographic targeting is really necessary; if resonance and importance of drivers are equal

across geographic boundaries, it becomes difficult to argue that one needs different messages for different countries. For the intra-country tests, at issue is whether framing is really necessary; if different drivers of policy support have similar resonance and importance, there is little value in focusing communications on one dimension of the policy rather than another.

H2.1₀: For each potential driver of policy support, mean resonance will be equal across the UK, France, Russia and Germany.

H2.1_A: Mean resonance will not be equal across countries.

H2.2₀: For each country, mean resonance will be equal across potential drivers of policy support.

H2.2_A: Mean resonance will not be equal across drivers.

H2.3₀: For each potential driver of policy support, estimated importance will be equal across the UK, France, Russia and Germany.

H2.3_A: Estimated importance will not be equal across countries.

H2.4₀: For each country, estimated importance will be equal across potential drivers of policy support.

H2.4_A: Estimated importance will not be equal across drivers.

(C) The Influence of News Consumption and National Leaders

The final issue to explore concerns the importance of two key behavioral and external factors on policy support: news consumption and local opinion leaders. The July 2002 Pew survey, unlike subsequent surveys, asks respondents whether they watch international news channels such as CNN. We use this variable to test whether news consumption had an equal effect on policy support across countries, and whether this effect changes once we control for attitudes toward local opinion leaders. If attitudes towards local leaders do moderate the relationship between news consumption and U.S. policy support, this suggests that news is not passively absorbed by international viewers, but instead, the same coverage can have completely different effects on U.S. policy support depending on the influence of one's opinion leaders. Therefore, a media-only strategy may be ineffective or even do harm if popular local leaders have taken a position in opposition to U.S. policy.

Research Question 3: In July 2002, how did the association between consumption of international news and support for U.S. policy vary by country and by attitude toward their national political leader?

H3.1₀: Without controlling for the interaction between news consumption and attitudes toward leaders, news consumption will have an equal effect on policy support across all countries.

H3.1_A: The effect of news will not be equal across all countries.

H3.2₀: The effect of news consumption on policy support will be equal between those individuals who do and do not have favorable attitudes toward their national political leader.

H3.2_A: The effect of news consumption will not be equal between these two groups.

3.3. DATA

As referenced above, the data source for this chapter's analysis is the Pew GAP Summer 2002 survey, accessible at <http://pewglobal.org/>. Sample sizes for the four study countries (U.K., France, Germany and Russia) are listed in Appendix B.

The first research question (baseline attitudes) focuses on variables measuring attitudes toward the U.S., its people, its international policies in general, and its counter-terrorism policy in particular (abbreviated as US, PEO, POL and GWOT, respectively).¹⁰⁶

The second research question (message design) focuses on four key potential attitudinal drivers of U.S. policy support: whether the respondent considers terrorism a problem (TERP) or considers the spread of nuclear weapons a danger (NUC), and respondent attitudes toward the

¹⁰⁶ Question wording is as follows: US: "Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the United States." PEO: "Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of Americans." POL: "In making international policy decisions, to what extent do you think the United States takes into account the interests of countries like [ours] - a great deal, a fair amount, not too much, or not at all?" GWOT: "Which of these comes closer to your view? I favor the US-led efforts to fight terrorism, OR I oppose the US-led efforts to fight terrorism."

United Nations (UN) and U.S.-style democracy (DEM).¹⁰⁷ Only the first of these four variables could be considered a "frame" in terms of emphasizing a particular dimension of the specific policy in question; the November 2002 Pew survey, which is analyzed in Chapters 4 through 6, is much richer in this regard. Nevertheless, the other attitudinal drivers have clear implications for the design of frames; hence we call them "frame-related attitudes." Specifically, it is relevant to see whether support for U.S. national security policy is associated with nuclear-related concerns (suggesting that the U.S. might frame its policy in terms of WMD threats), with support for the United Nations (framing policy in terms of upholding international authority), or with support for U.S. democracy (framing policy in terms of promoting democracy). As shown in Chapter 4, each of these frames, in fact, did play a role in discourse surrounding U.S. Iraq policy.

Finally, the third research question (news consumption and opinion of local leaders) relies on survey questions measuring consumption of international news (NEWS) and attitudes toward the domestic political leader of the country (LEAD).¹⁰⁸

3.4. METHODS

As a first step, we standardize all variables to vary between 0 and 1; this allows for direct comparison of mean resonance scores and estimated importance coefficients. On this scale, refusals are treated as missing, while "don't know" (DK) responses are given a value of 0.5.

¹⁰⁷ Question wording is as follows: TERP: "Please tell me if you think [terrorism] is a very big problem, a moderately big problem, a small problem or not a problem at all." NUC: "Here is a list of five dangers in the world today. Which one of these poses the greatest/second greatest threat to the world?" [answers "Spread of nuclear weapons."] UN: "What influence is the United Nations "having on the way things are going in [our country]...very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad?" DEM: "Which of these comes closer to your view? I like American ideas about democracy, OR I dislike American ideas about democracy?"

¹⁰⁸ Question wording is as follows: NEWS: "Do you watch an international news channel such as [CNN/Bloomberg/BBC Worldwide/Euronews]?" LEAD: "What influence is the Prime Minister/President "having on the way things are going in [our country]...very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad?"

Variables are oriented such that negative attitudes are set to 0 and positive attitudes are set to 1. Therefore, higher values for US, PEO, POL, GWOT, UN, DEM and LEAD represent higher approval ratings, while higher values for TERP and NUC represent greater belief that terrorism and the spread of nuclear weapons are serious problems, respectively.

Importance measures are estimated from regression coefficients in a logistic model predicting GWOT, i.e., support for U.S. counter-terrorist policy.¹⁰⁹ The model takes the following form:

$$s_i = \alpha + \sum_{k=1}^K \beta_k x_{i,k} + \sum_{f=1}^7 \lambda_f y_{i,f} + \sum_{c=1}^3 \delta_c z_c + \sum_{k=1}^K \sum_{c=1}^3 \sigma_{k,c} (x_{i,k} \times z_c) + \sum_{f=1}^7 \sum_{c=1}^3 \theta_{f,c} (y_{i,f} \times z_c) + \varepsilon_i$$

Where s is a logit term reflecting factors increasing the probability of support for U.S. policy for individual i ; x is a vector of demographic covariates including age, gender, income, marital status, religion, and education; y is a vector of the four attitudinal drivers TERP, NUC, UN and DEM, as well as NEWS, LEAD, and an interaction between the two (for evaluating hypothesis 3.2); and z is a vector of country-level fixed effects. We also include interactions between x and z , as well as y and z , to allow these variables to have country-specific measures of association with policy support. As a result, the importance of driver f in country c is calculated as the sum of the non-interacted driver coefficient and the country-by-driver interaction term ($\lambda_f + \theta_{f,c}$).

To plot country-specific, driver-specific resonance scores (the average of $y_{i,f}$ for a particular country and driver) and importance scores ($\lambda_f + \theta_{f,c}$, as described above) we construct the resonance-importance plot introduced in Chapter 1. Cutoff scores for the four quadrants (e.g., the high resonance/low importance quadrant) were set to 0.5 for resonance (i.e., resonance is "high" when the mean attitude score exceeds 0.5 on the 0 to 1 scale) and 0.8 for importance (i.e.,

¹⁰⁹ An ordered or multinomial logistic model on GWOT, using "Don't Know" (DK) responses as a middle level, could not be pursued due to the sparse number of DK responses to the question.

importance is "high" when the regression coefficient on the attitude variable exceeds 0.8). The value of 0.8 was chosen to reflect policy significance rather than statistical significance (although the latter is also required for inclusion in our results). A regression coefficient of 0.8 in a logistic model represents across non-extreme probabilities (10 percent - 90 percent) an average 15-point increase in the probability of policy support attributable to the attitude (e.g., with a coefficient of 0.8 on DEM, an individual who does not like American democracy has a 65 percent predicted probability of supporting U.S. counter-terrorism policy, while an otherwise identical individual who does like American democracy has an 80 percent chance of supporting the policy). We deem this 15 percentage point increase a reasonable threshold for signifying that the attitude/frame is an important driver of support for U.S. policy.

3.5. RESULTS

The results in this chapter showed that opinion on the U.S. and its policies often - but not always - varied significantly across countries. Accordingly, the results identify a number of promising targeted messaging strategies arising from the July 2002 data.

(A) Baseline Attitudes


Testing H1.1 (equality of each attitude measure across the four countries), we are able to reject the null of equality for every variable. On attitudes toward the U.S. and its people, the UK scored notably more positive than other countries, perhaps because of its linguistic and cultural ties with America. On attitudes toward American foreign policy, Germany joins the UK with more positive scores than in France and Russia. Between-country variation shrinks noticeably for attitudes toward U.S. counter-terrorism policy. However, this similarity masks variation in the drivers of this policy support, which we explore in the next section.

Testing H1.2 (equality across different attitude measures, within each country), we are also able to reject the null of equality for every country. This is driven largely by the sizeable difference in attitudes

toward U.S. foreign policy in general (POL, which received only lukewarm support) and attitudes toward U.S. counter-terrorism policy (GWOT, which was widely popular, even more so than the American people). Testing each pair of variables separately using sign tests, we affirm that each attitude measure is significantly different from the other three measures.

Figure 3.1, below, shows the mean baseline attitude scores, by country, of US, PEO, POL and GWOT.

Figure 3.1 - Baseline Opinion of the U.S., By Country, July 2002



Note: Error bars signify weighted standard errors.

The implication of the hypothesis tests is that a communication campaign should not treat countries interchangeably, and should not expect attitudes toward U.S. policies to mirror attitudes toward the U.S. or its people. We also note that while the opinion environment faced by the U.S. in July 2002 was generally favorable, generic approval of U.S. foreign policy was low in France and Russia.

(B) Identifying Promising Frames

The popularity of U.S. counter-terrorism policy - particularly in comparison with U.S. foreign policy in general - makes identifying the


drivers of this support a useful exercise. We focus on four potential attitudinal drivers (the variables TERP, NUC, UN and DEM) that, as described above, eventually formed the core of frames used in public diplomacy surrounding Iraq. Measures of these attitudes' resonance (support for the belief that terrorism and nuclear weapons are dangers, and that the UN and American democracy are good) or of their importance (the magnitude of variable coefficients in the model predicting policy support, as described earlier) are of limited use individually. Knowing resonance without importance makes it impossible to tell if one is actually focusing on key drivers of policy support; while knowing importance without resonance makes it impossible to tell if the key drivers one has identified are rare in the population, or are already accepted by most individuals.

As a result, we calculate both resonance and importance scores for each attitudinal driver in each country. All 16 resonance scores (4 attitudinal drivers x 4 countries) and 9 out of 16 importance scores are positive and significantly different from zero. [Full results for the logistic model regressing U.S. policy support on the attitudinal drivers and other covariates - from which the importance scores are derived - are presented in Appendix C.]

Figure 3.2, on the following page, helps visualize the distribution of these attitudes by plotting these frame resonance and frame importance scores as coordinates in two-dimensional space. As discussed in Chapter 1, the quadrant in which a frame or frame-related attitude appears on this plot suggests whether or not the attitude may be a promising component of a communications campaign, and if not, whether framing, conventional persuasion, or both are needed for improvement.

Figure 3.2 also highlights which countries break from the pack on particular drivers - and may therefore require geographically targeted framing strategies. The markers corresponding with each attitude are all shown in the same shape and color, so that markers not close to others of the same shape and color represent countries with relatively idiosyncratic influence arising from that particular attitude.

Figure 3.2 - Resonance-Importance Plot, By Country and Attitudinal Driver of Support for U.S. Counter-Terrorism Policy, July 2002



Note: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$ (regression coefficient different from zero). Label prefixes: Bri=Britain; Frn=France; Ger=Germany; Rus=Russia. Label suffixes: Terp=Believe terrorism is a problem; Nuc=Believe nuclear weapons are a threat; UN=Support UN influence; Dem=Support U.S.-style democracy.

Each coordinate is marked with the country and attitude it represents; for example, the leftmost point, "FrnNuc," marks the attitude, in France, that the spread of nuclear weapons is a problem. Figure 3.2 highlights a number of implications for message design:

- *NUC (diamond markers)*: In all four countries, concern with the spread of nuclear weapons had relatively low resonance and weak importance in driving support for U.S. policy. This suggests nuclear/WMD frames might have been less promising than other frames in generating support for U.S. policy.
- *DEM (square markers)*: In the UK, Germany, and Russia, opinion of U.S. democracy was strongly linked to policy

support. However, attitudes toward U.S. democracy were roughly balanced between positive and negative, suggesting that a campaign to generally bolster the image of U.S. democracy (moving the markers to the right) might have helped spur policy support. In France, the link between DEM and policy support was significantly lower than in other countries, and marginally below the threshold of policy significance. This suggests that a democracy-focused messaging campaign might have been less effective there.

- *TERP (triangular markers)*: In the UK and Russia, the belief that terrorism was a problem was generally accepted, but was not significantly associated with policy support. Here, a campaign to generally convince people that terrorism was a problem would do little good. Instead, the U.S. may have benefitted from better portraying its policy as the solution to this problem (moving the markers up the vertical axis). In Germany and especially France, there was actually a strong association between this belief and policy support, suggesting that frames simply emphasizing the problem of terrorism could help maintain policy support there.
- *UN (circular markers)*: All four countries have relatively similar resonance scores (generally liking the UN), but have widely dispersed importance scores. For example, while frames extolling the importance of the UN might have effectively driven support for U.S. policy in France, such frames were not significantly associated with policy support in Russia, where it fell well below the threshold of policy significance as well.

The hypothesis tests confirm what is visually apparent in Figure 3.2: resonance and importance of the four key potential drivers are varied across attitudes and countries. Regarding resonance, the null hypotheses for H2.1 and H2.2 (equality of attitude resonance across countries or within countries) can be rejected; that is, it is very unlikely that we would observe these differences in resonance scores if

they were actually equal. Regarding attitude importance, due to larger standard errors we are unable to reject the null hypotheses of H2.3 (equality of importance across countries), but can reject H2.4 (equality of attitude importance within countries) for Britain, Germany and Russia. We can also reject this null hypothesis across the entire sample (evaluating all countries together). In sum, geographic targeting and selective framing appear to be somewhat necessary given the variety in the dynamics behind U.S. policy support.

(C) The Influence of News Consumption and National Leaders

To evaluate H3.1 - comparing the effect of news consumption on policy support across countries, without correcting for interactions between news consumption and support for one's national leaders - we remove the interaction variables from our model and calculate the estimated effect of the NEWS variable on policy support for each country. The null hypothesis that news has an equal effect across countries cannot be rejected. In fact, no two countries have a statistically significant difference in the coefficient on NEWS, and the coefficient is statistically indistinguishable from zero in every country except France. One might take these results to mean that the consumption of international news has a generally unremarkable relationship with an individual's support of U.S. policy.

However, we conjecture that in Britain in particular - where Prime Minister Tony Blair was recognized as a strong ally of the Bush administration - this insignificant result masks large variation between two subpopulations: (1) Britons who liked Blair, accepted his arguments when he appeared on news programs, and therefore showed a strongly positive effect of news coverage on U.S. policy support; and (2) Britons who disliked Blair, dismissed his arguments when he appeared on the news (while accepting the arguments of his opponents), and therefore showed a strongly negative effect of news coverage on U.S. policy support.

Accordingly, we test H3.2 - evaluating whether the effect of news consumption varies significantly depending on one's attitude towards the national political leader - by adding an interaction term between this attitude and news consumption. Evaluating all four countries together,

we can reject the null of equality between the group that likes its national leader and the group that does not ($F=2.9$, $p<0.05$).

Turning to individual countries, in Britain and to a surprisingly large extent in Russia, the effect was significant and positive: the more a Briton or Russian respondent liked U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair or Russian President Vladimir Putin, respectively, the more positive was the association between exposure to international news channels and support for U.S. policy.¹¹⁰ In both of these countries, the effect was strong enough to switch signs: watching international news had a negative effect on policy support for Britons and Russians who disliked their leader, but a positive effect on policy support for those who liked their leader. In Germany and France, on the other hand, disaggregating the population based on their opinion of German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and French President Jacques Chirac, respectively, did not yield a statistically significant difference in effect of news.

These results suggest that at least in some countries, similar news coverage can have very different effects on support for U.S. policy. In particular, these effects may be moderated in large part by individuals' attitudes toward their national political leaders. Implications will be discussed below.

3.6. CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS

This chapter, covering the July 2002 planning period for the diplomacy campaign in support of U.S. Iraq policy, does not directly analyze support for military action in Iraq. Instead, it maps the challenges and opportunities that public diplomacy faced in generating policy support across what are often substantially different target populations. Conclusions from this analysis include the following:

¹¹⁰ At the time of this survey, Putin's government had recently signed what was considered a breakthrough pact to cooperate with NATO on counter-terrorism and other issues. This may partially account for the positive association between support for Putin and support for U.S. counter-terrorism policy.

- Attitudes toward the U.S. and its people were different, but not always more favorable, than attitudes toward U.S. policies. The implication is that public diplomacy campaigns that aim to increase support for one type of attitude may not influence other types. Nor can support for a particular U.S. foreign policy be predicted from levels of support for U.S. foreign policy in general.
- Even when addressing U.S. policy directly, certain frames or frame-related attitudes appeared to strongly drive policy support in some countries, while having relatively little effect in others. In Britain, Germany, and Russia, support for U.S. counter-terrorism policy was most strongly associated with attitudes toward U.S.-style democracy, while in France, U.S. policy support was most strongly associated with support for the UN and the belief that terrorism was a significant problem. The implication here is that an approach focusing on different levels of attitude resonance and importance may be useful in providing direct, actionable recommendations for targeted message design.
- Recommendations on message design should be tempered by the reality that messages are not passively received, but are processed in conjunction with attitudes toward - and possibly cues from - local opinion leaders. This finding implies that a messaging campaign at odds with the position of local leaders may have no effect, or even backfire.

Accordingly, the within-country and between-country variation found in this chapter reaffirms the value of audience research before the launch of a public diplomacy campaign. Without such research, time, money, and manpower could be wasted on distributing messages that ultimately prove unpersuasive or ineffective in driving policy support. In addition, messages could be distributed that actually make an audience less likely to support U.S. policy.

The findings in this chapter also highlight the importance of key factors - message framing, news exposure, and opinion leadership - that, in the next three chapters, will be directly considered in the context of U.S. Iraq policy in 2002-03.

4. IRAQ: FRAMES IN MEDIA REPORTING

"Iraq connected to the terrorist[s]...is not the angle [American officials] are exploring now. The angle they are exploring is production of weapons of mass destruction."

-Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien, following a meeting with President Bush, September 9, 2002

This chapter focuses on the next step of frame-based assessment: tracking policy-related frames in international media reporting. The degree to which USG-preferred frames of U.S. Iraq policy dominated (or failed to dominate) international coverage of the issue is an important intermediate metric on its own. However, as suggested by the findings in Chapter 3, we should take particular interest in whether frames supporting the U.S. policy position ("pro-USG frames") were coming from local opinion leaders - who may be particularly influential in driving policy support - or from U.S. officials only.

After identifying the common frames in media reporting on Iraq policy in the fall of 2002, this chapter explores three specific issues: (1) whether pro-USG frames were mostly attributable to U.S. officials rather than local leaders; (2) whether frames emphasized by local leaders were more likely to be emphasized by a country's media than other frames; and (3) whether certain frames highlighting concerns with U.S. policy ("anti-USG frames") were not sufficiently rebutted by corresponding pro-USG frames. For all three of these issues, we conclude in the affirmative. These findings are significant in that they confirm the importance of both targeted message design and local opinion leadership, and alert policymakers to budding problems in the messaging campaign that could have been diagnosed and addressed.

4.1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS & HYPOTHESES

The questions below are intended to parallel questions that could have been asked throughout the Iraq messaging campaign (fall 2002 to spring 2003), and could also be asked in evaluating media reporting surrounding future public diplomacy campaigns. Public opinion on Iraq

policy will not be addressed in this chapter, but will be addressed in both Chapters 5 and 6.

(A) Frame Identification

Before tracking the reporting of key Iraq-related frames in media, we must first identify these frames. In both public diplomacy and traditional diplomacy surrounding Iraq in 2002-03, frames were not hard to come by. As early as October 2002, Gamson & Modigliani's (1987) definition of frames - setting forth "what the controversy is about" - seemed especially apt for describing the language of debate on Iraq in the UN Security Council:

[UK]: It is a debate, clearly, **that is about more than Iraq**...The issues in our minds, whether we all refer to them or not, go much wider: the security of the whole neighbourhood of Iraq; the reinforcement of our collective effort to eliminate terrorism; justice for Palestine and security for Israel within the law; the role of the Security Council when serious matters of national security are before its members and the overall effectiveness of the United Nations itself.¹¹¹
[Emphasis added.]

[France]: This debate constitutes an important, perhaps even cardinal, moment for our Council and, beyond that, for our Organization. What is at stake in the ongoing negotiations is fundamental: **even beyond Iraq, we are talking about** the future of the international order, relations between North and South, and notably, our relationship with the Arab world.¹¹²
[Emphasis added.]

This type of language - patiently explaining to one's colleagues what the Iraq issue was "really about" - is the essence of framing, and remained a common rhetorical tool throughout the debate on Iraq policy. Under Secretary Grossman, in the February 6th news conference discussed in Chapter 2, used this type of language repeatedly:

¹¹¹ UN Security Council transcript, 4625th meeting, 10/17/02. Accessed at [http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/PV.4625\(Resumption3\)&Lang=E](http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/PV.4625(Resumption3)&Lang=E).

¹¹² Ibid.

It's not **about** the United States; it's **about** the United Nations...this is not **about** inspectors, with all due respect, sir. It's **about** whether Saddam Hussein has taken the fundamental decision to disarm...if we could all start talking **about** disarming rather than inspections, we'd get a clearer message out to Saddam Hussein.¹¹³ [Emphasis added.]

The goal of this section is to isolate, from the vast and frame-rich discourse on Iraq, a clean set of frames to be analyzed and tracked throughout this study.

Research Question 1: What frames of U.S. Iraq policy were employed by U.S. officials, representatives of foreign governments, and other figures appearing in international media?

In using frame-based assessment for future public diplomacy campaigns, officials might begin with a list of specific audience-tested frames they have decided to employ, and track the media presence of those frames accordingly. Here, we have no such list, and so - as in much of the framing literature discussed in Chapter 2 - we identify such a list inductively from the content of the media itself. As a result, we do not test hypotheses in this section, although the findings here will influence the hypotheses to be tested in the remainder of this chapter.

(B) Frame Messengers

After identifying frames and tracking them in media content across countries and time periods, we will have a rich set of data on who discussed Iraq policy, what they said, and when they said it. To turn this data into actionable policy recommendations on message design and delivery, we first consider the "who" question. Academic literature identified in Chapter 2 suggests that the identity of the person promulgating a particular frame can determine the degree to which the frame is accepted. In addition, the findings in Chapter 3 suggested that local political leaders exert an important influence over attitudes toward U.S. policy. Accordingly, we first consider the degree to which pro-USG frames were attributed in media reports to local figures (e.g.,

¹¹³ State Department (2003).

German media quoting Germans) rather than U.S. officials. We set a U.S. share of 50 percent - that is, half or more of pro-USG frames in a country's media are coming directly from the mouths of U.S. officials - as an undesirably high threshold.

Research Question 2: What proportion of pro-USG frames in a country's media were attributable to figures from that country, and what proportion were attributable to U.S. officials?

H2.1₀: The proportion of pro-USG frames attributable to local figures will not be statistically distinguishable from zero.

H2.1_A: The proportion will be greater than zero.

H2.2₀: The proportion of pro-USG frames attributable to U.S. officials will not be greater than 50 percent.

H2.2_A: The proportion will be greater than 50 percent.

(C) Opinion Leadership and Media Content

Next, we seek to test whether the frames appearing in a country's media are ultimately driven by the frames promulgated by that country's political leaders. As with the last section of Chapter 3, at issue here is whether a centralized, U.S. spokesperson-based media strategy can succeed on its own or whether it needs the help of local advocates. If media framing of U.S. policy is ultimately driven by what local figures are saying, simply turning up the volume or frequency of U.S. voices may do little good.

Research Question 3: What is the association between the most common Iraq-related frames attributable to a particular country's political leadership, and the most common frames appearing in that country's media coverage of the Iraq issue?

Our null hypothesis is that the overlap between the frames emphasized by a country's political leaders and the frames emphasized by the country's overall coverage of the policy issue is no greater than one would expect due to chance.

H3.1₀: There is no association between policy-related frames emphasized by a country's political leaders and the frames emphasized in that country's media coverage.

H3.1_A: There is such an association.

(D) Frame-Specific Debates

Finally, we explore what we call here "frame-specific debates": the correspondence between the frequency of a pro-USG frame (e.g., emphasizing the benefits of U.S. policy for the Iraqi people) and its anti-USG counterpart (e.g., emphasizing the costs or risks of U.S. policy to the Iraqi people).

Each frame has a particular level of prominence in a country's pro-USG and anti-USG media reporting. If the share of an anti-USG frame is larger than that of its corresponding pro-USG frame, this is an early indication that major criticisms of the policy may be going unanswered, or responses to the criticisms are going unreported. For example, policy opponents may emphasize the risks of U.S. policy in increasing terrorism, but supporters of the policy are relatively quiet on how it might actually help in this regard.

Conversely, if the share of a pro-USG frame far outweighs that of its anti-USG counterpart, this may be an indication that the pro-USG frame is receiving more exposure than is really necessary to counter relevant criticism. For example, policy supporters may be spending a great deal of time emphasizing Iraqi non-cooperation with UN inspections, even though policy opponents are not challenging this point. Such over-emphasis could represent an intentional strategy by the U.S. to focus on its strongest arguments against Iraq. However, with a finite news hole for journalists to fill on the subject of Iraq (either in pages of print or minutes of broadcast), this over-emphasis could crowd out the USG's ability to employ other important frames to counter more serious attacks on the policy.

Data on these positive frame gaps (a pro-USG frame outweighs its anti-USG counterpart) or negative frame gaps (an anti-USG frame outweighs its pro-USG counterpart) could be used to modify a messaging campaign at a relatively early stage. Even if such gaps were intentionally created for strategic reasons, this information would still be useful in monitoring how well such a strategy was executed.

Research Question 4: What gaps existed in the relative frequency of corresponding pro-USG and anti-USG frames of U.S. Iraq policy?

We test the null hypothesis that all frames are appropriately challenged; that is, the share of any single pro-USG frames does not vary significantly from that of its anti-USG counterpart.

H4.1₀: For each pro-USG frame in each country, the share of the frame as a proportion of all same-valenced frames is equal to the share of the corresponding anti-USG frame.

H4.1_A: The shares of corresponding frames are not equal.

4.2. DATA

The research questions tested in this chapter relied on two pools of data: (1) a small set of speeches and media reports used to identify Iraq-related frames employed by the U.S. and others, and (2) a larger set of media reports for which these frames were coded and tallied.

The initial identification of frames was based on the following:

- President Bush's 9/12/02 speech to the UN, officially launching the diplomatic campaign against Iraq, in which he laid out the basic U.S. argument against the Hussein regime.
- Following President Bush's address, the first UN security council speeches of the UK, France, Russia, and Iraq on the subject of Iraqi disarmament, laying out their countries' respective positions on the issue.
- A random sample of 60 lead paragraphs from stories in the national newswires of the UK (Press Association), France (Agence France-Presse), Russia (TASS), and Germany (Deutsche Presse-Agentur), where an Iraq-related term (Iraq, Baghdad, or Hussein) was present in the headline. Stories were reviewed from both the fall 2002 period (beginning with President Bush's 9/12/02 address to the UN, and concluding at the start of the November 2002 Pew survey) and spring 2003 (beginning with Secretary Powell's 2/5/03 address to the UN, and concluding at the start of the March 2003 Pew Survey). As discussed in Chapter 2, lead paragraphs are a common choice in media studies; they are large enough to contain coherent frames, but short enough to reflect editorial priorities as to how to introduce the issue.

The second, larger set of media for coding came from the same four national newswires, using the same criteria (lead paragraphs of stories with an Iraq-related term in the headline). For this task, 200 stories were randomly sampled per newswire, per time period - resulting in approximately 1600 lead paragraphs (200 x 4 countries x 2 periods). The only exception here was for the Press Association - with 135 stories in Period 1 and 209 stories in Period 2, all stories for this source were coded. Consequently, coding counts for this source do not have an associated sampling error. To avoid presenting small results as "statistically significant" simply because of this lack of error, all findings below must exceed specific measures of policy significance - e.g., a gross difference of a certain size - to warrant comment.

4.3. METHODS

For the initial identification of key frames, the author and a colleague conducted a pile sort of the speeches and lead paragraphs described above. Consistent with commonly-practiced content analytic methods, the source texts were printed and cut into paragraphs. We next sorted these paragraphs into piles in keeping with Entman's (1993) definition of frames, i.e., based on which aspects of the Iraq issue were being highlighted (or in rarer cases, downplayed) in the text. All 189 paragraphs were ultimately sorted into 33 piles; paragraphs were split into smaller pieces when necessary to fit into more than one pile. In this initial step, very small piles (one or two items) were acceptable so long as they represented a distinct category of framing. As a next step, however, the piles were aggregated into 24 frame categories (12 frames, each with "pro-USG" and "anti-USG" forms) more manageable for coding.

The complete definition of these codes, including step-by-step coding instructions, can be found in the Codebook in Appendix D. The coding was designed to extract as much complexity as possible from the data, while remaining simple enough to be coded with relative ease and reliability. The unit of analysis was each quoted party within each

lead paragraph.¹¹⁴ As a first step, the name of each quoted party and his/her affiliation (e.g., "UK Labor Party," or "German Public") was noted. Next, a valence term was entered ("Pro-USG," "Anti-USG," "Mixed Position," or "No Position") reflecting the party's expressed position on U.S. Iraq policy or on arguments used to support or oppose the policy. Third, the coder marked for the presence or absence of the set of key frames as identified in the above pile sort (each of which could have a "pro-USG" or "anti-USG" manifestation).

Data analysis includes Wald tests for significant differences in frame presence and the identity of frame messengers, and Chi-squared tests of association in the distribution of frame emphasis.

4.4. RESULTS

The results of this analysis show widespread geographic diversity in (1) the way local media and local leaders used frames to discuss Iraq, and (2) levels of local advocacy of pro-USG frames. Significantly, we also detected correspondence between the frames emphasized by political leaders and the frames emphasized in their countries' overall media coverage of Iraq.

(A) Frame Identification

The 33 piles resulting from the initial pile sort are listed in Appendix E, in order from largest to smallest pile. The piles were then aggregated into 24 frame categories for content analysis.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴ Although limiting analysis to quoted parties excluded the minority of stories containing only paraphrases or other allusions to party positions, it holds several advantages over alternative coding schemes. First, it eliminated what would have been an ambiguous and unreliable effort to determine when an unquoted mention of a party was "enough" to count as a unit of coding. Second, it reduced coding time without significant distortion in content; thorough measurement of the effect of including paraphrases and allusions revealed no significant change in the "Pro-USG"/"Anti-USG" proportion in any country or period. Finally, focusing on actual quotes, rather than mere references or paraphrases, both reflects editorial priorities on who to quote in a lead, as well as the success of government officials and surrogates in bringing their verbatim messaging and framing directly to audiences.

¹¹⁵ For an example of this aggregation, three original piles all emphasized the nexus between Iraq and terrorism: one could be considered

Table 4.1, below, provides the names and short definitions of the 24 frames (12 if "pro-USG" and "anti-USG" forms counted together).

Table 4.1 - Key Frames, Based on Pile Aggregation

Frame	Code	Short Definition
Terrorism	TERR	Iraq (is/is not) linked to terrorists; military action (will/will not) increase terrorist activity
Regional Threat	RETHRT	Iraq (is/is not) a threat to Mideast stability
Regional Instability	ALLOUT	Military action (will/will not) threaten Mideast stability
Oil	OIL	The U.S. and allies (are/are not) motivated by a desire to control Iraqi oil
Iraqi People	PEO	Iraq (is/is not) a threat to its people; military action (will/will not) hurt the Iraqi people
Cost	ECON	Military action (will/will not) damage the global or domestic economy
Inspections	INSP	Inspections (are/are not) an effective disarmament tool; Iraq (is/is not) cooperating
WMD	WMD	Iraq (is/is not) in possession of WMD; Iraqi WMD (is/is not) a threat
International Authority	AUTH	Iraq (is/is not) eroding international authority; military action (will/will not) erode same
International Opinion	OPINION	The international community (is/is not) supportive of military action
Moral	MORAL	Military action (is/is not) morally wrong
Time Pressure	TIME	Iraq (is/is not) running out of time to show compliance


The larger sample of media content was then coded for these 12 frames, with results presented below.

"pro-USG" (emphasizing Iraqi links to terrorism), while the other two were both "anti-USG" (downplaying the Iraqi terrorist threat, and highlighting the risk that a war would worsen the problem of terrorism). These were combined into a single terrorism frame, taking on either "pro-USG" or "anti-USG" forms.

(B) Frame Messengers

We first track the affiliations of individuals promoting U.S. policy. Figure 4.1, below, categorizes all pro-USG frames appearing in media based on whether they were attributed to U.S. officials, local individuals from the same country as the media source, or other individuals from neither the USG nor the home country.

Figure 4.1 - Attributions of Pro-USG Frames, By Country and Time Period



While pro-USG frames of Iraq policy in British media coverage largely came from the mouths of the British themselves, local voices were essentially absent in pro-USG frames in other countries (Pro-USG frames were scarce in Russia generally, regardless of the source). Therefore, we cannot reject H2.1₀ for France, Germany or Russia, in that the share of local voices in support of U.S. Iraq policy is not statistically distinguishable from zero.

Hypothesis 2.2 tested whether the share of pro-USG frames attributable to U.S. officials exceeded 50 percent, which we set as a threshold for possible over-reliance on U.S. officials as promoters of their own policy. In Britain, where the total corpus of articles was coded, U.S. sponsorship of pro-USG frames clearly fell short of this mark; in both periods, U.S. officials were responsible only for

approximately 10 percent of pro-USG framing, as British leaders made the case to their own people. Elsewhere, the only instance where we can reject the null hypothesis - and conclude that USG sponsorship of pro-USG frames exceeded the 50 percent threshold - is for German media in 2002. However, if the threshold for "too much" reliance on U.S. officials for pro-USG framing is lowered only slightly (to approximately 40 percent), both French and German media, in both time periods, are found to significantly exceed this threshold.

(C) Local Opinion Leadership and Media Content

Given the general absence of local political leaders from pro-USG framing of U.S. Iraq policy, it seems worthwhile to track down what these local leaders were saying about the issue of Iraq. Figure 4.2, below, displays the overall valence of quoted government officials toward U.S. Iraq policy, by time period and the officials' country. For comparison, we also include the valence of statements by officials from the U.S. and Iraq.

Figure 4.2 - Valence of Government Figures toward U.S. Iraq Policy, By Country and Time Period




Figure 4.2 shows that the expressed position of French, German and Russian government leaders was overwhelmingly negative toward U.S. Iraq policy. Outside of the U.S., only in Britain did government officials express a mix of both positive and negative views on the policy. Further investigation revealed that in Britain, the bulk of pro-USG attributions came from members of the Labour Party within Tony Blair's inner circle, while the bulk of anti-USG attributions came from other members of the Labour Party. Implications of this opinion leadership on public attitudes will be tested in Chapters 5 and 6. For now, we test the implications of this political leadership on a more intermediate metric - the usage of particular Iraq-related frames in country-specific media reporting.

Hypothesis 3.1 tests the association between frames emphasized by a country's political leaders and frames emphasized by that country's media. We first define an "emphasized" frame as a frame that is used significantly more by a particular country's leaders or media than in the rest of the dataset, with a gross difference in frequency of at least five percentage points. In this manner, we identify nine out of 192 possible frame-country-time period combinations (24 frames x 4 countries x 2 time periods) emphasized by the political leadership of particular countries in particular time periods:

- In fall 2002, British leaders emphasized that Iraq was running out of time to comply with the UN, posed a WMD threat, and posed a threat to its neighbors. [TIME-Pro, WMD-Pro, and RETHRT-Pro]
- In spring 2003, British leaders emphasized that Iraq was running out of time to comply with the UN, posed a WMD threat, and that inspections were not working. [TIME-Pro, WMD-Pro, and INSP-Pro]
- In fall 2002, French leaders emphasized that the push for military action in Iraq was inconsistent with international rules and authorities. [AUTH-Anti]
- In spring 2003, German leaders emphasized that Iraq was not running out of time for compliance. [TIME-Anti]

- In fall 2002, Russian leaders emphasized that inspections were working and Iraqis were cooperating. [INSP-Anti]

Repeating the exercise across media sources, we discover that four of the nine frames emphasized by leaders were also emphasized by the corresponding country's media coverage. This implies that frames not emphasized by local leaders had a 2.7 percent chance of being emphasized in a country's media (5 out of 183 possible frames), while frames emphasized by local leaders had a 44.4 percent chance of being emphasized by media (4 out of 9 possible frames). This 16-fold difference in probability is far greater than one could attribute to chance alone. Confirming this, the Chi-squared test statistic on the association between leader emphasis and media emphasis is highly significant ($\chi^2=33.4$, $p<0.001$). As a conservative measure, we repeat the analysis excluding frames never emphasized by any country's leadership, and the test statistic remains highly significant ($\chi^2=10.0$, $p<0.01$). Accordingly, we reject the null $H_{3.10}$ of no association between leader emphasis and media emphasis. Frames emphasized by a country's political leaders were between 7 and 16 times more likely to be emphasized in their country's media coverage than frames that were not. Put another way, national leaders played a large enough role in their country's media that very often, the frames they emphasized became the frames their country's media emphasized.

(D) Frame-Specific Debates

The final set of results track the relative frequency of pro-USG frames compared with their anti-USG counterparts. The goal of this analysis is to see how well pro-USG framing matched, missed, or over-addressed corresponding frames raising opposition to the policy.

Testing the null on $H_{4.1}$ (that there were no statistically and policy significant mismatches between corresponding frames), we reject it after finding several such mismatches, listed in Table 4.2 on the following page. The upper 10 are "under-matches" (anti-USG outweighs pro-USG), while the bottom 5 are "over-matches" (pro-USG outweighs anti-

USG). Table 4.2 also provides a policy recommendation for each type of mismatch.

Table 4.2 - Significant Mismatches in Frame-Specific Debates

Country	Frame	Share of all Pro Frames	Share of all Anti Frames	Gap	Policy Recommendation
Russia	AUTH	0.0%	19.8%	-19.8%	<i>The pro-USG versions of these frames are not as prominent as the anti-USG versions. These frames may represent unanswered criticisms of U.S. policy, and officials may wish to consider additional emphasis on these frames in these countries.</i>
Russia	OPINION	0.0%	16.3%	-16.3%	
France	MORAL	0.9%	11.1%	-10.3%	
UK	TERR	6.3%	15.6%	-9.4%	
UK	MORAL	3.1%	12.5%	-9.4%	
UK	OPINION	1.6%	10.9%	-9.4%	
Germany	OPINION	5.6%	14.3%	-8.7%	
Germany	MORAL	0.9%	8.9%	-8.0%	
UK	AUTH	7.8%	15.6%	-7.8%	
UK	PEO	8.6%	15.6%	-7.0%	
UK	INSP	18.0%	10.9%	+7.0%	<i>The pro-USG versions of these frames are more prominent than the anti-USG versions. Officials may wish to de-emphasize these frames in these countries in favor of other frames.</i>
UK	TIME	14.8%	1.6%	+13.3%	
Germany	TIME	17.6%	3.6%	+14.0%	
Germany	WMD	26.9%	12.5%	+14.4%	
UK	WMD	35.9%	9.4%	+26.6%	

Note: The abbreviated frames listed above emphasized the following aspects of the Iraq issue: AUTH=issues of international (e.g., UN) authority; OPINION=issues of international opinion; MORAL=emphasizing moral aspects of the issue; TERR=terrorism as a justification or consequence of military action against Iraq; PEO=the suffering of Iraqis as a justification or consequence of military action; INSP=whether or not weapons inspections are working; TIME=whether or not time is running out for Iraqi cooperation; and WMD=emphasizing or de-emphasizing the Iraqi WMD threat.

Although framing decisions would ideally be taken in conjunction with data on frame importance (see Chapter 6), the above data on rebuttal mismatches can provide clues as to what dimensions of U.S.

policy are criticized more than supported, and where certain pro-USG frames may be emphasized more than necessary. Looking at Table 4.2, it appears that criticisms in Russia that the Iraq policy violated international authority and opinion went relatively unanswered, as did criticisms in France that the policy was immoral. In Germany and the UK, an ideal framing strategy might have shifted away from defending the policy as a time-pressured action to avert a WMD threat, and more towards a moral decision backed by at least some portion of the international community. Messages in the UK may have ideally also focused more on countering prominent criticisms of the Iraq policy's effects on the Iraqi people and its risk of worsening terrorism.

4.5. CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS

This chapter further contributes to the two top-level conclusions identified in Chapter 1: the importance of targeted message design, and the importance of local opinion leaders.

Regarding message design, we note a wide diversity of frames surrounding U.S. Iraq policy - from its potential effects on the Iraqi people, to the consistency of U.S. policy with international law. We further note that the frames being utilized by policy supporters do not always match the most prominent frames of policy opponents. This does not necessarily suggest that something is wrong with the communications campaign, but it can highlight instances where either too little effort is being made to address a prominent policy criticism, or too much effort is directed toward a relatively rare criticism.

Regarding opinion leadership, it appears that public diplomacy on Iraq suffered from a number of interrelated problems. Local government figures in France, Germany and Russia almost always expressed opposition to U.S. policy, and therefore almost no pro-USG framing came from local figures. This was particularly damaging because frames emphasized by local figures were far more likely to play a substantial role in their country's overall media coverage of Iraq than were other frames. The case of Britain shows what can happen with significant local message advocacy: pro-USG framing became predominantly a local affair, substituting for the (presumably less influential) framing coming

directly from the mouths of U.S. officials. As we will see in the next two chapters, this local advocacy likely exerted positive effects on public support for particular pro-USG frames and for U.S. Iraq policy in general.

5. IRAQ: MEDIA REPORTING AND FRAME RESONANCE

"I would hope people in Germany and in Mexico, instead of thinking through what will happen after there's a conflict, will stay focused on what is required to avoid a conflict."

-Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, February 6, 2003

The previous two chapters explored initial audience research and media reporting of U.S. policy, respectively. This chapter turns to the next step of frame-based assessment: estimating the effect of media framing on audience acceptance of those frames. This acceptance, which we refer to as frame resonance, is a valuable intermediate diagnostic. If international media are using pro-USG frames, but such frames are nevertheless not resonant among foreign publics, the policy problem shifts from a failure of message distribution to a failure of persuasion. When foreign audiences reject the arguments they hear in support of U.S. policy, simply increasing the volume or frequency of pro-USG voices is not likely to have an effect. Policymakers may need to retool their pro-policy arguments to make them more persuasive, or focus on other ways beyond traditional media to transmit these frames to foreign populations, such as direct contact with local leaders or on-the-ground interaction with foreign publics.

The analysis in this chapter (1) assesses the resonance of several Iraq-related frames, (2) evaluates whether this resonance is associated with corresponding country-level framing in media reporting, and (3) measures the importance of factors such as political sophistication and self-identified ideology in moderating this association. Based on a model predicting an individual's frame resonance from measures of Iraq reporting in that individual's national media (as well as other variables), we conclude that the pro-USG/anti-USG balance of media coverage of a particular frame in a particular country did have a significant association with the likelihood that an individual in that country would accept the argument being promoted by that frame. Measures of media reporting that did not include USG statements had a

stronger association with frame resonance than measures including all statements, suggesting that the direct statements of U.S. officials were relatively ineffective in fostering frame resonance. The effects of media were also limited by the effects of political sophistication and self-identified political ideology, likely because politically sophisticated individuals were better able to selectively reject media messages they disagreed with in favor of those associated with their natural political leaders. This further emphasizes the advantages of local message advocacy over a strategy of centralized, uniform message distribution by the USG.

5.1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS & HYPOTHESES

The following questions could be asked in any public diplomacy campaign in support of U.S. policy, once initial opinion data on the policy has been collected.

(A) Levels of Frame Resonance

At the most basic level, we would like to know the popularity of various frames in the UK, France, Germany and Russia. As in Chapter 3, we are interested in whether or not there is variation in frame resonance, and we evaluate the null hypotheses that resonance scores are equal either across frames or across countries.

Research Question 1: In November 2002, how did the resonance of key frames of U.S. Iraq policy vary by country and by frame?

If we are unable to reject equality across countries, there is relatively little variation in countries' willingness to embrace pro-USG frames, and thus relatively little need for targeting messages. If we are unable to reject equality across frames, then all frames are of roughly equal popularity and there is no need to consider resonance as a factor in choosing promising frames.

H1.1₀: For each frame, resonance will be equal across countries.

H1.1_A: Resonance will not be equal across countries.

H1.2₀: For each country, resonance will be equal across frames.

H1.2_A: Resonance will not be equal across frames.

(B) The Effect of Media Content on Frame Resonance

The next step in our analysis tests the association between media reporting of a particular frame in a particular country (as coded and tabulated in Chapter 4) and public acceptance/resonance of that frame in that country.

Research Question 2: In November 2002, was frame-specific, country-specific media reporting associated with frame resonance?

If we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of no relationship, then the media's portrayal of Iraq-related frames may have ultimately made little difference in whether or not those frames were accepted by foreign publics. This calls into question the value media had as a component of public diplomacy surrounding Iraq.

H2.1₀: There is no relationship, or a negative relationship, between media reporting and frame resonance.

H2.1_A: There is a positive relationship between media reporting and frame resonance.

We can also test whether measures of media reporting excluding the statements of U.S. officials had a stronger relationship with frame resonance than overall measures of media reporting. If so, this reaffirms the findings in earlier chapters that what is said by non-USG figures (particularly local leaders) plays a more influential role in foreign public opinion than what is said by the USG.

Research Question 3: How did the association between media reporting and frame resonance vary when measures of media reporting excluded statements by U.S. officials?

H3.1₀: Excluding U.S. officials' statements from media reporting measures will have no effect, or a negative effect, on the media-resonance association.

H3.1_A: Excluding the USG from media measures will increase the association between media reporting and frame resonance.

(C) Sophistication, Ideology and Frame Resonance

While the research question above tests for different media-resonance effects depending on who is talking, this section looks for differences depending on who is listening. As discussed in Chapter 2,

as individuals become more politically sophisticated, they are theorized to better reject arguments inconsistent with the statements of their self-identified ideological leaders. If true, this places a ceiling on the effect of any U.S. effort directed at attitude change; no matter how much of the U.S. message permeates local media, these messages will be rejected if they conflict with what their preferred local opinion leaders are saying.

Here, we test whether highly-sophisticated individuals do, in fact, show a weaker relationship between media reporting and frame resonance - and a stronger relationship between self-identified political ideology and frame resonance - than other individuals. We would expect this to occur as more sophisticated individuals become resistant to media messages, and instead gravitate toward the views expressed by their perceived ideological leaders. We first conduct this test on the raw data, and then in the full model to see whether these associations remain significant after controlling for demographic, country-level, and other characteristics.

Research Question 4: How did the relationship between media reporting and frame resonance vary depending on one's political sophistication and self-identified ideology?

H4.1₀: The gap between frame resonance of left-identifying and right-identifying individuals will be no greater at the highest levels of sophistication than it is at moderate levels of sophistication.

H4.1_A: The gap will be larger at the highest level of sophistication.

H4.2₀: As sophistication increases, holding other factors constant, the influence of media content on frame resonance will remain the same or increase.

H4.2_A: As sophistication increases, the influence of media content on frame resonance will decrease.

H4.3₀: As sophistication increases, holding other factors constant, the influence of self-identified ideology on frame resonance will remain the same or decrease.

H4.3_A: As sophistication increases, the influence of ideology on frame resonance will increase.

5.2. DATA

There are two primary data sources for this analysis. The first, country-level data on specific media frames, were already collected and discussed in Chapter 4. In this chapter, we focus on four of the 12 key frames - RETHRT (Iraq's threat to the Mideast), ALLOUT (the impact of invasion on the risk of all-out war in the Mideast), TERROR (the impact of invasion on the risk of terrorism) and OIL (oil as a factor behind U.S. policy) - each of which was included as a question in the November 2002 Pew survey.¹¹⁶ For these frames, we coded additional articles to further reduce sampling error and created country-specific, frame-specific net valence scores of the media's reporting of the frame (calculated as the percentage of stories in a country's media source with the pro-USG version of frame, minus the percentage of stories with the anti-USG version). This difference, or net valence score, will be the key independent variable of the model in this chapter, and is the "measure of media reporting" that is referred to frequently throughout this chapter.

The second source of data is the Pew GAP November 2002 survey. Sample sizes for the four study countries (U.K., France, Germany and Russia) are listed in Appendix B. The key dependent variables of the model are the four attitudinal variables corresponding to the RETHRT, ALLOUT, TERROR and OIL frames. The survey also includes a number of demographic variables - including age, gender, education, religiosity, and self-identified political ideology - that will be incorporated into the model.

¹¹⁶ Question wording is as follows: RETHRT: "How much of a danger is the current government in Iraq to stability in the Middle East and world peace? A great danger, moderate danger, small danger or no danger at all?" ALLOUT: "How worried are you that a possible war with Iraq might lead to an all out war in the Middle East - a great deal, a fair amount, not too much or not at all?" TERROR: "In the long run, do you think a war with Iraq to end Saddam Hussein's rule is likely to increase the chance of terrorist attacks in Europe, lessen the chance, or will it make no difference?" OIL: "In your opinion, which of the following better explains why the U.S. might use military force against Iraq? Is it more because the U.S. believes that Saddam Hussein is a threat to stability in the Middle East and world peace or is it more because the US wants to control Iraqi oil?"

5.3. METHODS

As before, we begin by standardizing the range of all variables between 0 and 1 for comparability of resonance scores and model coefficients. For each frame, a score of 1 represents the pro-USG position (i.e., that Iraq is a threat [RETHRT], that war with Iraq would not lead to an all-out war [ALLOUT], that war would lessen the chance of terrorism [TERROR] and that the U.S. was not using military force to get Iraqi oil [OIL]), while a score of 0 represents the anti-USG position, and 0.5 represents "don't know" or neutral responses.

For the statistical model regressing frame resonance on media reporting, the data were transformed to analyze all four frames simultaneously. In this approach, the frame was the unit of analysis; accordingly, we created four observations for each survey respondent, one for each frame. Although each of the four observations took on identical values for most covariates, each took a different value for the dependent variable (corresponding to the individual's survey response to each of the four frame-related questions) and the key independent variable (corresponding to the country-level media reporting measure for the matching frame). As a result, we use generic (rather than frame-specific) "media reporting" and "frame resonance" variables, where for each individual's first observation, the media measure and frame response would be set to the values for RETHRT; for the second observation, the values for ALLOUT; and so forth.

By analyzing all frames together, we can take advantage of 16 levels of variation in media framing content (4 countries x 4 frames), and include indicator variables for country type and frame type to control for country-level fixed effects (some countries may be more willing to accept pro-USG frames than others) as well as frame-level fixed effects (some frames may be more acceptable than others). The resulting model is as follows:

$$s_{i,f} = \alpha + \sum_{k=1}^K \beta_k x_{i,k} + \sum_{f=1}^3 \lambda_f y_f + \sum_{c=1}^3 \delta_c z_c + \gamma m_{f,c} + \eta p_i + \sigma h_i + \theta(m_{f,c} \times h_i) + \phi(p_i \times h_i) + \varepsilon_{i,f}$$

Where s is a logit term reflecting factors increasing the probability that individual i accepts frame f ; x is a vector of

demographic covariates such as age and gender; y is a vector of frame-level fixed effects; z is a vector of country-level fixed effects; m measures country-specific, frame-specific media reporting; p measures an individual's self-identified political ideology; h represents an individual's political sophistication (using a proxy based on education and political non-opinion); and the remaining terms interact political sophistication with media reporting and self-identified ideology to test whether high political sophistication moderates the impact of these variables on frame acceptance (hypotheses 4.2 and 4.3).¹¹⁷


5.4. RESULTS

The results in this chapter again confirm that each country represents a distinct opinion environment, and that local opinion leaders put constraints on the ability of U.S. public diplomacy to change attitudes toward U.S. policy.

(A) Levels of Frame Resonance

Figure 5.1, on the next page, displays the level of frame resonance for the four frames in the UK, France, Germany and Russia. For comparison, frame resonance scores for the U.S. public are also displayed in the figure.

¹¹⁷ Self-identified political ideology is on a ten-point scale (lower=left); however, when "right-identifying" or "left-identifying" individuals are discussed as a group, we are referring to all survey respondents placing themselves on the right or left side of the scale, respectively. The proxy for political sophistication was derived from two sub-proxies discussed in Chapter 2: individual education level (political knowledge proxy) and the number of "don't know" responses to political attitude questions (political interest proxy). In the Pew survey, individual-level education (ED) could range from a value of 1 (low) to 3 (high), while an individual's number of "don't know" responses (DK) could range from 0 to 12 (out of 12 attitude questions). DK was transformed into a political interest variable (PI) spanning the same 1 to 3 range as ED ($PI = 3 - 0.25 \cdot DK$). A raw sophistication score (ED+PI), ranging from 2 to 6, was grouped into three sophistication categories such that approximately one-third of the total sample fell into each category ("low" = 2.00-4.99, "moderate" = 5.00-5.49, and "high" = 5.50-6.00). To avoid collinearity among regressors, education appears in this model only through the sophistication proxy.

Figure 5.1 - Acceptance of Four Key Frames, by Country

Note: Error bars signify weighted standard errors.

We are able to reject the null hypotheses for both H1.1 and H1.2; that is, both across and within the UK, France, Germany and Russia, there was significant variation in frame resonance. Sign tests on each pair of variables confirm statistically significant differences in each resonance score. Notable differences in resonance include large differences between British and German resonance of RETHRT and OIL compared to Russian and French respondents; that is, Russian and French respondents were more likely to believe that Iraq was not a threat and that the U.S. was motivated by oil. Germans, on the other hand, were especially prone to believe that military action in Iraq would lead to all-out war in the Mideast, but were also more likely than other Europeans to believe it would reduce the risk of terrorist attacks in Europe. This variation suggests that the selection of promising frames cannot simply rely on differences in frame importance in driving support for U.S. policy, but must also take into account geographic differences in the degree to which the arguments underlying the frames are accepted. We will combine these scores with frame importance scores to offer policy recommendations on message design in Chapter 6.

(B) The Effect of Media Content on Frame Resonance

The full results of the logistic regression of frame resonance on media content and other variables are provided in Appendix F.¹¹⁸ We can reject the null of H2.1 that there is no relationship between media content and corresponding frame resonance ($t=8.3$; $p<0.001$). In other words, after controlling for country-level fixed effects, frame-level fixed effects, and demographics, there still appeared to be a positive association between the net valence of coverage of a particular Iraq-related frame (i.e., the percentage of stories in a country's media source with the pro-USG version of frame, minus the percentage of stories with the anti-USG version) and the probability that an individual in that country would accept that frame's argument.

Several other variables - age, the country-level and frame-level fixed effects, sophistication, and self-identified ideology - appeared to have strongly significant associations with an individual's probability of accepting a frame. Younger and politically right-identifying individuals were more likely to accept pro-USG frames. Compared with the reference country of Britain, respondents in France and Russia were significantly less likely to accept any given Iraq-related frame, while somewhat surprisingly, Germans were significantly more likely to do so. In addition, TERROR, OIL and ALLOUT were each significantly less likely to be accepted than RETHRT - which is not surprising, given the high resonance of RETHRT shown in Figure 5.1. It appeared to have been relatively easy to accept that Iraq was a threat, but harder to accept that a proposed military action was driven by legitimate motives or that it would have positive consequences.

While the association between media reporting and frame acceptance (as measured by the regression coefficient on the media reporting variable) was significant using an overall measure of media reporting,


¹¹⁸ While the frame resonance variable had a neutral/"don't know" level of 0.5, which could have served as an intermediate category, ordered logistic regression could not be pursued because the proportional odds assumption was violated, and multinomial logistic regression was rejected because dividing the respondent pool by resonance level disturbed the four-observation-per-respondent data structure, making the interpretation of coefficients difficult.

the association was significantly higher when statements of U.S. officials were excluded from the media measure (regression coefficient 33 percent higher; $F=23.6$; $p<0.001$).¹¹⁹ Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis of H3.1 that removing USG statements from the media measure would have no effect on the model. This change implies that the media frames used by U.S. officials were relatively poor drivers of frame resonance, when compared with frames attributed to non-USG individuals.

(C) Sophistication, Ideology and Frame Resonance

Hypothesis 4.1 tests whether, as predicted by theory, the gap in frame resonance between left-identifying and right-identifying individuals increased significantly between moderate and high levels of political sophistication, as highly-sophisticated audiences gravitated toward the prevailing position of their ideological group. Figure 5.2, below, illustrates this effect across the entire four-country sample.

Figure 5.2 - Frame Resonance for RETHRT, ALLOUT, TERROR and OIL, by Political Sophistication and Self-Identified Ideology



¹¹⁹ Significance of the coefficient difference calculated using Stata's *suest* (seemingly unrelated estimation) command.


Testing the raw data (not yet controlling for other variables), we can reject the null of no difference or negative difference across sophistication for three of the four frames: RETHRT, ALLOUT and OIL. For these frames, high sophistication exerted a strong, ideology-specific effect on frame resonance, widening the gap between right-identifiers (who generally have higher resonance) and left-identifiers (who generally have lower resonance). TERROR, however, appeared to be less dependent on these ideological factors.

Figure 5.2 confirms these results visually. For RETHRT and OIL, a relatively small ideological gap among moderately sophisticated individuals (who are theorized to be less successful than highly-sophisticated individuals at screening arguments inconsistent with their professed ideology) grew as sophistication increased, mostly because frame acceptance among left-identifiers dropped sharply. For ALLOUT, an unexpected result at low levels of sophistication - where left-leaning individuals were more optimistic about the effects of war on the Mideast - adjusted to the ideologically expected pattern (higher policy optimism among right-identifiers) as sophistication increased. The clearer match between RETHRT and OIL and their corresponding theoretical predictions may have to do with the fact that these two frames dealt with the nature of the Iraqi threat - a highly-politicized topic - while ALLOUT and TERROR framed the possible consequences of military action, which may have had a less rigid ideological divide.

For hypotheses H4.2 and H4.3 (exploring changes in the effect of media and ideology on frame resonance, holding other factors constant), we return to our model, where interaction terms show the effect of media content and self-identified ideology on individuals with different levels of sophistication. The interaction terms on high sophistication for both media content and ideology are both significant in the direction predicted by theory, so we reject the null in favor of the alternative hypothesis for both H4.2 (interaction between high sophistication and media reporting was negative; $t=-2.7$; $p<0.01$); and H4.3 (interaction between high sophistication and ideology was positive; $t=4.5$; $p<0.001$). Figure 5.3 calculates the coefficients of the media

reporting and ideological variables across all levels of sophistication, based on these interaction coefficients.

Figure 5.3 - Effect of Self-Identified Ideology and Media Content on Frame Resonance, by Level of Sophistication, November 2002



The results in Figure 5.3 conform to the theory discussed in Chapter 2: the effect of media framing peaks at the moderate level of sophistication (where individuals are exposed to media but not yet able to selectively resist it), while the effect of ideology peaks at high levels of sophistication (once individuals are aware of the prevailing beliefs of their selected ideological group). While at low and moderate levels of political sophistication, the effect of media reporting on frame resonance is far greater than the effect of self-identified political ideology, this difference reverses itself (with an insignificant difference between the two coefficients) at high levels of sophistication.

5.5. CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS

This chapter addressed two main questions: (1) was media coverage of Iraq-related frames associated with corresponding frame resonance in key European publics, and (2) what factors strengthened or weakened this association?

While such an association did appear to exist, it was heavily influenced by factors that appeared to limit the ability of U.S.

officials to improve frame resonance through a centralized media strategy. Frame resonance declined when shifting from threat-related frames to frames of U.S. motivation or the consequences of war; the effect of media on resonance declined when including USG statements in measures of media reporting, as opposed to non-USG statements only; and this effect also declined as political sophistication increased, as individuals may have begun to reject media messages inconsistent with those associated with their perceived ideological leaders. Taken together, these findings recommend a media strategy focusing on non-USG voices in support of the policy, particularly voices of local ideological leaders, and particularly when assuaging concerns about U.S. policy motivations or the future consequences of the policy.

In this chapter, we also found significant differences in frame resonance across frames and across countries; for example, French and Russian respondents appeared relatively skeptical of the legitimacy of the Iraqi threat. In the next chapter, we combine these differences in frame resonance with differences in frame importance to arrive at specific, targeted recommendations for effective message design in support of U.S. policy.

6. IRAQ: FRAMING AND POLICY SUPPORT

"I have always been reluctant to go to war, because I know what the consequences of war are."

-Secretary of State Colin Powell, May 25, 2001

This chapter assesses the link between public acceptance of policy-related frames and public support for U.S. policy. Support of (or opposition to) U.S. policies may arise from any number of factors, including moral considerations, beliefs about American motives, or predictions of policy consequences. If the frames used by a public diplomacy campaign are not calibrated with these key attitudinal drivers, then U.S. messages - even if accepted - may ultimately do little to improve public support.

The analysis in this chapter seeks to: (1) diagnose problems in how frame resonance was translated into support for U.S. Iraq policy, and (2) identify changes in messaging strategy that may have mitigated those problems. We begin by exploring cross-country differences in public support for U.S.-led military action in Iraq. Next, we develop a model estimating the importance of different frames in driving such support. Based on these estimates, as well as the resonance scores derived in Chapter 5, we conclude that some frames were more significant drivers of policy support than others, and that certain frames relating to the consequences of - and motivations behind - U.S. policy may have been underutilized. We also confirm the important role of the local political environment in affecting policy support, particularly in Britain and France. Finally, we conclude, based on low correlation among resonance variables, that it is not likely that reverse causality was at play (i.e., policy support driving stated acceptance of frames).

6.1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS & HYPOTHESES

Policymakers assessing future public diplomacy campaigns can test the research questions below once data has been collected on both frame resonance and policy support. Ideally, the data would include individual-level attitudes toward every major frame used by the USG and

other parties to discuss the policy, as well as key demographic variables (e.g., age, income, education, or ethnic affiliation), particularly those upon which an audience could be segmented.

(A) Levels of Policy Support

As in previous chapters, we begin by testing for variation in our key variable of interest (here, support for a hypothetical U.S.-led military action in Iraq) across countries. We also test for changes over time, comparing support in November 2002 with that in March 2003 to see whether the opinion environment improved or worsened as the U.S. public diplomacy campaign progressed.

Research Question 1: In November 2002 and March 2003, how favorable were the attitudes of the four key audiences (UK, France, Germany and Russia) toward potential U.S.-led military action in Iraq?

We test two null hypotheses: that policy support is equal across countries in any given time period, and that support is equal across time periods in any given country. If we cannot reject the former, then no country stood out as particularly hostile toward U.S. policy. If we cannot reject the latter, then at the highest level, the U.S. public diplomacy campaign did not appear to achieve its objective of improving policy support among these key audiences.

H1.1₀: For each time period, mean levels of policy support will be equal across the UK, France, Russia and Germany.

H1.1_A: Policy support will not be equal across countries.

H1.2₀: For each country, mean levels of policy support will be equal across time periods.

H1.2_A: Policy support will not be equal across time periods.

(B) Frames as Drivers of Policy Support

Here, our research questions assess the importance of different Iraq-related frames in driving support for U.S. Iraq policy, where "importance" is measured through regression coefficients in a model predicting policy support. These may be the most critical findings in frame-based assessment: they provide direct insight into what dimensions of the policy debate drive policy support or opposition among specific

target audiences, and should therefore be emphasized (or de-emphasized) in USG frames directed at those audiences. The four frames we test for association with policy support - RETHRT, ALLOUT, TERROR and OIL - are the same frames we explored in Chapter 5.

Research Question 2: How did the importance of Iraq-related frames in driving U.S. policy support vary by country and by frame?

As done in Chapter 3, we test null hypotheses that importance scores of a particular frame are equal across countries, and that importance scores for all four frames are equal within a particular country. These answers provide initial clues regarding the necessity of targeted framing for U.S. Iraq policy, but (as discussed below) these importance scores need to be evaluated in conjunction with the frame resonance scores derived in Chapter 5 to provide actionable policy recommendations.

H2.1₀: For each Iraq-related frame, frame importance will be equal across the UK, France, Russia and Germany.

H2.1_A: Frame importance will not be equal across countries.

H2.2₀: For each country, frame importance will be equal across the four-Iraq related frames.

H2.2_A: Frame importance will not be equal across frames.

We will plot these frame importance scores - along with the frame resonance scores from Chapter 5 - on the four-quadrant resonance-importance plot introduced in Chapter 1, which shows which frames in which countries should be targeted for persuasion (increasing resonance scores), conventional framing (changing importance scores), both, or neither. To provide more precise recommendations and provide a check on our interpretation of the resonance-importance plot, we run a simulation of the model to confirm that low-resonance, high-importance frames have the potential to yield the greatest improvements in policy support.

H2.3₀: In a simulation of persuasion in support for U.S. Iraq policy, low-resonance/high-importance frames (those in the upper left quadrant of Figure 1.2) will yield potential opinion improvements no greater than that for frames in other resonance-importance quadrants.

H2.3_A: Low-resonance/high-importance frames provide the highest potential opinion improvements.

(C) Sophistication, Ideology and Policy Support

For this section, we repeat the analysis performed in Chapter 5, but in this case look at the influence of political sophistication and self-identified political ideology on overall policy support rather than on specific frame resonance. If the effect of self-identified ideology on policy support increases at high levels of sophistication, this may mean that more sophisticated individuals are again gravitating towards the prevailing positions of their self-identified ideological group and are becoming more resistant to USG messages.

Research Question 3: How did levels of policy support vary depending on one's political sophistication and self-identified ideology?

H3.1₀: The gap between policy support of left-identifying and right-identifying individuals will be no greater at the highest level of sophistication than it is at moderate levels of sophistication.

H3.1_A: The gap will be larger at the highest level of sophistication.

H3.2₀: As sophistication increases, holding other factors constant, the influence of self-identified ideology on frame resonance will remain the same or decrease.

H3.2_A: As sophistication increases, the influence of ideology on frame resonance will increase.

(D) Considering Reverse Causality

Our final research question addresses the anticipated critique that our assumption that frame acceptance drives policy support misreads the direction of causality. According to this critique, it is possible that - rather than fashioning an overall opinion of a policy based upon its costs, its benefits, or its moral acceptability - individuals choose a policy position for some unmeasured reason and then merely provide whichever responses to frame-related questions justify that position. In the Iraq example, an individual might oppose potential U.S. military action for no clearly articulated reason, but then - perhaps in order to justify their answer to the interviewer - unthinkingly express the belief that the war will worsen terrorism and lead to an all-out war in

the Mideast. If true, this explanation would cast serious doubt on the ability of frames to affect policy support. Expressions of frame acceptance would not be causes of policy support, but effects of it.

This critique can be easily tested. If frame acceptance does not contribute to one's policy position, but is instead merely offered as a *post hoc* justification of it, we would expect that the four frame acceptance questions would be highly correlated. War supporters would justify their choice by expressing pro-USG answers to RETHRT, ALLOUT, TERROR and OIL, while war opponents would do the reverse, without considering differences among the four frame questions.

Research Question 4: How highly correlated were the four variables measuring individual acceptance of Iraq-related frames?

We compute six correlation coefficients (one for each pair of frame acceptance variables) for each country. We use 0.5, a standard indicator of "large" correlation,¹²⁰ as a relatively strict threshold above which inter-frame correlation will be considered high enough to warrant causality concerns.

H4.1₀: The majority of correlation coefficients between pairs of frame acceptance variables are greater than 0.5.

H4.1_A: The majority of correlations are less than or equal to 0.5.

6.2. DATA

The public opinion data in this chapter comes from the November 2002 and March 2003 Pew GAP surveys; sample sizes for the four study countries for both surveys are listed in Appendix B. In addition to the variables studied in previous chapters, we include WARFAV, a variable measuring support for U.S.-led military action in Iraq.¹²¹

¹²⁰ See Cohen, Jacob (1988), *Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences*, New York: Academic Press, as referenced, e.g., in U.S. Department of Education, Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for Education Statistics, "Statistical Standards: Analysis of Data / Production of Estimates or Projections," NCES Standard 5-1-4, online at http://nces.ed.gov/StatProg/2002/std5_1.asp.

¹²¹ Question wording is as follows: "Thinking about possible war with Iraq, would you favor or oppose [your country] joining the US and other allies in military action in Iraq to end Saddam Hussein's rule?" Answers are recorded as 1 for "Yes" and 0 for "No." While the survey

6.3. METHODS

As before, we standardize all model variables to vary within the 0-1 range. Unlike in Chapter 5, we do not create a generic frame acceptance variable, but instead keep individual responses to RETHRT, ALLOUT, TERROR and OIL as separate variables. The coefficients of these variables in a model predicting WARFAV represent the importance scores for each frame. The model can be written as follows:

$$s_i = \alpha + \sum_{k=1}^K \beta_k x_{i,k} + \sum_{f=1}^4 \lambda_f y_{i,f} + \sum_{p=1}^3 \eta_p w_{i,p} + \sum_{c=1}^3 \delta_c z_c \\ + \sum_{c=1}^3 \sum_{k=1}^K \sigma_{k,c} (x_{i,k} \times z_c) + \sum_{c=1}^3 \sum_{f=1}^4 \theta_{f,c} (y_{i,f} \times z_c) + \sum_{c=1}^3 \sum_{p=1}^3 \mu_{p,c} (w_{i,p} \times z_c) + \varepsilon_i$$

Where s is a logit term reflecting factors increasing the probability of policy support for individual i ; x is a vector of demographic covariates; y is a vector of the four frame variables; w is a vector of political variables (sophistication, self-identified ideology, and an interaction between the two); and z is a vector of the three binary country fixed-effects variables (with the fourth country as the reference case). On the second row of the equation, we fully interact the above terms by the country fixed-effects variables. This essentially creates separate, country-level models within the overall model, allowing us to generate country-specific estimates of the importance of frames and other factors in driving policy support. For example, as in Chapter 3, the importance of frame f in country c is calculated as the sum of the non-interacted frame coefficient and the country-by-frame interaction term ($\lambda_f + \theta_{f,c}$).

Simulation (hypothesis 3.2) is carried by computing which of the frames not yet accepted by a non-supporter of U.S. policy would yield the greatest increase in predicted probability of policy support; it essentially asks, for each individual, which frame would be most

does record a third level of response ("Don't know"), these occur very rarely (<4 percent of sample), and so we use binary logistic regression rather than multinomial or ordered logistic regression models.

effective in converting the individual to a policy supporter.¹²² Finally, we use polychoric correlation coefficients to compute the correlations across frame acceptance variables, as is appropriate for ordinal variables.¹²³

6.4. RESULTS

The results below reveal important differences in both the strength of policy support across countries, and in the strength of different frames in driving such support.


(A) Levels of Policy Support

Figure 6.1, on the following page, shows average levels of public support for U.S.-led military action in the U.K., France, Russia, and Germany, in both November 2002 and March 2003 (where a value of 1 represents unanimous support, and a value of 0 represents unanimous opposition).

¹²² Simulation was carried out as follows: after generating a predicted probability of policy support for each individual, we discarded from the simulation all individuals already expressing support for U.S.-led military action (WARFAV = 1) or individuals accepting all four pro-USG frames (RETHRT, ALLOUT, TERROR and OIL = 1). For the remaining individuals, we increased the level of acceptance of each non-accepted frame (e.g., changing RETHRT to 0.5 if currently equal to 0, changing it to 1 if currently equal to 0.5, or leaving it unchanged if currently equal to 1), and compute the increase in predicted probability of policy support associated with each frame acceptance change. We then flag the frame yielding the greatest increase in predicted probability.

¹²³ A polychoric correlation coefficient controls for the potential spurious effect that the number of ordinal categories can have on a correlation measure by treating ordinal responses as if they came from a continuous variable. Accordingly, the measure is more appropriate for ordinal variables than the more commonly-used Pearson correlation coefficient. See Olsson, Ulf (1979), "Maximum Likelihood Estimation of the Polychoric Correlation Coefficient," *Psychometrika* vol. 44 iss. 4: pp.443-460.

Figure 6.1 - Opinion of U.S.-Led Military Action in Iraq, By Country, November 2002 and March 2003



Note: Error bars signify weighted standard errors.

Testing H1.1 (equality of support across the four countries), we can reject the null of equality in both 2002 and 2003 ($F=70.0$ and 87.3 , respectively; $p<0.001$). Policy support varies widely across countries, particularly between the UK, where it is highest (mean support for U.S.-led military action is in the 0.4-0.5 range, where 0 represents unanimous disapproval and 1 unanimous approval); and Russia, where it is lowest (mean support is in the 0.1-0.2 range).

Testing H1.2 (equality of support within countries, over time), we can reject the null of equality for Britain ($F=7.1$, $p<0.01$), France ($F=17.14$, $p<0.001$) and Russia ($F=5.48$, $p<0.05$). In all three of these countries, public support for potential military action dropped significantly from November 2002 to early March 2003. Therefore, although it is possible that U.S. public diplomacy efforts prevented an even larger drop in international public support for U.S. military action over this time, it did not succeed in actually improving levels of support. This support likely fell further once the U.S. terminated its effort to secure a UN Security Council resolution authorizing

military force, as far more Europeans were willing to support a UN-authorized war than a unilateral action by the U.S. and its allies.¹²⁴

The case of Germany presents an intriguing exception to this decline over time, although the limited geographic coverage of this study prevents firm conclusions. As shown in Figure 6.1, Germany was the only one of the four countries not to suffer a significant drop in support for U.S. military action between 2002 and 2003; instead, it experienced a positive but statistically insignificant change. Interestingly, Germany was also the only one of the four countries where the overall valence of media coverage of Iraq significantly improved between 2002 and 2003.¹²⁵ Given the small number of countries in this study, we cannot test whether this is mere coincidence, or whether the pro-USG movement in German coverage prevented a drop in U.S. policy support among Germans. However, these findings are not inconsistent with the possibility that media coverage played an important role in affecting expressed attitudes toward U.S. policy.


(B) Frames as Drivers of Policy Support

In Appendix G, we present the full regression output for the statistical model regressing policy support on frame acceptance and other variables. Figure 6.2 depicts the results as a resonance-importance plot, with the horizontal coordinates representing resonance scores (from Chapter 5), and the vertical coordinates representing importance scores (country-specific regression coefficients). As was done in Chapter 3, points are labeled by country and frame, and markers for the same frame have the same shape and color.

¹²⁴ In a Gallup poll released in January 2003, when asked "Are you in favor of military action against Iraq?", 49 percent of U.K. respondents supported military action against Iraq in some form, but only 10 percent supported unilateral action by the U.S. and its allies. In other countries, the (overall support/unilateral support) figures were 34 percent/7 percent for France, 48 percent/9 percent for Germany, and 30 percent/7 percent for Russia. Source: Gallup International Iraq Poll 2003, online at <http://www.gallup-international.com/>.

¹²⁵ The overall media valence measure (averaged across all quoted parties, excluding USG statements as in Chapter 5, where 1 = Pro-USG valence, 0 = Anti-USG, and 0.5 = Neutral or Mixed) rose in Germany from 0.23 in 2002 to 0.33 in 2003 (a 47 percent increase, $F=4.64$, $p<0.05$).

Figure 6.2 - Resonance-Importance Plot, by Country and Frame Related to U.S. Iraq Policy, November 2002



Note: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$ (regression coefficient different from zero). Label prefixes: Bri=Britain; Frn=France; Ger=Germany; Rus=Russia. Label suffixes: Allout=Believe U.S. Invasion will not Lead to an All-Out War; Terr=Believe U.S. Invasion will Reduce Risk of Terrorism; Oil=Believe U.S. is not Motivated by Iraqi Oil; Rethrt=Believe Iraq Regime Poses a Threat to the Mideast.

We again use a regression coefficient cutoff of 0.8 to signify that the effect of a frame on policy support is at a policy significant level (corresponding to an average 15-point increase in the predicted probability of policy support associated with the acceptance of the frame). In general, the coordinates of the same frame across different countries (points of the same shape and color) tend to cluster together, while there are major differences between the scores of different frames within the same country. Consistent with this observation, we cannot reject the null on H2.1 (equality of importance for the same frame across different countries), while we are able to reject the null on H2.2 (equality of importance across different frame types) both on the entire dataset ($F=12.9$, $p < 0.001$) and individually for Britain, France,

and Germany. The implication here is that geographic differences were not nearly as pronounced as differences in the resonance and importance across different frame types.

As discussed in Chapter 1, frames require different treatment depending on which quadrant they occupy on this plot. Accordingly, the following recommendations emerge from Figure 6.2:

- *ALLOUT (square markers)*: In all four countries, concern that the Iraq war might trigger wider conflict in the Middle East had relatively low resonance and weak importance in driving support for U.S. policy. This suggests little to no need to dwell on frames emphasizing (or downplaying) the effects of a potential war on wider Mideast stability.
- *RETHRT (circular markers)*: The belief that Iraq posed a threat to the Mideast was widely accepted and a strong driver of support for U.S. policy. While French and Russian audiences may have needed some additional persuasion on this point, this frame was already popular and important, and so there was relatively little potential for it to further increase support for U.S. policy.
- *TERROR (triangular markers)*: On average, this frame was unpopular (most people believed war would worsen terrorism), making it a moderately-sized driver of policy opposition (except in Russia, where it was not significant). Here one might have recommended either (1) a greater push to persuade audiences that the war would reduce terrorism (shifting the triangular markers to the right), or (2) moving the conversation away from terrorism, perhaps to other benefits of the war, in order to reduce the salience of terrorism (shifting the triangular markers down the vertical axis). We could then assess, through subsequent surveys over time, whether persuasion-focused strategies (detected through horizontal movement on the plot) or salience-focused strategies (detected through vertical movement) were more successful.

- *OIL (diamond markers)*: In the UK, Germany, and Russia, attributions of U.S. motives regarding oil were strongly associated with policy support or opposition. To make improvements on this front, it may not have been possible to reduce the salience of the frame by merely ignoring it; salience was already high, and the U.S. and UK were already essentially ignoring the issue. If the oil frame remained important over time, the best recommendation may have been to try persuasion (shifting the diamond-shaped markers to the right) by confronting oil rumors directly and/or making enforceable promises on the future of Iraqi oil.

To add a degree of precision to the above recommendations - and confirm that our interpretation of the resonance-importance plot is generally correct - we next carried out a simulation using the model, as described in the previous section, to flag which of the four frames would yield the greatest increase in the chance that a current policy opponent would switch to policy support. The results are presented in Table 6.1 below.

Table 6.1 - Frames Yielding Greatest Simulated Increase in Probability of Policy Support, by Country

Country	RETHRT	ALLOUT	TERROR	OIL	Total
UK	3%	2%	25%	70%	100%
France	2%	1%	11%	86%	100%
Germany	3%	3%	24%	69%	100%
Russia	3%	2%	7%	88%	100%

Note: Totals may not add to 100% due to rounding. Rethrt=Believe Iraq Regime Poses a Threat to the Mideast; Allout=Believe U.S. Invasion will not Lead to an All-Out War; Terr=Believe U.S. Invasion will Reduce Risk of Terrorism; Oil=Believe U.S. is not Motivated by Iraqi Oil.

These results are consistent with our interpretation above. Improvements in RETHRT and ALLOUT were the least likely to trigger large improvements in policy support, albeit for different reasons: RETHRT because most individuals already accepted it, and ALLOUT because, even if people did accept it, it made little difference to one's decision to support U.S.-led action. For the vast majority of individuals, an improvement in OIL would have yielded the greatest increase in predicted likelihood of policy support, although one in five British and German policy opponents in the simulation were swayed most by TERROR (because these individuals already believed that the U.S. was not going to war for oil).

Accordingly, we reject the null of H2.3 (that low-resonance, high-importance frames such as OIL and TERROR would not fare better in this simulation than other frames, such as ALLOUT and RETHRT). Foreign publics already generally agreed that Iraq posed a threat, so U.S. officials might have benefitted from moving beyond this point to address foreign concerns about the consequences of war and the motives behind U.S. policy, especially the role of oil in U.S. calculations.


(C) Sophistication, Ideology and Policy Support

For hypothesis 3.1 - testing whether the gap between politically left-identifying and right-identifying individuals was significantly higher at high sophistication than at moderate sophistication, as predicted by theory - we can reject the null of no difference for the entire sample ($F=4.6$, $p<0.05$) and for Britain and France individually. In these countries, the effect of self-identified ideology on policy support is insignificant at moderate sophistication, but large and significant at high sophistication. Germany and Russia also show movement in the expected direction, but the change in the gap is not statistically significant; at the very least, this means that no country shows changes over sophistication that are inconsistent with what is predicted by theory.

Figure 6.3, on the next page, illustrates these results by showing levels of support for military action (WARFAV) for each country,

disaggregated by respondents' political sophistication and self-identified ideology.

Figure 6.3 - Public Support for U.S.-Led Military Action in Iraq (WARFAV), by Respondents' Political Sophistication, Self-Identified Political Ideology, and Country



Why the change is largest in Britain and France is unclear; in Britain, one explanation might have been the prominence of opinion leaders' voices on both sides of the Iraq debate (see Figure 4.2), such that a sophisticated viewer could easily find arguments consistent with his or her self-identified ideology.

To test hypothesis 3.2 - measuring the effect of ideology on policy support after holding frame acceptance and other variables constant - we test the significance of the interaction between self-identified ideology and high sophistication in the model predicting policy support. If the interaction is large and significant, then that would suggest that ideology becomes a stronger driver of policy support at the highest levels of sophistication. The results are similar to the previous

hypothesis: we reject the null of no significant interaction for the entire sample ($t=2.6$, $p<0.05$) and for France individually ($t=3.9$, $p<0.001$).

The persistent significance of an (ideology x sophistication) effect in France may be due to the higher ideological consistency among highly sophisticated French respondents than among highly sophisticated respondents in other countries. While 20 percent of highly sophisticated French respondents provided consistently pro-USG or anti-USG answers across RETHRT, ALLOUT, TERROR, OIL and WARFAV, only 14 percent of sophisticated Russians, 11 percent of sophisticated Germans, and 6 percent of sophisticated Britons did so.¹²⁶ Therefore, sophisticated individuals in France may have been particularly adept at gravitating toward a policy position consistent with their self-identified ideology, and by extension, also adept at resisting messages that conflicted with that position.

(D) Considering Reverse Causality

As discussed in the preceding paragraph, some uniformity in respondent's answers to frame acceptance questions is expected. However, if correlations between frame acceptance variables are too high - as discussed above, defined as exceeding 0.5 - this could indicate that frame-related attitudes are being expressed merely to justify a predetermined policy position. If this is the case, we cannot realistically analyze frame importance in driving policy support, because the policy position is affecting stated frame acceptance, rather than the other way around.

Table 6.2, on the following page, displays the correlation coefficients between each pair of frame acceptance variables in each country (six pairs x four countries).

¹²⁶ The difference between the French and Russian measures is only weakly significant ($F = 2.8$, $p<0.1$), but French differences with Germany and the UK are significant at $p<0.01$ and $p<0.001$, respectively.

Table 6.2 - Correlations Between Frame Acceptance Variables, by Country

Frame Pair	UK	France	Germany	Russia
RETHRT-ALLOUT	-0.13	-0.18	-0.07	-0.14
RETHRT-TERROR	0.06	-0.00	-0.01	0.08
RETHRT-OIL	0.30	0.38	0.35	0.24
ALLOUT-TERROR	0.12	0.24	0.28	0.17
ALLOUT-OIL	0.10	0.05	-0.02	-0.04
TERROR-OIL	0.15	0.14	0.06	0.20

Note: Totals may not add to 100% due to rounding. Rethrt=Believe Iraq Regime Poses a Threat to the Mideast; Allout=Believe U.S. Invasion will not Lead to an All-Out War; Terr=Believe U.S. Invasion will Reduce Risk of Terrorism; Oil=Believe U.S. is not Motivated by Iraqi Oil.

We can clearly reject the null hypothesis of H4.1, that the majority of correlation coefficients exceed 0.5. In fact, no correlations exceed 0.4. The highest correlations are consistently between RETHRT and OIL - both of which are concerned with the legitimacy of the Iraqi threat (RETHRT is concerned with the Iraqi threat to the Middle East, while OIL is concerned with whether the Iraqi threat is mere pretext for the U.S. desire for oil).

The frames RETHRT and ALLOUT have a consistently negative correlation: those who are afraid of the Iraqi regime (pro-USG on RETHRT) are also afraid of what a U.S.-led war might do to the region (anti-USG on ALLOUT). This is an entirely logical relationship, but is inconsistent with the conjecture that frame acceptance responses were merely being offered to justify respondents' policy positions after the fact. Accordingly, we believe that this potential threat to the interpretation of our results is minimal.

6.5. CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS

This chapter is the last to apply the frame-based assessment methodology to the case of U.S. Iraq policy in 2002 and 2003. Here, we have focused on the drivers of support for U.S.-led military action, with a particular emphasis on the relationship between individual frame acceptance and policy support.

While policy support varied significantly across the four countries studied, three of the four shared a common trend: between November 2002 and early March 2003, support for U.S.-led military action dropped significantly (and likely dropped further once the U.S. terminated the effort to secure UN Security Council authorization of military force). We cannot say how much of this decline might have been prevented with a different messaging strategy (although, as the case of Germany shows, such a decline was not inevitable). However, the analysis pinpoints a number of possible adjustments that might have been made to U.S. messages at the time. These included:

1. Move beyond framing Iraq as a threat, which was already widely accepted by foreign publics and was already strongly important in driving policy support. (In the four countries, resonance for RETHRT varied between 0.63 and 0.88, while importance scores varied between 1.1 and 1.4.)
2. More vigorously attempt to persuade audiences of the benefits of U.S. policy in reducing the risk of terrorism, or failing that, de-emphasize terrorism frames entirely. (Resonance for TERROR varied between 0.23 and 0.29, while importance scores varied between 0.7 and 1.0).
3. Directly confront frames regarding the role of oil in U.S. motivations, which were strongly associated with policy support. (Resonance for OIL varied between 0.19 and 0.51, while importance scores varied between 0.9 and 1.4.)
4. Ignore frames regarding the impact of a potential U.S.-led war on Mideast stability. (Resonance for ALLOUT varied between 0.11 and 0.29, while importance scores varied between 0.1 and 0.5.)

5. Shift time and resources away from politically sophisticated audiences, particularly in France, who were likely already resistant to USG messages. (Highly-sophisticated French respondents had a regression coefficient on self-identified ideology that was 4.6 higher than the same coefficient for only moderately-sophisticated individuals.)

Finally, there is an important conclusion to be drawn from our analysis of correlations among frame acceptance variables. The negative correlation between RETHRT and ALLOUT highlights the danger that two pro-USG frames might work against each other: an emphasis on the risks Iraq posed to the Mideast could have led audiences to think that a U.S.-led war would itself be risky for the region; conversely, minimizing the risks of U.S.-led war to the Mideast might have sown doubt as to whether Iraq really posed that much of a risk to the region to begin with. In short, shifts in messaging strategy may come with risks and unintended consequences - reaffirming the benefits of detailed, targeted audience research before the campaign even begins.

7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

"[U]ltimately, the United States is going to do what's in its best interests, even though that may mean that people don't find us particularly popular."

-James K. Glassman, Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, September 17, 2008

The decision to carry out a controversial U.S. policy is often cast as a dilemma between doing what is right and doing what is popular (see former Under Secretary Glassman's comments, above). The goal of public diplomacy - and of this dissertation - is to demonstrate that this dilemma is not as stark as it might appear. Public diplomacy can, with varying degrees of success, make the "right" policy more popular through targeted messages directed at attitudinal drivers of policy support or opposition. However, public diplomacy research can also assist in identifying when such a policy might hurt America's global support more than it would further other U.S. objectives. In particular, there can often be a tradeoff between narrow or short-term USG policy objectives, and longer-term interests such as maintaining the viability of USG coalition strategies. If the "right" U.S. policy severely diminishes our prestige and partnerships around the world, it may not be the right policy after all.

Accordingly, this chapter concludes with recommendations for the successful execution of public diplomacy - both in campaign design and campaign assessment - as well as a broader discussion on the role of public diplomacy within the overall practice of foreign policy.

7.1. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY CAMPAIGN DESIGN AND ASSESSMENT

Three top-level recommendations for the design of public diplomacy campaigns emerge from the analysis in this study; these can be summarized as affirming the importance of (1) message targeting, (2) the use of local advocates, and (3) an ongoing assessment process. In this conclusion, we do not simply aim to summarize the findings of previous chapters, but also consider the challenges and dilemmas the State

Department or other public diplomacy practitioners would face in actually carrying out these recommendations.

(A) Message Targeting

The first top-level recommendation is that messages in support of U.S. policy should be more targeted than at present, focusing on the *specific* drivers of support or opposition to *specific* U.S. policies among *specific* international audiences. Not all arguments in support of a policy are equal. Some arguments may already be widely accepted by target audiences, while others may be nearly unanimously rejected. Furthermore, both popular and unpopular arguments can vary in the degree to which they actually drive policy support. Adding to the complexity, these dynamics can vary widely by audience; elderly conservatives in Egypt likely support or oppose U.S. foreign policies for very different reasons than do young liberals in Japan.

Summary of Findings: Our chapter-by-chapter analyses support the recommendation of greater message targeting:

- In Chapter 3, our baseline target audience analysis across four countries found that the significance of potential drivers of U.S. policy support varied by country. For example, messages highlighting the risk of terrorism appeared to hold some potential for improving policy support in France and Germany, but not in Britain or Russia.
- In Chapter 4, our media content analysis highlighted several instances where specific anti-policy arguments may not have been adequately rebutted in the media reporting of a particular country, potentially requiring country-by-country messaging adjustments.
- In Chapter 5, we found significant differences in the degree to which different policy-related arguments were accepted by foreign publics, both when comparing the same policy argument across different countries, and different arguments within the same country.

- In Chapter 6, we found significant differences in the degree to which different policy-related arguments appeared to drive overall policy support. Certain frames (e.g., emphasizing the possible effects of U.S. policy on Mideast stability) had little relationship with the individual decision to support or oppose U.S. policy.

Executing the Recommendation: The major issue in executing a targeted messaging campaign concerns the level of audience segmentation. For a particular Mideast policy, for example, is it enough to have one pro-policy message for Muslims and another message for non-Muslims? Or must we determine the best message at a much finer level, for example, learning why 20- to 30-year-old males in Lebanon feel the way they do about the policy?

There are at least two important tradeoffs associated with this decision. The first tradeoff is a resources problem, pitting the messaging value of detailed audience data against the cost (in time, money and manpower) of acquiring that data. This tradeoff will be discussed later in this chapter, as part of the discussion on executing a rapid and cost-effective public diplomacy assessment process.

The second tradeoff, which we focus on here, is a communications problem. While targeted messages can effectively hone in on the drivers of policy support among specific audiences, targeting can also lead to claims that the messengers are inconsistent (i.e., that the USG is jumping wildly from one policy justification to another) or that they are opportunistic (i.e., that the USG is pandering to different audiences, telling each one what they want to hear). In October 2002, U.S. Senator Russ Feingold argued that the Iraq messaging campaign was suffering from this precise problem:

I'm not suggesting there has to be only one justification for such a dramatic action. But when the Administration moves back and forth from one argument to another, I think it undercuts the credibility of the case and the belief in its urgency. I believe that this practice of shifting justification has much to do with the troubling phenomenon of

many Americans questioning the Administration's motives in insisting on action at this particular time.¹²⁷

Continuing advancements in media technology only increase the risk of such criticism, as any pro-policy message intended for a particular foreign audience (or even for domestic U.S. political consumption) is likely to be carried by satellite and Internet to many unintended audiences as well.

How might the USG effectively target messages without falling victim to such criticism? One potential strategy is to rely more heavily on local advocates, as will be discussed in the next section. In the global media age, top U.S. officials, such as the President, cannot realistically limit specific messages to specific countries, let alone use contradictory arguments for different audiences. However, local advocates can employ more country-specific messages with less spillover into global media coverage, and with less risk of being accused of inconsistency or pandering.

A second strategy to avoid accusations of inconsistency is to ensure that different frames are related thematically. In the literature and practice of public relations, message consistency does not require that the messages heard by each audience are identical, but only that "there is a thread that holds them together."¹²⁸ This is a useful insight for public diplomacy, where national security frames might show the most promise for increasing policy support among one audience, while other audiences might respond better to economic frames or moral frames. With a clumsy framing strategy, these three frames might have nothing to do with one another; but with some forethought, frames can create a common story (or meta-frame) encompassing all three elements. For example, the USG might link the economic benefits of the policy to the opportunities created by an improved security environment; or link the moral desirability of the policy to economic benefits that

¹²⁷ "Statement of U.S. Senator Russ Feingold on Opposing the Resolution Authorizing the Use of Force Against Iraq," 9 October 2002, online at <http://feingold.senate.gov/speeches/02/10/2002A10531.html>.

¹²⁸ Moriarty, Sandra E. (1994). "PR and IMC: The Benefits of Integration." *Public Relations Quarterly* vol. 39 iss. 3: pp. 38-44.

will help lift people out of poverty. As a result, when different frames are emphasized to different audiences, the audiences are not hearing completely different arguments, but merely different facets of the same central story.

A third and final strategy to avoid juggling too many different arguments is to hone in on the audience segments most likely to help or harm U.S. policy interests, and focus on the frames that appear most influential for them. For public diplomacy in support of U.S. military coalitions, this might mean focusing on the influential frames, in allied countries, for whichever audience segments are applying the most vocal pressure on their leaders to withdraw their troops. While messages targeted to these vocal opponents would not be optimal for the non-vocal majority of foreign audiences, they may represent the most effective way to reduce allied leaders' perceived political costs of cooperating with the United States.

(B) Local Advocates

The second top-level recommendation is that it is highly desirable to have local advocates (e.g., Germans speaking to Germans) taking a greater role in messages in support of U.S. policy. Local advocates are not only more persuasive than non-locals (particularly more so than U.S. officials, who are unlikely to be seen as unbiased judges of U.S. policy), but in today's media environment, high-level U.S. officials cannot target particular pro-policy messages to particular countries (as discussed above). Thus, a strategy based on local advocates is a crucial element of the targeted, country-by-country messaging strategy recommended above.

Summary of Findings: Our analyses in earlier chapters support the recommendation of local advocacy:

- In Chapter 3, our baseline target audience analysis found that the relationship between news consumption and U.S. policy support could vary significantly depending on individuals' attitudes toward their national political

leader, suggesting that cues from these leaders could influence the effectiveness of media messages.

- In Chapter 4, our media content analysis found that frames emphasized by local leaders were far more likely to be emphasized by a country's media than frames that were not, suggesting that an effective way to get pro-USG frames into media coverage was when they were voiced by local leaders.
- In Chapter 5, we found significant effects of individuals' political sophistication and self-identified political ideology on frame resonance, likely because sophisticated individuals were better able to selectively reject media messages they disagreed with in favor of those associated with their natural political leaders. We also found that the association between media coverage and frame resonance was strongest when the media reporting measure excluded USG statements, suggesting that the direct statements of U.S. officials appearing in media were relatively ineffective in fostering frame resonance.
- In Chapter 6, we also found significant effects of political sophistication and self-identified political ideology on policy support, again suggesting that certain individuals' attitudes may be influenced by ideological leaders.

Executing the Recommendation: If local advocates are indeed important, how might the USG actually find and influence them? First, we unpack two distinct (but not mutually exclusive) strategies for local advocacy: (1) persuading existing local opinion leaders to support U.S. policy, and (2) helping existing local supporters of U.S. policy to become more prominent opinion leaders.

Existing local opinion leaders - whether political officials, ethnic leaders, or media figures - should be easily identifiable by USG staff with country-level expertise, such as embassy employees. Failing that, the USG might also choose to survey foreign audiences directly for the names of leaders they find persuasive or influential. If resources

are limited, there are cheaper and faster alternatives to surveys, which we will review in the next section.

As for persuading these leaders to actually become local advocates for U.S. policy, there are several potential strategies. Research in public relations has identified a number of key factors associated with successful relationships, such as proactivity (not waiting to develop a relationship until after a problem has occurred), continuity (not fading away once a crisis passes), preparedness before speaking with the other party, openness, accuracy, and meaningful personal relationships.¹²⁹ In the context of public diplomacy and relationships with opinion leaders, these findings provide a number of insights. To begin with, to turn local opinion leaders into advocates, the USG should develop one-on-one relationships with opinion leaders over the long term, and not just reach out when support for a policy is needed. This includes continued support for educational exchanges in order to develop relationships with future opinion leaders as well. When making its case to an opinion leader, the USG should be prepared to share data and resources, offer access to high-ranking U.S. officials or important official events, be familiar with the opinion leader's stated positions on the policy issue, and generally serve as an informative partner rather than making an aggressive attempt to "spin" the leader. Clumsy attempts at persuasion could be harmful, particularly if the opinion leader then announces that the USG has tried (and failed) to win him or her over.

Turning to the second strategy of local advocacy - increasing the prominence of existing policy supporters - the USG can identify such supporters through several methods. Frequent monitoring of foreign media reporting (see the assessment section, below) should reveal which local figures are expressing support for the U.S., either in general or in regard to specific U.S. policies. Alternatively, U.S. officials could rely on other parts of the public diplomacy system, such as local

¹²⁹ Desiere, Scott and Bey-Ling Sha (2005). "Analyzing Organization-Media Relationships: Exploring the Development of an Organizational Approach to Media Relations." *8th International Public Relations Research Conference Proceedings*, Miami, FL: pp. 43-58.

embassies or educational/cultural exchange programs, to identify potential local advocates.

As for actually making these supporters more prominent opinion leaders, possible approaches (on a rough scale from least to most intensive) for the USG include (1) highlighting the arguments of these advocates when speaking to the foreign press, (2) inviting these advocates to joint announcements or other events in which they could speak directly with their local media, or (3) encouraging advocates to generate media coverage in their own right by making announcements, giving interviews, writing reports or opinion columns, sponsoring or creating conferences or other sources of information, or introducing legislation. Of course, some of these actions carry dangers that the advocates will lose credibility through their association with the USG. Therefore, detailed target audience analysis on the baseline credibility of potential advocates would be of significant value.

If no opinion leaders can be persuaded to support the policy, and no credible local advocates can be found, this could itself be a signal that current U.S. messaging to the target audience - or even the policy itself - needs serious re-assessment. Below, we summarize our recommendations for how to assess a public diplomacy campaign using a frame-based approach.

(C) Ongoing, Multi-Level Assessment

The third and final top-level recommendation is that public diplomacy campaigns are likely to benefit from ongoing, detailed assessment of the success of pro-policy frames in reaching and ultimately persuading target audiences.

Summary of Findings: As discussed in Chapter 1, a major advantage of frame-based assessment is that it provides precise diagnostics regarding where a failed public diplomacy campaign might have broken down. Moving to Chapter 6, we saw that in the most top-level sense the Iraq public diplomacy campaign was such a failure, in at least three of the four countries covered in this study. Accordingly, here we review a number of frame-based assessment questions that - in the Iraq case - could have revealed warning signs as early as November 2002, near the

very beginning of the campaign. As such, these questions represent valuable intermediate diagnostics for future public diplomacy campaigns.

- *Is the USG choosing the right public diplomacy policy objective?* In the Iraq case, to the extent the USG was hoping to create public pressure in favor of military force in countries where the majority of individuals opposed it, the entire public diplomacy campaign may have been founded on unrealistic goals.
- *Is the USG conducting baseline target audience research before commencing the public diplomacy campaign?* It is unclear what effort the USG undertook in the summer of 2002 to explore drivers of foreign support or opposition to military action in Iraq. However, the USG's subsequent focus on nuclear/WMD issues - even though our baseline research found low resonance and importance of the nuclear issue on support for U.S. counter-terrorism policy - suggests that any effort may have been limited.
- *Is the USG designing pro-policy frames based on this audience research?* Again, we have only limited access to information regarding the role of research behind the crafting of the USG's pro-policy message. However, we do know that at least one of the major elements of the Iraq message was chosen by speechwriters.¹³⁰
- *Are pro-policy arguments being disseminated by local international speakers?* Although desirable, this almost never occurred in France, Germany and Russia.
- *Are the pro-policy arguments in USG messages being taken up by foreign media?* Some arguments were taken up, but many

¹³⁰ Former speechwriter to President Bush, Michael Gerson, conceived the smoking gun/mushroom cloud metaphor used repeatedly by administration officials to emphasize the nuclear threat posed by the Hussein regime. For attribution, see, e.g., Moyers, Bill, "Buying the War," *Bill Moyers Journal* 25 April 2007, online at <http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/btw/transcript1.html>.

were attributed to U.S. officials themselves, who would have had limited persuasiveness. In addition, there were several large mismatches where a particular anti-policy argument went relatively unchallenged, or a pro-policy argument may have been repeated more frequently than necessary.

- *Are the pro-policy arguments in USG messages being accepted by foreign publics?* Some arguments were accepted, but arguments relating to the efficacy or motivations behind U.S. policy were accepted far less than arguments relating to the general nature of the policy problem.
- *Are the pro-policy arguments in USG messages driving overall policy support?* Some arguments did influence policy support, but important drivers of policy support (such as belief in the Iraqi threat) may have been discussed more frequently than necessary, while important drivers of policy opposition (such as the role of Iraqi oil) may have been ignored in the hope they would disappear, even though confronting negative rumors and making enforceable promises could have had a more beneficial effect.

In summary, the diagnostics suggest that the Iraqi message was fairly centralized - with a significant share of pro-USG messaging coming directly from high-level U.S. officials - and focused on the Iraqi threat to the exclusion of other, potentially more globally persuasive arguments. With few local advocates, it may have been impossible for the USG to keep its threat-focused message - one that may have been optimal for domestic political consumption - from also becoming the predominant, although sub-optimal, message heard by international audiences.

Executing the Recommendation: In the abstract, it is difficult to argue against the appeal of detailed campaign assessment. However, in a world with limited time, money and manpower, the more relevant issue becomes how to obtain this assessment data in a resource-efficient manner. International public opinion surveys (and to a lesser degree, detailed media content analyses) can be resource-intensive, as well as

slow to design, carry out, and analyze. What real-time, low-budget options do policymakers have to isolate key frames and assess the success of USG messages?

One option is frequent monitoring of local media in a way that falls short of detailed content analysis. Editorials or front page stories of major local newspapers, or major addresses of local opinion leaders, can be quickly scanned on a daily or weekly basis to identify the elements of U.S. policy that both supporters and opponents are emphasizing, the coverage given to protests of the policy, and whether the parties quoted in support of the policy are primarily from the USG itself. Cheaper alternatives to public opinion polls include (1) direct conversations with opinion leaders, to isolate whether they believe particular pro-policy arguments and which of those arguments are most important in their decision to support or oppose U.S. policy; (2) on-the-ground, informal reports from U.S. officials posted abroad (such as embassy staff) on which U.S. policies appear to particularly incense or appeal to the local population, and why; and (3) the results of local polls commissioned by other organizations. On-the-ground information can serve as an early warning system for nascent foreign concerns with specific U.S. policies, and also point to overlooked but important sources of media influence, such as controversial documentaries that locals have been watching and discussing.

7.2. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

The one assessment question notably absent from the previous section is also the broadest: *is the USG choosing the right policy?* Public diplomacy practitioners have taken two distinct positions on whether public diplomacy and public opinion considerations should influence the formation and execution of U.S. foreign policy. The first and more common position has been to take U.S. foreign policy decisions as *fait accompli* and attempt to optimize public diplomacy around the policies. For example, in their 2003 report, the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World writes that:

We fully acknowledge that public diplomacy is only part of the picture. Surveys show much of the resentment toward America stems from our policies...But our mandate is clearly limited to issues of public diplomacy, where we believe a significant new effort is required.¹³¹

The implicit judgment behind this position is that public diplomacy is a metaphorical mop: useful for cleaning up messes, but not helpful for preventing the mess in the first place. When issues of public opinion do appear at the policymaking table, according to this view, they serve to warn policymakers to prepare for a public outcry, but should not influence whether or not the policy is actually chosen. Under Secretary Glassman - the former head of U.S. public diplomacy quoted at the beginning of this chapter - further elaborated:

[I]f our objective were to get the United States the highest favorability ratings we could get, then maybe we'd be more like Finland...in public diplomacy, [we] want to have some input into the policies in the sense that we say, if you do this, here's what the likely public reaction is. But that's not a reason not to carry out such a policy, **absolutely not**.¹³² [Emphasis added.]

By this logic, the costs of a damaged U.S. reputation can somehow remain off the books, and should not enter the accounting of a policy's costs and benefits. Even if the policy leads to months, or years, of dampened coalition support - with U.S. allies contributing fewer troops or resources to U.S.-led military campaigns, or with diplomatic support for U.S. initiatives disappearing or even turning to opposition - foreign public opinion is to remain a non-factor. In short, the role of the public diplomacy professional is to communicate U.S. policies to the world, not shape them.

¹³¹ Djerejian, Edward P. (Chairman) (2003), "Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World," Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, Washington, DC.

¹³² U.S. Department of State, "Bloggers' Conference: James K. Glassman, Under Secretary For Public Diplomacy And Public Affairs," 17 September 2008, online at <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/us/2008/109934.htm>.

The alternative view on this issue has been to advocate a greater and more formalized role for public diplomacy in the strategic formation of policy itself. As Edward R. Murrow famously quipped as USIA director dealing with the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs invasion, "If they want me in on the crash landings, I better damn well be in on the take-offs."¹³³ One rationale for such a view is that the diplomatic cost of a globally unpopular policy may be greater than the costs incurred by simply adjusting the policy to make it more palatable to foreign publics. The sway of this view may have peaked during the Kennedy administration; Murrow was the first and only USIA director to regularly attend meetings of the National Security Council.¹³⁴

Both of these perspectives have merit. U.S. policymakers must of course sometimes act in contravention of what is popular among foreign publics. Yet the pursuit of foreign public support is a legitimate goal, and would seem to deserve a voice at the policy drawing board. The question is: how exactly should this voice contribute?

The analysis in this dissertation can provide some insight toward answering this question. During the formation of U.S. policy, the public diplomacy practitioner - armed with baseline target audience analysis - could identify adjustments to the policy that might yield the greatest increases in support among key foreign audiences. For example, if frames emphasizing a policy's economic benefits seem resonant but not yet important in driving policy support, the policy could be expanded to more visibly encompass economic activities or benefits, such as reductions in trade barriers. If these changes do relatively little harm to the overall objectives of the policy, they may be worth implementing, particularly in cases where policy success is dependent on coalitions or other forms of international support.

If, on the other hand, a globally unpopular policy has no promising frames - perhaps all of the USG's potential pro-policy arguments are neither believed nor important - this may be a signal that neither messaging nor minor adjustments can make the policy more acceptable to

¹³³ Snow (2006).

¹³⁴ Ibid.

foreign publics. If foreign support is critical to the policy's success, and opinion costs outweigh other benefits of the policy, the policy may need to be drastically changed or abandoned entirely. Critics might call this a show of weakness, but the alternative - continuing with the policy, and alienating U.S. allies - may ultimately be more harmful to U.S. policy objectives.

In the introduction to this study, we noted that low international support for the U.S. and its policies is troublesome to the extent the USG relies on coalition strategies to share the burden of military, economic, and other campaigns. We conclude by re-framing this idea in a somewhat less worrisome light. It may be true that public diplomacy lies in a gray area between slogans and solutions - more substantive than the spin or propaganda its critics take it for, but still less concrete than policies that build homes or move aircraft. Nevertheless, as the world continues to become more interconnected, partnerships and coalitions will move from being useful and advantageous to becoming necessary and critical. To the extent that public diplomacy can nurture and expand these partnerships, its effects will reach far beyond the world of words and directly save American lives and money.

APPENDICES**APPENDIX A: DEFINITIONS OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY**

1965: "[T]he influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies...encompasses dimensions of foreign relations beyond traditional diplomacy, the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of intercultural communications."¹³⁵

1979: "'Public diplomacy'—international communication, cultural and educational activities in which 'the public' is involved."¹³⁶

1983: "Public diplomacy is comprised of those actions of the U.S. Government designed to generate support for our national security objectives."¹³⁷

1987: "Government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries; its chief instruments are publications, motion pictures, cultural exchanges, radio and television."¹³⁸

¹³⁵ Edmund A. Gullion, quoted in Snow Jr., Crocker, "About America: Edward R. Murrow: Journalism at its Best," USINFO Publications (April 2006), online at <http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/murrow/snow.htm>.

¹³⁶ Comptroller General, Report to the Congress of the United States. "The Public Diplomacy of Other Countries: Implications for the United States." July 23, 1979.

¹³⁷ The White House, National Security Decision Directive Number 77, "Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security," January 14, 1983. Online at <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/23-1966t.gif>.

¹³⁸ U.S. Department of State, Dictionary of International Relations Terms (1987), quoted in Public Diplomacy Alumni Association (PDAA), "What is Public Diplomacy?" (updated January 2008), online at <http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/1.htm>.

1988: "Public diplomacy is 20th century public affairs adapting traditional approaches both domestically and abroad to take account of modern communications technology."¹³⁹

1990: "A government's process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation's ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and current policies" and "to reduce the degree to which misperceptions and misunderstandings complicate relations between the U.S. and other nations."¹⁴⁰

1991: "Public diplomacy consists of overt campaigns to persuade the general public in countries overseas to be favourably disposed towards the country which funds such activities."¹⁴¹

1995: "Public diplomacy is the communication of U.S. interests and ideals beyond governments to foreign publics."¹⁴²

1998: "Public diplomacy seeks to promote the national interest through understanding, informing, and influencing foreign publics and broadening dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad."¹⁴³

2000: "Public diplomacy promotes U.S. national security and other interests by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign

¹³⁹ U.S. Department of State, Office of Public Diplomacy, *State* (January 1988), quoted in Tuch (1990).

¹⁴⁰ Tuch (1990).

¹⁴¹ Lee, Michael (1991). "The Projection of Australia Overseas: The Origins of the Council for Australia Abroad." *Australian Journal of Public Administration* 50(1), 38-46.

¹⁴² U.S. Department of State (1995). "Public Diplomacy for the 21st Century." Online at <http://www.state.gov/r/adcompd/1995rep.html>.

¹⁴³ United States Information Agency, "About this Site - The Public Diplomacy Forum," Spotlight, Issue 1, online at <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/usia/usiahome/pdforum/sptabout.htm#WHATIS>.

publics and policy-makers, and by broadcasting the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad."¹⁴⁴

2001: "Those overt international public information activities of the United States Government designed to promote United States foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad."¹⁴⁵

2002: "The cultural, educational, and information programs, citizen exchanges, or broadcasts used to promote the national interest of the United States through understanding, informing, and influencing foreign audiences."¹⁴⁶

2003: "Public diplomacy is the promotion of the national interest by informing, engaging, and influencing people around the world."¹⁴⁷

2004: "Public diplomacy is the promotion of America's interests, culture and policies by informing and influencing foreign populations."¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁴ Ritenburg, Pete and Dennis J. Gallagher (2000). "Administering Public Diplomacy Grants and Cooperative Agreements: Topic-Grants & Cooperative Agreements; Interagency Agreements; Gift-Receiving Authority; et al.: An Outline of Selected Legal Authorities and Issues." Office of the Legal Adviser (Buildings and Acquisitions), U.S. Department of State. Online at <http://fa.statebuy.state.gov/content/documents/tab11.pdf>.

¹⁴⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001.

¹⁴⁶ U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (2002), "Building America's Public Diplomacy through a Reformed Structure and Additional Resources."

¹⁴⁷ Djerejian (2003).

¹⁴⁸ Susan B. Epstein. "U.S. Public Diplomacy: Background and the 9/11 Commission Recommendations." Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, October 5, 2004.

2004: "Conveying information and selling a positive image is part of it, but public diplomacy also involves building long-term relationships that create an enabling environment for government policies."¹⁴⁹

2004: "Public diplomacy seeks through the exchange of people and ideas to build lasting relationships and receptivity to a nation's culture, values, and policies. It seeks also to influence attitudes and mobilize publics in ways that support policies and interests."¹⁵⁰

2005: "Work aiming to inform and engage individuals and organizations overseas, in order to improve understanding of and influence for the United Kingdom in a manner consistent with governmental medium and long term goals."¹⁵¹

2006: "The overall goal of U.S. public diplomacy is to understand, inform, engage, and influence the attitudes and behavior of foreign audiences in ways that support U.S. strategic interests."¹⁵²

2007: "Public diplomacy is the [State] Department's tool to fight what the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs has termed the 'war of ideas.'¹⁵³

¹⁴⁹ Nye, Joseph S. (2006). *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2004.

¹⁵⁰ Report of the Defense Science Task Force on Strategic Communication, September 2004. William Schneider, Jr., Chairman. Online at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-Strategic_Communication.pdf.

¹⁵¹ Lord Carter of Coles, "Public Diplomacy Review." Presented to the Foreign Secretary of the Treasurer, 13 December 2005.

¹⁵² Ford, Jess T. (2006). "U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Persistent Challenges." U.S. Government Accountability Office, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Science, the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related Agencies, House Committee on Appropriations. Online at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06707t.pdf>.

¹⁵³ U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General. "Report of Inspection: Summary Review of Public Diplomacy Efforts," Report Number ISP-I-07-08.

2008: "[P]ublic diplomacy focuses on the ways in which a country (or multi-lateral organization such as the United Nations), acting deliberately or inadvertently, through both official and private individuals and institutions, communicates with citizens in other societies...It involves not only shaping the message(s) that a country wishes to present abroad, but also analyzing and understanding the ways that the message is interpreted by diverse societies and developing the tools of listening and conversation as well as the tools of persuasion."¹⁵⁴

¹⁵⁴ USC Center on Public Diplomacy, "What is Public Diplomacy?" Online at http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/index.php/about/whatis_pd.

APPENDIX B: PEW GAP SURVEY DETAILS

	Summer 2002 Survey	November 2002 Survey	March 2003 Survey
<i>Sample Size</i>			
Britain	501	1,000	962
France	507	1,007	485
Germany	1,000	1,022	524
Russia	1,002	1,000	501
<i>Reported Sampling Error</i>			
Britain	± 4.4%	± 3%	± 3.5%
France	± 4.4%	± 3%	± 5%
Germany	± 3.1%	± 3%	± 5%
Russia	± 3.1%	± 3%	± 5%
<i>Fieldwork Dates</i>			
	07/05/2002 - 08/10/2002	11/02/2002 - 11/10/2002	03/12/2003 - 03/16/2003

APPENDIX C: FULL MODEL RESULTS, CHAPTER 3

Variable	Reference Country			
	Britain	France	Germany	Russia
Support for U.S.-Style Democracy	1.42***	0.76**	1.38***	1.51***
Support for UN	1.19*	1.5**	1.03*	n.s.
Belief that Terrorism is a Problem	n.s.	1.3**	1.01**	n.s.
Concern with Spread of Nuclear Weapons	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Support for One's National Leader	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Watch International News	-1.48**	n.s.	n.s.	-1.75**
Leader Support x Watch News	2.2*	n.s.	n.s.	4.91*
Self-Identified Ideology	n.s.	1.64*	1.86**	n.s.
Gender (Male)	n.s.	0.51*	n.s.	n.s.
Age	-0.81*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Marital Status (Married)	n.s.	n.s.	0.71***	n.s.
Number of Children	-0.19*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Income	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Political Sophistication	n.s.	n.s.	-0.79*	n.s.
Christian Self-Identification	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.

n.s. = Not significant; * = $p < 0.05$; ** = $p < 0.01$; *** = $p < 0.001$.

APPENDIX D: CODEBOOK

This coding protocol is designed to identify policy-relevant frames in the lead paragraphs of media stories.

Organization of Data

The coding table fills 16 columns, as shown in the table below.

Coding Data Layout

Headline	Lead	Quoted Party	Quote Valence	Frame 1	Frame 2	...	Frame 12
"..."	"..."						
"..."	"..."						

In the raw, pre-coded format, each row displays the **headline** and **lead** of a different news story in which a direct quote is present. These first two columns are already filled in. However, since our ultimate units of analysis are the quoted parties within leads, we need to duplicate rows with more than one such party. This happens only rarely; it occurs most commonly when there are two separate quotes credited to two separate parties within the same lead. However, a single quote is also given two separate rows when it is attributed to two separate parties (as in a joint statement or resolution). Conversely, two quotes remain in a single row when they are both spoken or written by the same party.

Therefore, for any one text, each row has a single and unique **quoted party** (the first column to be filled in). The next row reports the **quote valence** reflecting the party's overall position toward U.S. Iraq policy (to be explained below). Both party and valence should always be filled in. On the other hand, the remaining 12 columns should only sometimes be filled in; they are for marking the quoted party's position on frames that may or may not be present in the paragraph.

Very rarely, a few lead paragraphs will turn out to have nothing to do with Iraq, only mentioning it in passing (i.e., they are really about

North Korea or the Israel-Palestine conflict). You may flag these as off-topic and ignore them for the rest of the process.

The "Quoted Party" Column

A quoted party is the person, organization or country to whom a quote is attributed in the lead paragraph. Quotes are, simply, anything in quotation marks. Quotes can be as short as one word. However, a few items appearing in quotes are to be excluded, including:

- Quotations used for rhetorical purposes rather than to denote speech (e.g., certain phrases and foreign words)
- Names of organizations; nicknames of unknown origin
- Wording of surveys/polling

The party is the attributed source of the quote. The level of detail at which a party is coded depends on whether it comes from one of our seven core "countries" (U.S., UK, France, Germany, Russia, Iraq, or UN) or not.

If it does, we code the party at a high level of detail:

- Code names of individuals as is ("George Bush," "Kofi Annan," etc.).
- Code anything else as a combination of country prefix and party suffix.
- Country prefixes: **US, UK, FRN, GER, RUS, IRQ, UN**
- Party suffixes:
 - **G** (government: executive/military branches; use when the country is referred to as actor, e.g., "France said that..." or for "unnamed Russian officials," etc.)
 - **OG** (other government: legislative/local/police)
 - **Expert** (when not identified by name)
 - **Public** (generally for signs at protests)
 - **Other** (other organizations, or unclear)

So for the quoted party column, a named individual is coded simple with his or her name; the German government is coded as "GER-G," the US

Congress is "US-OG," an unnamed UN expert is "UN-Expert", and a sign quoted at a British protest is "UK-Public."

If the party does not come from one of these core countries, just code the party as the country of origin (includes "Europe" for Europe-wide organizations or office holders, and "INT" for international-level organizations or office holders). So the Prime Minister of Denmark is coded as "Denmark," protesters from Canada are coded as "Canada," etc.

It is common journalistic practice to blur the line between attributing a quote to a group and to an individual within that group, as in "The German government says it is 'very hopeful' about recent developments. 'We believe it is progress,' said the foreign minister." In this situation, we would treat this as a single quote by the foreign minister, not two separate quotes by the government and minister. Similarly, when one quote is attributed to a leader and another is attributed to his or her spokesperson, this is to be treated as a single quote, just from the leader. Finally, if sources are recalling that someone made a particular quote, this can be counted as a quote by the original speaker.

The "Quote Valence" Column

Once the quoted party has been identified, the "Quote Valence" column identifies whether the coded party is expressing support for (or arguments in support of) US Iraq policy, or is expressing opposition to (or arguments in opposition to) that policy. This column can take four values: "Pro-USG," "Anti-USG," "Mixed Position," and "No Position." This last category also covers ambiguous references.

To make this valence attribution, you may use the quote itself, as well as any paraphrased content attributed to that same party extending outside of the quote. For example, if the lead states that "Tony Blair said he was 'very happy to meet with Parliament today' in order to discuss the threat of Saddam Hussein to world peace," this may be counted as "Pro-USG" even though the valenced content appears outside of the quotation marks.

However, you may not use outside knowledge (e.g., you "know" that France was opposed to the war, even if the paragraph doesn't say so).

If it is not clear from the paragraph what position the party supports, even if you think you know what position they support, mark as "No Position." For example, a quote from Jacques Chirac that "our talks were very productive" has no position. However, a quote from Jacques Chirac that "our talks revealed the importance of a non-military solution" is coded as "Anti-USG."

Code "Pro-USG" for the following:

Very common:

- Expressing support for new, "tougher" UN resolutions on Iraq
- Expressing support for military action in Iraq
- Criticizing motives, honesty, etc. of Iraqi government or of war opponents
- Defending against criticism of war, or defending US / UK governments re: war
- Saying the responsibility for avoiding war is up to Iraq
- Specific pro-war arguments (it will help Iraqi people, economy, region, or UN authority; it will help fight terrorism; Hussein is a threat; inspections are not working or Iraq is not cooperating; this is Iraq's last chance / no time is left; the world supports war; etc.)

Less common:

- The importance of maintaining military threats / keeping pressure on Hussein
- The argument that the US / UK governments may not need UN authorization
- Praise of Iraqi exiles

Code "Anti-USG" for the following:

Very common:

- Criticizing or refusing to support new, "tougher" UN resolutions on Iraq
- Criticizing or refusing to support military action in Iraq
- Criticizing US / UK governments (motives, honesty, etc.) or those who support them
- Basic opposition to war (protests, etc.) or praise for war opponents

- Call for "political," "diplomatic" or "peaceful" resolution
- Specific anti-war arguments (it will hurt Iraqi people, economy, region, or UN authority; it will lead to more terrorism; Hussein is not really a threat; inspections are working or Iraq is cooperating; there is still time to avoid war; the world is opposed to war; etc.)

Less common:

- Concerns that war is a "distraction"
- Claims that Iraqis will fight hard, making war difficult

Code "Mixed Position" for the following:

Very common:

- "Yes, but..." or "on the one hand..." type statements:
 - Criticizing both Iraqi and US / UK governments
 - Praising Iraqi cooperation with inspectors, but saying more is needed
 - Saying war can be avoided, but only if Iraq cooperates
 - Explicitly coming out in support of war, but only with UN authorization
 - Against resolution / against war, but concerned about Iraqi WMD
 - Against war, but may support assisting US / UK governments logistically
 - Pushing for threat of military action, but still hoping for peace
 - Want Hussein to leave, but peacefully (e.g., exile)
 - Noting potential costs of war, but asserting that they are manageable
- Noting that the war could help the economy, or it could hurt the economy
- Worries that Hussein will retaliate violently if attacked (on the one hand, it suggests he is a legitimate threat; on the other hand, suggests that war is foolish/dangerous)

Less common:

- Expressions of willingness to compromise or "not ruling out" a change in position

- al-Qaeda statements of support for Iraqis (on the one hand, the content is anti-USG; on the other hand, it suggests a link between the two, which was a pro-USG argument)

Code **"No Position"** for the following:

Very common:

- Ambiguous or "dry" diplomatic / political comments
 - Announcements or scheduling of meetings / votes / reports, but no position stated
 - "Progress" is being made in negotiations, but no position stated
 - Arguments over delayed votes or summits, but no position stated
 - Criticizing disagreements or calling for unity, but no position stated
- Ambiguous or "dry" economic comments (taxes, trade, markets, etc.) when not saying the war will help or hurt economy
- Ambiguous or "dry" military comments (deployments, military technology, training)
- Evacuations or other imminent preparations for war
- Other comments that don't reveal a position or have arguments in favor of a position

Less common:

- Merely saying when inspections can resume or that they can resume now; not discussing whether or not they will work
- Merely calling for faster / tougher inspections (this argument does not have a "side")
- Referring to illegal sales of "equipment" or "radar" to Iraq (not "weapons" or "arms")
- Explicit statements that a country is not taking a position on the Iraqi issue

The 12 Frame Columns

The remaining 12 frame columns identify whether specific aspects of the Iraq issue are being raised in the quote. Because many quotes are fragments, you may again look at the quote itself, as well as any

paraphrased content attributed to that same party extending outside of the quote.

The 12 frames, along with short definitions, are:

- **OIL** - Whether the US/UK position on Iraq is motivated by oil
- **TERROR** - Terrorism as the motivation for war or as its unintended consequence
- **ALLOUT** - Whether war would help or hurt Mideast stability
- **RETHRT** - Whether or not Iraq poses a threat to the Mideast
- **PEOPLE** - The suffering of Iraqis as the motivation for war or as its unintended consequence
- **ECON** - The economic costs or benefits of war
- **MORAL** - Religious or moral statements for or against war
- **TIME** - Whether or not there is time for peaceful solutions
- **INSPECT** - Whether or not inspections work
- **WMD** - Whether or not Iraq poses a WMD threat
- **AUTHORITY** - Whether international authority is undermined or supported by war
- **OPINION** - Whether the world supports or opposes war

Unlike the overall valence code, frames are only either coded as "Pro-USG" or "Anti-USG" - there is no "Mixed" or "None" here. If a frame is being brought up in an ambiguous or ambivalent way, there is no need to mark it.

The next 12 pages provide guidance for each of these 12 frames.

1. **OIL** - Whether the US/UK position on Iraq is motivated by oil

Code as "Pro-USG"

- US/UK denials of oil as a motivating factor
- US/UK promises to "protect Iraq's natural resources"
- Co-occurring words/phrases: "natural resources"

Code as "Anti-USG"

- Claims that US/UK goal in Iraq is to "control the oil"
- Claims that US/UK actions are driven by its "energy needs"
- Protest slogans like "Blood is not oil," "No blood for oil"
- Iraqi references that it is "defending" its oil
- Co-occurring words/phrases: "control the oil," "energy needs," "blood is not oil," "no blood for oil," "blood in exchange for oil"

Do Not Code

- Discussions of oil prices, unless an explicit claim that US/UK is going to war to manipulate oil prices
- Discussion of oil shipments or Iraqi Oil-for-Food program
- Iraqi oil agreements or oil ties with Russia or other countries

Close but No

- Reference to Iraq as "oil-rich" but not discussing US motives

2. TERROR - Terrorism as a cause for war or a potential consequence**Code as "Pro-USG"**

- Explicit claims that Iraq is known to "harbor" terrorists or be "backing terrorism," or reference to its "support of terrorism"
- Mentioning the relationship between "Iraq and Osama," or al-Qaeda's "partnership with Iraq" or Iraq's connection to Ansar al-Islam
- Reference to Iraq's weapons of "mass terror"
- Connecting the "twin evils" of terrorism and WMD, or referring to "terrorism and its backers" or "terrorist or tyrant" or the danger that weapons be "passed to terrorists"
- Claim that Iraq can launch "catastrophic attack" on US soil
- Denials that the Iraq issue distracts from the fight against terrorism; that the war can be fought on "two fronts"
- Calling Iraqi inspections the duty of the international antiterrorist coalition
- Concern of terrorist attack involving Iraqi smallpox virus
- Co-occurring words/phrases: "terror" or "qaeda" or "qaida" (present in nearly all hits); "backing terror," "partnership with Iraq," "support of terror," "mass terror," "twin evils," "two fronts," "terrorism and its backers," "terrorist or tyrant," "Iraq and Osama"

Code as "Anti-USG"

- Concerns that war would inflame "extremism" or "radicalism" or increase the "risk of terrorism," "boost terrorism" or lead to "new terrorists"
- Claim of "no link" or a "foundered" connection between Iraq and al-Qaeda
- Claim that war will weaken the "coalition against terror"
- Iraqi claims that it takes the side of the West in the fight against terrorism
- Iraqi denials that its diplomats are linked to terrorism (incident in the Philippines) or denials of links to 9/11
- Dismissing US/UK claims of Iraq-terror link

- Co-occurring words/phrases: "terror" or "qaeda" or "qaida" (present, but not sufficient, in nearly all hits); "extremism," "radicalism," "risk of terror," "risk of further terror," "new terror," "boost terror," "coalition against terror"

Do Not Code

- Iraq denouncing "state terrorism" or "terrorist acts" of US
- Discussions of terrorism unrelated to Iraq (e.g., Syria)
- Mentions of terrorism by parties not quoted

Close but No

- Concerns that Iraq will launch WMD (non-terror) in retaliation if attacked
- al-Qaeda statements expressing solidarity with the Iraqi people

3. **ALLOUT** - Whether war would help or hurt Mideast stability

Code as "Pro-USG"

- Justifying the US/UK position as restoring "international peace" or bringing "democracy" to the region
- Claims that war is in the "interest of the region"
- Assurances by Iraqi neighbors (Iran, Turkey, Israel) that they will "show restraint" or avoid "adventures"
- Co-occurring words/phrases: "international peace," "interest of the region," "show restraint"

Code as "Anti-USG"

- Concerns that war will lead to "tension" in the region or "across the region" or lead to "chaos" or "turmoil" or "great disorder"
- Requests to "spare the region" or "save the region" from war, or raising the issue of "regional stability" or "stability in the Gulf" or "international stability"
- Accusations that US actions are aimed at the "whole region," to "divide up" the region
- Claims by Iraqi neighbors (Turkey, Israel, Iran) that it may intervene to prevent the establishment of a "Kurdish state," would "retaliate" if attacked, or that it is "preparing for the worst"
- Warnings of regional "Armageddon" resulting from war
- Risks of terrorist attack across the region in case of war
- Iraqi warnings to its neighbors if they assist the US/UK
- Concerns in neighboring countries of the potential problem of Iraqi refugees
- Co-occurring words/phrases: "tension in the region," "tensions in the region," "regional tension," "across the region," "chaos," "turmoil," "great disorder," "spare the region," "save the region," "regional stability," "stability in the Gulf," "international stability," "Kurdish state," "retaliate," "Armageddon"

Do Not Code

- Whether or not Hussein poses a risk to the region (see code RETHRT)
- Other references to region that are not concerned with the regional consequences of war

Close but No

- Whether the war increases hatred of US in the region
- Issue of Iraq's neighbors (Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia) assisting the US/UK in an invasion

4. RETHRT - Whether or not Iraq poses a threat to the Middle East**Code as "Pro-USG"**

- Reminders of Hussein's regional aggressions: "he has invaded" other countries, along with his "occupation of Kuwait," threats to "neighbors" or use of WMD on non-Iraqis
- Warning that Hussein still "threatens his neighborhood" or can "threaten the region," can launch missiles hitting Cyprus or otherwise inflict "damage upon the region,"
- Argument that Iraq's neighbors have "reason to fear" it
- Reports that Iraq has moved "missiles towards Kuwait"
- Co-occurring words/phrases: "he has invaded," "occupation of Kuwait," "neighbor," "neighbour," "threaten the region," "Cyprus," "reasons to fear," "missiles towards Kuwait"

Code as "Anti-USG"

- Explicit statements that Iraq is not a threat to the Mideast
- Iraqi cooperation with region, e.g., handover of seized Kuwaiti archives
- Co-occurring words/phrases: "Iraq is not a threat," "archives"

Do Not Code

- How war will impact region (see code ALLOUT)
- Other references to region that are not concerned with the regional consequences of war

Close but No

- Reference to Iraq as a threat to the world or to world peace (non-regional)
- General Gulf war references not being used to argue that Hussein remains a threat to the Mideast

5. **PEOPLE** - The plight of Iraqis as a cause or consequence of war

Code as "Pro-USG"

- References to Iraqi "liberation" or the goal to "liberate" Iraq or to do what is "right for the Iraqi people"
- Mention wrongs done by Hussein to "his own people," including persecution of Iraqi Kurds and putting people under house arrest
- Referring to Iraqi elections as a "spectacle" or Hussein's lack of popular support
- Iraqi wrongs against Kurds
- Reference to the Iraqi regime being "brutal" or to the "horror" of the regime
- Post-war promises of a "free Iraq" with "civilian leadership," of "rebuilding Iraq"
- Co-occurring words/phrases: "liberate," "liberation," "his own people," "brutal," "horror," "free Iraq," "civilian leadership," "right for the Iraqi people," "rebuilding Iraq," "rebuilding of Iraq"

Code as "Anti-USG"

- Claims that war will have "horrific" consequences, concerns about "cleaning up" after war, and mention of "humanitarian" costs or concerns
- Discussion of the impact of war on "Iraqi civilians," saying that war will "affect civilians" or cause "suffering" or "civilian death" or kill "innocent civilians"
- The need for "helping the population" or to "help the Iraqi people" re: war
- Concerns over the potential US use of landmines in the event of war
- Criticism of US/UK human rights arguments
- Co-occurring words/phrases: "humanitarian," "Iraqi civilians," "innocent civilians," "affect civilians," "civilian death," suffering," "helping the population," "help the Iraqi people"

Do Not Code

- Humanitarian issues involving other peoples (e.g., Africans)

Close but No

- Calling Hussein a "dictator" without specific reference to Iraqi people
- Speculating on wrongs done by Hussein to his people that haven't yet happened
- Discussing suffering of Iraqis in relation to the UN embargo/sanctions
- Iraqi promises that the Iraqi people will defend their homeland
- Foreign calls for solidarity with Iraqi people

6. **ECON** - The economic costs or benefits of war

Code as "Pro-USG"

- Claim that Iraq war could have a "positive effect" on the economy
- Co-occurring words/phrases: "positive effect"

Code as "Anti-USG"

- Claim that Iraq war or fear/uncertainties surrounding war would worsen or "cast a cloud" on economies, leading to "recession" or "downturn"
- Claim that war fears depress tourism, other industries
- Co-occurring words/phrases: "economies," "cast a cloud," "recession," "downturn," "economic fallout"

Do Not Code

- Discussions of economic cooperation, trade, ties between Iraq and other countries
- Discussions of putting economic pressure on Iraq
- Discussions of the harm done by economic sanctions on Iraq
- Economic trade or ties between Iraq and other countries
- Market movements in the price of oil
- Any other economic discussion not involving current or predicted costs of war

Close but No

- Countries mentioning economic costs, but saying they will be manageable or minimal
- Experts mentioning that economic costs could be large or small (too ambivalent)
- War budgets

7. **MORAL** - Religious or moral statements for or against war

Code as "Pro-USG"

- Referring to the "moral case" for war
- Referring to disappointment with war opponents from a "moral point of view"
- Referring to Hussein as "evil" or to the "face of evil"
- Co-occurring words/phrases: "moral case," "moral point of view," "Saddam was evil," "face of evil"

Code as "Anti-USG"

- Referring to US/UK actions as "immoral" or lacking in "moral justification" or "moral legitimacy"
- Referring to "evil US" or to US planes as "ravens of evil"
- Quotes by the Dalai Lama or Pope or church or Christian leaders against war, for peace
- Claims that US/UK ignore views of religious officials
- Iraqi calls for "holy war"
- War opponents citing "principles" as a justification for their position
- Claims that war "would be wrong:"
- Protest signs or chants criticizing war or "warmongering" on principle
- Co-occurring words/phrases: "immoral," "moral justification," "moral legitimacy," "evil US," "ravens of evil," "Dalai Lama" "Pope," "church," "Christian," "would be wrong," "warmongering"

Do Not Code

- Positions/quotes that do not invoke morals, principles or religion

Close but No

- Moral dimensions of other problems (e.g., 9/11 attacks)

8. TIME - Whether there is time for peace or time is running out**Code as "Pro-USG"**

- All references in quotes and quoted resolutions that Iraq has missed its "final opportunity" or "final chance" to cooperate or disarm
- Claims that Hussein's time is "running out" or has "run out," that there is not a "lot of time" or "much time" or any "time left" or that "now is the time" to act; that "time is not on our side"
- Reminders of the "dangers of delaying" and that there should be "no more delay"
- Support for a "deadline" for Iraqi compliance
- Co-occurring words/phrases: "final opportunity," "final chance," "running out," "lot of time," "much time," "time left," "now is the time," "time is not on our side," "dangers of delaying," "no more delay"

Code as "Anti-USG"

- Calls for inspectors to be given "more time," that there is "still time" for peace and to give "inspections a chance"; that all peaceful options have not yet been "exhausted"
- Criticism of US/UK for giving Iraq "too little time"
- Co-occurring words/phrases: "more time," "still time," "inspections a chance," "exhausted," "too little time"

Do Not Code

- Other mentions of "time" not related to pressing for immediate action vs. delay

Close but No

- Saying inspections should be given more time, but not a lot (too ambivalent)

9. INSPECT - Whether or not inspections work**Code as "Pro-USG"**

- Claims that Iraq has failed to cooperate with inspectors
- Insinuations of non-cooperation ("whether they have cooperated is questionable," urging Iraq to make a drastic change and cooperate, to cooperate more)
- Any reference to Iraqi "deception/deceiving" or "concealment/concealing" or "hidden/hiding" materials or "prevarication"
- Claims that Iraq is "jeering" or playing a "game" or "charade" or "rope-a-dope" designed to "string us" along or "fool" the West, with "loopholes"
- US/UK dismissal of Iraqi offers to cooperate, reacting with "skepticism" or "scepticism" or "scorn"
- Claims that Iraq cannot be trusted; reference to past "negative experience" with cooperating
- Co-occurring words/phrases:
"cooperate/cooperating/cooperation" (also with hyphens),
"deception/deceiving/deceit," "hidden/hiding," "jeering,"
"game," "charade," "rope-a-dope," "string us," "fool,"
"loopholes," "skepticism," "scorn," "negative experience,"
"prevarication"

Code as "Anti-USG"

- Assertions that Iraq is "cooperating," has sent "positive" signals
- A country "praises" or "welcomes" or "hails" Iraqi moves toward inspections, interprets them as proof of cooperation or that inspections work
- Praise of the Iraqi "decision to allow" inspections "without conditions," of "taking steps" or that it "expressed its willingness" for "unfettered access"
- Claims that inspections process "works well," "were working" or "going well" or show "progress," that inspectors can "easily" succeed

- Claims that inspections "yielded results" that are "very substantial"
- Interpretation of Iraqi moves as "real disarmament," a "good atmosphere" in which Hussein should be taken "at his word"
- Admissions that Iraq is not cooperating, but saying that all this means is that inspections should be intensified
- Iraqi protests that they are "doing our best" to comply and "ensure means of success" for inspectors
- Reference to "December 1998" and the progress inspectors had made at that point
- Co-occurring words/phrases:
 "cooperate/cooperating/cooperation" (also with hyphens),
 "welcomed," "welcomes," "decision to allow," "progress,"
 "without conditions," "December 1998," "real disarmament,"
 "yielded results," "doing our best," "works well," "were working,"
 "going well," "very substantial," "taking steps,"
 "expressed its willingness," "unfettered access," "ensure means of success,"
 "good atmosphere," "at his word"

Do Not Code

- Acts of cooperation by other countries (US, Russia, etc.)
- "Games" played by other countries
- Saying there is a need for cooperation without commenting on whether it is occurring
- Cooperation on issues other than inspections (economic cooperation, etc.)
- Commenting on US accusations of concealment without the US being a quoted party

Close but No

- Praising cooperation but saying more needed, question marks remain (too ambivalent)
- Praising cooperation but noting poor cooperation in the past (too ambivalent)
- Criticizing noncooperation but still believing inspections can work (too ambivalent)

- Criticizing Iraqi noncompliance or failure to comply with UN resolutions, without pinning the cause on active deception or concealment (too vague)
- Urging or demanding that Iraq cooperate when not clear that it's a criticism that they're currently not
- Talking about the consequences of failure to cooperate without saying that they are currently failing in this regard

10. WMD - Whether or not Iraq poses a WMD threat

Code as "Pro-USG"

Generally, quotes **assuming** that Iraq possesses WMD:

- Talk of "ridding" or "stripping" or "dealing with" or "tackling" Iraqi WMD (rather than inspecting, determining whether or not they exist)
- Demands that Iraq "abandon" or "disarm" or "surrender" or "scrap" his weapons
- Claim that Iraq has WMD "capability," continues to "build," "develop" or "seek" WMD
- Accusations that Iraqi WMD denials are a lie, identification of a "smoking gun"
- The "danger" or "threat" of Iraqi weapons, its "deadly arsenal"
- Iraqi possession of smallpox and nerve agents
- Foreign leaders expressing "concern" or "apprehensions" over Iraqi WMD, or calling evidence "sobering" or "troubling"
- Claims of illegal "arms" or "weapons" sales to Iraq
- Co-occurring words/phrases: "rid Iraq of weapons," "stripped of its weapons," "deal with his weapons," "deal with Saddam Hussein's weapons," "abandons his weapons," "disarm his weapons," "disarm Iraq of all weapons," "disarm Iraq of weapons," "Hussein must disarm," "we will disarm him," "surrender his weapons," "scrap its banned weapons," "capability," "dangers of his weapons," "weapons of mass murder," "seeking weapons," "did indeed have weapons," "continuing to produce weapons," "dossier," "presentation," "produce more weapons," "to build weapons," "smallpox," "weapons program," "nerve agent," "smoking gun," "world's worst weapons," "Hussein was capable," "his efforts to acquire weapons," "prevent the spread of weapons," "accumulation of weapons," "to develop weapons," "non-conventional weapons," "deadly arsenal," "targeted on Britain," "continuing to build," "stockpiling weapons," "nuclear bomb"

Code as "Anti-USG"

Generally, skepticism that Iraq actually poses a WMD threat:

- Criticism, dismissal of Powell's UN presentation on WMD or the British WMD dossier, or claims that the evidence presented can only be evaluated by international experts
- Labeling US claims of Iraqi WMD as lies or distortions or politically-motivated
- Explicit skepticism of Iraqi WMD possession, of lack of WMD proof
- Explicit Iraqi insistence that they do not possess or did not develop WMD, or that inspectors will not find anything
- Iraqi downplaying of their missiles as inaccurate, poor quality
- Skepticism that Iraq obtained uranium from Africa
- Shifting attention to Israel's possession of nuclear weapons
- Denials of illegal "arms" or "weapons" sales to Iraq
- Co-occurring words/phrases: "had no illegal weapons," "no longer had any weapons," "clear of all nuclear," "does not have weapons," "dossier," "presentation"

Do Not Code

- Mention of the US push for disarmament or WMD resolutions as editorial backdrop when quote is by another party or is unrelated to WMD
- Discussions of WMD that do not presume whether or not they exist; for example:
 - "whether or not the country has or develops weapons of mass destruction"
 - "must demonstrate its compliance with UN resolutions on weapons"
 - "our goal is to guarantee that Iraq does not possess weapons"
 - "the two talked about the crisis over Iraq's weapons"
 - "Blair is confident of nailing down a resolution on Iraqi weapons"

- General talk about need for "following resolutions" that doesn't mention the WMD themselves

Close but No

- Urging Iraq to comply with weapons resolutions (without assuming that the weapons exist)
- Threat of Hussein using weapons, but only in retaliation to US invasion
- Merely investigating illegal weapons sales, not suggesting if allegations are true, or not calling them weapons ("radar," "equipment," "hardware," etc.)

11. AUTHORITY - Whether war supports or undermines intl. authority**Code as "Pro-USG"**

- Warning of the risk of Iraqi noncompliance to the "authority" or "credibility" of the UN, NATO, or the international community in general
- Calling the UN to face Iraq to uphold "the will of the United Nations," to show "backbone," not be "feeble" or go beyond "mere words," "meet its obligation" or "live up to its obligation", US role to "spur" UN to act; that the UN needs to face Iraq to avoid "irrelevancy"; that it is a "test for the UN" or a "defining moment"
- Mention of Iraq's "defiance" of the UN or international community
- US/UK description of their responsibility to "enforce" UN resolutions
- Warnings of "appeasement" or of "appeasing" Iraq; parallels to Hitler
- Claim that US actions are within "international law"
- Co-occurring words/phrases: "authority of the United Nations," "will of the United Nations," "credibility," "international law," "irrelevance," "irrelevant," "backbone," "feeble," "mere words," "defiance," "meet its obligation," "live up to its obligation," "spur," "appeasement," "appeasing," "test for the UN," "defining moment"

Code as "Anti-USG"

- Warning of risk of US/UK action "undermining" or otherwise threatening the "authority" or "credibility" of the UN, NATO, or the international community in general
- Argument that Iraqi solution must take place within an international "framework" or the "framework" of the UN, or in accordance with the UN Charter; the "primacy" of the UN, following the "UN process," the "UN role" being a "key role" or "lead role"

- Argument that only the UN or "international authorities" have the "legitimacy" to use force; need for action to have the "mandate" or "sanction" or be "backed" by the UN
- Claim that US actions violate "international law" or are "unlawful" or without legal justification; opponents reminding the US/UK to act within "international law" or voicing a solution on the basis of "international law, the "rule of law," "international legality," or legal basis/methods/necessity/foundation
- Claim that US-pushed resolutions violate earlier (Vienna) agreements with Kofi Annan
- Co-occurring words/phrases: "authority of the United Nations," "council's authority," "authority of the UN," "undermining," "credibility," "international law," "framework," "legitimacy," "international authorities" "charter," "unlawful," "legal basis," "legal methods," "legal necessity," "legal foundation," "rule of law," "international legality," "UN role," "key role," "lead role," "UN process"

Do Not Code

- Discussions of credibility or authority of other parties (e.g., the US government)
- Many other UN references that are more specific than philosophical

Close but No

- Discussing specific UN violations without touching on broader challenge to authority

12. OPINION - Whether the global community supports or opposes US/UK**Code as "Pro-USG"**

- Touting international support for US/UK policy; speaking of "coalition" as if it already exists and is lined up behind US/UK
- When warning Iraq of action, mentioning "friends" or "allies" joining the US/UK
- Saying that Iraq must answer to the world, not just the US/UK
- Warning opponents of war that they face international "isolation"
- Downplaying international disagreements over war
- Highlighting Iraqi difficulty in winning allies
- Co-occurring words/phrases: "lead a coalition," "coalition of nations," "international coalition," "its allies will," "its friends will," "demands of the world," "isolate/isolating/isolation"

Code as "Anti-USG"

- Quotes from or commenting on public protests of war
- Touting international support for a peaceful/diplomatic solution
- Warning the US/UK that they face international "isolation" or "hatred;" reminders that the "majority" of the world or of Iraqis support peace
- Warning the US to "pay more attention" to world opinion against war
- Mention of the UK as only nation fully supporting the US; claims that US/UK is "bribing" other countries for support
- Calling election results a "rejection" of US position
- Opponents labeling US actions as "unilateral"
- Co-occurring words/phrases: "protest," "demonstrator," "slogans," "rejection of the U.S.," "unilateral," "by one country," "pay more attention," "members of the international community," "majority of the international community," "majority of exiles," "majority of countries,"

"majority of the world," "world public opinion," "anti-war sentiment," "the only nation," "bribing," "isolate/isolating/isolation"

Do Not Code

- When concept is not attributed to the quoted party (it is just editorial, or spoken by someone else, such as an editorial reference to the US "coalition")
- Protests mentioned in editorial background; not mentioned by the quoted party

Close but No

- US/UK promises to work with or build up a coalition, in the sense of making a concession to do something that hasn't been done yet
- US/UK expression of willingness to take unilateral action (non-negative treatment)
- Criticism of protests

APPENDIX E: PILE SORT RESULTS

File Name	Freq.	Example Item
Highlighting inspections progress/sufficiency/Iraqi cooperation	16%	"Furthermore, the outcome of United Nations inspections has been very positive."
Highlighting need for political/UN solution, unity, good relations, consultation, approval of force	14%	"Finally, given the gravity of the situation, in which nothing less than peace or war is at stake, it is essential for the Security Council to remain in charge of the process every step of the way."
Highlighting Iraqi threat re: WMD	13%	"Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon."
Highlighting US/UK motivation: interfere with/violate UN	13%	"From the very beginning we were faced with difficulty when the Americans refused to allow the members of the organization to carry out their inspections."
Highlighting need for settlement/ ending sanctions on Iraqi people	13%	"The sanctions imposed on Iraq have caused a humanitarian catastrophe comparable to the worst catastrophes that have befallen the world throughout history."
Highlighting US/UK motivation: aggression/control/oil	8%	"The goal of that aggression is the colonization of our country and the imposition of American domination over our oil"
Highlighting inspections failures/Iraqi noncooperation	8%	"Just months after the 1991 cease-fire, the Security Council twice renewed its demand that the Iraqi regime cooperate fully with inspectors, 'condemning' Iraq's 'serious violations' of its obligations."
Highlighting need for inspections to resume/stronger inspections	7%	"France, however, is fully disposed to support measures strengthening the inspection regime, insofar as that proves necessary to facilitate the inspectors' work."

Pile Name	Freq.	Example Item
Highlighting Iraqi threat re: UN authority	7%	"Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding or will it be irrelevant?"
Highlighting Iraqi threat re: the Iraqi people	6%	"Last year, the U.N. Commission on Human rights found that Iraq continues to commit 'extremely grave violations' of human rights and that the regime's repression is 'all pervasive.'"
Highlighting Iraqi threat re: Middle East	6%	"Saddam Hussein attacked Iran in 1980, and Kuwait in 1990. He has fired ballistic missiles at Iran, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Israel."
Downplaying Iraqi threat re: WMD	5%	"I believe that everyone knows that there are no nuclear, chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and that Iraq implemented many years ago the disarmament requirements set out in paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 687."
Highlighting need for credible military threat against Iraq	4%	"It must be made 'crystal clear to that regime that unless they do comply with the obligations ... then they face the risk and the threat of the use of force'"
Highlighting Iraqi threat re: terrorism	4%	"Iraq continues to shelter and support terrorist organization that direct violence against Iran, Israel, and Western governments."
Highlighting US/UK motivation: regime change	3%	"British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw on Tuesday raised with Egyptian leadership the possibility of a future Iraq without President Saddam Hussein at the helm, a senior British official said."
Highlighting need to listen to other countries	2%	"The Council needs to hear the voice of the wider membership, particularly when we are on the edge of decisions that could make the difference between war and peace."
Highlighting need to confront Iraqi threat	2%	"We must choose between a world of fear and a world of progress. We cannot stand by and do nothing while dangers gather."
Highlighting support for war: US/UK	2%	"Chancellor Gordon Brown has backed Prime Minister Tony Blair's tough stance on

Pile Name	Freq.	Example Item
political		Iraq, in his first public comments on the issue."
Highlighting US/UK motivation: desire for peace	2%	"I repeat, our first preference is a peaceful solution to the current crisis surrounding Iraq."
Highlighting war's risk re: Middle East	2%	"A resort to force against Iraq, with a chance not being given to the inspectors and the Arab-Israeli conflict continuing as it is, would provoke a great disorder in the region"
Highlighting opposition to war: non-US/UK governments	2%	"The Philippines will not support a United States attack on Iraq without a United Nations Security Council resolution backing it, an official said Saturday."
Highlighting potential benefits of US position re: the Iraqi people	2%	"If we meet our responsibilities, if we overcome this danger, we can arrive at a very different future. The people of Iraq can shake off their captivity."
Highlighting opposition to new inspections/resolutions: Iraq	2%	"Iraq will not accept a new UN resolution that would impose fresh conditions on disarmament, an official spokesman announced Saturday, in a fresh challenge to a US push for tougher measures against Iraq."
Highlighting need to stand up to American power	2%	" It is also a matter that relates to the capacity of the international community to face up to the American tendency to practice hegemony and aggression, and to stand steadfastly by the principles of the United Nations Charter."
Highlighting opposition to war: non-government	2%	"Thousands of anti-war demonstrators took to the streets of Rome and several other major Italian cities including Milan, Bologna, Venice and Florence Saturday to protest US plans for war on Iraq."
Highlighting opposition to war: US/UK political	2%	"A group of American Congressmen today formed a liaison with members of the British Labour party in a transatlantic bid to prevent war with Iraq."

Pile Name	Freq.	Example Item
Highlighting potential benefits of US position re: UN authority	1%	"And we will show that the promise of the United Nations can be fulfilled in our time."
Highlighting war's risk re: terrorism	1%	"A United States-led war on Iraq would heighten the risk of further terrorist attacks by al Qaida, according to a report published today."
Downplaying Iraqi threat re: terrorism	1%	"Nor have we seen any other facts that would situate Iraq in the context of combating terrorism."
Downplaying war's risk re: domestic/economic costs	1%	"The Singapore government has expressed confidence the island state will not relapse into recession in the event of an oil price hike if the United States attacks Iraq."
Highlighting potential benefits of US position re: Middle East	1%	"They can one day join a democratic Afghanistan and a democratic Palestine, inspiring reforms throughout the Muslim world. "
Highlighting war's risk re: domestic/economic costs	1%	"Armed forces could be stretched to the limit if there is an attack on Iraq while they are busy replacing striking firefighters, a military expert warned."
Highlighting war's risk re: the Iraqi people	1%	"PEN declared it was 'alarmed by the intention of the president of the U.S. to attack Iraq by military force,' and warned, 'the war primarily affects civilians and deprives them of livelihood or life itself.'"

APPENDIX F: FULL MODEL RESULTS, CHAPTER 5

Variable	Regression Coefficient in Logistic Model
Net Country-Level Media Coverage	2.80***
Fixed Effects:	
Britain	(Reference Country)
France	-0.34***
Germany	0.20*
Russia	-0.38***
Belief that Iraq Poses a Threat to the Mideast	(Reference Frame)
Belief that U.S. Invasion will not Lead to All-Out War	-2.01***
Belief that U.S. Invasion will Reduce Risk of Terrorism	-2.49***
Belief that U.S. is not Motivated by Iraqi Oil	-1.64***
Low Sophistication	n.s.
Moderate Sophistication	(Reference Level)
High Sophistication	-0.75**
Religiosity	n.s.
Self-Identified Ideology	0.51*
Gender (Male)	n.s.
Age	-0.27**
Low Sophistication x Ideology	n.s.
High Sophistication x Ideology	1.81***
Low Sophistication x Media Coverage	n.s.
High Sophistication x Media Coverage	-0.96**

n.s. = Not significant; * = $p < 0.05$; ** = $p < 0.01$; *** = $p < 0.001$.

APPENDIX G: FULL MODEL RESULTS, CHAPTER 6

Variable	Reference Country			
	Britain	France	Germany	Russia
Belief that Iraq Poses a Threat to the Mideast	1.16***	1.28***	1.4***	1.06*
Belief that U.S. Invasion will not Lead to All-Out War	0.51**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Belief that U.S. Invasion will Reduce Risk of Terrorism	0.96***	1.04***	0.92**	n.s.
Belief that U.S. is not Motivated by Iraqi Oil	1.28***	0.94***	1.37***	1.3**
Religiosity	-0.63**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Self-Identified Ideology	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Gender (Male)	0.65***	0.42*	0.79***	n.s.
Age	-0.77**	-0.57*	-0.72*	n.s.
Low Sophistication	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Moderate Sophistication	(Reference Level)			
High Sophistication	n.s.	-2.48***	-1.26*	n.s.
Low Soph. x Ideology	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
High Soph. x Ideology	n.s.	4.62***	n.s.	n.s.

n.s. = Not significant; * = $p < 0.05$; ** = $p < 0.01$; *** = $p < 0.001$.