




Highlights of Recent RAND Research on Counterinsurgency

For more information, contact Shirley Ruhe, Director of Congressional Relations, at 703-413-1100, x5632 or Shirley_Ruhe@rand.org, or Kurt Card, National Security Legislative Analyst, at 703-413-1100 x5259 or Kurt_Card@rand.org


As the leading research authority on counterinsurgency, the RAND Corporation has developed a wide selection of materials for policy makers. With multiple insurgencies operating in several theaters this research was developed to provide a historical, geographical, and functional understanding of past and present insurgencies and counterinsurgency operations.



Social Science for Counterterrorism Putting the Pieces Together

Darcy Noricks et al., 2009


This report from an interdisciplinary project to survey and integrate the scholarly social-science literature relevant to counterterrorism answers questions related to why some individuals become terrorists, how terrorists generate public support, how terrorist organizations make decisions, and why individuals disengage.



A Stability Police Force for the United States Justification and Options for Creating U.S. Capabilities

Terrence K. Kelly et al., 2009

Establishing security is the sine qua non of stability operations, since it is a prerequisite for reconstruction and development. Security requires a mix of military and police forces to deal with a range of threats from insurgents to criminal organizations. This research examines the creation of a high-end police force, which the authors call a Stability Police Force.




Underkill **Scalable Capabilities for Military Operations amid Populations**

David C. Gompert et al., 2009

The battle for Gaza revealed an extremist strategy: hiding in cities and provoking attack to cause civilian deaths that can be blamed on the attacking forces. The U.S. and allied militaries, having no options but lethal force or no options at all, are ill-equipped to defeat this strategy. The use of lethal force in dense populations can harm and alienate the very people whose cooperation U.S. forces are trying to earn. To solve this problem, a new RAND study proposes a “continuum of force”—a suite of capabilities that includes sound, light, lasers, cell phones, and video cameras.


In missions ranging from counterinsurgency to peacekeeping to humanitarian intervention to quelling disorder, the typical small unit of the U.S. military should and can have portable, easy-to-use, all-purpose capabilities to carry out its missions without killing or hurting civilians that may get in the way. The technologies for these capabilities are available but have not been recognized as a solution to this strategic problem and, consequently, need more high-level attention and funding.



An Argument for Documenting Casualties **Violence Against Iraqi Civilians 2006**

Katharine Hall and Dale Stahl, 2008


Protecting the civilian population is one of the central tenets of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. Until very recently, however, the U.S. military has not had a formal system for documenting the level of violence directed against Iraqi civilians. Therefore, other groups (such as nongovernmental organizations, the United Nations, and Iraqi ministries) have filled the vacuum in reporting, relying on media accounts, surveys, death certificates, and other open-source information to generate datasets of varying transparency and quality. The resulting statistics have generated widespread debate over sources, methods, and political biases. This study examines available open-source data on Iraqi civilian fatalities and assesses problems associated with previous collection and analysis efforts. The authors present a more robust RAND Corporation Iraqi civilian violence dataset from which they derive new observations about trends in targeting and weapons in 2006. RAND's dataset reveals that the majority of attacks in the year 2006 against civilians were directed against individuals without any identifiable affiliation, and that most attacks were carried out using firearms (rather than via improvised explosive devices or suicide attacks). These findings lead to a proposed framework for future civilian fatality data-collection efforts in Iraq and beyond.



Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan

Seth Jones, 2008


This volume explores the nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan, the key challenges and successes of the U.S.-led counterinsurgency campaign, and the capabilities necessary to wage effective counterinsurgency operations. By examining the key lessons from all insurgencies since World War II, the author finds that most policymakers repeatedly underestimate the importance of indigenous actors to counterinsurgency efforts. The author concludes that the U.S. should focus its resources on helping improve the capacity of the indigenous government and indigenous security forces to wage counterinsurgency. The U.S. military—along with U.S. civilian agencies and other coalition partners—is more likely to be successful in counterinsurgency warfare the more capable and legitimate the indigenous security forces (especially the police), the better the governance capacity of the local state, and the less external support that insurgents receive.



Dangerous Thresholds Managing Escalation in the 21st Century

Forrest E. Morgan, 2008

Escalation is a natural tendency in any form of human competition. When such competition entails military confrontation or war, the pressure to escalate can become intense due to the potential cost of losing contests of deadly force. Cold War-era thinking about escalation focused on the dynamics of bipolar, superpower confrontation and strategies to control it. Today's security environment, however, demands that the United States be prepared for a host of escalatory threats involving not only long-standing nuclear powers, but also new, lesser nuclear powers and irregular adversaries, such as insurgent groups and terrorists. This examination of escalation dynamics and approaches to escalation management draws on historical examples from World War I to the struggle against global Jihad. It reveals that, to manage the risks of escalatory chain reactions in future conflicts, military and political leaders will need to understand and dampen the mechanisms of deliberate, accidental, and inadvertent escalation. Informing the analysis are the results of two modified Delphi exercises, which focused on a potential conflict between China and the United States over Taiwan and a potential conflict between states and nonstate actors in the event of a collapse of Pakistan's government.



Department of Defense Training for Operations with Interagency, Multinational, and Coalition Partners

Michael Spirtas, 2008


The nature of recent challenges and the types of missions the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has undertaken highlight the need for DoD to consider ways to help the military prepare to work with other government agencies, international organizations, private and nongovernmental organizations, and foreign militaries. These challenges require DoD to combine military and nonmilitary means, such as intelligence, diplomacy, and developmental assistance, to advance U.S. national-security interests. Moreover, exhibiting cultural awareness and sensitivity vis-à-vis non-DoD partners is paramount to successful operational planning and execution. To build or bolster local governance, to foster economic growth, and to respond to natural disasters, the United States must also use different types of tools, military and otherwise, simultaneously. It is no small task to synchronize these different tools so that they work in tandem, or at least minimize conflict between them. This report provides suggestions for how the U.S. military can help prepare its personnel to work successfully with interagency, multinational, and coalition partners. The authors found that almost all of the requirements for integrated-operations training can be found in existing joint and service task lists. Current training programs aimed at headquarters staffs need to be revamped to focus on high-priority tasks that are amenable to training.



How Terrorist Groups End Lessons for Countering al Qaeda

Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, 2008


All terrorist groups eventually end. But how do they end? The evidence since 1968 indicates that most groups have ended because (1) they joined the political process (43 percent) or (2) local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members (40 percent). Military force has rarely been the primary reason for the end of terrorist groups, and few groups within this time frame have achieved victory. This has significant implications for dealing with al Qaeda and suggests fundamentally rethinking post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism strategy: Policymakers need to understand where to prioritize their efforts with limited resources and attention. The authors report that religious terrorist groups take longer to eliminate than other groups and rarely achieve their objectives. The largest groups achieve their goals more often and last longer than the smallest ones do. Finally, groups from upper-income countries are more likely to be left-wing or nationalist and less likely to have religion as their motivation. The authors conclude that policing and intelligence, rather than military force, should form the backbone of U.S. efforts against al Qaeda. And U.S. policymakers should end the use of the phrase “war on terrorism” since there is no battlefield solution to defeating al Qaeda.



Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006)

Bruce R. Pirnie and Edward O'Connell, 2008


The authors draw lessons from counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, including the deleterious effects of the U.S. failure to focus on protecting the Iraqi population and the failure of a technologically-driven counterinsurgency (COIN) approach. The Iraq experience offers a combination of factors likely to be replicated in insurgencies elsewhere and thus is particularly germane to drawing lessons about counterinsurgency.



Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies

Walter L. Perry and John Gordon IV, 2008


This volume examines the nature of the contemporary insurgent threat and provides insights on using operational analysis techniques to support intelligence operations in counterinsurgencies. Techniques such as pattern discernment and predictive analysis show promise of being useful to intelligence analysis. The authors also explore methods of game theory and change detection to examine the interactions between friendly and enemy forces.



Rethinking Counterinsurgency

John Mackinlay and Alison Al-Baddawy, 2008

British and U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) operations have been slow to adapt to the rise of the global jihadist insurgency. During the period of decolonization in Asia and Africa, the United Kingdom faced more insurgent activity than any other Western power. The authors analyze past British COIN experience, explore the evolving nature of insurgency, and suggest a new COIN framework.




Byting Back

Regaining Information Superiority Against 21st-Century Insurgents

Martin Libicki et al., 2007

U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have failed to exploit information power, which could be a U.S. advantage but instead is being used advantageously by insurgents. Because insurgency and counterinsurgency involve a battle for the allegiance of a population between a government and an armed opposition movement, the key to exploiting information power is to connect with and learn from the population itself, increasing the effectiveness of both the local government and the U.S. military and civilian services engaged in supporting it. Utilizing mostly available networking technology, the United States could achieve early, affordable, and substantial gains in the effectiveness of counterinsurgency by more open, integrated, and inclusive information networking with the population, local authorities, and coalition partners.




War by Other Means

Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency

David C. Gompert et al., 2008


This capstone volume to the RAND Counterinsurgency Study draws on other reports in the series as well as an examination of 89 insurgencies since World War II, an analysis of the new challenges posed by what is becoming known as global insurgency, and many of the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. The authors evaluate three types of counterinsurgency (COIN) capabilities: civil capabilities to help weak states; informational and cognitive capabilities to improve COIN decision making; and security capabilities to protect people and infrastructure and to weaken insurgent forces. The authors conclude by outlining the investments, organizational changes, and international arrangements that the United States should pursue to improve its COIN capabilities.



Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube **Analyzing the Success of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI)**

Russell W. Glenn, 2007


The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), which began on July 24, 2003, has been a remarkable success, in part because of the consistency of its message, the strength of its leadership, and its uncommon support for, rather than overt control of, the Solomon Islands government and policing capability. This study reviews RAMSI operations through the lens of a broader application to current and future counterinsurgency efforts.



Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era **The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions**

Alan J. Vick et al., 2006


United States has engaged in counterinsurgency around the globe for more than a century. But insurgencies have rarely been defeated by outside powers. Rather, the afflicted nation itself must win the war politically and militarily, and the best way to help is to offer advice, training, and equipment. Air power, and the U.S. Air Force, can play an important role in such efforts, which suggests making them an institutional priority.



On "Other War" **Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research**

Austin Long, 2006

The challenges posed by insurgency and instability have proved difficult to surmount. This difficulty may embolden future opponents to embrace insurgency in combating the United States. The author makes recommendations for COIN based on RAND's decades-long study of the subject.



Airlift Capabilities for Future U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations

Robert C. Owen and Karl P. Mueller, 2007

Does likely continued U.S. involvement in counterinsurgencies call for adding specialized aircraft, training, or other resources to the general airlift fleet? The authors find that the current U.S. military airlift fleet can perform most counterinsurgency airlift missions effectively but is likely to need reinforcement if such operations continue at current levels.



Heads We Win **The Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency (COIN)**

David C. Gompert, 2007

Current U.S. counterinsurgency operations must move beyond the use of force and seek out and invest in ways to "fight smarter" against an enemy that is quick to adapt, transform, and regenerate. These capabilities include comprehension, reasoning, and decisionmaking, the components that are most effective against an enemy that is quick to adapt, transform, and regenerate.



Understanding Proto-Insurgencies

Daniel Byman, 2007


This study discusses ways to anticipate the possibility of an insurgency developing before it materializes, provide behind-the-scenes training and advisory programs for partner nations, and help inhibit outside support for emerging insurgencies.



Subversion and Insurgency

William Rosenau, 2007

The author discusses methods for combating subversive activities in the context of the “long war” against violent Islamist extremism.




Money in the Bank

Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations

Angel Rabasa et al., 2007


Six historic COIN operations from the 19th and 20th centuries—in the Philippines, Algeria, Vietnam, El Salvador, Jammu and Kashmir, and Colombia—are examined to determine which tactics, techniques, and procedures led to success and which to failure.



The Malay-Muslim Insurgency in Southern Thailand **Understanding the Conflict's Evolving Dynamic**

Peter Chalk, 2008

Current unrest in the Malay-Muslim provinces of southern Thailand has captured growing national, regional, and international attention. This paper assesses the current situation and its probable direction.



Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence

The U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1960-1970 and 2003-2006

Austin Long, 2008

The author posits that ingrained organizational concepts and beliefs have a much greater influence on operations than written doctrine, and that mental and material preparation for large-scale operations and overwhelming firepower has made the U.S. military poorly suited to counterinsurgency.

Updated 6/26/09