



# Highlights of Recent RAND Research on Afghanistan and Iraq

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
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's three federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs), the RAND Arroyo Center, RAND Project AIR FORCE, and the RAND National Defense Research Institute, have supported ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.



## **The Long March Building an Afghan National Army**

Obaid Younossi et al., 2009


The Afghan National Army (ANA) is critical to the success of the allied efforts in Afghanistan and the ultimate stability of the national government. This monograph assesses the ANA's progress in the areas of recruitment, training, facilities, and operational capability. It draws on a variety of sources: in-country interviews with U.S., NATO, and Afghan officials; data provided by the U.S. Army; open-source literature; and a series of public opinion surveys conducted in Afghanistan over the past several years. Although the ANA has come a long way since the outset of the recent conflict in the country, the authors conclude that coalition forces, especially those of the United States, will play a crucial role in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, particularly in light of the increased threat from Taliban forces and other illegally armed criminal groups.



## **Occupying Iraq A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority**

James Dobbins et al., 2009


The American engagement in Iraq has been looked at from many perspectives — the flawed intelligence that provided the war's rationale, the failed effort to secure an international mandate, the rapid success of the invasion, and the long ensuing counterinsurgency campaign. This book focuses on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority and its administrator, L. Paul Bremer, who governed Iraq from May 2003 to June of the following year. It is based on interviews with many of those responsible for setting and implementing occupation policy, on the memoirs of American and Iraqi officials who have since left office, on journalists' accounts of the period, and on nearly 100,000 never-before-released CPA documents. The book recounts and evaluates the efforts of the United States and its coalition partners to restore public services, reform the judicial and penal systems, fight corruption, revitalize the economy, and create the basis for representative government. It also addresses the occupation's most striking failure: the inability of the United States and its coalition partners to protect the Iraqi people from the criminals and extremists in their midst.



## **Underkill** **Scalable Capabilities for Military Operations amid Populations**

David C. Gompert et al., 2009


The battle for Gaza revealed an extremist strategy: hiding in cities and provoking attack to cause civilian deaths that can be blamed on the attacking forces. The U.S. and allied militaries, having no options but lethal force or no options at all, are ill-equipped to defeat this strategy. The use of lethal force in dense populations can harm and alienate the very people whose cooperation U.S. forces are trying to earn. To solve this problem, a new RAND study proposes a “continuum of force” — a suite of capabilities that includes sound, light, lasers, cell phones, and video cameras. In missions ranging from counterinsurgency to peacekeeping to humanitarian intervention to quelling disorder, the typical small unit of the U.S. military should and can have portable, easy-to-use, all-purpose capabilities to carry out its missions without killing or hurting civilians that may get in the way. The technologies for these capabilities are available but have not been recognized as a solution to this strategic problem and, consequently, need more high-level attention and funding.



## **Improving Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations**

Nora Bensahel et al., 2009

Until recently, governments and militaries have preferred to focus attention and resources on conventional military operations rather than stabilization and reconstruction missions. Thus, skills and capacities for the latter set of missions have remained underdeveloped or have been allowed to atrophy. U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated, however, that improving U.S. capacity for stabilization and reconstruction operations is critical to national security. To help craft a way ahead, the authors provide an overview of the requirements posed by stabilization and reconstruction operations and recommend ways to improve U.S. capacity to meet these needs.



## **Guidebook for Supporting Economic Development in Stability Operations**

Keith Crane et al., 2009


This guidebook is designed to help U.S. Army personnel more effectively use economic assistance to support economic and infrastructure development. The guidebook should help tactical commanders choose and implement more effective programs and projects in their areas of responsibility and better understand the economic context of their efforts. It describes key characteristics of the economic environment, the key players that soldiers are likely to encounter, and who may be involved in what sorts of assistance efforts. It also provides suggestions on what to and what not to do, with examples from current and past operations. Suggestions on providing assistance are grouped into the following areas: humanitarian assistance; infrastructure and essential services; agriculture; currencies, budgets, finance, and foreign trade; private sector development and employment generation; natural resource management; and the effects of the U.S. military on local economies. To write this guidebook, the authors visited commanders in Afghanistan, conducted interviews with returning U.S. military officers, drew on their own experiences in Iraq, Liberia, and the Balkans, and tapped the substantial literature about effective economic assistance.



## **Unfolding the Future of the Long War Motivations, Prospects, and Implications for the U.S. Army**

Christopher G. Pernin et al., 2008


The United States is currently engaged in a military effort that has been characterized as the “long war.” The long war has been described by some as an epic struggle against adversaries bent on forming a unified Islamic world to supplant western dominance, while others describe it more narrowly as an extension of the war on terror. But while policymakers, military leaders, and scholars have offered numerous definitions of the long war, no consensus has been reached about this term or its implications for the United States. To understand the impacts that this long war will have on the U.S. Army and on U.S. forces in general, it is necessary to understand more precisely what the long war is and how it might unfold over the coming years. To address this need, this study explores the concept of the long war and identifies potential ways in which it might unfold as well as the implications for the Army and the U.S. military more generally. This report uses the generation of either “trajectories” or alternative paths in which the long war might unfold to explore the implications for the U.S. military. The discussion focuses on the potential threats the U.S. faces in each trajectory and considers the confluence of three major problems raised by the war: those related to the ideologies espoused by key adversaries in the conflict, those related to the use of terrorism, and those related to governance (i.e., its absence or presence, its quality, and the predisposition of specific governing bodies to the United States and its interests). The goal of this report is not to determine which of these areas is the key problem. Instead, we take the stance that in order to ensure that this long war follows a favorable course, the United States will need to make a concerted effort across all three domains. Numerous broad conclusions and recommendations are given for addressing issues surrounding the long war.



## **Assessing Irregular Warfare A Framework for Intelligence Analysis**

Eric V. Larson et al., 2008


The objective of this study was to provide an analytic framework for intelligence analysis of irregular warfare (IW) environments that could be used as the basis for a subsequent IW intelligence analysis curriculum development effort. The authors conducted a review of recent policy, strategy, doctrinal, and other materials pertaining to IW, concluding that although the term irregular warfare remains somewhat nebulous, situations considered within the realm of IW generally can be thought of in terms of two main stylized types: (1) population-centric IW situations, which include such missions as counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, and support to insurgency, where the indigenous population is the center of gravity; and (2) counterterrorism operations, whether conducted as one element of a theater commander's campaign or as part of the U.S. Special Operations Command-led global war on terrorism, where a cellular network is being targeted. The authors identify the intelligence and analytic requirements associated with each of these two stylized forms of IW and describe a top-down framework, or analytic procedure, that can be used for assessing IW environments. Also included is a list of references to IW-relevant doctrinal publications.



## **In Their Own Words** **Voices of Jihad, Compilation and Commentary**

David Aaron, 2008

This book presents the actual statements and writings of jihadis expressing their views on virtually every subject relevant to their cause. It is not about Islam as it is practiced in its many varieties in Muslim communities throughout the world, nor is it about Islamic fundamentalism or the various Islamist political movements. Rather, it is about a small group of Muslims who carry out and promote terrorism in the name of Islam. Because the jihadis' statements are often more appalling and more profoundly revealing than the accounts that have been written about jihadi terrorism, this book provides unfiltered access to a broad range of the stories, rationales, ideas, and arguments of jihadi terrorists and those who support them. Introductory and contextual material is also included, to provide the background and origins of what the jihadis are saying — to each other and to the world. It is hoped that this will provide greater insights into the motives, plans, and participants in jihadi terrorism, as well as the nature of the threat they pose. Not all of the quotations are from prominent jihadis. Some have been selected because they are representative, others because they are contradictory, and still others because they provide a unique insight into the jihadi mentality.



## **Analysis of Strategy and Strategies of Analysis**

David C. Gompert et al., 2008


In a fluid global security environment such as ours, assessing the costs, risks, and likely consequences of alternative national defense strategies is as hard as it is essential. The “Global War on Terror,” for example, has cost as much as \$800 billion more than was first projected. Too often, strategies are chosen without disciplined analysis in response to external events and under pressures of time and politics. The authors show how, even in the face of uncertainty, the costs and other implications of any strategy can be assessed by examining the capabilities needed by U.S. combatant commands — the chief agents of strategy — to fulfill what the strategy expects of them. They then demonstrate how such “outside-in” strategy assessment can be integrated with “inside-out” analysis of how core national strengths can best be exploited in national defense.



## **More Freedom, Less Terror? Liberalization and Political Violence in the Arab World**

Dalia Dassa Kaye et al., 2008


In the wake of September 11 through the U.S. invasion of Iraq, a key tenet of U.S. foreign policy has been that promoting democracy in the Arab world is an important strategy in reducing terrorism; at the same time, some policymakers and analysts have held that democracy has nothing to do with terrorism — or even that the growth of democracy in the Middle East may exacerbate political violence. However, scant empirical evidence links democracy to terrorism, positively or negatively. This study examines whether such links exist by exploring the effects of liberalization processes on political violence in Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Morocco from 1991 to 2006. Drawing on data on the incidence of terrorist violence, extensive fieldwork and interviews in each of the six countries, and primary and secondary literature from and about each country, Kaye et al. find that political reforms have, in some instances, helped to marginalize and undercut extremist actors, but that these effects tend to be short-lived if reforms fail to produce tangible results. Moreover, when regimes backtrack on even limited openings, the risks of instability and violence increase.



## **An Argument for Documenting Casualties Violence Against Iraqi Civilians 2006**

Katharine Hall and Dale Stahl, 2008

Protecting the civilian population is one of the central tenets of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. Until very recently, however, the U.S. military has not had a formal system for documenting the level of violence directed against Iraqi civilians. Therefore, other groups (such as nongovernmental organizations, the United Nations, and Iraqi ministries) have filled the vacuum in reporting, relying on media accounts, surveys, death certificates, and other open-source information to generate datasets of varying transparency and quality. The resulting statistics have generated widespread debate over sources, methods, and political biases. This study examines available open-source data on Iraqi civilian fatalities and assesses problems associated with previous collection and analysis efforts. The authors present a more robust RAND Corporation Iraqi civilian violence dataset from which they derive new observations about trends in targeting and weapons in 2006. RAND's dataset reveals that the majority of attacks in the year 2006 against civilians were directed against individuals without any identifiable affiliation, and that most attacks were carried out using firearms (rather than via improvised explosive devices or suicide attacks). These findings lead to a proposed framework for future civilian fatality data-collection efforts in Iraq and beyond.



## Department of Defense Training for Operations with Interagency, Multinational, and Coalition Partners

Michael Spirtas et al., 2008


The nature of recent challenges and the types of missions the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has undertaken highlight the need for DoD to consider ways to help the military prepare to work with other government agencies, international organizations, private and nongovernmental organizations, and foreign militaries. These challenges require DoD to combine military and nonmilitary means, such as intelligence, diplomacy, and developmental assistance, to advance U.S. national-security interests. Moreover, exhibiting cultural awareness and sensitivity vis-à-vis non-DoD partners is paramount to successful operational planning and execution. To build or bolster local governance, to foster economic growth, and to respond to natural disasters, the United States must also use different types of tools, military and otherwise, simultaneously. It is no small task to synchronize these different tools so that they work in tandem, or at least minimize conflict between them. This report provides suggestions for how the U.S. military can help prepare its personnel to work successfully with interagency, multinational, and coalition partners. The authors found that almost all of the requirements for integrated-operations training can be found in existing joint and service task lists. Current training programs aimed at headquarters staffs need to be revamped to focus on high-priority tasks that are amenable to training.



## Future U.S. Security Relationships with Iraq and Afghanistan U.S. Air Force Roles

David E. Thaler et al., 2008


The United States is heavily invested — diplomatically, economically, and militarily — in Iraq and Afghanistan, and developments in these two nations will affect not only their own interests but those of their neighbors and the United States as well. The authors emphasize that the United States must clarify its long-term intentions to the governments and peoples in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the surrounding regions. They describe possible regional security structures and bilateral U.S. relationships with both countries. The authors recommend that the United States offer a wide range of security cooperation activities to future governments in Kabul and Baghdad that are willing to work with the United States but should also develop plans that hedge against less-favorable contingencies. Finally, arguing that the U.S. Air Force could remain heavily tasked in Iraq and Afghanistan even after major U.S. troop withdrawals, they recommend that the United States provide increased, sustained resources for development of the Iraqi and Afghan airpower, because the greater the emphasis on building these capabilities now, the faster indigenous air forces will be able to operate independently and the operational demands on the U.S. Air Force will diminish.



## How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qaeda

Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, 2008


All terrorist groups eventually end. But how do they end? The evidence since 1968 indicates that most groups have ended because (1) they joined the political process (43 percent) or (2) local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members (40 percent). Military force has rarely been the primary reason for the end of terrorist groups, and few groups within this time frame have achieved victory. This has significant implications for dealing with al Qaeda and suggests fundamentally rethinking post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism strategy: Policymakers need to understand where to prioritize their efforts with limited resources and attention. The authors report that religious terrorist groups take longer to eliminate than other groups and rarely achieve their objectives. The largest groups achieve their goals more often and last longer than the smallest ones do. Finally, groups from upper-income countries are more likely to be left-wing or nationalist and less likely to have religion as their motivation. The authors conclude that policing and intelligence, rather than military force, should form the backbone of U.S. efforts against al Qaeda. And U.S. policymakers should end the use of the phrase “war on terrorism” since there is no battlefield solution to defeating al Qaeda.



## Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan

Seth G. Jones, 2008

This study explores the nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan, the key challenges and successes of the U.S.-led counterinsurgency campaign, and the capabilities necessary to wage effective counterinsurgency operations. By examining the key lessons from all insurgencies since World War II, it finds that most policymakers repeatedly underestimate the importance of indigenous actors to counterinsurgency efforts. The U.S. should focus its resources on helping improve the capacity of the indigenous government and indigenous security forces to wage counterinsurgency. It has not always done this well. The U.S. military-along with U.S. civilian agencies and other coalition partners-is more likely to be successful in counterinsurgency warfare the more capable and legitimate the indigenous security forces (especially the police), the better the governance capacity of the local state, and the less external support that insurgents receive.



## **Green Warriors** **Army Environmental Considerations for Contingency Operations** **from Planning Through Post-Conflict**

David E. Mosher et al., 2008

Recent experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans have highlighted the importance of environmental considerations. These range from protecting soldier health and disposing of hazardous waste to building water supply systems and other activities that help achieve national goals in the post-conflict phase of contingency operations. The Army has become increasingly involved with environmental issues in every contingency operation and must be better prepared to deal with them. This study assesses whether existing policy, doctrine, and guidance adequately address environmental activities in post-conflict military operations and reconstruction. Findings are based on reviews of top-level policy and doctrine, analysis of operational experience, extensive interviews with diverse Army personnel, and a review of operational documentation and literature. From these sources, a database of 111 case studies was created. The research showed that environmental concerns can have far-reaching and significant impacts on the Army, both direct and indirect, especially in terms of cost, current operations, soldier health, diplomatic relations, reconstruction activities, and the ultimate success of the operation or the broader mission. Some evidence suggests that environmental problems may have even contributed to insurgency in Iraq. Recommendations include updating current policy and doctrine to fully address environmental considerations in contingency operations; ensuring that contractors are carefully selected and managed; and transmitting proactive field environmental practices and lessons throughout the Army.



## **Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence** **The U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1960-1970 and** **2003-2006**

Austin Long, 2008

The publication of a new counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine manual in late 2006 was widely heralded as an indication that the U.S. military was finally coming to understand the problems it has recently faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, this interpretation assumes a tight linkage between doctrine as written and operations as actually conducted. By comparing modern counterinsurgency doctrine and operations to those of 1960s, this paper tests and ultimately disproves this proposition. An examination of COIN doctrine and operations in the 1960s reveals that operations seldom matched written doctrine. Instead of winning hearts and minds, improving civil-military relations, conducting small-unit operations, and gathering intelligence, most Vietnam War commanders and units attempted to defeat the insurgency through large-scale operations and overwhelming firepower. Modern U.S. COIN operations in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate a similar preference for high-intensity warfare and a similar inability to adapt technologically and mentally to the requirements of COIN. To help explain the discrepancy between written doctrine and actual operations, this paper posits that ingrained organizational concepts and beliefs have a much greater influence on operations than written doctrine. While embedded beliefs can help organizations as they conduct their preferred missions, they can be detrimental in other contexts. Mental and material preparation for high-intensity warfare has made the U.S. military poorly suited to COIN. Altering these beliefs will require more than just new doctrine and some additional professional education: The services must reorient themselves mentally as well as physically.



## **Stabilization and Reconstruction Staffing Developing U.S. Civilian Personnel Capabilities**

Terrence K. Kelly et al., 2008


The United States participated in several interventions and state-building efforts during the 1990s, and the rationale for U.S. engagement in such efforts received a new urgency after the 9/11 attacks. However, recent U.S. experiences in Afghanistan and in Iraq, especially, have shown that engaging in stability and reconstruction operations is a difficult and lengthy process that requires appropriate resources. Most of all, to have a chance of succeeding, such operations require a realistic understanding of the capabilities needed for them. The authors present the results of research on the U.S. civilian personnel and staffing programs for stability and reconstruction operations undertaken in other countries under U.S. leadership or with the participation of the United States. The study uses the Office of Personnel Management's Human Capital Assessment and Accountability Framework to assess the personnel requirements for such operations. The Framework advocates strategic alignment, workforce planning and development, leadership and knowledge management, results-oriented performance culture, talent management, and accountability. The authors also present recommendations that the U.S. government should consider undertaking to deal with the types of problems that the United States has encountered in post-2003 Iraq. The research draws on the rapidly growing body of literature dealing with reconstruction and stability missions, interviews with U.S. and British civilian personnel deployed to Iraq, and the authors' own experiences in Iraq as U.S. civilians involved with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The study should be of interest to policymakers dealing with stability and reconstruction operations.



## **Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006)**

Bruce R. Pirnie and Edward O'Connell, 2008

This monograph outlines strategic considerations relative to counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns; presents an overview of the current conflict in Iraq, focusing on COIN; analyzes COIN operations in Iraq; presents conclusions about COIN, based on the U.S. experience in Iraq; describes implications from that experience for future COIN operations; and offers recommendations to improve the ability of the U.S. government to conduct COIN in the future.




## **War by Other Means**

### **Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency**

David C. Gompert et al., 2008


The difficulties encountered by the United States in securing Iraq and Afghanistan despite years of effort and staggering costs raises the central question of the RAND Counterinsurgency Study: How should the United States improve its capabilities to counter insurgencies, particularly those that are heavily influenced by transnational terrorist movements and thus linked into a global jihadist network? This capstone volume to the study draws on other reports in the series as well as an examination of 89 insurgencies since World War II, an analysis of the new challenges posed by what is becoming known as global insurgency, and many of the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan.



## **Preparing the Army for Stability Operations Doctrinal and Interagency Issues**

Thomas S. Szayna et al., 2008


This monograph presents the results of a project entitled Improving Army Doctrine and Planning for Stability Operations. A great deal of activity has been aimed at revising the approach to the planning and implementation of Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations. The primary emphasis of the changes is on ensuring a common U.S. strategy rather than a collection of individual departmental and agency efforts and on mobilizing and involving all available U.S. government assets in the effort. However, using a template to assess the extent of progress in building collaborative interagency capacity for SSTR operations, the authors find that some elements essential to the success of the process are not yet in place.



## **After Saddam Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq**

Nora Bensahel et al., 2008

This monograph begins by examining prewar planning efforts for postwar Iraq, in order to establish what U.S. policymakers expected the postwar situation to look like and what their plans were for reconstruction. The monograph then examines the role of U.S. military forces after major combat officially ended on May 1, 2003; the analysis covers this period through the end of June 2004. Finally, the monograph examines civilian efforts at reconstruction after major combat ended, focusing on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its efforts to rebuild structures of governance, security forces, economic policy, and essential services prior to June 28, 2004, the day that the CPA dissolved and transferred authority to the Interim Iraqi Government. The authors conclude that the U.S. government was unprepared for the challenges of postwar Iraq for three reasons: a failure to challenge fundamental assumptions about postwar Iraq; ineffective interagency coordination; and the failure to assign responsibility and resources for providing security in the immediate aftermath of major combat operations.



## **Byting Back Regaining Information Superiority Against 21st-Century Insurgents**

Martin C. Libicki et al., 2007

U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have failed to exploit information power, which could be a U.S. advantage but instead is being used advantageously by insurgents. Utilizing mostly available networking technology, the United States could achieve early, affordable, and substantial gains in the effectiveness of counterinsurgency by more open, integrated, and inclusive information networking with the population, local authorities, and coalition partners.

*Updated 6/26/09*