Fiscal Year 2004 Research Agenda

Operational Concepts for Detecting, Identifying, and Locating Nuclear Weapons

The Secretary of Defense has an established goal to “protect critical bases of operations (most importantly the U.S. homeland) and defeat weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.” FY03 work assessed potential signatures associated with stealing, buying, building, or holding a nuclear weapon. This study will:

• Evaluate the ability of alternative sensors to detect the signatures of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and related activities, and to identify, locate, and track warheads and associated weapon systems.

• Develop alternative Concepts of Operations (CONOPs) to deploy (and employ) the appropriate sensors to obtain target-quality intelligence that can be used to capture or destroy these weapons.

• Determine which combinations of sensors and platforms are most effective and assess the ability of the appropriate CONOPs to detect, identify, monitor, and track weapons and production facilities.

Sponsors: AF/XOR, AF/XPX, AF/XOH, AF/XOS
Project Leaders: Michael Hynes, Jed Peters

 

Employing Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Assets to Engage Critical Mobile Targets

This study will assess current Air Force capabilities and future requirements to provide persistent surveillance, tracking, and identification of vital enemy warfighting capabilities in both permissive and nonpermissive environments. The goal is to help the Air Force plan the most effective and affordable mix of concepts, forces, and systems: a roadmap. This integrating study will draw from past PAF research on this topic as well as research by other Air Force organizations, agencies, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and contractors to provide an overarching independent, objective assessment of where the Air Force should invest.

Sponsors: AF/XI, AF/XOR, SAF/AQ
Project Leader: Carl Rhodes

 

Future Special Operations Multimission Aircraft and Alternative USAF Force Structures

This project will examine the potential of two possible future multimission aircraft families for enhancing Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) and overall Air Force combat capability within currently planned USAF budget profiles. The two multimission aircraft families are based on the most promising classes of alternatives to emerge from the Next-Generation Gunship (NGG) Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). Either family of aircraft could have members optimized for a variety of missions. For the manned aircraft, possible additional missions include Special Operations Forces (SOF) insertion and survivable tactical transport to enable future ground forces to maneuver by air. Either family might include a long-range strike/interdiction aircraft (a medium bomber) and a persistent Close Air Support (CAS) and interdiction capability. Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) might also perform Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD)/Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses (DEAD) missions and serve as long endurance Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms.

Sponsors: AFSOC/CC, SAF/AQ, ACC/CC, AF/XOR
Project Leader: James Chow

 

Balancing Collateral Damage Considerations and Mission Accomplishment to Achieve Desired Effects in Air Operations

Avoiding collateral damage has been a key consideration in U.S. warplans for decades. However, the need to limit collateral damage has become an increasingly difficult constraint in recent conflicts as our adversaries seek to exploit humanitarian concerns to protect themselves and their militaries. This study will examine several aspects of our recent efforts to limit collateral damage, and will develop some new concepts to increase the effectiveness of our air operations while limiting unintended consequences. Operation Iraqi Freedom will serve as an important case study. Specific issues include:

• In Operation Iraqi Freedom, what was the impact of restricting regime and leadership targets in order to limit collateral damage?

• What is the appropriate balance between the risk of collateral damage and mission accomplishment?

• To what extent do air operations pose a greater or lesser risk than other types of operations?

• What new concepts can be developed to improve the precision and effectiveness of air operations?

Sponsors: ACC/CC, ACC/XP
Project Leader: William Stanley

 

Enhancing Special Operations Forces Employment of Air Power:
Focus on the Air-Surface Interface

This project will assess the application of airpower to the “close battle” involving special operations forces and other nonconventional ground forces. In particular, this project will help the Air Force to develop equipment, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to posture its force for future growth of integrated and joint close air support, air interdiction, and other emerging counterland operations. Tasks include:

• Review current and evolving joint and service-specific doctrine, TTPs, and training requirements for performing Close Air Support (CAS) and related missions, especially issues relating to the tactical control of air by special operations forces, other government agencies (OGA), and/or small conventional units forward.

• Assess plausible operating environments in which USAF forces could be called upon to provide responsive fire support to friendly ground operations involving special operations forces, OGA, and/or other small conventional units forward.

• Examine new concepts that offer the potential for enhancing the safety, timeliness, flexibility, effectiveness, and efficiency of close support provided by USAF assets.

Sponsors: AFSOC/CC, AF/XOR
Project Leaders: Jody Jacobs, Gary McLeod

 

Operational Concept(s) Employing Space Forces in Conflicts

Space systems and forces have been employed in every conflict of the last two (and perhaps the last four) decades. Unfortunately, space forces are frequently employed in a highly fractionated fashion, without the operators having the same information and capabilities at their disposal that other operators have. For example, theater communications operators do not usually take part in making long-range plans for the acquisition of commercial transponders covering their theater. Nor do they have access to the information necessary to determine when the military or commercial transponders supporting them are under electronic attack, and the identification and location of the jamming source. Finally, theater communicators do not have the capability to dynamically adapt their communications usage to rapidly work around the disruptions caused by jamming. An Area Air Defense Coordinator, for example, would have the analogous capabilities—the ability to plan for the types and amounts of capabilities needed to control his airspace, the sensors needed (e.g., Airborne Warning and Control System [AWACS]) to provide situational awareness, and the command staff and authority to adapt air defense operations to changing conditions. By end-to-end operational concepts, we mean the personnel, systems, and items of information necessary to employ space forces to provide a stated capability within a dynamic environment against an aggressive and hostile enemy. (The term “concept of execution or CONEX” was given this meaning in the past.) This study will develop end-to-end operational concepts to provide the following capabilities: space control, information services for expeditionary forces, global surveillance, tracking, and command and control of space forces.

Sponsors: AFSPC/CC, AF/XI, AF/XOS, SAF/USI
Project Leader: Myron Hura

 

Assessing Air Force Divestiture Options

The Air Force may need to divest itself of some existing force structure and capabilities in order to afford new CONOPS, forces, and systems. Issues to be examined include:

• What is the history of divesting forces?

• When has this been done with foresight rather than as a reaction to adverse results in combat or other contingencies?

• What have the results been?

• What clues might we gather from past and current issues in order to gain insights into the divestiture candidates today?

• How low can the Air Force structure go before irreparable harm is caused to key warfighting capabilities?

Sponsor: AF/XPX
Project Leader: Kevin Lewis

 

Bio-Defense Concepts of Operations for the Air Force to Administer Prophylaxes and Medical Treatments

The Air Force has been implementing a new counter-chemical weapon Concept of Operations (CONOP) since FY02, and has a new counter-biological weapon CONOP under analysis to be implemented in FY04. Air Force personnel will continue to face chemical and biological (CB) threats from the remnants of hostile forces in Iraq, terrorists, and potential adversaries such as North Korea. It is therefore important to assess how well these CONOPs might have served if Iraq had employed those agents it is believed to have possessed. This project will review and recommend improvement to CONOPs and guidelines, including unambiguous decision rules for when and which CB measure an airbase commander should employ in the specific areas. Air Force offices have requested examination of the following areas:

• Determine the optimal mix of wide-area and ground-point CB surveillance.

• Determine the degree that CB defense should rely on the intercept and defeat of CB agents prior to encountering friendly forces.

• Examine the tradeoffs between safety margin and heat stress/performance degradation risk associated with Individual Protective Equipment (IPE) including masks.

• Determine CONOPs and decision rules for donning various pieces of IPE under various situations.

• Delineate disease pathways and processes of biological agents of concern and, for each bio-agent, establish a timeline for taking various effective medical treatments.

• Examine the tradeoffs between mandatory and voluntary quarantine CONOPs in the event that an air base is attacked by contagious bio-agents.

• Develop CONOPs for mass CB casualty transport, treatment, and management from fixed and expeditionary facilities.

• Develop procedures for handling unexposed, anxious patients.

Sponsors: AF/XON, AF/SGX
Project Leader: Brian Chow