CAPP Events: 2003

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Korea Experts Discuss North Korea Nuclear Crisis

Ambassador Richard Solomon, President of the U.S. Institute of Peace and CAPP Advisory Board member, chaired a CAPP-sponsored roundtable at RAND’s Washington, D.C. office on September 5, 2003 with Ambassador Stephen Bosworth and Professor Victor Cha, two of the United States' foremost experts in Korean affairs, to discuss the crisis on the Korean peninsula. Ambassador Bosworth is Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and served as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea from 1997 to 2000. Dr. Victor D. Cha holds the D.S. Song-Korea Foundation Chair in Asian Studies at Georgetown University and is co-author of the forthcoming 2003 book, Nuclear North Korea? A Debate on Strategies of Engagement.

Solomon began the discussion by elaborating on the current state of affairs. He described North Korea’s situation -- self-imposed alienation from its key allies and a ruined economy -- as unsustainable. Given North Korea’s plight, Solomon expressed doubt that Pyongyang would be prepared to give up its nuclear program, which represents its one real point of leverage over the United States. He speculated that from the North Koreans’ point of view, the brass ring is a change in its relationship with the U.S.

Victor Cha added that there are two standard assumptions about North Korea’s motives: 1) That insecurity is motivating Pyongyang, whose ultimate goal is to trade the dismantlement of its nuclear capabilities for food, fuel, and security, and 2) North Korea wants fuel, food, and security but is not willing to give up its nuclear capabilities. Its main goals, according to Cha, appear to be to avoid an attack by the U.S., avoid collapse, obtain aid, and to keep its nuclear weapons.

Cha explained that a nuclear North Korea is extraordinarily problematic because it could lead to “nuclear dominoes” – other countries in the region might arm themselves to counter the threat from Pyongyang – and because an opaque nation like North Korea developing into a nuclear weapons state could be extremely harmful for commerce in the region.

Solomon noted that the crisis is exacerbated by divisions within the U.S. government and between the U.S., South Korea, and other allies over how to handle it. Since the beginning of the crisis, the U.S. has shifted from refusing to negotiate to a more diplomatic approach. Cha opined that this shift represents a recognition by the U.S. that negotiation is the “least bad of a series of bad alternatives.”

South Korea’s approach has been to exercise its economic power as a supplement to deterrence, within the framework of the Sunshine policy, to induce changes in Pyongyang. For South Korea, Solomon explained, the nuclear threat from North Korea is not significant compared to the threat from conventional weapons; however, for the United States, the threat posed by a nuclear Pyongyang in the post-September 11th political environment and the risk of dealing with it, especially militarily, is considered extremely problematic. Differences in the preferred approach to dealing with North Korea could lead to structural changes in the U.S.-Korea relationship, Solomon posited.

Ambassador Bosworth pointed out that South Korea’s national assembly elections next year could complicate Seoul’s handling of the crisis; if South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun fares poorly, his term will be “stunted.” In order to appeal to the more conservative element in the government, Roh might take a harder line. Bosworth mentioned the rise of China as another important factor. China is becoming a world power and a major player in the negotiations with North Korea. If North Korea proceeds with nuclear testing, Bosworth stated, Pyongyang risks defying China. He added that it is important to understand that although Pyongyang is a very repressive, insulated regime that operates more as a “religious cult” than a political body, its leaders are not suicidal and probably realize that testing would fail to advance their cause.

As to the possibility of whether weapons inspections would ever work, the group agreed that verification of North Korea’s nuclear program would be conceptually very difficult. Bosworth mentioned that Iraq, another similarly intransigent regime with possible weapons of mass destruction, only allowed inspectors into the country after having been defeated in the Gulf War. He cautioned that South Korea and China are likely to try to bring the United States’ demands down with the argument that the more economic incentives North Korea is given, the less likely Pyongyang will be to cheat