CAPP Events: 2003

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RAND Scholars Discuss the Future of the US-ROK Alliance

Upon their return from a trip to South Korea, CAPP Visiting Scholar General Dong-shin Kim, Former Korean Defense Minister and a 4-star Republic of Korea (ROK) Army Chief of Staff, and RAND analyst Bruce Bennett discussed their perspectives on and impressions of current challenges facing the region at a CAPP roundtable on February 19, 2003.

General Kim reported that debates continue unabated in northeast Asia over the development of Pyongyang’s nuclear program and Kim Jong-Il’s recent bellicose threats and defiant behavior. While protests against the United States are on the decline in South Korea, he stated, anti-American sentiment has led to reactionary anti-Korea fervor, fueled by the U.S. media, in the States. Conflict between the different assessments, expectations and approaches by the United States and South Korea to resolving the current tensions and heated rhetoric on both sides have resulted in strains on the ROK-U.S. relationship.

“Both nations need to overcome this crisis and search for a more mature, advanced alliance relationship,” Kim asserted. “Lack of understanding and prejudice should not drive policies.”

Despite the recent ripple in U.S.-ROK relations, recent polls indicate that South Koreans still favor a continued U.S. troop presence in their country. The United States, however, is currently mulling an adjustment that could result in a reduction and/or relocation of its forces on the peninsula.

Kim speculated on Pyongyang’s motivation, stating that North Korea fears an imbalance of power with the South and seems to expect imminent military attacks from the United States. South Koreans are demanding a breakthrough to end the North-South standoff; meanwhile, the Bush administration has demanded that North Korea abandon its nuclear weapon development and make progress on reducing other weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and conventional forces.

He described two conflicting views about Pyongyang’s intentions and capabilities in South Korea: 1) that Pyongyang is incapable of developing nukes and merely bluffing to intimidate the United States into negotiations and aid; 2) that, as a matter of survival, Pyongyang will never abandon its nuclear program. Solutions to the problem differ according to these views.

He outlined the following policy recommendations:

The building of a “peace regime” on the peninsula, with a North-South Korea peace treaty contingent upon North Korea’s agreement to arms control in Korea. South Korea could encourage Pyongyang to change its perceptions of the United States and become a more open society. This would include proposing a joint study with Pyongyang to write a future roadmap for peaceful relations. U.S. forces could be reduced in conjunction with these efforts.

A re-adjustment of the ROK-U.S. alliance, based on three conditions:

1) The ROK improves its military capabilities in hardware, software, and intelligence-gathering, 2) a package deal between Washington and Pyongyang whereby the latter’s nuclear and conventional weapons are reduced in exchange for a reduction in U.S. forces, and 3) a joint study of the future ROK-U.S. alliance to enhance cooperation and foster a consensus among the two governments and the public in both countries (this study has actually begun).

He noted that the ROK defense budget may need to be increased to provide Korea with the military capabilities necessary for it to assume greater wartime operational control of military forces in Korea.

Bennett agreed with General Kim’s assessment of their recent trip and cautioned that, contrary to the views of some policymakers, the nuclear weapons crisis on the peninsula should not wait until the current crisis with Iraq is over. He posited that there is a nonnegligible chance that North Korea’s ramped-up plutonium reprocessing could lead to the production of several nuclear weapons that might be sold to a third party. Policymakers who think the United States could make a “surgical strike” against North Korea and end the crisis quickly are wrong, he warned; such a strike could easily lead to a dangerous “escalatory spiral" and would not likely successfully destroy all of the North’s nuclear capabilities.

Bennett also dismissed sanctions as a potential solution, because they will not stop North Korea's nuclear program. Also, Kim Jong-Il’s recent statements indicate they would be viewed by North Korea as an act of war. Bennett suggested that North Korea might agree to keeping the 1994 Agreed Framework in place and enforcing it, given the dire economic crisis the regime is facing, assuming that the United States agrees to a non-aggression pact.

General Kim added that there is currently no U.S.-ROK strategic plan against North Korea’s development and use of nuclear weapons, and he noted that the South Korean people are unaware of the extent of the nuclear threat from the North. He recommended that the United States and South Korea make a concerted effort to inform the Korean public of the threat, as well as reform any current policies that may keep the Korean government and military in the dark about the North’s nuclear capabilities.

Related Commentary:

North Korea's Threat to South Korea by Bruce Bennett (United Press International wire, March 7, 2003)