

Individual determinants of participation in community development in Indonesia

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Abstract. Given the new decentralization legislation in Indonesia, citizen participation is an increasingly important factor in planning and development policies. Yet policymakers have inadequate information about the types of individuals likely to contribute their knowledge, time, and economic resources to the development process. This paper provides a background and conceptual framework for understanding citizen participation in community development as well as the related components of civil society and social capital in Indonesia. A series of logistic and ordinary least squares regression models are used to analyze the effect of individual demographic and socioeconomic characteristics on the likelihood of participation in community development. I conclude that participatory community development (1) restricts women's participation beyond the role of family caretaker, and (2) has a limited capacity to help the poor.

Introduction

One of the most important concerns regarding the success of decentralized planning is the new responsibilities it places on citizens. Although neither the literature on decentralization nor that on citizen participation is new, what remains controversial is using citizens to plan and deliver public services (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Cooke and Kothari, 2002; Manor, 1999; Ribot, 1999; Tendler, 1997). The success of participatory community development depends on the ability of citizens to form cooperative relationships and channel their knowledge, time, and economic resources through civil society organizations to achieve positive development outcomes (Narayan and Pritchett, 1999; Ostrom, 1990; 1995; Putnam, 1993; Uphoff and Wijayarathna, 2000). However, planners and policymakers know very little about what types of individuals are likely to form the requisite social relationships of trust and reciprocity. The purpose of this paper is to identify individual characteristics associated with citizen participation, and, in particular, individual contributions of time and money to community development.

In Indonesia, questions about the capacity of citizens to plan and deliver services have immediate relevance as the country moves from a centralized to a decentralized planning model. The two key pieces of legislation underlying this shift are Law No. 22 and Law No. 25, passed in 1999 and implemented in 2001. The enactment of these laws has changed Indonesia from a highly centralized state, with governance, planning, and fiscal management partially 'deconcentrated' to provincial government offices, to a decentralized state with power over these responsibilities 'devolved' to lower levels of government (Alm et al, 2001; Beier and Ferrazzi, 1998; Booth, 2003; Smoke and Lewis, 1996). From a policy perspective, successful decentralization rests on the assumption that citizens through their participation in civil society organizations will undertake many planning and service-delivery functions previously the responsibility of various levels of government.

Planners and policymakers have little hard evidence to suggest where decentralized planning and development will succeed. For example, are such efforts more likely to

succeed in rural or in urban areas? On Java or off? What type of individual is likely to participate and contribute resources? Individuals of higher or of lower socioeconomic status? In this paper I develop a predictive model of citizen participation in community development based on individual demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. I begin by providing a background and conceptual framework for understanding community development in Indonesia. Next I outline a series of hypotheses about the type of individual likely to participate in community development. Then the data, variables, and the analyses used to test these hypotheses are presented. Finally, the models and findings are discussed.

Background and conceptual framework

The movement from centralized to decentralized planning models resulted from two important shifts in the field of planning. The first shift is epistemological and it is summarized as a critique and movement away from the positivist epistemology that dominated planning until the 1980s (Escobar, 1992; Flyvbjerg, 1998; Holston, 1989; Scott, 1998). In that construction, the professional planner was omnipotent: possessing the knowledge and technical skills necessary to resolve complex development problems. Increasingly, the planner as technical expert is being replaced by the planner as facilitator—responsible for ensuring the articulation and incorporation of local, contextual, and indigenous knowledge in the planning process (Sandercock, 1998). This epistemological shift is closely related to the assumption that closer geographic proximity improves efficiency (Healey, 1997). Kingsley (1996, page 1) summarizes this assumption (now common in urban planning) when he asserts: “urban infrastructure is definitionally harder to plan and control from the center.”

The second shift is political. In the 1990s the rise of civil society and diverse social movements became an influential force in development (Abers, 2000; Castells, 1983; Fox, 1996; Fox and Gershman, 2002; Friedmann, 1989; Friedmann and Douglass, 1998). For conservatives, international lending agencies, and the state, inclusion of these actors was seen as a way of shifting responsibility to the private sector, voluntary associations, and charities in an effort to remedy problems associated with public sector programs. Some critics viewed this as a timely response for a weak state. In that regard, Indonesia is an apposite example as it tries to cope with the aftermath of its economic and political crisis.⁽¹⁾ On the other hand, liberals, activists, and community-based organizations welcomed this shift, because they viewed it as a means to empower grassroots actors, thus ultimately resulting in more democratic and transparent local governance.

In 2001 Indonesia put this paradigm shift into practice when it implemented a national decentralization program that transformed the country from one of the world’s most centralized states to one of the world’s most decentralized states (Alm et al, 2001). Law 22/1999 gave ‘authority’ (*kewenangan*) to lower levels of government, thus weakening the central government’s control over provinces and districts (Booth, 2003; Fane, 2003; Ferrazzi, 2000; World Bank, 2003). A second law, Law 25/1999, reconstituted the fiscal relationship between the central government and the regions by replacing earmarked funds with grants. The decentralization legislation also established new social and political spaces for civil society (for example, the creation of urban forums) and mandated that village or subdistrict-level governance support

⁽¹⁾The economic crisis began in Indonesia in late 1997, then escalated and evolved into a social and political crisis in 1998 (Emmerson, 1999; Manning and Van Diermen, 2000). Some events marking this crisis include: widespread urban unrest, the killing of student demonstrators, attacks on Indonesian ethnic Chinese, and ultimately the resignation of President Suharto.

“diversity, participation, genuine autonomy, democratization and people’s empowerment” (Antlöv, 2003, page 197). In the next section I describe two important factors in citizen participation: (1) the form and function of civil society organizations and (2) social relationships associated with trust, reciprocity, and cooperation.

Civil society

In order to understand civil society in Indonesia, one has to consider the preeminent role of the state and its control over civil society in the post colonial period (Anderson, 1983; Eldridge, 1990; Emmerson, 1978; Malley, 1999). Prior to the current period of political reform, Indonesia was characterized by a strong, centralized state, with a pronounced role for the military in social and economic development (*dwifungsi*). During Suharto’s presidency (1966 to 1998) this process had the effect of severely limiting the social and political spaces in which civil society could exist. Indeed, such organizations and the citizens who participated in them were often viewed as a threat to central government and the country’s political stability (Anderson, 2001). Though a *vertically* integrated political–administrative structure the state was able to reach down and control neighborhoods and households (Sullivan, 1992). The structure simultaneously restricted *horizontal* spaces for integration across communities that could be used for broader social mobilization and collective action (Beard, 2002). However, this structure was *not* simply a state tool of social and political control. In many communities local residents elected their leaders through popular and democratic procedures. There is also evidence that residents used the limited spaces, experiences, and skills they gained through participation in community-based organizations, however modest, to gain access to resources and in rare cases to demand political reform (Beard, 2003).

From this political history a two-tiered system of civil society has emerged in Indonesia. The first tier encompasses community-based organizations. Some were established by the state (for example, community governance groups and health care clinics), others are indigenous and exist outside the purview of the state (for example, rotating credit schemes, or *arisan*, and indigenous community governance organizations, such as *Jumat Kliwon* on Java, *subak* on Bali, and *nagari* in West Sumatra); still others are hybrids of the state and indigenous organizations. The second, newer tier consists of the nongovernmental organizations or NGOs (in Indonesia including both *Yayasan* and *Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat*), which usually operate at a geographic and institutional level above territory-based communities. In Indonesia NGOs are often established and managed by members of the educated middle-class and have a specific agenda such as agricultural assistance or environmental resource management. Alternatively, they target specific groups such as women, street children, or sex workers. The two tiers represent fundamentally different types of civil society. Despite the growth of the NGO sector in the last fifteen years, community-based organizations still have a much broader presence nationally.

Social capital

Given the mandate in the decentralization legislation for citizen participation in planning and local governance, the type and quality of social relationships between individuals have become increasingly important to policymakers. Social capital is one type of social relationship—characterized by trust, reciprocity, and cooperation—that is associated with positive community-development outcomes (Narayan and Pritchett, 1999). Although it is also documented that social capital can contribute to exploitative or exclusionary relationships, these negative aspects of social capital are beyond the scope of this paper (Mayoux, 2001; Portes, 1998). It is important to note, however, that the conceptualization as well as the importance of social capital remains disputed in both the social science (Bourdieu, 1985; Coleman, 1988; Loury, 1977; Portes, 1998) and

the public policy literature (Dasgupta and Serageldin, 1999; Lin, 2001; Paldman, 2000; Putnam, 1993; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000).

A seminal work in the conceptualization of social capital and its relationship to positive development outcomes, particularly relevant to this study, is Putnam's *Making Democracy Work* (1993).⁽²⁾ Putnam (1993, page 167) defines social capital as the "features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action." Both Putnam (1993) and Coleman (1990) cite Geertz's work (1962) on rotating credit schemes (*arisan*) on Java as an apposite example of social capital. These schemes are noteworthy because the apparent risk involved defies the logic of collective action; that is, individuals voluntarily participate in *arisan* and continue to do so after they have won the pot (Putnam, 1993). According to Putnam, a number of factors prevent the expected self-defeating opportunism. First, because the risk involved in participation is recognized by all members, new participants are carefully screened; and, second, "the threat of ostracism from the socioeconomic system is a powerful, credible sanction" in a community of dense networks of exchange (Putnam, 1993, page 168). As a result, the social capital underlying these mutual aid efforts is expected to increase with proper use and decrease with misuse.

In Indonesia the generalized reciprocity aspect of social capital is best illustrated by the sociocultural ethic of *gotong royong* (Bowen, 1986; Koentjaraningrat, 1961; Sullivan, 1992). This ethic is believed to have originated from the cooperative conditions necessary for wet rice production in Java. Bowen (1986) traces the politically motivated use of the term and differentiates among three generalizable types of *gotong royong* found in both rural and urban areas. It is widely accepted that the Indonesian state has used the ethic of *gotong royong* to further its own development agenda. As a result, the first and third types of *gotong royong*, 'labor mobilized for direct exchange' and 'labor mobilized on the basis of subordinate political status', are more commonly referred to as *padat karya* (intensive work programs) and *kerja bakti* ('voluntary' labor) in Indonesia. However, the second type of *gotong royong*, Bowen distinguishes, 'generalized reciprocity', remains a strong social norm in Indonesia as well as a powerful determinant of social capital.

The relationship between participatory community development and individual characteristics

In this paper I analyze individual characteristics likely to be associated with participation in first-tier civil society organizations that deliver public goods and services to territory-based communities. In this model of participatory community development social capital, understood as generalized reciprocity, is extremely important. For example, the mother and child health care clinic (*Posyandu*) provides preventative health care, immunization, vitamin supplements, and health information, below the cost of comparable services in the private sector. However, community members are expected to make financial contributions and take turns administering the health care clinic: setting up the tables, maintaining the equipment, and recording height and weight information. Similar organizations which expect individuals to contribute their knowledge, time, money, and/or resources include those which provide drinking water and solid waste removal, credit, and neighborhood security. Based on the participatory

⁽²⁾For a critique of Putnam, see Tarrow (1996). That critique, however, does not encompass Putnam's conceptualization of social capital on which the current paper draws. Instead it focuses on Putnam's research strategy, selective use of historical evidence, and the direction of a causal link between the presence of social capital, an active civil society, and successful policy outcomes.

model used by these organizations, it is hypothesized that a very particular type of individual will have both the need for a particular service and the minimum resources they are expected to contribute in return for the service. In this section of the paper I set up a series of hypotheses about the type of individual likely to participate in this model of community development.

Participatory community development depends not only on individuals who have a combination of a particular need and resources, but also individuals who have specific skills and sufficient educational attainment to carry out the organization's activities. Examples of duties which require skills and education include: participating in activity-specific training, organizing participants, understanding government regulations, and managing a project budget. However, individuals with considerable formal education, at the high school level or above, are likely to belong to the social and economic elite. They will not need reciprocal exchange relationships to receive the social and physical services, which they can purchase in the private sector. For example, a highly educated person whose time has a high monetary value and who perceives that private services of higher quality, professionalism, and accountability are available will opt to pay a private doctor rather than go to a community clinic, which would expect the person to contribute time and/or money in the future. Commenting on this dynamic, Coleman (1990, page 321) notes that, whenever more alternatives become apparent to doing favors in exchange for future services or insurance, an individual will reduce his or her obligations, thus destroying social capital.

Given the territorial basis of first-tier civil society organizations and the importance of trust in interactions that built social capital, it is hypothesized that there will be more social capital in rural areas. The hypothesis is based on a set of assumed differences between rural and urban areas. For example, rural residents are more likely to have lived at their current residence for a longer time, and thus they are more likely to know their neighbors and also their neighbors' extended families that live in close proximity; and that this network has the potential to create strong bonds of trust and accountability among neighbors. According to Coleman (1990, page 318–320), in urban areas the absence of 'closure' in urban social networks undermines trust, making social capital less attainable.

Another important element of social capital is an individual's access to social networks (Lin, 2001). The social, cultural, and religious groups to which individuals belong increase or decrease the number of people they know and the number of people they potentially engage in exchange relationships. It is therefore hypothesized that the members of dominant social groups, (for example, members of the Muslim religion) are more likely to participate in civil society organizations.

For two reasons, residence on Java is expected to be positively associated with the presence of citizen participation in first-tier civil society. (1) Over the last thirty years the Indonesian state has actively encouraged the development of community-based civil society on Java. (2) The ethic of *gotong royong* is thought to originate from the Javanese term *ngotong* (a group of people lifting or carrying an object together), which suggests the importance of cooperative and reciprocal relationships on Java.

Given that participation in civil society organizations means contributing time and/or money, an individual's economic status will affect his or her level of involvement. Similarly to the pattern described above for education and literacy, a minimal economic level is a prerequisite for participating in civil society organizations: the individual must have time to attend meetings and sufficient wealth to cover routine membership dues and other costs. Moreover, from the perspective of the civil society organization, those members are preferable who are known to have enough resources to contribute to its activities and agenda. Yet because of the welfare focus of many

territorially based civil society organizations, it can be anticipated that the individuals who have high household incomes will not choose to invest time and disposable income in such organizations, and instead they will purchase services in the private sector. In conjunction with Coleman's (1990, page 321) point that increased alternatives reduce social capital, he also argues that "because of affluence ... persons need each other less, [and] less social capital is generated." It is therefore hypothesized that active employment and a minimal level of assets and expenditures will be positively associated with an individual's participation in civil society. However, in terms of assets and expenditures there will be cutoff points at the bottom and at the top of the distribution, beyond which an individual is not likely to participate in civil society organizations. At the low end of the distribution individuals will not have enough economic resources, and at the high end they will not have the incentives.

Data and methods of analysis

The Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) collects data on individual participation in a wide array of first-tier society organizations, and on the time and money individuals contribute and the benefits they receive in return. The level of detail in this module facilitates analysis beyond that in previous studies analyzing simply membership and the number and type of civic organizations in a given geographic location (Putnam, 1993). It is believed that an individual's contribution of time and money is a superior measure of participation.⁽³⁾ In addition, the IFLS dataset provides detailed information on the demographic, socioeconomic, and geographic characteristics of individuals. The section below describes the data and methods of analysis used in the study.

The citizen participation module

The results in this paper are based on an analysis of the second wave of the IFLS (IFLS-2). The IFLS is a multipurpose, panel survey that collects data at the individual, household, and community levels. The first wave, IFLS-1, did not collect information on citizen participation, whereas IFLS-2 includes a special module on citizen participation (PM—*Partisipasi Masyarakat*) that conveys information on an individual's knowledge of community-based organizations, whether or not an individual participated in activities in the last twelve months, individual contributions of time and money in the last twelve months, and benefits received in return for participation.⁽⁴⁾ The citizen participation module was administered to each adult household member in IFLS-2.⁽⁵⁾ In this module men and women are asked about a series of organizations that are open to both sexes, and then each are asked about their participation in male-specific or female-specific organizations.

⁽³⁾ An additional measure that would be useful in citizen participation is the *role* an individual assumes in an organization. For example, there is a qualitative difference in whether an individual participates as a *member* or *recipient* of a group's services or as *leader* of a group. The second wave of the IFLS does not gather this type of information.

⁽⁴⁾ The benefits-received question asked individuals if they had received services, or money related to their participation in an activity during the past twelve months. However, the question was structured so that responses were open ended. When these data were coded it was found that the majority of respondents replied that they had received benefits in the form of services, material, money, information, infrastructure, environment, health, and community cohesion. A small number of respondents received other benefits or no benefits. Respondents also had the option of answering that they had received more than one benefit.

⁽⁵⁾ If an individual respondent could not be interviewed, a proxy respondent (usually another member of the household) was asked about whether or not that individual participated in various activities.

The IFLS-1 and IFLS-2 samples

The first wave of the panel (IFLS-1) was in 1993 and the second wave (IFLS-2) in 1997. Because the IFLS is a panel survey, the IFLS-2 sample was derived from the IFLS-1 sample, so knowledge of IFLS-1 sampling is important for this study. The IFLS-1 sample was stratified by province and urban–rural locations with a random sample selected from within these strata (Frankenberg and Thomas, 2000, page 4). The sample was drawn from thirteen provinces in Indonesia, representing approximately 83% of the population. The provinces were selected in order to “maximize representation of the population, capture the cultural and socio-economic diversity of Indonesia, and be cost-effective to survey given the size and terrain of the country” (Frankenberg and Thomas, 2000, page 4). The IFLS provinces are: North Sumatra, West Sumatra, South Sumatra, Lampung, DKI Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, DI Yogyakarta, East Java, Bali, West Nusa Tenggara, South Kalimantan, and South Sulawesi.⁽⁶⁾ Within each province, enumeration areas are randomly selected from a nationally representative sample frame used in the 1993 National Social Economic Survey, which was developed by the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics.⁽⁷⁾

In IFLS-1 7224 households were interviewed between late 1993 and early 1994. IFLS-2 attempted to relocate and interview the 7224 households interviewed in 1993. In addition, IFLS-2 also tracked households and individuals who had moved.⁽⁸⁾ In the end, IFLS-2 was able to relocate 6821 households. Because some individuals had moved out of existing IFLS households and started new households, IFLS-2 added 877 ‘split-off’ households. Thus a total of 7698 households were interviewed. Individual interviews were conducted with 26 537 IFLS-1 household members, and IFLS-2 added 5416 new individuals.⁽⁹⁾ The citizen participation module was asked of all household members age 15 years or older. Thus there were 19 892 respondents and 1652 proxy respondents (proxy respondents were asked only whether the original respondent had participated in an activity twelve months prior to the interview, not about time and money contributions). In order to analyze the second wave of the IFLS in isolation from the first wave, cross-sectional weights were used in descriptive analysis to correct for oversampling, to make the data approximately equivalent to a nationally representative sample, and to correct for attrition between the first and second waves.

Method of analysis

In the descriptive statistics and the regression models, men and women are analyzed separately because their patterns of participation differ according to prescribed gender roles in Indonesia, and these differences are also reflected in the structure of the participation module. Men usually participate in civil society organizations related to community-level governance, physical infrastructure, environmental improvements, and neighborhood security, whereas women participate in organizations that focus on family welfare, economics, and health. As a result the survey asked men and women about participation in different organizations.

⁽⁶⁾ These provinces refer to names and jurisdictions at the time of the survey. Some of these provinces have been subdivided and new provinces have been created.

⁽⁷⁾ The National Social Economic Survey sample frame was derived from the 1990 Census (Frankenberg and Thomas, 2000, page 4).

⁽⁸⁾ For a detailed explanation of the interhousehold sampling scheme used in IFLS-1 and tracking protocols used in IFLS-2, see Frankenberg and Thomas (2000, pages 4–8).

⁽⁹⁾ For an examination of the magnitude and character of attrition in the IFLS, see Thomas et al (2000).

The analysis in this paper consists of three steps. For the first step (table 1), I developed descriptive statistics to show differences between men's and women's demographic and socioeconomic characteristics and participation rates. In the second step (table 2, over), I analyze the effect of an individual's demographic and socioeconomic characteristics on the *likelihood* of knowledge of and participation in first-tier civil society organizations. Specifically, logistic regression models were performed for men and women separately with the following dependent variables: knowledge of civil society organizations and participation in civil society organizations. In the third step (table 3, pages 32–33), based on individuals who participate, I analyze the effect of individual demographic and socioeconomic characteristics on the *amount*

Table 1. Men's and women's characteristics related to social capital and participation rates. (All figures in the table are percentages except where labeled as mean; the sample sizes are given in parentheses.)

Characteristics	Men	Women
Head of household	37.11** (6 285)	6.87** (1 336)
Spouse of head of household	0.29** (98)	32.97** (5 942)
Age 15–30 years	61.06 (12 108)	61.57 (12 504)
Age 31–45 years	21.20 (3 628)	20.77 (3 872)
Age 46–60 years	11.42 (2 060)	11.02 (2 273)
Age 61 years or older	6.32 (1 506)	6.63 (1 761)
Married	45.04 (8 089)	44.37 (8 502)
Prime-age adults (31–45 years), mean number	1.14 (17 095)	1.13 (18 307)
Children 5 years or under, mean number	0.69 (17 095)	0.69 (18 307)
Children 6–10 years, mean number	0.64 (17 095)	0.64 (18 307)
Children 11–15 years, mean number	0.76 (17 095)	0.73 (18 307)
Activities that exist in community ^a , mean number	9.90 (17 095)	9.86 (18 307)
No education	18.41** (3 249)	24.81** (4 750)
Elementary education	45.71 (8 038)	45.56 (8 521)
Junior high education	15.67** (3 040)	13.77** (2 896)
High school education	16.96** (3 720)	13.99** (3 252)
University education	3.25** (705)	1.87** (470)
Literacy	85.56** (9 159)	73.02** (8 703)
Rural	59.53 (10 117)	59.54 (10 608)
Muslim	91.87 (16 557)	91.99 (17 514)
Reside on Java	71.02 (10 957)	70.75 (11 695)
Employed last year	51.28** (9 637)	26.62** (5 515)
Assets 1st–25th percentile	16.81 (3 323)	17.63 (3 606)
Assets 26th–50th percentile	26.03 (4 871)	25.37 (5 094)
Assets 51st–75th percentile	28.83 (5 359)	28.68 (5 523)
Assets 76th–90th percentile	17.45 (3 382)	17.14 (3 497)
Assets 91st–100th percentile	10.88** (2 368)	11.18** (2 692)
Expenditures 1st–25th percentile	24.47 (5 774)	27.54 (6 135)
Expenditures 26th–50th percentile	28.56 (5 290)	28.09 (5 539)
Expenditures 51st–75th percentile	24.94 (4 669)	24.54 (4 834)
Expenditures 76th–90th percentile	12.77 (2 357)	13.17 (2 553)
Expenditures 91st–100th percentile	6.27 (1 173)	6.65 (1 280)
Know of any activities	87.34 (8 285)	87.24 (9 534)
participate in any activities	79.69** (7 319)	51.93** (5 145)
amount of Rupiah contributed, mean number	41 020.62** (2 583)	23 853.01** (2 510)
hours contributed, mean number	746.30** (5 778)	284.52** (4 393)

** Gender differences significant at the 0.01 level, * gender differences significant at the 0.05 level.

^a The survey asks about twelve types of activities. The range for this variable is 2–12.

of time and money contributed to first-tier civil society organizations. Ordinary least squares regression models were performed on men and women separately with the following dependent variables: amount of time and amount of money. In the next section I will discuss how discrete variables were operationalized.

Variables

The dependent variables in the regression models include measures of any knowledge, any participation, contributions of time, and contributions of money.⁽¹⁰⁾ These variables all refer to the last twelve months. The variables for the amount of time and money an individual has given are summed for all the civil society organizations asked about the survey. These include four organizations that both men and women might participate in: community meetings, cooperatives, voluntary labor, and neighborhood or village improvement schemes. Then only men were asked about four activities that are typically considered ‘male activities’: neighborhood security, providing drinking water, providing water for washing and cleaning, and solid waste removal. Only the women were asked about four activities that are considered ‘female activities’: Women’s Family Welfare Organization (*Wanita PKK*), community health post (*Posyandu*), support groups for contraceptive acceptors, and the child development program. In summary, men and women were each asked about their knowledge of, participation in, and contribution to eight activities: four that are relevant for both genders and four that are gender specific. It is important to note that the participation questions are nested, so a respondent who answers he or she has no knowledge of an organization is not asked further questions about that particular organization. Obviously, a respondent who answers that he or she did not participate in an organization’s activities during the last year is not asked questions about contributions of time or money. The regression models that examine an individual’s contribution of time and money analyze only those individuals who participated in at least one civil society organization in the past year.

The variables that represent socioeconomic status in table 1 are also the independent variables in the regression models. Education is divided into five dichotomous variables for the highest level of education completed: no education, elementary school, junior high school, senior high school, and university. In the regression models, ‘junior high school’ is the omitted category.⁽¹¹⁾ In the descriptive statistics and the regression models, ‘literacy’ is a dichotomous variable for being able to read in at least one language. ‘Employed last year’ is a dichotomous variable based on whether the individual has worked for pay for at least one hour in the last year. Hence this variable does not capture unpaid family or domestic work. ‘Muslim’ is a dichotomous variable for either being Muslim or belonging to one of the other main religions represented in the survey. This ‘other category’ includes Protestants, Catholics, Hindus, Buddhists, and a small number of respondents identified with an indigenous belief system. ‘Rural’ is a dichotomous variable based on whether the administrative designation of where an individual resides is classified as rural. Assets are the Rupiah value of a household’s physical store of wealth. Assets are operationalized in terms of five dichotomous variables: the 25th percentile and below, between the 26th and 50th percentiles, between the 51st and 75th percentiles (omitted), between the 76th and 90th percentiles, and between the 91st and 100th percentiles.⁽¹²⁾

⁽¹⁰⁾ A correlation matrix was used to check for collinearity among the independent variables in each of the regression models. None was found.

⁽¹¹⁾ An omitted category is a comparison category for tests of statistically significant effects.

⁽¹²⁾ The actual Rupiah amounts that correspond to the categories of assets are: Rp0–1675 000; Rp1675 001–7057 500; Rp 7057 501–21 100 000; Rp21 100 001–56 225 000; Rp 56 225 001–301 000 000.

Table 2. Logistic regression models predicting men's and women's knowledge and participation.

	Any knowledge				Any participation			
	men		women		men		women	
	odds ratio	<i>p</i>						
Household head	1.235 (0.136)	0.054	1.240 (0.140)	0.056	1.563** (0.138)	0.000	2.237** (0.206)	0.000
Spouse of head of household			1.097 (0.122)	0.404			1.267** (0.091)	0.001
Age 15–30 years	1.034 (0.131)	0.791	1.155 (0.119)	0.162	0.621** (0.064)	0.000	1.146 (0.081)	0.053
Age 46–60 years	1.267* (0.148)	0.044	0.901 (0.096)	0.327	0.811* (0.082)	0.038	0.587** (0.045)	0.000
Age 61 years or over	0.758* (0.099)	0.033	0.557** (0.066)	0.000	0.345** (0.037)	0.000	0.478** (0.047)	0.000
Married	1.088 (0.123)	0.457	1.676** (0.179)	0.000	1.118 (0.100)	0.209	2.884** (0.205)	0.000
Number of adults aged 30–45 years in household	1.056 (0.048)	0.228	1.074 (0.045)	0.089	0.913* (0.032)	0.010	0.910** (0.028)	0.002
Number of children 5 years or under	0.971 (0.043)	0.502	0.967 (0.040)	0.413	0.965 (0.036)	0.336	1.558** (0.050)	0.000
Number of children 6–10 years	0.979 (0.046)	0.661	1.073 (0.047)	0.106	1.060 (0.043)	0.152	1.037 (0.033)	0.250
Number of children 11–15 years	0.963 (0.039)	0.351	0.925* (0.035)	0.041	0.959 (0.032)	0.214	0.986 (0.028)	0.619
Number of activities in community	1.377** (0.26)	0.000	1.327** (0.022)	0.000	1.082** (0.020)	0.000	1.089** (0.017)	0.000
No education	0.906 (0.155)	0.561	0.719* (0.106)	0.025	0.695* (0.102)	0.013	0.770* (0.085)	0.017
Elementary education	1.147 (0.108)	0.147	0.918 (0.094)	0.400	1.060 (0.085)	0.462	0.901 (0.062)	0.128
High school education	1.132 (0.111)	0.206	0.898 (0.099)	0.326	1.126 (0.092)	0.144	1.132 (0.084)	0.093
University education	2.092** (0.470)	0.001	0.818 (0.195)	0.397	0.868 (0.115)	0.286	0.794 (0.119)	0.124
Literacy	1.076 (0.138)	0.570	1.398** (0.146)	0.001	0.966 (0.110)	0.763	1.299** (0.101)	0.001
Rural	1.466** (0.105)	0.000	1.260** (0.085)	0.001	1.364** (0.081)	0.000	1.273** (0.062)	0.000
Muslim	1.213* (0.112)	0.036	1.418** (0.118)	0.000	0.941 (0.082)	0.483	0.929 (0.068)	0.311
Reside on Java	1.895** (0.133)	0.000	2.427** (0.159)	0.000	1.544** (0.092)	0.000	1.153** (0.057)	0.004
Employed last year	1.346** (0.120)	0.001	1.430** (0.095)	0.000	1.863** (0.129)	0.000	1.212** (0.055)	0.000
Assets 1st–25 percentile	0.609** (0.059)	0.000	0.796* (0.071)	0.011	0.829* (0.069)	0.024	0.805** (0.055)	0.002
Assets 26th–50th percentile	0.833* (0.073)	0.038	0.866 (0.069)	0.075	1.048 (0.079)	0.536	0.968 (0.059)	0.592
Assets 76th–90th percentile	0.957 (0.098)	0.665	1.149 (0.111)	0.150	0.960 (0.077)	0.612	0.925 (0.060)	0.231
Assets 91st–100th percentile	0.996 (0.123)	0.972	1.112 (0.128)	0.359	0.810* (0.074)	0.021	0.970 (0.073)	0.682

Table 2 (continued).

	Any knowledge				Any participation			
	men		women		men		women	
	odds ratio	<i>p</i>	odds ratio	<i>p</i>	odds ratio	<i>p</i>	odds ratio	<i>p</i>
Expenditures 1st–25th percentile	1.512**	0.000	1.148	0.099	1.144	0.073	1.069	0.270
	(0.134)		(0.096)		(0.085)		(0.065)	
Expenditures 26th–50th percentile	1.308**	0.002	1.012	0.885	1.083	0.284	0.998	0.968
	(0.116)		(0.086)		(0.081)		(0.060)	
Expenditures 76th–90th percentile	1.312*	0.014	1.073	0.510	1.039	0.673	0.882	0.084
	(0.145)		(0.115)		(0.095)		(0.064)	
Expenditures 91st–100th percentile	1.170	0.260	0.730**	0.009	0.868	0.215	0.807*	0.024
	(0.163)		(0.088)		(0.099)		(0.077)	

** Significant at the 0.01 level, * significant at the 0.05 level.

Note. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The sample sizes are men with any knowledge: $n = 9500$, women with any knowledge: $n = 11\,000$, men with any participation: $n = 9287$, and women with any participation: $n = 10\,098$.

Expenditures are measured in terms of the Rupiah value of a household's routine per capita expenditures.⁽¹³⁾ Expenditures are operationalized in terms of five dichotomous variables: the 25th percentile and below, between the 26th and 50th percentiles, between the 51st and 75th percentiles (omitted), between the 76th and 90th percentiles, and between the 91st and 100th percentiles.⁽¹⁴⁾ In the regression models where household assets and per capita expenditures are independent variables, the omitted category is between the 51st and 75th percentiles.

The models are controlled for a number of other social, demographic, and economic factors. They included a variable for whether or not the respondent was designated as the household head. This designation, made by the household, is usually assigned to the most economically prominent male household member, although it is sometimes assigned to the oldest male if he owns the house where the household resides. In most cases where the female is designated as the household head, there is no economically active adult male. The respondent's age was also included in the models as four dichotomous variables: age 15–30 years, aged 31–45 years (omitted), aged 46–60 years, and aged 61 years and older. Marital status is measured with a dichotomous variable indicating whether the respondent is married. Those who are not married include individuals who have never married as well as those who are separated, divorced, or widowed. The number of children in the household in different age categories was also included in the models: age 5 years or under, 6–10 years, and 11–15 years.⁽¹⁵⁾ The total number of prime-age adults in the household (those aged between 31 and 45 years) was also included. Finally, all of the models controlled for the total number of activities in the respondent's village. An activity 'existed' if at least 2% of the respondents in a given village had knowledge of the activity in the twelve months before the survey.

⁽¹³⁾ It is well documented in the literature on measuring poverty in developing countries that routine household expenditures is the more reliable and preferred indicator for measuring living standards compared with household income (Ravallion, 1994).

⁽¹⁴⁾ The actual Rupiah amounts that correspond to the categories of expenditures are: Rp 0–296 886; Rp 296 887–650 700; Rp 650 701–359 300; Rp 1359 301–2708–440; Rp 2 2708 441–251 000 000.

⁽¹⁵⁾ The models were first attempted with continuous variables for the respondent's age and the total number of children in the household; however, the use of dichotomous variables explained a larger percentage of the variation.

Table 3. Ordinary least squares regression models predicting men's and women's contributions of time and money (if any).

	Amount of time volunteered				Amount of money donated			
	men		women		men		women	
	<i>b</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>p</i>
Household head	76.14*	0.037	41.63**	0.002	7 665.5**	0.002	4 358.8**	0.006
	(36.51)		(13.59)		(2 497)		(1 585.6)	
Spouse of head of household			29.60**	0.006			2 878.6*	0.020
			(10.68)				(1 241.1)	
Age 15–30 years	–88.77*	0.034	–40.00**	0.000	–5 448.9	0.057	–3 732.4**	0.002
	(41.80)		(10.50)		(2 863)		(1 220.1)	
Age 46–60 years	–3.95	0.914	–14.25	0.221	–1 718.6	0.491	976.8	0.471
	(36.50)		(11.64)		(2 496)		(1 354.0)	
Age 61 years or over	–166.43**	0.000	–44.09**	0.004	–2 337.9	0.455	–745.9	0.675
	(45.72)		(15.24)		(3 128)		(1 781.0)	
Married	123.42**	0.001	51.05**	0.000	3 336.9	0.209	3 825.1**	0.002
	(38.83)		(10.71)		(2 658)		(1 244.8)	
Number of adults aged 30–45 years in household	–23.94	0.122	–11.18*	0.015	–593.1	0.576	–641.5	0.230
	(15.46)		(4.59)		(1 062)		(534.3)	
Number of children 5 years of under	–17.92	0.247	11.12*	0.016	236.6	0.823	–165.2	0.758
	(15.47)		(4.61)		(1 059)		(535.7)	
Number of children 6–10 years	24.79	0.134	–1.70	0.723	–1 557.3	0.169	17.1	0.975
	(16.54)		(4.78)		(1 113)		(555.9)	
Number of children 11–15 years	14.55	0.303	1.09	0.799	763.0	0.430	433.5	0.387
	(14.12)		(4.31)		(966)		(501.4)	
Number of activities in community	19.81*	0.011	10.86**	0.000	2 686.9**	0.000	719.2**	0.008
	(7.81)		(2.32)		(534)		(270.0)	
No education	28.75	0.639	–40.44*	0.016	–2 659.7	0.525	–2 676.5	0.169
	(61.27)		(16.71)		(4 182)		(1 944.4)	
Elementary education	73.16*	0.027	–30.29**	0.003	–2 463.6	0.277	–1 952.1	0.102
	(33.08)		(10.27)		(2 267)		(1 194.1)	
High school education	17.47	0.610	2.70	0.807	2 760.4	0.240	1 331.3	0.300
	(34.20)		(11.03)		(2 347)		(1 283.8)	
University education	–120.82*	0.037	–43.93	0.052	4 479.7	0.260	7 816.0**	0.003
	(57.87)		(22.63)		(3 976)		(2 636.2)	
Literacy	37.39	0.392	52.52**	0.000	4 659.2	0.118	2 219.2	0.110
	(43.64)		(11.96)		(2 976)		(1 389.5)	
Rural	100.82**	0.000	37.23**	0.000	–2 987.3	0.072	233.4	0.784
	(24.20)		(7.33)		(1 658)		(852.8)	
Muslim	87.21*	0.015	–27.20*	0.014	4 035.0	0.102	1 658.7	0.199
	(35.95)		(11.05)		(2 470)		(1 291)	
Reside on Java	–2.49	0.920	49.64**	0.000	4 229.5*	0.013	3 768.1**	0.000
	(24.86)		(7.40)		(1 698)		(860.9)	
Employed last year	128.18**	0.000	31.78**	0.000	6 010.6**	0.006	–141.4	0.859
	(32.11)		(6.83)		(2 203)		(794.8)	
Assets 1st–25th percentile	–53.50	0.126	–9.95	0.332	–2 630.6	0.271	–1 211.4	0.310
	(35.01)		(10.25)		(2 392)		(1 192.3)	
Assets 26th–50th percentile	–39.92	0.183	2.16	0.811	–1 717.3	0.403	–4.5	0.997
	(29.98)		(9.05)		(2 051)		(1 052.2)	
Assets 76th–90th percentile	27.27	0.403	15.51	0.113	2 595.5	0.245	2 428.6*	0.033
	(32.61)		(9.78)		(2 233)		(1 136.1)	
Assets 91st–100th percentile	–48.00	0.207	6.91	0.545	23 379.6**	0.000	7 651.2**	0.000
	(38.07)		(11.41)		(2 615)		(1 329.4)	

Table 3 (continued).

	Amount of time volunteered				Amount of money donated			
	men		women		men		women	
	<i>b</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>p</i>
Expenditures 1st–25th percentile	5.76 (30.72)	0.851	28.60** (9.13)	0.002	3 608.7 (2 105)	0.086	695.5 (1 062.7)	0.513
Expenditures 26th–50th percentile	–29.88 (30.29)	0.324	4.80 (9.06)	0.596	818.0 (2 075)	0.693	–455.1 (1 053)	0.666
Expenditures 76th–90th percentile	–36.51 (36.96)	0.323	–1.28 (11.01)	0.907	–716.7 (2 524)	0.776	–1 231.0 (1 280.2)	0.336
Expenditures 91st–100th percentile	21.22 (47.38)	0.654	–23.40 (14.19)	0.099	1 610.2 (3 226)	0.618	1 237.0 (1 650)	0.454
Constant	–1.61 (114.85)	0.989	–75.04 (32.94)	0.023	–33 904.2 (7 868)	0.000	–9 564.9 (3 829.0)	0.013

** Significant at the 0.01 level, * significant at the 0.05 level.

Note. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The sample sizes are men, amount time: $n = 8186$; women, amount time: $n = 9484$; men, amount money: $n = 8212$; and women, amount money: $n = 9393$.

Findings

The findings are discussed in two parts. First, the standard demographic characteristics and the controls are discussed. Second, the relationships between the descriptive statistics, the models, and the hypotheses presented earlier are discussed. The discussion of individual-level determinants of citizen participation is organized into three sections, the effects of: (1) education and literacy, (2) membership in social organizations and residency, and (3) economic status.

Standard demographic characteristics and other controls

Standard demographics were included as controls in each of the models. As expected, table 1 shows that men were significantly more likely to be designated as the household head and women as the spouse of head. As expected, table 2 and table 3 show that respondents designated as the household head, either men or women, or designated as the spouse of the household head were more likely to participate in activities as well as to contribute more of their time and money. Also as expected, certain age groups were more likely to participate in first-tier civil society organizations. Table 2 shows that men between the ages of 46 and 60 years were more likely and that men over the age of 61 years were less likely to have knowledge of local civil society organizations and activities, compared with the omitted category of men between the ages of 31 and 45 years. Women aged 61 years and over were less likely to have knowledge of activities. The same table shows that men in the age groups 15–30, 46–60, and 61 years and above were less likely to participate in activities that were the omitted category of men between the ages of 31 and 45 years. Again, in the same table, women aged 46 years or above were less likely to participate, compared with the omitted category of ages 31–45 years. Table 3 shows that both men and women between 15 and 30 years, and 61 years or over contributed less time, and women of ages between 15 and 30 years contributed less money compared with the omitted categories. Overall, the findings indicate that for both men and women there is a ‘prime-age range’ over 30 and under 46 years in which respondents are more likely to participate in civil society organizations. That likelihood is partly related to their role as male and female

household heads and its associated responsibilities. Similarly, table 2 demonstrates that being married meant that women have a significantly higher likelihood of knowing about and participating in civil society organizations. Table 3 shows that married men and women contribute more time, and married women also contribute more money. The strong relationship between marital status and women's behavior reflects the reality that most of the opportunities for women to participate in civil society are in their roles as mothers, wives, and household managers.

The number of other prime-age adults in the household and the number and ages of the respondent's children also influence the respondent's pattern of participation. Table 2 and table 3 demonstrate that more household members being between ages 31 and 45 years reduces both the likelihood that men and women will participate and the amount of time that women contribute to civil society organizations. This may indicate that it is sufficient for a limited number of household members to participate in a given activity in order for all the household members to reap the benefits of both the particular activity and the social capital that participation generates, such as access to a given service, information exchanged at a meeting, and social contacts. The number and ages of the children in the household were also found to influence knowledge and patterns of participation. Table 2 indicates that women with more children aged 11 to 15 years are less likely to have knowledge of activities. However, women with more children under the age of 5 years are more likely to participate in civil society organizations. Table 3 also indicates that women with more children aged 5 years or under contribute more of their time. Again, these findings were expected because many of the opportunities for women to participate in civil society focus on helping them gain access to services for their families and young children. Finally, for the obvious reason that individuals cannot participate if the activity does not exist, the total number of activities in a given village was found to be significant in every model.

Education and literacy

It is hypothesized above that individuals would need a minimal level of education in order to know about civil society organizations and to participate actively in many of their activities. Conversely, it is hypothesized that individuals with relatively high levels of education—high school level and above—would be less likely to engage in reciprocal relationships where the 'payoff' may be risky or have a longer trajectory. Table 1 shows that women had a significantly lower level of educational attainment and literacy than did their male counterparts in all categories, except in the category of elementary school education. As illustrated in tables 2 and 3, having no education as compared with having a junior high school education is negatively associated with women's knowledge of civil society organizations, men's and women's participation in these organizations, and the amount of time women contributed to these organizations. Having an elementary school level of education as compared with a junior high school education is positively associated with the amount of time men contributed, and negatively associated with the amount of time women contributed to civil society organizations. This may reflect the fact that the civil society organizations in which women participate require reading, writing, and formal training, whereas many of the men's organizations (for example, water services and solid waste management) are based on physical labor inputs. Having a university education as compared with a junior high school education is positively associated with men's knowledge of civil society organizations, but negatively associated with the amount of time they contributed. However, having a university level of education is positively associated with the amount of money women contributed to these organizations.

Literacy is positively associated with women's knowledge of organizations, their participation, and the amount of time they contributed. Again, this may reflect the fact that many of the civil society organizations open to women's participation require formal education. As mentioned earlier, these organizations are responsible for administering credit schemes and for providing health, contraceptive, and child development information and services. Overall, the hypothesized relationship between education and literacy, and participation in civil society was not found in all models; the hypothesized patterns were found in more of the models analyzing women and less so in the models analyzing men.

Social organization and residence

It is hypothesized above that individuals who belong to the dominant religious group, who reside in rural areas, or who reside on Java would be more likely to participate in civil society organizations and have the social capital that is both a necessary condition for and a by-product of their participation. According to table 1, approximately 92% of the individual respondents were Muslim, 60% resided in rural areas, and 71% resided on Java. Tables 2 and 3 show that belonging to the Muslim religion is positively associated with both men's and women's knowledge of civil society organizations and the amount of time men contributed to them, yet it is negatively associated with the amount of time women contributed. Men and women who resided in rural areas were more likely to know of and participate in civil society and to contribute significantly more time to these organizations. Residence on Java is positively associated with men's and women's knowledge and participation, and the amount of money they contributed to civil society organizations. It is also positively associated with the amount of time women contributed to these organizations.

Economic status

As explained earlier, economic status is expected to be an important determinant of an individual's participation in civil society. It is hypothesized above that individuals at the bottom end of the distribution of assets must have a minimum of economic well-being to participate in civil society organizations. However, they also must need the services that such organizations and relationships provide. It is also hypothesized here that civil society organizations recruit individuals with access to resources that they can contribute to the organizations. According to table 1, men had significantly higher employment rates than women did in the year prior to the survey: 51% compared with 27%. Tables 2 and 3 show that, as expected, being employed in the year prior to the survey is positively associated with men's and women's knowledge and participation, and with the amount of time they contributed to civil society organizations. Employment is also positively associated with the amounts of money men contributed. Men with household assets below the 51st percentile were less likely than men in the 51st and 75th percentile, the omitted category, to have knowledge of civil society organizations. Women with household assets below the 26th percentile were less likely than women in the 51st to 75th percentile, the omitted category, to have knowledge of civil society organizations. Men and women with household assets below the 51st percentile were less likely than their counterparts in the omitted category to participate in civil society organizations. As hypothesized, men at the highest end of the distribution of household assets, in the 91st to 100th percentile range, were less likely than their counterparts in the omitted category to participate in civil society organizations. However, men and women with household assets in this range contributed more money to civil society organizations than their counterparts in the omitted category. As hypothesized, this behavior may represent a decision to remain in good standing in the eyes of fellow community members by substituting money for time, or 'buying

their way out of' contributing their time. As shown in table 2, men with per capita expenditures below the 50th percentile and men in the 75th to 90th percentile were both positively associated with knowledge of civil society compared with the omitted category, the 51st to 75th percentile. In table 3 women at the lowest end of the per capita expenditure distribution, below the 26th percentile, contributed significantly more of their time to civil society activities.

Conclusion

In summary, the findings indicate that citizen participation is strongly influenced by socioculturally prescribed family and gender roles. For example, household heads and the spouses of household heads are more likely to participate in civil society organizations. There is also a 'prime-age range': between 31 and 45 years of age, when respondents are more likely to participate in civil society. In terms of gender, women had a unique pattern of participation related to their roles as mothers, wives, and managers of household welfare. The likelihood of their knowledge and participation increased when they were married. The likelihood that they would participate and contribute more time increased when their children were 5 years of age or under. This pattern of participation is probably a result of the type of services women's organizations focus on—access to health care, contraception, and credit.

It was hypothesized that a minimum level of education and literacy was necessary to engage in civil society, but also that high educational attainment would reduce participation. This pattern was not found in all the models: it occurred in the models based on women more often than in those based on men. Women with low levels of education and literacy were less likely to have knowledge of civil society organizations and to participate in them. They also contributed less time. Although a university education increased men's knowledge of civil society organizations, on average it reduced the amount of time they contributed.

It was also found that membership in the dominant social group was positively associated with participation in civil society. Muslims were more likely to have knowledge about civil society and contributed more of their time on average, whereas Muslim women were less likely to do so. This gender differentiation may reflect a religious belief about the appropriate level of public engagement for women. Men and women in rural areas who resided on Java were more likely to have knowledge about and to participate in civil society organizations. Men and women in rural areas contributed more of their time. In addition, on average, men who resided on Java contributed more money, and women who resided on Java contributed more time.

It was hypothesized that a minimum economic status was necessary for an individual to participate in civil society, and that there would be upper and lower 'thresholds' beyond which individuals in the highest and lowest economic categories would reduce their involvement in civil society. As expected, employment was a strong indicator of men's and women's knowledge, participation, and contributions of time; and of men's contributions of money. However, assets and expenditures told a more complicated story about an individual's participation in civil society. Men and women in the lowest category of assets consistently had a significantly lower likelihood of having knowledge of or participating in a civil society. However, men with the lowest expenditures were significantly more likely to have knowledge of the same activities, and women with the lowest expenditures contributed more time. This findings may indicate that civil society organizations that depend on individual's contributions of time and money avoid members who do not have visible signs of wealth (for example, jewelry, clothes, and home appliances) that demonstrate their economic ability to contribute financially. On the other hand, individuals with low expenditures will

pursue information about civil society organizations that provide goods and services for less cost. However, the findings about assets and expenditures were not consistent in all models.

In conclusion, the form and function of first-tier civil society organizations are specific to Indonesia's political history and in turn these organizations have created a unique pattern of citizen participation. As a result, first-tier society in Indonesia creates a restricted set of spaces for women's participation beyond their gender-prescribed roles as mothers and wives, responsible for family welfare. Another broader interpretation of the findings is that participatory community development is insufficient to meet the needs of the poor. This conclusion is based on the knowledge that civil society organizations require their members to contribute resources and the poor are either reluctant or unable to invest scarce resources in endeavors that they perceive as risky because of their dependence on social relationships characterized by trust, reciprocity, and cooperation.

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