The RAND Center for Corporate Ethics and Governance, or CCEG, is committed to improving public understanding of corporate ethics, law, and governance, and to identifying specific ways that businesses can operate ethically, legally, and profitably at the same time.
The CCEG is dedicated to three objectives:
Creating more effective public policies
Promoting more ethical, self-governing corporate cultures, and
Improving public trust in the corporate world.
A broad range of board-level interventions—including having an empowered, independent Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer—could improve compliance and ethics oversight within the C-suite and better support transparency toward shareholders and employees.
Although fair value accounting was blamed by some as the primary cause of the 2008 financial crisis, this was probably not the case. Nevertheless, policymakers should be aware that both fair value and historical cost accounting sometimes can produce misleading information, resulting in both institutional and systemic risk.
Hedge funds did not play a pivotal role in the financial crisis compared to other agents, such as credit rating agencies, mortgage lenders, and issuers of credit default swaps. However, hedge funds do have the potential to contribute to disruptions of the U.S. financial system.
A preliminary assessment of the impact of the financial crisis on the civil justice system finds that litigation demands on some parts of the system have increased, that funding for state courts may be trending downward, and that there have been disruptions in the legal services economy, in the provision of legal aid, and in the operation and staffing of courts.
The debate over the new U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission whistleblower rules overshadows a deeper question for corporations and regulators—how best to reconcile strong compliance and internal reporting mechanisms with the incentives created by the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to report fraud directly to the SEC.
The kerfuffle over Dodd-Frank conceals broad agreement that corporate fraud and misconduct are bad and that internal compliance mechanisms are intended to protect companies as well the community at large from bad behavior, write Michael Greenberg and Donna Boehme.
The role of women helping women at the highest levels of firm leadership in corporate America—among the directors and top executives of large corporations—indicates that relationships forged by these two groups consequently increase the amount of female executives.
The collapse of financial markets in late 2008 has invited renewed questions about the governance, compliance, and ethics practices of firms. RAND convened a symposium to explore the perspective and role of corporate boards of directors in overseeing ethics and compliance matters within their firms.
Sarbanes Oxley is widely considered the most comprehensive business legislation since the New Deal. While research has been done on the financial costs, little is known about the non-monetary effects. This study evaluates those effects, finding that as a result of the legislation firms have been harmed, and/or have decreased in value.
Improving corporate compliance, ethics, and oversight has been a significant policy goal for the U.S. government for decades, and made more salient by the collapse of financial markets in late 2008. On March 5, 2009, RAND convened a conference in Washington, D.C., on the role and perspectives of corporate chief ethics and compliance officers in the detection and prevention of corporate misdeeds.
Just a few years ago, insider trading was considered "dirty." It was the province of marginal players working on the fringe of the capital markets... But today insider trading has proliferated and gone global, writes Larry Zicklin.
The financial services industry is complex and financial service professionals are becoming less distinguishable and more inter-related. However, investors are generally highly satisfied with their own financial service providers.
This paper investigates whether the regulatory regime created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) has driven firms in general, and small firms in particular, out of the public capital market.
Since the implosion of Arthur Andersen in 2002, many have advocated that the auditing industry should be insulated from legal liability, arguing that the profession faces such high risk of cataclysmic liability that its future viability is imperiled. This article discusses the legal, theoretical, and empirical nature of that claim.