Gilmore Commission - Minutes

 

Panel to Assess the Capabilities for Domestic Response
to Terrorist Acts Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction

June 16, 2003
Arlington, VA

Panel Members Present
James Gilmore- Chairman
Bill Reno
Paul Maniscalco
Bill Jenaway
Patty Quinlisk
Bill Garrison
Dallas Jones
John Hathaway
Kathleen O’Brien
Jim Greenleaf
George Foresman
Pat Ralston
Mike Freeman
AD Vickery
Ken Shine
Jack Marsh
Jennifer Brower
Mike Wermuth
Other Visitors
Hillary Peck-RAND Staff
Scott McMahon-RAND Staff
Suzanne Spaulding-RAND Staff
David Brown-GAO
Dan Glucksman
Dan Kreske-Gilmore Aide
Susan Everingham-RAND Staff
Roger Molander-RAND Staff

Administrative Remarks

Wermuth: If its okay, Jennifer and I will start off with some administrative announcements, walk through the agenda and tell you what we see this meeting looking like over the next two days. In your workbook we have an updated agenda behind tab 1. I am going to give an overview of how things stand with the National Response Plan (NRP) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS). Some of you have already seen copies of those documents, at your seat, you have the latest version of the NRP that is now out for comment. Jennifer is going to spend some time talking about our research plan. All of you should have received a draft of some material for the fifth report. It is taken directly from material from our conference call in March and then from our April meeting. We will continue into the afternoon on that discussion. We think it will take us until we break this afternoon to finish that discussion. Tomorrow we continue with fifth report discussion items. We will move the survey discussion until the afternoon at 2:00 so that we can have Lois Davis available to help answer our questions. That will probably end up being out last discussion of the day. Currently, at 12:15 tomorrow, we have a visitor scheduled. There is still an open question about whether he will discuss anything classified or not. We may have to go to a closed session. Suzanne Spaulding is with us, we will defer our discussion about legislative issues until tomorrow. In the fifth report, we will publish a more complete biographical sketch of all the panel members, unless you have an objection to that. Roger Molander will be helping to facilitate the discussion of the strategic vision. Do we have any other questions? I will make one more longer-term announcement. Dallas Jones has agreed to be our host for our September meeting in Sacramento. I think you will be in for a real treat when you see Dallas’ little shop.

Freeman: Do you have a list of what has been recommended and the status?

Brower: We are working on it right now, that will be available in the near term.

Wermuth: We can give you that matrix, even as a continuing draft so that you can see what has and hasn’t been implemented. Even some of the old recommendations have been implemented in a more robust manor than they were originally.

Shine: I think the annotation would be very interesting. The one that I am most concerned about is what happened with the Office of Homeland Security (OHS) and the fact that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) solution is inadequate.

Brower: Part of the research is to look at what our recommendations have been and comparing that with what actually was implemented.

Wermuth: We intend to look at this as a more strategic recommendation. Some of the big items that were only implemented in part or improperly, we will probably take some of those issues and go into them in detail.

Shine: There is still room for follow up recommendations. The solutions seem to only be partial solutions right now. Is there an assistant to the president for homeland security?

Wermuth: There is an assistant to the president for homeland security. His name is John Gordon. His deputy is Richard Falkenrath. There is no more OHS, it is now the Homeland Security Council staff, and it is headed by an assistant to the president. It is still unfolding.

Brower: I think a lot of these recommendations will be included in your strategic vision. Your vision will have clear lines of authority, etc…

Greenleaf: Is there any way to gauge whether our recommendations were actually the catalyst for change or if they were in the pipelines anyway?

Wermuth: RAND has already prepared a document that actually laid all the various reports and things along side of each other, we can give everybody that. That will start to answer the question that you ask. Our recommendation for the NCTC is a good example of this. Certainly others came up with similar ideas, but our panel came up with the closest to what was actually implemented, not to the exclusion of the others, but it is clear that you see the fingerprint of the panel on many areas.

National Response Plan/National Incident Management System Discussion

Foresman: In the absence of the chairman, we are going to go ahead and move on with the presentation. Two quick items, we had a really good meeting with Mike and Jennifer last week in preparation for this meeting. I think it really got to the point that we are doing a good job. I can remember at two points thinking that we were coming up with our most important report, that was during work on the first and the third. But I am more convinced than ever that this one is really the most important. I am convinced that not many of the organizations that are standing now have a vision of their goals for the next five or ten years. When Director Mueller was here he basically said that he has no vision. The second issue is that we have at least one cabinet member with us tomorrow and over the next few months I think its critical that we get more of their opinions on the strategic vision. Even though the panel is ending its work this year, if we have something that is strategic, maybe a few years down the road people will look at us and say, ‘hey the Gilmore panel was right on the mark.’ I think we have a lot of potential.

Gilmore: Sorry I am late. Mike is going to make a presentation on the NRP and the NIMS. I am relying on the roadmap, the original conference call that we had in March to drive our agenda the next two days. There are many topics we still need to address; what is preparedness? How do you get the proper funding to the right levels? How do we decide what is adequate? How do we move beyond? What impact does this have on the civil freedoms and is it having those impacts? We don’t want this to be political. There may be other topics that we want to take up. I remind you all again, everyone should be sure their input is heard. This is our last shot, every member’s opinion has value. Mike will now give the panel a briefing on his work with the NRP and NIMS.

Wermuth: Copies of these slides are in your workbooks, feel free to take notes on them and ask me any questions at any time. (View presentation)

Reno: We have talked a lot about what is readiness…and we have talked about the absence of standards. Is there intent, within the NRP, of an effort to establish standards? Would it go under the Secretary?

Wermuth: Absolutely, it will go under the Secretary. The plan is the plan, the strategic framework, the NIMS is the execution of the process.

Jones: It says that the Secretary assumes responsibility for managing domestic incident…why doesn’t it say Federal if its federal? It seems to be two different issues to me.

Wermuth: You will see that it is clear in the NIMS.

Gilmore: I feel a little discomfort with this presentation so far. I thought we wanted state and locals to play a larger role than this presentation implies that they will. I am watching this and asking myself, who is in charge? I just thought I would mention this, I don’t know how anyone else feels.

Wermuth: All I can try to do is repeat what I said earlier, that you can see as we get down into the NIMS, how that will unfold. In the plan, the state and local role is clear, even if I don’t have them on these slides.

Reno: I share the chairman’s view. It would be helpful to go back to the diagram we had in the first report. We need to figure out who is in charge.

Marsh: You are just telling us all of this for our own information? That line that Dallas mentioned, could have read six months ago, the word FEMA? Is that what FEMA used to do?

Wermuth: This is coming because after September 11, the President decided that he wanted one person to coordinate all the pieces of the puzzle. The President was clear that he didn’t want to have to go to two or three or four cabinet members in order to get a clear picture of an event. He has tagged Tom Ridge to do this right now.

Gilmore: I get the feeling that this is a little beside the point. The whole topic of what we have done for the past 5 years is to emphasize the state and local needs.

Vickery: There are a couple things that can help, an example of an exercise and maybe a real event. One is the TOPOFF 2 exercise and the other was the shuttle recovery. I could provide some insight on the exercise and there are some excellent presentations that some of the folks who worked on the shuttle recovery could deliver.

Wermuth: I am going to move back to a graphic that might help us get through this.

Brower: What does the word ‘responding’ mean?

Wermuth: It is called a National Response Plan. Response can be at any point of the process, there can be response in the awareness process.

Gilmore: It is a very elaborate document. The floor is now open for questions and discussion.

Foresman: I have five points. They are mostly comments. I think our big challenge is to focus on the concepts and the process for this planning activity for this program building activity. I am sure the federal government will form working groups to determine who talks to who. I think we should develop the processes. That is the first piece. A question that really plays into this is; what is homeland security? As I started thinking about what we are trying to address, I asked myself many questions. We are really trying to come up with a plan for any incident, not just terrorist attacks. But there are a lot of people who think that homeland security is only terrorism. I think our panel is in a position to educate the public about what the process is. The other issue is what is national versus federal leadership? Does this meet the tenet of meeting the framework so that state, local and federal parts can come together to meet their responsibilities? Operationally we always seem to get it done but when the policy people show up there are arguments about who is in charge of what. I think we need to assess whether this meets the goal of a national incident management system instead of a federal one. What is the right regional structure? Homeland security has not addressed this. The ten federal regions may not or may be the right way to do this. I don’t think we need to worry about the details but need to see if this conceptually fits with what we have been saying all along.

Greenleaf: Just one thought, I liked the direction that this is going in. It looks great on paper, I wonder how it is really going to work. Looking at the role of the Secretary of Homeland Security, I am assuming that this will require that a lot of policies are changed in advance. What if the Attorney General (AG) and the Secretary disagree? Will it have to be moved to a higher level?

Wermuth: That is one of the TBD items. There are three annexes that have to be developed. And that is the role of the Secretary with those three authorities- the DoJ, the DoD and the Department of State.

O’Brien: Three comments, when local governments and state governments set up a structure, you do that without a lot of resources. It is really utilizing resources well. On the federal side it looks like it is using a lot of resources. Secondly when I see the area of regional management, I am nervous about it being placed under the state government column of resources instead of the federal government column for resources. Thirdly, we have the same problem in city and state government.

Foresman: Were the councils designed to take the joint terrorism taskforces, bioterrorism, and all the other terrorism taskforces and make this the focal point for all of this?

Wermuth: The answer is yes but does it merge them into one body? That answer is probably not. The idea is not to get all these entities in one room, its to give them an opportunity to get together collectively and work together. The regional management is not intended to be a new structure.

O’Brien: The regional area management diamond, is meant to be a virtual entity that includes whoever is needed depending on the event?

Wermuth: It is.

O’Brien: I understand how those work but I think that the Principal Federal Officer (PFO) needs to be in a different sized box or different shaped box in order to differentiate it from the area management.

Shine: I want to focus in on the local prevention preparedness. What is it preventing and preparing for?

Wermuth: All hazards, all preventions. It includes for response and recovery.

Shine: This council is an all-hazards council, so it has to be concerned with fires, disease etc. How is the money going to flow to this council as it relates to anti-terrorism versus all hazards? Will federal funds be for all hazards or only the anti-terrorism function of all hazards?

Maniscalco: My head is about to explode. Without giving explicit guidelines, we are setting ourselves up for disaster. There is no guidance. This is going to require discipline so that it does not become a distraction.

Wermuth: The intention is to provide the guidance and structure. There are going to be definitive guidelines.

Quinlisk: I am having the same problem that I have been having. When people talk about these types of plans, they are really going from very traditional types of action, when an incident occurs, then we respond. The problem is that biologics don’t work that way. I don’t think that this plan would work if say, SARS had become an epidemic.

Wermuth: As one of the longer-range taskings, someone is to actually test these things against a set of scenarios and the first thing that was brought up was SARS. So, if this broad view goes through…

Quinlisk: You have to be careful when you say all hazards, one size fits all. Sometimes you don’t have AN incident, you have multiple problems simultaneously. I am not sure that if there was a biological event that this would help, I am actually worried that it would make things worse.

Vickery: The PFO was a big step forward in the exercise that I took part in. That WILL work in a bioterrorist event. I am always frustrated by the health sector’s unwillingness to share their scope with other sectors. Take fire management for example, there can easily be over 100 fires taking place at the same time all over the country and we can handle it. The same thing could be used if there is a biological event. I think it’s important to take an incident, like the shuttle recovery, and have a presentation to this panel. This incident involved four states, and many different sectors of responders. TOPOFF was another example. It was interesting to see the chain of command and the PFO involvement. The PFO is an excellent idea.

Gilmore: In a wildfire situation, who is the lead agency?

Vickery: Agriculture. There are private contractors because there are private and public lands. You have to use a variety of diverse interests and pull them together. It depends on the magnitude of the event of who is in charge. Area command is made up of overhead teams. Missing from this chart is the typing of resources and that is necessary. The difficulty of the PFO is that it is primarily a political position. It might be a good thing, it might help calm a situation down. You don’t have to have an individual who has been to 70 wildfires to represent your group. It is a toolbox and I think what we are seeing here is the mega incident all on one slide.

Wermuth: You just can’t put everything on one slide. It is really a macro view. But there will be other slides.

Ralston: Will the states have to change their statutes or is there a federal statute change?

Foresman: I think the easiest way is through the grant guidelines package. What a lot of this is about is getting all the agencies in one group and agreeing that we will not have individual federally mandated activities. Instead we are going to create a united front against an all hazard incident.

Freeman: The PFO, I think is a key element of this. I think it will be more comfortable after we look at how the incident evolved. An incident isn’t going to fly from the sky, it will evolve. We have seen the incident management action plan in my area. For example, we had a plan for the academy awards. I think that if something ever happens, the PFO will be very helpful to represent all the assets of the federal government. I do see a challenge here, below the triangle and the diamonds, these planning and prevention councils, there has got to be funding. Just to exercise this NIMS, it is going to require a lot of resources, a lot of planning. My concern is that once this is in place, how are we going to maintain and exercise this in terms of funding and exercises that will ensure that we are effective? This discussion that we are having here is very important.

Wermuth: The outreach hasn’t really started yet. There are going to be a number of methods for outreach. It will be within states and it will be to individual organizations. This isn’t going to happen overnight. It isn’t going to just fall out of the sky, it is going to be deliberate. The challenge is to articulate something that could roll in something that exists in the transition period until all of these issues are flushed out. This is a longer-term proposition and it is not even nearly done.

Jenaway: In my own mind, the jury is still out on the ability of this. In my work with corporations, this model mirrors corporate disaster and recovery systems. As I look at this, and taking A.D.’s concepts of looking outside the box, I see a lot of similarities with corporate recovery systems. They work for corporations, but I am not sure if they will work for the government.

Jones: This NIMS is a plan, it isn’t a detailed plan yet. This is the overarching concept. I have a feeling that the system will work on any incident. Resource requests come up from the local level and this doesn’t tell me that this has to go through the local levels before it is approved. Accountability for resources is very important. The chain of resources is very very critical and this doesn’t say anything about that.

Gilmore: Is the federal coordinating officer (FCO) in this model the PFO?

Foresman: I think the FCO never worked because FEMA was viewed as a secondary authority. I think that the FCO didn’t carry the President’s views when he came down. But the PFO is official. I think that what we have always had is operational coordinating but we have lacked policy coordination. The question is that the governor now has to designate someone other than his officer in order to match up with the PFO…that is a different issue.

Jones: It makes me nervous because in my system things HAVE to go a certain way and in yours it COULD go a certain way.

Ralston: To me the PFO concept is at more of a policy level than an operational level.

Shine: We have heard about this, are we making a response to this? Are we making formal comment at this time? As the group makes comments, are they formal?

Wermuth: Whatever you would like. You could do it now, or when it is more structured and the public outreach takes place. Whatever the panel decides, you can do it.

Shine: I would think there is a way that we could collectively express our concerns, perhaps at the September meeting. If we wait until December, it may be too late.

Quinlisk: I think Mike when you said that they are going to take this and try it out, its not that I am against a unified command but I think that there are some inherent differences between a traditional attack and biologics. Most quarantine, isolations etc.. are state-led. Another big difference is that when we are dealing with the medical community, you are not dealing with a single entity like the police or the fire services. They are not in a structure that is easy to put on a graph. I don’t think having a command structure is wrong, but if it is so good, then why hasn’t it been used for biological events?

Wermuth: It is intended to be a framework and to have people think, process wise, consistently about how they look at organization structures. It is a system of systems. The biological event may unfold differently.

Quinlisk: If you are putting together a plan, then some of the differences have to be addressed.

Wermuth: They will be.

Reno: I helped on the last national plan, this will have more impact than we had before. Things will result from this document. I think the panel HAS to respond to it. I wouldn’t mesh our recommendations into our final report. My sense is that it’s going to have far more structure than we have ever had before. I think there will be more control, not less. If we have enough information, maybe we could issue a white paper.

Wermuth: Maybe we could create a sub panel, or have another meeting before the September meeting.

Brower: I am happy to coordinate a public document of your recommendations.

Gilmore: Obviously Mike has raised a remarkable topic here and I think there is a need for more discussion about this. First of all the agenda calls for the discussion of the research plan and Jennifer said maybe we should push that until tomorrow so that we can continue the NRP discussion and then hear from Roger. There has been some debate about what to do about this structure. Should we create a vehicle to comment on this? Should it be now or September? Procedurally, should we form a sub panel and then develop a white paper? Jennifer can staff it. After that, we can hold a conference call to comment on it, or we could put it on the calendar for the September meeting. Is there any thought about that?

Foresman: I think we have to be careful about going back to our core attributes of what constitutes a good national management system. The second issue is to articulate some of the issues that this group highlighted all along. Those are probably instructive of what they are going to hear. I think there are plenty of experts focusing on the nuts and bolts, we need to focus on the overall strategic vision. We need to stay a level above the DHS review process. I feel that DHS is going to bring a group to the table. This is really going to be an important document. Mike, I don’t know much about the time structure, the sooner this commission weighs in, I think the better. I am thinking that September is too far out. But it may also be so complicated that it might take that long. I don’t want us to focus on the boxes and the names in the boxes as we do the overall process.

Wermuth: It would be useful to address issues more in the NIMS, not the NRP. You can, if you want, but obviously the sooner the better. The document is going to be extensive. Remember that what you saw today is just the picture.

Gilmore: We can still do this, when it comes out for comment in a couple weeks, we can send one to all the members of the panel. If you want to be involved in a sub panel, we can do this. Just to clarify, this thing does not incorporate DoD, DoJ or Dept. of State?

Wermuth: It will incorporate them in special categories. There will be annexes that display these relationships. They are special relationships because that is what the presidential directive calls for.

Gilmore: It seems to me that this is in consequence to the creation of the DHS.

Wermuth: Everybody knows my views about the differences between a strong operative inside the white house and another entity that sits on the line. It’s not yet crystal clear.

Shine: I support this kind of activity. I think that many people on this panel will be involved in the commenting. It seems that that does not preclude the commission as a commission from making some recommendations. I also agree entirely with George, this should not be a detailed list of criticisms; it should be more of a limited number of major points that reflect our overall approaches. There have probably been about a half a dozen articulated today. I think the most valuable thing to do is to put these overarching principals on the table.

Gilmore: The point is that this is strategic.

Brower: How does the private sector fit into this?

Wermuth: The private sector, depending on their relationship to the incident structure at the local and state levels already, would fit into the picture at whatever level necessary. You could structure it so that just like other kinds of things, private sector things would plug into the appropriate level.

Gilmore: That is pretty unmanageable isn’t it?

Wermuth: There are a number of ways to do it, you could do it by sector.

Freeman: Who would our target audience be for our communication from the commission?

Wermuth: The Secretary of Homeland Security.

Gilmore: Our charge is to the President of the Congress, officially.

Vickery: When you bring groups together and there is money involved, you might look more at a steering committee instead of a commission where someone is obviously in charge. As money follows its way down, less and less makes it down to the locals. When you have a steering committee where everyone is equal, you have a greater shot of getting a fair share of the money.

Wermuth: Clearly at the local level, a round table is the picture we are leaning toward.

Gilmore: Mike, AD, Paul and George will serve on the sub committee.

Maniscalco: At the local level, the unified command system is the center of gravity, and everything else revolves around supporting that, as I understand it. Where is the disconnect Patty?

Quinlisk: The place where I had concern, is that when the federal government gets involved, they send out their resources and then they stay in control. And that is just not the way it has worked so far. My problem was saying that the feds would stay in control at your local level and I just don’t think that is going to work, especially with hospitals who are used to working independently.

Maniscalco: Is it a disconnect because of some document that we missed?

Quinlisk: When the constitution was set up, public health was placed at the state level. That is where almost all the laws are. Public health and medical stuff became a state function. Therefore, the feds don’t have the legal authority to take over the state-level public health. Biologics are different because it is right at the level of the citizens because that is where the public health authorities are.

Wermuth: I know we all know that the federal government can use its resources basically whenever it wants to. The intention is not to change the processes that are already working.

Shine: It is clear that for a variety of issues, that the incident command is not likely to be in the real world the Secretary of Homeland Security. Wildfires are a good example of that. As we think of this plan, we remember that it is one thing to talk about resources, but it’s another to talk about chains of command, even for incidents that are not terror related. I think some clarification of those differences is essential.

Presentation of a Strategic Vision- Roger Molander

Molander: (View presentation)
This was designed to be a stimulus to your thoughts.

Gilmore: One of two things is going to happen really soon and we don’t know which one it will be. Either there will be a decision to spend this money or else there is going to be a terrorist incident that forces us to spend this money. Or there is not going to be another terrorist attack and we are going to ease on down and ease on down. The goal of this commission is not to simply engage in this debate but as we go out the door, to look outward and to set the future debate. The real question is when do you get to stop? When do you quit? If we want absolute security, we will just keep spending and spending and we will hit diminishing return. And still we will never hit total security. In the process we break the country politically. But on the other hand if you don’t do anything and the enemy attacks, you have a whole other set of problems. No other group has asked the question, when do you get to quit? It is a political landmine, if someone asks when you quit, they will look unpatriotic.

Shine: Both in the documents and the presentation, the emphasis has been on the strategic part and not the vision part. My question is whether we should spend some time on saying if we were cruising over the US in ten years and we were looking at where the country was, what would it look like? What would be the vision in terms of, for example, ongoing comprehensive community planning? I would like to see integrated federal support of local responses to all hazards, via a single line of communications. I would like an integrated analysis of intelligence going all the way down to the local and state levels. I would like to see an educated population about the risks but at the same time understanding that they can go on with their day-to-day lives.

Wermuth: We could take those points that you just made and put them in bullets in each of those categories and you have described a strategic vision. That is what we are thinking right Roger? Just put the words next to the bullets that are already there. And that might be the framework for one form of a strategic vision.

Shine: I think the governor is right on target, he wants to refer to the type of society that we will be living in. If we could agree on how we want this to look, then the rest is easy.

Gilmore: I would suggest that you type that up for us.

Brower: Some of this might need to be prioritized.

Shine: The vision is the movement of people and goods across all of our borders in a free and open way that uses technology in such a way so that it identifies those threats in an all-inclusive way. What kind of borders do we want? What kind of transportation do we want? Those are the kinds of things I am thinking about.

Brower: I think the Governor is right, it depends on if there is an attack. We have to come up with something that is sustained. What if our vision is for ten years and there is an attack in the eleventh year? We want our suggestions to be sustained. We want a strategic vision within restraints. We will never get to 100% security so we need to think about what we are willing to give up, our civil liberties? Education? Prescription drug benefits? We need to remember that there are tradeoffs.

Foresman: Roger as you talk through this, I think of this as two dimensional. It almost becomes a third dimension, when we talk about the expenditure of funds and the risks. I think part of our challenge is defining our environment ten years from now and that vision has to be a fine balance between Chicken Little screaming the sky is falling and Optimistic Annie who thinks everything is okay.

Jones: One thing I have been grappling with is the “knee-jerk dance.” Nobody, to my knowledge, has come out and said who is responsible for what. Its my view that we haven’t done a good job of threat assessment and then sharing that with state and local officials so that we can see how deep the water is. If we are going to have coordinated response, we are going to have to get together and share resources. It’s really a problem. We are not able to respond because we don’t know what our threat is. We are having a tremendous time dealing with the private sector, they own 90% of the infrastructure. That to me is part of this whole strategy, if we are going to get to the goals as Ken outlines, then we need to decide who does what. It seems to me that we are becoming less coordinated instead of more. The last thing I have to say is about the public outreach thing; we need to tell people, at some point, what the threat is. We are in this for the long term, we might as well just tell them and level with them and let them move on with their lives.

O’Brien: I have been thinking about how we might formulate our consensus of how we should formulate this vision. Our chairman has stated a goal that we want to address a return to normalcy. I think what Ken was saying was kind of a description of an end state. We probably need to be thinking about principals. Sustainability, accountability, and stewardship are all principals that we have mentioned before. Partnership, civil engagement, these are all principals that may be the basis of our vision. Then we can go more toward our strategies. And then I think we get to the tasking.

Ralston: We are getting ready to embark on a strategic plan but we haven’t really seen any guidance. But there are a lot of possibilities out there. One of the things that I have thought about is the potential return on investments. In Indiana, we have made a threat matrix. It takes into account railroads, agriculture etc… This plan is really going to be an important document in Indiana for the future of our state.

Wermuth: This panel has been successful in the context of its previous reports, where it makes a proposal and then sets forth other proposals. This methodology that Roger gave us gives us this opportunity again.

Gilmore: Lets assume that we won’t have an enemy get in here with a nuclear weapon. Lets take the more realistic scenario. Even if its just suicide bombers, how do we solve that? Cameras everywhere? Checking all transactions? Checking all bank records? Focus on people of Middle Eastern descent? This is the other end of the spectrum and for some people in this country that is the mainstream thinking. And I think we need to address whether that is okay thinking or not.

Shine: Even my own brother, saw someone taking pictures of the Golden Gate Bridge who looked foreign and he reported him. That scares me and I don’t think what you are saying, Governor is far fetched. I am horrified of this. I think there has to be a way to define limits. Dallas made a couple of important points. Someone at Harvard has done a study after 9-11 asking why people didn’t fly because clearly it was more safe to fly places. The question is this notion of risk and that depends on what you think your own risk is. This is why not many people got the smallpox vaccination, they didn’t think that they were really at risk. Do you connect some of these ideas, like cameras to the most vulnerable areas like bridges, dams and nuclear facilities?

Jones: We continue to put guardsmen out instead of cameras even two years after an event. There has to be a better way to do something for the long-term.

Foresman: No one wants to be seen as not having done enough when the next attack comes. The second issue is the economic risk. What is the least amount of money we can spend and what is the risk we are willing to accept. Right now we have accepted acceptable risk as zero casualties, zero injuries, zero property loss, zero economic loss etc. No one can live in a risk-free society. How can we articulate acceptable risk that everyone can identify with? Just because we can, doesn’t mean we should.

Garrison: Corporate America has a different perspective. From a strategic standpoint we need to remind ourselves what the bad guys are trying to do. They are trying to instigate an economic disaster, because this is what America is all about. Large casualties are a means to do this. They know the best way to hit us is in the pocketbook. Their second goal is to affect our culture. And they can do this by us changing in all the ways you mentioned. And the third goal is to get us out of the Middle East. That is their strategic vision. I don’t know if those are beneficial or not.

Jenaway: I think the question was asked whether this is different than any criminal activity and the answer was no. Is there any way to get terror down to the level where we see it as the same as we see criminal activity? Looking at some things that have happened in the past, if we look at hazardous materials; we have limited fear through education. We have the ability to deal with it at a local and business level, we have hazmat and other authorities. If we could consider terrorism the same way we consider kidnapping or the release of hazardous material, maybe we could handle it the same way.

Freeman: If we want to return to normalcy, maybe we should go back to our point of equilibrium. How far do we take this preparedness? Lets look at countries that deal with terrorism on a daily basis. Somehow we should justify why this is important.

Foresman: Should we be justifying why we should be returning to normalcy? Shouldn’t the question be why shouldn’t we be returning to normalcy?

Freeman: As a commission, for whom are we speaking? Are we speaking for a cross-section of the American public? I think that maybe people have in their own mind a return to normalcy. I think where things are going with the federal government, to make a call for a return to normalcy, I think it would be rejected straight out. That is why we need to make some justification for why we think we should return to normalcy.

Garrison: The terrorists that are going after us are going after economic, military and diplomatic targets. They know they really can’t get to us militarily, so the economic target is the biggest one right now. But that doesn’t read very well at the local level.

Reno: As I listen to this discussion, if you accept what Bill Garrison has stated about the goals of the terrorist, which I do, you understand that their goals are inherently strategic, they are based on religion. Is it feasible to deal with the risk issue? No matter which party establishes a system, the opposite party will attack it because of pure political issues. Is it feasible to reach a political consensus for the solution as a unit?

Gilmore: You might want to write what you mean by this and it can be integrated in our thinking.

Foresman: A lot of time has been focused on the Patriot Act. I would ask maybe Bill Garrison to address this issue. Are the terrorists not going after our fundamental values as well?

Garrison: Yes, that is one thing I mentioned, they hate our culture and they hate our values.

Foresman: In some sense they have won the battle, after September 11 we changed some of our values, we have changed how we treat people.

Maniscalco: I am not sure I agree with that. I think we always knew there were risks. I would say that they forced our hands. We achieved a sense of political brinkmanship again with this, as far as how the money is allocated and such. This gets back to the governor’s original question of what is readiness? What is preparedness?

Shine: I don’t think we should overlook the all hazards aspect of what we are trying to do. Public health is a good example of how a sector has been saved. The fire departments, police were dealing with under-funding. I would argue that normalcy is having a resilient robust system to deal with all incidents. And if the terrorists have done anything, they have helped to improve the all hazard activities of all sectors of responders.

Gilmore: I don’t think that anyone wants a return to normalcy to go back to being reckless again.

Quinlisk: If we hadn’t had September 11, we couldn’t possibly have dealt with what we have dealt with over the last year; SARS, West Nile, Smallpox and now Monkeypox. I think in the strategic plan we need some education section so that everyone knows what risk means. When the anthrax terror took place, I got plenty of letters from terrified people who honestly, didn’t have much risk of ever being infected.

Greenleaf: We have seen billions of dollars being spent on systems and structures that are purely cosmetic. And we need to decide is if this is worth it? How can we best spend all of this money that is going out? People are buying masks and they don’t need them. Equipment is being given out that isn’t really needed. It’s a real issue. We are throwing money at a problem right now.

Vickery: We have a unique opportunity to put together a strategic dynamic. Al Qaeda is today, who knows what is next week. What we put together today has the potential to solve all the future problems. We are capable of doing this. The strategic vision needs to be dynamic enough to deal with any type of incident.

O’Brien: Maybe something that should be in our strategic vision is a challenge to the political leaders to get over the political bickering. If we don’t say it, who is going to? I think the message needs to be out there.

Jones: I think this really gets down to what we see the end state being. We are building a cycle. We learned from Y2K that we needed to tell the public that we didn’t know what was going to happen. And we haven’t done that now. We have to start telling people what could happen and what the risks are and how we are trying to prevent it.

Maniscalco: We are focusing our energy on off shore organizations and we are not paying attention to domestic chatter. We need to get back to some of the earlier discussions, back to the basics. What is proper emergency preparedness and response? Then we can get back to the strategic vision.

Gilmore: Maybe tomorrow morning we can return to this topic. And we can ask the commissioners if we are on track for the fifth report. There is no reason why we can’t focus on additional topics if we need to. You all think about that tonight and we can talk about it this morning. I really think that we had a very profound conversation at the conference call.

Brower: Under Tab 4, there is a redrafted outline of the Fifth report, so when you are thinking about this, take a look at that.

Gilmore: Keep in mind that we still, as a country, don’t have a strategic plan.

O’Brien: In slide four of your presentation, Roger. I am having a hard time defining the word ‘harden’ and I was wondering what you meant by this.

Molander: The first area, ‘reduce the terrorist threat’ is sort of caricatured by the drain the swamp scenario. Reduce vulnerability is sort of the fortress America idea. Harden is taking into consideration the risk to your area. And at some point you decide not to harden. This was meant to stimulate discussion, which way you go with emphasis. That was the reason for that kind of organization.

O’Brien: One thing I would like us to think about is if those are the components we should focus on or whether we should focus more on what Bill Garrison was saying, the goals of the terrorists. I think these, Roger, bring us to the tactical area immediately.

Molander: We should have done what Bill Garrison did and put on the slideshow what the goals of the terrorists are and integrate that into the presentation. I think very quickly one has to move on to the specifics but at the same time you want to get to the things that Ken Shine talked about. Very few people think long term that are in any position to do anything about it. And I think that is one of the advantages of this panel. If you don’t know where you are going, all roads lead there.

Shine: One of the issues in regard to our vision would be the economy. Is the economy growing? Do we know how much money we are spending domestically related to this problem? If it turns out that we are spending a large quantity of our GDP but our economy is growing, is that okay? Will terrorists succeed in bottlenecking our economy? Can we add something on this point of view.

Foresman: We are very much on autopilot. We are trying to get the money out to the communities and states for the sake of getting it out instead of in order to improve any system. The biggest issue we saw after 9-11 was the economic repercussions. We are focused on the politically popular, newsworthy issues and not the humdrum issues.

Shine: But how do we focus on that? Would it be to include economic vulnerabilities in our analysis?

Gilmore: The loss of productivity because of this problem has got to be a tremendous burden on the country.

Freeman: Arizona is going to ignore the hazards next time it goes to Orange. My vision is that no, we are not normal.

Brower: I am going to pass out a revised copy of the survey, if you could just glance at it for a minute tonight.

Adjournment

June 17, 2003 Meeting Minutes