RAND Public Policy Forum

Coping With Iran:
Confrontation, Containment or Engagement?

Date:	March 21, 2007
Time:	9:00 A.M. — 5:00 P.M.
Location:	U.S. Capitol, Washington D.C.


Read the Conference Proceedings Conference Summary On March 21, 2007, the RAND Corporation held a public conference on Capitol Hill entitled, “Coping With Iran: Confrontation, Containment or Engagement?” RAND's director of the International Security & Defense Policy Center, Ambassador Jim Dobbins, hosted the event. The conference featured high-level experts and was attended by over 300 guests, including former Ambassadors, Members of Congress and senior staffers, senior journalists, Pentagon officials and numerous well-known Middle East analysts. Two high level officials, Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, and Ambassador Javad Zarif, Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations (via videoconference), also shared their national perspectives with the audience in one-hour sessions each. The conference sought to facilitate an informed discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of various policy options to address the Iranian challenge. Discussions throughout the one-day conference broached a number of key issues, including internal leadership and societal dynamics within Iran, Iran's relationship with other regional actors, the implications of a nuclear-armed Iran and/or a military strike against Iran, as well as the various policy options available to address key issues such as Iran's nuclear capabilities, instability in Iraq, and terrorism. The general consensus reached at the conference was that some degree of both containment and engagement was the best policy approach toward Iran, and that a use of force option was neither imminent nor desirable. There was a general sense that UN sanctions and economic pressure was working in isolating Iran (even if some desired it work faster). Furthermore, Ambassador Burns emphasized that the U.S. is willing to be patient to allow economic and diplomatic efforts to work, and stated there are no imminent deadlines that would cause the U.S. government to pursue a drastic course in its approach towards Iran. To follow are several other key themes that emerged from the discussions: U.S.-Iranian cooperation is possible, especially on Iraq. Despite a legacy of nearly thirty years of antipathy and mistrust, previous crises—such as the aftermath of the Afghanistan war—have demonstrated that U.S.-Iranian cooperation is possible when key issues of mutual concern are at stake. Several panelists believed that was the situation today with respect to Iraq, and that without Iranian cooperation, the stabilization of Iraq would prove difficult if not impossible. Some panelists believed that the beginnings of U.S.-Iranian cooperation on Iraq (currently within a multilateral framework) could potentially lead to broader, bilateral negotiations in the future, including on the nuclear question. Still, the level of mistrust is so high that few expected dramatic breakthroughs in the next twenty months. Iran may be interested in working with the U.S. and the international community to find a solution to the nuclear issue. Ambassador Zarif emphasized Iranian ambitions to strengthen non-proliferation efforts. Panelists noted that successful negotiations would require establishing an end point agreeable to all parties. Ambassador Zarif suggested renewed efforts for an international consortium, which would provide more transparency of Iran's nuclear program as well as increased international monitoring. He also noted that the paradigm of “mistrust and verify” should govern the nature of a solution on Iran's nuclear file. Ambassador Burns stated that the United States would allow Iran to have “exit doors” in negotiations. The UN sanctions process and international economic pressure is working. Over the last several months, U.S. leverage has increased as Iran is further isolated by what one panelist called the “coalition of the reluctant.” Many panelists believed that “hanging tough” diplomatically—including strengthening restrictions on European trade with Iran—is producing results, changing Iranian calculations and ultimately behavior, at least in the short-term. In the long-term, few doubted that Iran—under any type of government—would continue to seek a nuclear weapons capability. Preemption is not imminent. Despite a group of participants with views from across the political spectrum, no panelist argued that the use of force option was imminent or desirable. Many recognized the significant risks and costs of a military strike and the inability of this option to effectively stop Iran's nuclear program. Given the context of the Iraq war, some also noted there was little stomach for the force option. Still, several panelists cautioned that escalation with Iran was still possible through inadvertent actions or miscalculations. And some noted that Israel viewed the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran as an existential threat. Despite such concerns, most panelists believed that the sanctions process was working and should be given time to work, even if some still preferred to keep the force option on the table. There was no sense of urgency voiced, and some even suggested that the use of force clock was slowing for the Israelis as well. Focus is on regime behavior, not regime change. With the exception of one panelist who argued the U.S. should promote regime change in Iran by increasing support for opposition groups from within, most panelists—including Ambassador Burns—focused on changing Iranian behavior, not the Iranian regime. Iran specialists did not believe there were strong prospects for regime change or revolution in the near term, and pointed to the lessons of the Libya model—where an existing regime can change behavior on issues of importance to the West (e.g. nuclear capabilities and terrorism) without a fundamental shift in the nature of the regime. But some also noted that in the long-term, U.S. support for democratization and human rights could serve American interests. A nuclear-armed Iran can be expected to be more dangerous and aggressive. Just as in the case of Pakistan, a nuclear-armed Iran is likely to demonstrate more risky and assertive behavior (particularly in areas like terrorism) and significantly increase the risks for escalation, even if unintended. Still, some analysts argued that Iranian behavior as a nuclear state will largely depend on the nature of the leadership. Individuals like Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei are more likely to exercise prudence and will not necessarily be spoiling for a fight, while successors to Khamenei are unknown but could potentially fall to more radicalized factions. Most experts also agreed that maintaining a stable deterrence relationship with Iran would prove far more difficult than the U.S.-Soviet experience under any leadership. Engagement and containment options were ultimately preferred over confrontation. Several analysts argued for immediate and direct U.S. engagement with Iran. But other analysts did not view engagement and containment of Iran (through the development of a regional Sunni alliance with tacit support from Israel) as mutually exclusive policy options, and suggested the U.S. pursue both in tandem. Just as in the case of U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War, the U.S. can negotiate with Iran and at the same time develop a containment structure to curtail the growth of Iranian power and influence in the region. Read the Conference Proceedings
Program
9:00 A.M. Registration & Coffee 9:30 A.M. Welcoming Remarks 9:45 A.M. Panel 1: Inside Iran Patrick Clawson Deputy Director for Research The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Paul Pillar Center for Peace and Security Studies Georgetown University Karim Sadjadpour Associate Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Ray Takeyh Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies Council on Foreign Relations Moderator Anne Gearan Diplomatic Correspondent Associated Press 11:15 A.M. Panel 2: Looking at Two Alternate Futures A RAND Presentation Examining the Consequences of: A Nuclear Capable Iran and/or An American and/or Israeli Attack Against Iran David Ochmanek Senior Defense Analyst The RAND Corporation Reactions Kenneth Pollack Director of Research Saban Center for Middle East Policy The Brookings Institution Michael Eisenstadt Director, Military and Security Studies Program The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Moderator Robert Hunter Senior Advisor RAND Corporation	12:45 P.M. Luncheon Served 1:00 P.M. An Iranian Perspective Remarks Javad Zarif * Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations Questions Michael Hirsh Senior Editor Newsweek David Ignatius National Security Columnist The Washington Post 2:15 P.M. An American Perspective Remarks R. Nicholas Burns Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Questions Michael Hirsh Senior Editor Newsweek David Ignatius National Security Columnist The Washington Post 3:15 P.M. Panel 3: What to Do: Preemption? Containment? Engagement? James Dobbins Director, International Security & Defense Policy Center RAND Corporation Martin Indyk Director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy The Brookings Institution Danielle Pletka Vice President, Foreign and Defense Studies American Enterprise Institute Steven Simon Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies Council on Foreign Relations Moderator Daniel Levy Senior Fellow & Director, Middle East Policy Initiative New America Foundation * via teleconference