Figure 5.1--MRC Capabilities as a Function of Circumstances
In what is becoming a quadrennial activity, the United States is conducting an overall review of its defense strategy and program.[1] Accordingly, the question of how to determine the size of U.S. forces has once again come to the forefront. As in 1993 when the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) was conducted (Aspin, 1993), the question is being asked: Does the United States need to be able to fight two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRCs) and, assuming it does, is the current BUR posture needed, or will something smaller suffice?
These questions, for all their importance, seem stale. They do not raise the fresh, more basic issues that also should be addressed--issues that include planning explicitly for demanding real-world peacetime operations and beginning a reengineering and recapitalization of forces for the 21st century. In this chapter, we agree that the force-sizing issue should be debated, and we offer a tentative assessment. But we do so using the new strategic framework described in Chapter Four.
We also go to some pains to separate the issue of force capability from the issue of manpower end strength. In most of this chapter, we reluctantly discuss force sizing in terms of traditional "tokens"--divisions, wings, carrier battle groups (CVBGs), and Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs)--even though these tokens sometimes have little to do with operations and may be becoming archaic. In the latter part of the chapter, we emphasize that force composition and doctrine will be changing: Reengineering is needed to prepare the United States for the next era of warfare, to facilitate peacetime operations with less stress on personnel, and to reduce long-term costs. In the future, it should be possible to field units with capabilities comparable to or greater than current types of units for most situations, but with significantly fewer people. Although this chapter ends up supporting a "large" force structure, comparable to today's, this by no means implies that end strength should be held constant or that the familiar tokens are appropriate for the long haul. Indeed, our view is that end strength will have to be cut to generate funds for modernization. The savings postulated from changes in defense infrastructure will not likely be sufficient. So, also, the familiar tokens will need to change as modernization and rationalization of operations take place.
With this as background, our approach is as follows: First, we take up the two-MRC issue on its own terms and discuss its rationale in some detail. We do this because Department of Defense (DoD) documents and most of the current debate focus on this standard.[2] We conclude that the standard is sensible; it is not, however, the only sensible standard that could be used. Indeed, it may not even be the most germane to the current world, in which U.S. forces are severely stretched as they conduct an endless stream of operations other than war (OOTW). Thus, we broaden the perspective and propose a new standard consisting of a set of three sizing criteria that should be satisfied simultaneously. The two new criteria both deal with the important issue of environment shaping. One also addresses the problem of ongoing lesser regional conflicts (LRCs) or military operations other than war (MOOTW).
Having defined new criteria, we develop a range of estimates for the force levels that they would "require." Any such estimates are necessarily heuristic, but the results are interesting. With these results in mind, we then discuss why having a set of three sizing criteria for defense planning would be a substantial improvement over the two-MRC standard by itself. The principal reason is that the three-criterion approach would convey a better sense of overall defense strategy, which should not and has not in practice been focused solely on near- and middle-term warfighting. It would also bring out the fact that environment shaping, including activities in support of "general deterrence," is now as demanding for force sizing as preparing for contingencies.
Finally, we turn to longer-term issues, noting the many uncertainties that preclude confidence about the force levels that will be needed a decade or two from now. We argue that the desire for strategic adaptiveness should encourage reengineering the forces. This will substitute capital for labor and, if things go well, increase rather than decrease functional capabilities for most missions. However, there are uncertainties about which missions will arise and at what level, and whether high-tech forces reliant upon precision strike and information dominance will prove as capable (or even half as capable) as now estimated. Thus, the United States should expect to revisit the sizing issue from time to time as the strategic landscape becomes more or less threatening, as potential adversaries do or do not field capabilities and doctrines undercutting our forces, and as we gain experience with information-era operations.
THE TWO-MRC ISSUE ON ITS OWN TERMS
Why Two MRCs?
The basic argument for two-MRC capability is simple: The United States should obviously be prepared to fight and win one war quickly and decisively. However, if the United States had only that level of capability, its freedom in crisis might be constrained because of "self deterrence." That is, because of a lack of reserves, the government might be dangerously overcautious about reacting to aggression. Further, if it did react to aggression at the MRC level, it would be virtually inviting aggression elsewhere. In a world with a variety of potential aggressors, that is not a minor issue.
Some have argued that, in the event of a second conflict, the United States could adopt one or another version of a "win-hold-win strategy"--by attempting to halt an invasion but delaying any attempt to recover territory or defeat the enemy's forces until the first contingency is completed (see Aspin, 1993; O'Hanlon, 1995). There is some logic in this view. If a two-MRC situation actually arises, such a sequential strategy might be appropriate militarily. After all, concentration of force is one principle of war, and orchestrating simultaneous wars is a difficult undertaking.
Those who would bank on this approach, however, gloss over the dangerous implications, which include giving the second aggressor time to prepare for a U.S. effort to dislodge him. The eventual counteroffensive might involve extended operations in difficult terrain with defense in depth and the prospect of a long "dirty" war with high casualties. Further, there might no longer be a core of defended-country forces to work with U.S. forces: They might have been largely defeated or worn out in the first phase. The counter-offensive burden would then be mostly on the United States. Knowing all this, a potential second-theater aggressor might be substantially less deterred by a win-hold-win force than if the United States were able to fight effectively on two fronts simultaneously. Would not such an aggressor have good reason to doubt that the United States would ever get around to defeating and dislodging him, thereby running the risk of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) long after the initial crisis "requiring" such a decisive war-winning response had wound down?[3] In answering this question, we should remember how often historical aggressors have managed to convince themselves, wrongly, that risks were tolerable because potential adversaries, such as the United States or Great Britain, would "probably" not enter the war to help the target of aggression.[4]
Finally, having two simultaneous crises or the threat of them is plausible. Does anyone doubt that if a Korean war broke out, Saddam Hussein would consider new adventures? We should also recall that when U.S. forces deployed to the Persian Gulf in 1994, tensions were high in Korea (Perry, 1995). Qualitatively, the argument for a two-MRC capability is strong. Even if the name of the game is deterrence, two--not one--is the right number.
What is meant by having such capability is another matter: There can be no blank check here, and room for compromise exists. Understanding this situation in more detail will provide the needed link between many of those on opposite sides of the two-MRC debate.
What Does Two-MRC Capability Really Mean?
If we go beyond a purely qualitative discussion of strategy options, there is no consensus on what a two-MRC capability really means. The ambiguity reflects the fact that the forces needed to fight one or two MRCs would depend on contextual details. Figure 5.1 suggests that, with current forces, the United States would be able to fight more than two or more MRCs in "easy or moderate cases" (even with a sizable threat, such as a plausible Iraqi force), but in other cases it might find coping with even one MRC very difficult. Circumstances worsen for rough terrain (including urban sprawl), weak allies, late U.S. deployments, problems with base access, an enemy using dismounted-infantry tactics, or a situation in which the United States is already engaged in an LRC or stressful OOTW. They also depend on the size and sophistication of the adversary, but we do not consider that here. Although approximate, this figure draws upon exploratory analysis described elsewhere (see Chapter Six).
Figure 5.1--MRC Capabilities as a Function of Circumstances
What Does Two-MRC Capability Really Mean?
If we go beyond a purely qualitative discussion of strategy options, there is no consensus on what a two-MRC capability really means. The ambiguity reflects the fact that the forces needed to fight one or two MRCs would depend on contextual details. Figure 5.1 suggests that, with current forces, the United States would be able to fight more than two or more MRCs in "easy or moderate cases" (even with a sizable threat, such as a plausible Iraqi force), but in other cases it might find coping with even one MRC very difficult. Circumstances worsen for rough terrain (including urban sprawl), weak allies, late U.S. deployments, problems with base access, an enemy using dismounted-infantry tactics, or a situation in which the United States is already engaged in an LRC or stressful OOTW. They also depend on the size and sophistication of the adversary, but we do not consider that here. Although approximate, this figure draws upon exploratory analysis described elsewhere (see Chapter Six).
In summary, the answer to the question "How many MRCs can the United States fight today?" is and should be a firm "It depends."
Virtual Wars, Deterrence, and the Two-MRC Standard
One of the most troublesome aspects of the two-MRC standard is that it seems so unworldly. Although the threat of war continues to exist in Korea and the Persian Gulf, aggressors would be foolish to challenge the United States on the terms assumed in the definition of "canonical" MRCs, as described in the Defense Planning Guidance. Often this is interpreted to mean that having the capability for these MRCs is unimportant. This is the likelihood fallacy.
A better way to view the situation is that current U.S. capabilities are probably sufficient--given sufficient warning--to deter what has been for decades the primary means of large-scale aggression: an attack with concentrated armored forces. While the United States must focus increasingly on more-stressful cases (e.g., short-warning cases), the aggressor contemplating the fast, daring, highly competent invasion and fait accompli beloved by analysts would likely find that such operations carry severe risks of their own--risks such as overextended logistics that could leave forces isolated and vulnerable at long distances from their support base. Similarly, a "dash" by highly dispersed armored forces would be more plausible for top-quality U.S. forces than for ill-motivated regional forces, such as Iraq's, and might well bog down if dispersal meant attempting logistical movements off-road in the desert. And an aggressor contemplating a dismounted-infantry invasion might conclude that the defending force would be much more capable of dealing with that kind of invasion than the classic armored thrust. The WMD option might bring a massive response against economic infrastructure. Yet another point here is that most of the potential adversaries worldwide have armored forces and Soviet-style armored doctrine. Thus, if the United States can deter the preferred form of invasion, this alone would be a significant accomplishment--"a good day's work."[5] It follows that the continued ability to win decisively the "virtual wars," which will not happen because the potential aggressor knows he would fail, should be a prominent and permanent U.S. objective.
To reiterate, the United States has a strategically meaningful two-MRC capability today and should strive to retain it indefinitely. However, this judgment does not mean that the United States could fight and win two decisive MRC campaigns simultaneously in all circumstances. Neither, we judge, should there be enthusiasm for increasing military capabilities to make doing so feasible. If worst cases come to pass, the United States can deal with them at the time-mobilizing additional forces and taking as much time as necessary. Buying insurance for such worst cases (e.g., by maintaining a substantially larger active military) would be wasteful in the absence of more credible and capable threats than those existing today. Thus, our judgment is that the curve of diminishing returns is something like that displayed in Figure 5.2.[6] Our reasoning is based on the observation that, while current capabilities seem substantial relative to threat, the Service budgets appear by many measures (notably in the unreasonably small procurement budgets) to be severely stressed, and the forces are operating at punishing operational tempos. Combat capabilities, moreover, would likely drop much faster than budget levels because of the difficulties of cutting infrastructure and "overhead" within major units. Historical data suggest that--in the absence of reengineering as discussed later in the chapter--combat capabilities drop roughly twice as fast as the budget. What is today a solid two-MRC capability could quickly become something appreciably less.
Figure 5.2--Notional Plot of Diminishing Returns
GOING BEYOND THE TWO-MRC CRITERION
A New Framework for Defense Planning
As described in Chapter Four, we recommend that the defense program be constructed using a portfolio management framework that emphasizes investments in (1) capabilities for diverse contingencies, (2) environment shaping in the three principal challenge regions (Europe, the Greater Middle East, and Asia); and (3) strategic adaptiveness. This new framework stresses planning for adaptiveness: both operational adaptiveness at any given time and strategic adaptiveness in response to potential changes in the world environment.
Dealing with the Near, Middle, and Long Terms
How can the framework be applied? The United States can begin by recognizing that it faces two separate but related challenges. The first is a near-term matter that requires resolution in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review. It is deciding how to use current U.S. forces to handle the existing geostrategic situation. This is the focus of the debate over whether the two-MRC construct should be modified. By contrast, the second challenge is mostly a middle- and long-term matter, and it is more fundamental. The second challenge is deciding how to deal with coming changes in both global politics and U.S. forces. It involves investing toward the future, perhaps with reengineering of the entire force structure and doctrine--something that no longer sounds radical when one considers the official image the Joint Chiefs of Staff now projects (Shalikashvili, 1996).
The middle- and long-term challenges do not have to be mastered immediately, but the sooner significant progress is made, the better: Major changes will take a generation to accomplish once they are begun in earnest. The accelerating pace of change in today's world is rapidly blurring the distinction between the near term and the longer term. As a result, U.S. policies toward the one will strongly affect the other. In any case, the QDR can make an important start on the broader issues--not by scaling back the two-MRC construct, as some are proposing and as many in the world would see as signs of disengagement or weakness--but by broadening the force-sizing construct, consistent with the broader framework, to guide and speed the transition toward what is needed in the longer run.
A New Construct with Three Force-Sizing Criteria
We propose a new construct for force sizing that recognizes different aspects of the broader strategic context. It is composed of three separate criteria (Figure 5.3) that can be used together to provide a more credible force-sizing formula. These criteria are:
Figure 5.3--Three Simultaneous Sizing Criteria
Objectives
Criterion 1 reflects the likelihood that U.S. forces will seldom be fighting major wars but will often be involved in environment-shaping activities. By this we mean activities contributing not only to peacekeeping, peacemaking, disaster relief, and minor crises, but also to the likelihood of avoiding major problems in the future. Thus, environment shaping is partly about the missions of peacetime presence and partly about long-term stability, which would be endangered if there were strategic vacuums encouraging counterproductive and potentially hostile force buildups and efforts to gain regional dominance. This aspect of environment shaping is often overlooked and requires substantial forces, although only some of them need be forward deployed, and not all of them need be active.
Focusing on the three challenge theaters, militarily significant U.S. forces (i.e., "capable contingency forces") will be continually deployed in these theaters, and many units in the continental United States (CONUS) will directly support them. Most of these environment-shaping activities presumably will continue in one form or another even if the Iraqi and North Korean threats fade. After all, U.S. forces remain in Europe today even though NATO has declared that it no longer faces any enemies. Why? Because the continued health and stability of Europe is a major U.S. interest: We do not want a repetition of history and the wars it entailed. Europeans also believe that a U.S. commitment and presence ensure stability.
Similarly, will U.S. forces leave Asia and the Persian Gulf if the current MRC threats in those regions disappear? Should the United States disarm its CONUS-based forces in some wholesale way? The answer to both questions is: Clearly not. If we did leave, other threats would emerge and might require very costly responses, even war. To put an earlier point differently, if international security theory tells us anything validated by history, it is that strategic vacuums are dangerous. The absence of security guarantees in the presence of power imbalances is a recipe for instability and war. We conclude that U.S. forces should continue to play major environment-shaping roles for the foreseeable future and that the force-sizing calculus should reflect these roles.[7]
Criterion 1 therefore poses an important question: How many U.S. forces are needed to carry out environment shaping under current conditions--a still-dangerous world, in which MRCs must be deterred but in which a host of other important military activities must also be carried out? This question can be answered only via careful judgment. When all the contributing factors are added up, however, they dispel the illusion that force needs for this criterion are somehow part of lesser-included considerations subordinate to a two-MRC capability.
Fairly large U.S. force commitments are needed simply to gain the necessary amount of political influence in each theater during peacetime--not only with potential adversaries but with allies as well.[8] In Europe, the commitment and stationing of sizable U.S. forces help ensure that U.S. diplomats and generals have influential positions within NATO and a powerful say over alliance policy and strategy. The same applies in Asia, where force commitments provide tangible evidence of the U.S. determination to defend its interests and those of its allies and, hence, are a source of U.S. influence over South Korean and Japanese defense policies. So also for the Persian Gulf, where the United States likely would have little influence if its forces were not committed to the region's security. How many forces are needed to reassure and influence allies, deter adversaries, and impress neutral countries? The answer is contentious, but U.S. military leaders assert--and allied countries agree--that the forces for each theater must have a capability for independent, sizable combat operations. Not all of these forces must be forward deployed, but the combination of overseas presence and rapidly deployable, CONUS-based forces committed to a region must add up to a major operational capability.
Part of the reason is that a smaller posture is often seen as merely symbolic.
It can come across--correctly--as an effort to create the impression of a
strategic commitment without the reality. More is involved than mere
expressions of national commitment. Theater commanders need adequate forces at
their disposal for a variety of practical purposes. One purpose is to conduct
frequently a full spectrum of daily training activities with allied forces.
This alone elevates requirements beyond what appears needed at first glance.
In addition, forces are needed to pursue outreach programs with new coalition
partners--the Partnership for Peace program in Europe being an example.
Likewise, theater commanders need forces for patrol activities in troubled
places, for responding to quick-breaking emergencies, and for carrying out
normal peacekeeping missions and crisis interventions (OOTW and LRCs). All of
these operations add up to a requirement for sizable forces and a high
operating tempo to boot. Indeed, operational tempos have increased markedly
for
the Services in recent years, creating great stress and making it
increasingly questionable whether the Services will be able to retain key
personnel.[9]
Regional Coalitions: A Key Element of Effective and Affordable Long-Term Environment Shaping
A key element of environment shaping is the development and nurturing of alliances or virtual coalitions in each of the principal challenge regions. Security in these regions will be enhanced, and stability encouraged, if all nations have confidence that the regional structure (whether or not formalized as in NATO) can and will effectively deal with aggression, even if that means large-scale military operations by a coalition. Over the middle and long terms, then, an important goal of U.S. foreign policy should be to ensure such regional frameworks. Consider, however, the consequences for force sizing: If a key to continuing stability is developing regional alliances and virtual coalitions with capable military forces, if the United States wants to ensure that regional states put up much of that capability and bear much of the costs, and if the United States wants simultaneously to maintain principal influence (to protect its interests and ensure military competence), it will itself have to commit significant forces to each key region--and affirm this commitment with visible operations and exercises, not merely on paper.
Estimating Force Needs
As indicated at the chapter's outset, our initial estimates of force needs will be based on current forces, current doctrine, standard "tokens," and more or less standard rules of thumb. This is not satisfactory for the middle or long terms, because the forces need to be reengineered as discussed later in the chapter, but we need a baseline.
Using Old-Fashioned Rules of Thumb. If we use current forces and doctrine, then for each region fairly standard rule-of-thumb reasoning suggests commitment of an Army corps of about three division equivalents; a U.S. Air Force posture of about four and one-half to six wing equivalents; one Navy on-station CVBG; and one MEF, with its division-sized ground force and its contingent of aircraft. Only some of these need be forward deployed. If this is the standard for a single region, the need for the three regions together--before allowing for a rotation base, as discussed below--amounts to perhaps nine Army divisions, 14 to 18 USAF fighter wings, three on-station Navy carriers, and three MEFs.[10] With such large forces, the United States could use some at any given time for other limited missions without seriously disrupting regional commitments--for example, to conduct crisis operations in the Caribbean or elsewhere. By contrast, if one were to rationalize smaller levels for the regional commitments, it would be necessary to allow explicitly for a reserve--especially since, in the real world, there appear to be "other" operations going on nearly all the time, whether involving military crises or OOTW.
Active Versus High-Readiness Reserves. Of these forces, how many need to be in active status? The answer depends on the nature of the reserve-component forces. Here, there are special issues for the Army. If the Army had high-readiness combat reserves that could be reliably used within days or weeks of call-up (in contrast to even the special 90-day readiness Army National Guard brigades postulated by the BUR), some of those high-readiness reserves could be used against the "requirement" for nine divisions. Other Services and other nations, notably Israel and Germany, depend heavily on high-readiness combat reserves. At the moment, however, the Army lacks such reserves. Until and unless they are created, the requirements for environment-shaping will need to be met largely by active forces.
If we carry along the option to have high-readiness Army reserves, force needs can be estimated as follows: Forces that are overseas deployed must be active; they must be supported by a rotation base of active forces. In addition, active forces are needed for routine crisis missions, whether of the OOTW or LRC variety. The remainder of the total required could be in high-readiness reserve.
The Army has two divisions (six to seven brigades) deployed in Europe and Asia. It sometimes has another brigade deployed in the Persian Gulf. The former are on permanent duty assignments (PCS), which can be sustained with approximately one division in CONUS per overseas-stationed division. The latter are on temporary duty assignment (TDY), which can be sustained with approximately two units in CONUS per overseas unit. Thus, about five army divisions are involved in overseas deployments and the rotation base, all of which should be active. The need for a cohesive crisis-response force, plus some slack for other peacetime operations, suggests at least another two or three active divisions (plus Marines). This leaves one or two of the nine that might in principle be high-readiness reserves. Rather than having high-readiness reserve divisions per se, a better approach would probably be to use company- or platoon-level reserve units to fill out active divisions when needed. National Guard units could be employed quickly at that level, whereas brigade- and division-level National Guard combat units would require extensive training (see Rostker, Don, and Watman, 1994; Lippiatt et al., 1996).
Roles and Missions. Some have long argued for treating Army and Marine divisions together when considering requirements and capabilities, but there are serious problems in doing so. In practice, the Marines--working with the Navy--have significantly different capabilities to offer.[11] They can be important elements of a "contingency capable" forward presence before air and ground forces would be welcome in a region. They have substantial early entry, combined-arms capabilities, and they are suitable for lesser contingencies and OOTW. At the same time, they lack the support structure necessary for sustained wide-area operations or for large operations inland. If the United States were zero-basing its entire armed forces and dispensing with individual Services, perhaps there could be some economies in the number of total ground forces. However, given the current baseline, we believe that a Marine force of three MEFs can be justified. We also see little basis for reducing the Marines' air component. The Marines have organized to depend heavily on tight coordination with their own air forces and have chosen to pay the price to do so (less artillery, no Multiple Launch Rocket System [MLRS] units). Although the Air Force might be asked to provide some of the support now provided by the Marines' own air forces,[12] there is no compelling reason to believe that would save a great deal of money without sacrificing functionality. Despite idealism on joint matters, there is reason to believe that performance would suffer for complex organizational reasons.
Permanent and Rotational Assignments for Overseas Presence. The Air Force has approximately five wings in Europe and Asia, on PCS status, and one in the Persian Gulf, on TDY status. Again using the rules of thumb of one wing in CONUS for each wing deployed on PCS status and two wings in CONUS for each wing deployed on TDY status, we estimate a need for 13 active wings of the 14 total. However, if these are supporting overseas deployments, we need additional air forces for crisis response. The current posture of 13 active and seven reserve wings then seems reasonable overall.
The Navy is the most complex Service with respect to rotation-base issues. Here it is customary to count in terms of CVBGs. Roughly speaking, about 3.5 CVBGs are needed in the inventory to provide one deployed CVBG, with that force being on station only perhaps 75 percent of the time. This large and expensive rotation ratio is due to transit time, routine maintenance, major maintenance, and overhaul. It is mitigated somewhat by one carrier being home based in Japan. In principle, there could be more extensive home porting, either in Asia or Europe. It might also be possible to use a given CVBG a larger fraction of the time by having two crews ("blue-gold crews") alternate in its operation (submarines operate in this way). These matters have been debated for many years, and some innovation is plausible. In the meantime, however, Figure 5.4 (adapted from Aspin, 1993) shows the price paid for overseas deployment. For something approaching continual presence, roughly 15 CVBGs are needed (the kink in the curve is due to differences among regions and the benefit of having one home-ported carrier). While we do not recommend the major expense of adding CVBGs, our point is that, from the perspective of Criterion 1, the United States is already cutting corners with naval presence (and, for that matter, with other forms of overseas presence). This causes considerable pressure on sailors and Marines, so much so that some senior officers have sug-gested cutting back on overseas presence (Sheehan, 1995), which might make sense economically and in terms of personnel tempo, but would seem inconsistent with environment shaping objectives--unless, importantly, other equally good or better forms of presence can be formulated.[13]
Figure 5.4--Consequences of Rotation Base for Total CVBG Requirements as a Function of Numbers Kept on Station
All of these estimates are inherently soft, so Table 5.1 summarizes results showing nominal estimates and a range of reasonable values for the total.[14] None of these include low-readiness reserves, including the enhanced-readiness Army National Guard units the BUR mandated. Arguably, environment shaping would be well served by having a substantial reserve that could be ready in a matter of months. However, another view is that it would be more effective to recruit and train new forces if the need to do so arose. This reflects the belief, based on historical experience, that low-readiness reserve units may not be suitable for combat even after significant training. It may or may not be valid in information-era warfare, in which technical sophistication and experience will be worth a high premium.
Estimated Force Needs Under Criterion 1
(constrained by
current doctrine)
| Army Divisionsa |
Air
Force Wings |
Navy
CVBGs |
MEFs | |
| Active
|
7
|
13
|
12b
|
3
|
| Reserve
|
2
|
7
|
1
|
--
|
| Total
|
9c
|
20
|
13
|
3
|
| Range
of Total
|
8-10
|
18-20
|
12-15c
|
3
|
These are all "modal estimates." Depending on judgments about how many trouble spots will exist in "normal" times (akin to Haiti and Somalia) and depending on how much force is considered to be a "substantial and credible" capability to deter would-be aggressors or competitors in the various regions, it is possible to come up with larger or smaller estimates. Another possibility for reducing "requirements" is to dual-task units. We prefer not to muddy the arithmetic by assuming dual-tasking. Instead, we assume separate nominal commitments and treat them as providing a kind of pad that can be used instead of providing explicitly for reserves for unanticipated crises.[15]aPlus three separate brigades or regiments (Perry, 1996b, p. 146).
bA better posture would probably involve a mix of CVBGs and other contingency-capable surface action groups, adding to a total of 15.
cPostulated high-readiness combat reserves available within days or weeks. Until and unless such units are created, these should be treated as additional active forces.
The bottom line is that overseas presence and rotational dynamics alone create a need for most of the current active-duty posture. The requirement for maintaining strategic influence reinforces this conclusion. To be sure, this calculus is open to interpretation at the margins. The key point, however, is that, given levels of current U.S. forces overseas, something close to the BUR posture--in terms of units, not necessarily end strength--is needed, even if no major regional wars are on the horizon.
This stems not from concerns about OOTW and LRCs, although those are factors, but from the need to commit significant forces to each region to maintain appropriate influence related to long-term security and stability. Token forces are not enough. Given the forces we suggest, OOTW and LRCs could be handled without a special set-aside for such purposes.
Other Implications of the Environment-Shaping Standard
Another implication of the environment-shaping criterion is that a somewhat different set of defense program priorities may be necessary to support Criterion 1. Under the two-MRC construct, the only programs that easily qualify for funding are those that help prepare for the standard MRCs in the Gulf and Korea. Other programs typically fall by the wayside because they are deemed marginal to DoD's most important goals. Yet many of these programs make great sense when environment shaping is taken into account. Examples include (also see Chapter Seven) programs for infrastructure, foreign military interactions, security assistance, and prepositioning--most of which are inexpensive yet--except for the Persian Gulf and Korea--chronically underfunded because they lack important status in U.S. defense strategy. Criterion 1 helps call attention to them without "cooking the books" against MRC programs that also make sense.
To cite another important example, the two-MRC standard has contributed to the personnel-tempo problem by putting higher priority on active combat forces than on active support forces. However, the reality of current operations suggests that certain support units that are routinely essential for OOTW and LRCs should be in the active force, even if that means reduced readiness, on the margin, for combat. Finally, elevating the importance of continual OOTW and LRC operations strongly supports an approach to personnel management more like that of the Navy and Marines than that of the Army and Air Force. Roughly speaking, Navy and Marine personnel have relatively clear schedules for being deployed overseas. When they are so deployed, they can use the time for normal peacetime presence, training, experimentation, or--if the occasion arises--contingency operations and OOTW. When not deployed, units need not be at a high level of readiness.[16] Some Air Force and Army units in the United States could have identified periods of high readiness for deployment if needed. This might not be appropriate for other units, all of which need to be in constant readiness (e.g., airlift and long-range bombers).
FORCE NEEDS UNDER A ONE-MRC STANDARD
Objectives
Criterion 2 calls for forces adequate to fight a single MRC while maintaining a stabilizing presence elsewhere. Many observers immediately assume such a criterion would permit a sizable cut in forces--if not by half, then nearly so. However, if the United States adopted a one-MRC standard, it would surely want to define the one MRC to be stressful. Otherwise, there would be no slack to deal either with the bad cases we have noted or with OOTW and LRCs that might be going on when the MRC began. In addition, even if the war were of only moderate difficulty (adequate warning, capable allies, and so on), complications would arise because U.S. forces would need to keep other theaters stable while this MRC campaign was in progress. Commitments in other regions might be shirked to some extent, but not fully, and crises might arise. For example, a new Persian Gulf war might erupt, and large U.S. forces would be required to converge on the scene. Concurrently, other U.S. forces would have to carry out normal peacetime operations in Europe, while maintaining a deterrence watch in Korea and performing other missions in Asia. It would not be at all surprising to see tensions rise in one of the other regions, in part because adversaries would be observing U.S. difficulties elsewhere. How many forces are needed, then, for this standard?
Estimating Force Needs for Criterion 2
One way to estimate force needs is to begin with the BUR building block as the force needed for a single MRC: about six active Army and Marine divisions, ten Air Force wings, five CVBGs, and other forces. However, logic suggests that the United States would want to have forces adequate to retaining strategic influence and performing a cut-back version of regular missions, including stability missions, elsewhere. This would suggest an additional two to four Army and Marine divisions, three to ten wings (the larger number corresponding to a win-hold-win version of a "one MRC strategy"), and five to six CVBGs (allowing for rotation base, maintenance, and overhaul).[17] If this number seems excessive, consider once again the constant stream of "normal" operations that U.S. military forces are called upon to conduct, e.g., crises in the Caribbean or disaster evacuations in the Pacific. Naval forces (both Navy and Marines) in particular would be needed. Another point is that the MRC might arise when some forces are tied down in an LRC or in OOTW of sufficient importance that the United States could not simply "back out."
This calculation assumes the appropriateness of the BUR building block. If the contingency were more stressful (Figure 5.1), ground-force requirements could go up dramatically. It should be remembered that the United States sent ten divisions to each of the last three regional wars. Further, the United States' preferred high-tech approach to war will not work well in infantry-intensive situations, such as urban sprawl or jungles. Thus, a better estimate for Criterion 2 would be something like 12 to 14 Army and Marine divisions, 18 to 21 Air Force wings, and 9 to 12 CVBGs. Perhaps about one-third of the division and wing equivalents could be in high-readiness reserves, probably assimilating into active units at a low level of organization (Rostker, Don, and Watman, 1994). We do not find it persuasive that counteroffensives have to be accomplished on any particular time scale.[18] Table 5.2 summarizes the resulting estimate. Its similarity to the BUR force was not intended but is not accidental: Many reasoning streams made the BUR force (or even the Base Force before it) appear reasonable to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff.
Estimated Force Needs Under Criterion 2
(constrained by
current doctrine)
Army
Divisionsa
Air
Force
Wings
Navy
CVBGs
MEFs
Active
8
12
10
3
Reserve
2
8
1
--
Total
10
20
11
3
Range
of Total
8-12c
18-21
11-13b
2-3
Thus, with current forces and doctrine, Criterion 2--fighting only one regional war while keeping the other two theaters stable--yields a strategic requirement only somewhat smaller than the BUR posture assuming an "easy" MRC, and a more prudent approach reconfirms or exceeds the BUR posture except for issues of the active-reserve mix.aThis does not count two separate brigades.
bA better posture would probably involve a mix of CVBGs and other contingency-capable surface-action groups, adding to a total of 15.
cPostulated high-readiness combat reserves available within days or weeks. Until and unless such units are created, these should be treated as additional active forces.
FORCE NEEDS UNDER A TWO-MRC STANDARD
Objectives
We will not go through the detailed arguments for Criterion 3, because the two-MRC standard is the baseline, and it seems to be generally accepted that the BUR force posture is at best adequate to deal with it. It is worth noting the following, however: If the two MRCs are of the "easy" variety, the United States could get by with smaller ground forces. Allied ground forces, with some contributions from the United States, plus heavy use of Air Force and Naval air power, would suffice. It is also not evident that ten CVBGs are needed for power projection in these scenarios, because land-based air forces in at least one theater would probably have adequate access to bases. Thus, one can generate cases in which the current force structure is not even needed for the two-MRC standard. Indeed, while many war games of such contingencies "involve" the full BUR force structure, inspection reveals that not all of the ground forces or naval forces were needed.[19]
What matters, however, is that contingency planning that addresses only easy cases would be irresponsible. If even one of the two MRCs is difficult (e.g., late warning, forced entry, unreliable allies, fait accompli), the current force posture might prove marginal at best.
Estimating Force Needs for the Two-MRC Standard
Authors of the two-MRC standard had in mind that forces might be rationalized for fighting two wars but would in fact be used for all sorts of lesser-included purposes. Thus, they did not want to allow for any strategic reserves or to add forces for overseas presence, specialized missions, or small contingencies. Those missions were to be performed with the forces justified by the two-MRC standard.
It seems that some of the requirement for the second MRC could be accomplished by using the postulated high-readiness Army forces available in days or weeks. Aside from that, however, we have no reason to modify the estimates found in the BUR. The results are shown in Table 5.3.
Estimated Force Needs Under Criterion 3
(constrained by
current doctrine)
Army
Divisionsa
Air
Force
Wings
Navy
CVBGs
MEFs
Active
8
12
11
3
Reserve
2
8
1
--
Total
10
20
12
3
Range
of Total
10-12c
18-22
11-14b
3
SUMMARY ESTIMATES OF FORCE NEEDSaThis does not count two separate brigades.
bA better posture would probably involve a mix of CVBGs and other contingency-capable surface-action groups, adding to a total of 15.
cPostulated high-readiness combat reserves available within days or weeks. Until and unless such units are created, these should be treated as additional active forces.
In summary, Table 5.4 provides some estimates of force requirements as a function of criterion and what might be called "conservatism." It is by no means rigorous, but we believe it provides a fair range. Roughly speaking, the "medium" cases correspond to the discussion above, but we have made some adjustments that fine-tune assumptions about reserve-component forces. A key point here is that only Army active combat forces should be considered "real" under current operational and organizational practices.[20] By contrast, Navy, Air Force, and Marine reserve-component combat forces are more reliably counted upon in planning.
One Set of Estimated Force Needs As Function of Criterion
and Conservatism, Assuming Current Types of Major Formations
(Army Divisions/AF
Wings/CVBGs/MEFs)
|
|
Standard
1a
|
Standard
2b
|
Standard
3c
|
|||||||||
| Force
Needs as a Function of Conservatism |
Div |
TFW |
CVBG |
MEF |
Div |
TFW |
CVBG |
MEF |
Div |
TFW |
CVBG |
MEF |
| Low
|
||||||||||||
| Active
|
6
|
12
|
11
|
2
|
6
|
12
|
10
|
2
|
8
|
12
|
9
|
2
|
| High-Readiness
Reserved
|
3 |
6 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
1 |
1 |
| Medium
|
||||||||||||
| Active
|
7
|
13
|
12
|
3
|
8
|
13
|
10
|
3
|
8
|
12
|
11
|
3
|
| High-Readiness
Reserved
|
2 |
7 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
1 |
0 |
| High
|
||||||||||||
| Active
|
10
|
15
|
14
|
3
|
8
|
14
|
12
|
3
|
10
|
14
|
12
|
3
|
| High-Readiness
Reserved
|
0 |
7 |
1 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
1 |
0 |
aStandard 1: Environment Shaping (Including "General" Deterrence).
bStandard 2: One MRC (plus other operations).
cStandard 3: Two MRCs (plus minimal other operations).
dReserve-component forces that can be employed effectively within days or weeks. The Air Force, Navy, and Marines have such reserve-component forces. The Army does not, and the Army National Guard combat units, even those mandated by the BUR to be employable within 90 days, are not currently suitable. Until and unless suitable units are created, Army active needs should be increased accordingly.
The principal conclusions from Table 5.4 are as follows:
Figure 5.5--Environment Shaping Becomes a Relatively Stressful Criterion
Figure 5.6--Comparison of Force Levels
CAN ALLIES CONTRIBUTE?
An obvious omission in the preceding material is discussion of allies and the extent to which their contributions could alleviate U.S. force requirements. The BUR has been appropriately criticized for having discussed allies almost not at all (subsequent defense reports at least mention them). We have the following suggestions.
Correcting the Baseline Description
Whereas the BUR suggested to most readers that the United States did not need allies for the basic two contingencies, the reality is arguably different. It should be recognized that the missions of rear-area security, post-victory disarming of the enemy, and occupation and stabilization create huge demands for ground forces--demands that cannot readily be met by substituting high-tech C4/ISR, aircraft, and missiles. There are three sources of forces for these missions: the regional allies being defended (e.g., South Korea and the Gulf states); major allies, such as the United Kingdom, France, and Germany; and other allies of convenience (e.g., Egypt and, in 1991, even Syria). If the initial phase of war was disastrous, the defended ally's forces might be in poor shape. In any case, requirements over time may be conceived more or less as shown in Figure 5.7. Note that the total need grows substantially with time, but much of the growth is for forces needed for the "other" missions. It is quite unlikely that the United States will have the force structure needed. It did not have such forces in Desert Storm. Thus, the baseline image should be that the BUR force structure already assumes, implicitly, the availability of quite substantial allied forces, particularly at later times--weeks or even months after the initial crisis.
Figure 5.7--Requirements over Time and the Role of Allies
As discussed elsewhere, there are many strategic reasons for wanting to plan more explicitly with our major European allies (notably the United Kingdom, Germany, and France) for security problems that extend well outside the confines of Europe.[21] This, however, raises the issues of what role these allies could play if they chose to contribute and how much the United States would want to depend on them. As a follow-on to Figure 5.7, Figure 5.8 suggests a notional "requirements curve" for the use of such major allies.
Figure 5.8--A Potential "Requirements" Curve For the Participation of Major Allies
Although the process of enlisting major allies in the challenge of defending common interests outside Europe is just starting, the notion we present here seems reasonable. The next question is how to share the burden. Table 5.5 suggests a commonsense approach to recognizing that, while the United States and major European nations have shared interests both inside and outside of Europe, notably the Persian Gulf, the interests are not equal. The suggestion is that we settle on something like a 75-25 percent split, with Europeans having the larger burden in Europe, and the United States having the larger burden in Southwest Asia.[22]
An Illustrative Burden-Sharing Formula
United
Statesa
Major
Alliesb
Europe
(lesser contingency)
25
75
Europe
(major contingency)
50
50
Persian
Gulf
(major contingency)
75
25
Southern
Europe
25
75
Near
East
ad
hoc
ad
hoc
aSpecial burden for C4I/ISR, Navy, and lift.
bSpecial burden for infra-structure in Europe.
By considering Criteria 1 and 2 in parallel with Criterion 3, the effect is to take pressure off Criterion 3 by itself. It does not have to be the sole rationale for force-sizing. A three-criteria construct also allows U.S. force planning to view the prospect of two concurrent MRCs in proper perspective as one important part of the defense agenda, but not the only part.
The message Criteria 1 and 2 impart is that the United States needs a sizable posture for the simpler but demanding tasks of carrying out global peacetime missions and being prepared for a single MRC without denuding the U.S. regional presence elsewhere. Criterion 3 reinforces this conclusion because it requires two MRC building blocks that--given current theories of contingency requirements--together could consume the entire active posture, plus major reserve-component assets.
As implied above, a key feature of our construct is that it puts forth the need for an overall joint force that is comparable to or only somewhat smaller than a two-MRC force as an enduring strategic principle, not a transient response. That is, this requirement will not go away if the two MRCs that are most plausible today--war against Iraq and North Korea--disappear. Obviously this need would not exist in the extreme case in which the risk of two MRCs could be absolutely ruled out. In this event, Criteria 1 and 2 would apply and might yield a somewhat smaller force. But today's world is not yet this stable, and tomorrow's world is also unlikely to be this stable.
A major consideration in mandating the multitheater principle is that force planning must take into account not only current geostrategic conditions but the future as well. Even if the United States does not face two regional enemies at a given time, it must maintain a sufficient capability to respond if two such enemies appear. The reason is that global politics can change faster than U.S. forces can be built: For example, Iraq became an enemy almost overnight. Moreover, a two-theater warfighting posture is needed to deter potential predators from taking advantage of perceived U.S. weakness. And a posture capable of defeating two regional aggressors provides some margin for being able to cope with future threats that might be larger than anticipated. In short, a two-MRC posture is the best guarantee that the two existing threats will not erupt into war and that, after these threats fade, new threats will not arise to take their place.
In our new construct, another main function of the two-MRC criterion is not only to reaffirm the need for multitheater deterrence, but also to determine what defense programs will be most needed to deal with two simultaneous wars. Being prepared for two MRCs has important implications for determining the size and character of strategic mobility programs so that demanding, fast-paced deployment plans can be carried out. It also calls for Air Force reserve component fighter wings, Army logistics forces and combat brigades, and other specialized assets that are ready enough to be deployed quickly. All of these programs merit funding under the two-MRC criterion, because they are unlikely to get adequate funding elsewhere.
Adopting Criteria 1 and 2 may provide elbow room to be more creative about addressing force requirements for the two MRCs. In both the Persian Gulf and Korea, a key risk is that "Achilles' heels"--e.g., lack of prompt reinforcement and adequate smart munitions, plus vulnerability to WMD--would result in early reversals. The prospect of these reversals, and the subsequent need for big counterattacks to recover lost ground, plays a large role in elevating force requirements so high that the entire U.S. active posture must be committed to defeat two medium powers, neither of which possesses a large storehouse of modern weaponry. To the extent that these early vulnerabilities can be reduced, the need to field this many forces may decline. The United States thereby would have less reason to fear that, in the actual event, it would have so many forces committed in the Gulf and Korea that nothing would be available for deployment anywhere else.
Likewise, the United States would have greater scope for recruiting allied forces without fearing undesirable offsetting cuts in its own posture. At the moment, a drawback of U.S. defense strategy in the Persian Gulf is that an MRC campaign there would be mostly a unilateral U.S. operation. The NATO allies are slated to play only minor roles. The result is the appearance of unfair burden sharing, because the oil being defended is needed by the entire industrialized world. This situation seems unlikely to endure: Sooner or later, a public outcry will be heard in the United States. A stronger European role in Gulf defense missions is needed not only to prevent a domestic backlash in the United States but also for another purpose: At the moment, U.S. forces in Europe are slated to play roles in the two-MRC deployment plan by deploying to the endangered theaters. Inevitably, this has the effect of raising questions about their commitment to NATO and Europe. If additional allied forces are committed to Gulf missions, these U.S. forces will be freed to play greater leadership roles as NATO enlarges and prepares for other projection missions. If the consequence of our new framework is to get better burden sharing and stronger U.S. leadership of key alliances, so much the better.
In summary, the proper step for the near term is not to abandon the two-MRC construct in reaction to budgetary pressures. Rather, the proper response is to build a broader construct that encompasses the larger purposes the U.S. posture serves. This step will help provide a better frame of reference for deciding upon force levels. The BUR posture may not be sacrosanct, but neither is it overly endowed when the full set of U.S. strategic requirements--which go beyond preparing for two MRCs--is taken into account. This chapter's new construct of three force-sizing criteria helps draw attention to this reality, while also providing a better basis for defining how U.S. forces will be used both in the most difficult case and in the situations most likely to be encountered.
LONGER-TERM FORCE SIZING: POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF NEW FORCES AND DOCTRINE AND OF CHANGES IN THREAT
In most of the preceding discussion, we have assumed that the force needs had to be achieved using the familiar building blocks of current forces: divisions, wings, CVBGs, and MEFs. That would be an improper assumption for the middle and long terms. Further, we have adopted the style of "requirements analysis" rather than the "capabilities analysis" style that we prefer (because requirements should be established only after understanding curves of diminishing return for alternative investment options). In this section, we relax some of the assumptions and look more critically at what could be done with new technology.
Building Forces for the Future, not World War II
Future force structures will be affected by the next era's warfighting concepts, which almost certainly will call for fewer but differently arrayed forces for any single contingency. Presumably these forces will deploy in a hurry, will be highly dispersed, will rely on information-dominance and deep-fire systems (tactical aircraft and long-range missiles), and will need to be able to deal with WMD. They will be capable of fighting and winning quickly through the use of high technology, while also being capable of sustained operations--perhaps even difficult, infantry-intense operations. This is not the posture of 1997. The problem with the existing posture is that it is not suited for the new era of warfare. Until the United States has more experience with advanced operational concepts and systems, it will be hard-pressed to judge how many forces are needed and in what mix.[23]
Substituting Capital for Labor (Reducing End Strength)
A central issue in defense planning should be how quickly to begin the substantial reengineering of forces needed. On the one hand, we need the reengineering to create suitable forces. Reengineering is also essential for cost-saving reasons. Further, it is called for by the simple logic of technological and military developments. Given incipient and projected improvements in our ability to locate and destroy enemy forces at longer ranges, it should not take as many ground-force personnel to accomplish most military missions in the future (the exceptions being infantry-intensive operations, such as counteroffensives in difficult terrain, stabilization after victory, and rear-area security in the absence of reliable allies). Some images of the future can perhaps be seen in the air operations of Desert Storm, the Marines' Sea Dragon experiments, and more recent Army experiments and advanced doctrinal concepts.[24] A key point here is that future operations will be truly joint, with ground forces depending on and exploiting long-range fires (i.e., air power and long-range missiles and even guns mounted on ships).
What might a future, reengineered Army look like if changes begin now and are focused on exploiting building blocks that already exist or are soon coming into the structure?[25] The following list provides one strawman image, which is our effort to construct a balanced future Army with a mix of armored units (more like current armored cavalry regiments than current divisions), mobile missile units exploiting MLRS and its successor with the Army Tactical Missile System and the Brilliant Anti-Tank munition, helicopter mobility, air-to-ground capability with attack helicopters, and infantry.[26] The list is for the active Army, assuming it is organized for brigade operations in wartime corps and Joint Task Forces. The range in number of units reflects the fact that we are considering the potential effects of sizable budget cuts.
What about the other Services? Naval forces can almost surely be operated with fewer personnel than in the past (as recognized in Navy experiments with the "Smart Ship").[28] The Navy also has a great deal of opportunity to reduce infrastructure, since cuts in infrastructure have badly lagged cuts in ships. Further, there is no enduring reason why Naval environment-shaping missions have to be organized around CVBGs. Perhaps what is needed is the concept of a "capable contingency group," which might involve Aegis cruisers and a variety of ships loaded with missiles (e.g., the arsenal ship). This would provide air and missile defense, surveillance, and substantial (but not very sustainable) offensive punch. The Air Force is coming to depend increasingly on its reserve-component elements, even for combat missions; is operating composite wings; and is reviewing how many air-superiority squadrons must be in high-readiness status in an era of diminished threats. It may wish to consider more permanent stationing of forces overseas, which could reduce squadron requirements.
For a variety of reasons, then, we believe that peacetime and less-than-worst-case contingencies could in the future be handled by a force structure with smaller active end strength. On the other hand, a substantial reserve component is desirable for other cases, and we do not believe that technology will soon substitute for infantry density in many operational situations associated with bad cases. Thus, we see value in high-quality reserve-component ground forces.
Reengineering to Avoid a Strategic Blunder
There is yet another reason for reengineering the force to reduce active end strength, while actually increasing capability. If the United States fails to do so, and if budget cuts come from "exogenous reasons" (decisions by Congress about relative priorities), U.S. combat forces will be savaged. The potential for hollow forces is real and sobering to those of us who doubt that enough money will be found in infrastructure to solve all the DoD's problems. As noted earlier, without reengineering, we should anticipate losing 20 percent of U.S. combat units for every 10 percent of the budget cut.[29]
If combat forces are reduced because of a failure to reengineer, it would be a victory for stasis. Organizations routinely argue that if budgets are cut, they must reduce what they are responsible for accomplishing. In defense, this would be manifested as disengagement: as rationalizing the ability to promote our interests while having nearly all of our forces at home, supposedly ready for rapid force projection as needed. In our view, this outcome would be disastrous for environment shaping and would, in time, lead to strategic vacuums, instabilities, and wars.[30]
Uncertainties and Worries: Reengineering Is No Panacea
Reengineering, of course, involves risks and uncertainty. A crucial assumption behind much current thinking is that the United States will be able to rely for warfighting on information dominance and long-range precision strike from aircraft, ships, and extended-range MLRS in the hands of Army units. The potential lethality of such forces is awesome, and field tests have been quite successful by and large. Furthermore, the empirical results from Desert Storm indicate that these capabilities are real. Indeed, even "old" weapons, such as the Maverick air-to-ground missile, raised the armor-killing capability of aircraft enormously. A relatively small number of aircraft (notably the F-15Es and others loaded with laser-guided bombs and Mavericks) achieved the vast majority of kills, approximating prewar estimates of effectiveness. The potential capability of sensor-fuzed weapons from aircraft and of Brilliant Anti-Tank munitions on the Army Tactical Missile System, whether launched by Army units or from ships, is very high.[31] Indeed, even the very small number of B-2s in the inventory could, in principle, be given a massive armor-killing capability. As mentioned earlier, the day of the classic armored invasion with lengthy exposure of armored forces from attack could be over, except when it can be accomplished without U.S. opposition or in other special ways.
Unfortunately for the optimists, but fortunately for analysts, developments continue, and there are predictable cycles of action and reaction. Although we are enthusiasts for the new warfighting concepts, including the exploitation of long-range precision strike, such capabilities are not panaceas. The most obvious drawback is that these weapons currently have only marginal value for wars in unfavorable terrain or in circumstances where enemies are intermixed with numerous friendly civilians. There may be other potential problems as well. We note that there has been very little discussion about prospects for tactical countermeasures to our precision-guided munitions. RAND analysis indicates that large effects are possible under some circumstances without invoking exotic technologies or information warfare (see also Chapter Six). Further, it remains to be seen whether the United States will be able to implement its emerging concepts, such as operational maneuver from the sea. There are many challenges involving advanced mines available on the world market at low prices, shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles that cannot easily be suppressed, and the potential for base-access problems at critical points in crisis. Complacency would be unwarranted.
Seeking Strategic Adaptiveness
It is likely that the United States will have to consider and reconsider both force sizing and the detailed character of the units over the next two decades. If, for example, the United States sees the emergence of adversaries likely to use massive infantry attacks, then, depending on its allies, the United States might have to increase the size of its ground forces and halt the trend seen by visionaries toward small, dispersed high-tech units. If the United States finds itself coming from behind and having to retake a large territory in which enemy forces were well established in rough terrain or urban sprawl, it might again find it necessary to have larger active ground forces.
Very different futures are also possible. It may be that our current formations (e.g., CVBGs) will be seen as excessively expensive and inappropriate for most missions, including being able to attack an invading army. It may be that the Revolution in Military Affairs enthusiasts will prove right and that change will be rapid and drastic.
The relationship of these prospects to the force-sizing debate is simple: We should not imagine that the issue of force size can be resolved now once and for all. The size of the force can increase and decrease over time in response to needs. This has happened many times in the past, even during the Cold War, and it will happen again. If we anticipate this, we may choose in our force sizing to emphasize protecting the "breeding stock" appropriate for generating diverse kinds of forces, most importantly including those we associate with next-generation warfare in the information era. This judgment suggests that active end strength should be sacrificed for modernization and experimentation with new kinds of units. The measure of a Service's vitality should not be active end strength but capability for both near-term missions and for adaptation to the worlds that may emerge in the middle and long terms. At the same time, it may be wise to hedge against needing larger numbers of traditional, manpower-intensive units by maintaining substantial capabilities in the reserves, at least until the future of warfare is clearer than it is today.
CONCLUSIONS
Our principal conclusion is that the United States should adopt a set of three force-sizing standards, to reduce pressure on the two-MRC criterion and to elevate the visibility of important considerations, such as environment shaping. If this step is taken, our estimates suggest that the current force structure is approximately valid in terms of numbers of combat units, although arguably smaller than it should be with respect to naval forces. We see little basis for cutting back the active component posture, and we are concerned that doing so will result in the perception of "disengagement," which would be damaging for environment shaping. This said, the force structure should be reengineered for the next era of warfare, and it is likely that substantial reductions in end strength will be possible while actually increasing military capability for most missions. The exceptions are important, but should be dealt with by relying upon reserve-component forces and the ability to expand ground forces by enlistment if necessary.
The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review can accomplish a great deal if it changes the criteria for sizing the force and adopts an overall strategic framework that elevates the stature of investments for a diversity of contingencies and for both environment shaping and strategic adaptiveness. Whatever is decided in 1997 about force size, however, we must expect that the matter will and should be reassessed regularly as the strategic landscape changes and as we learn more about the actual capabilities and limitations of the new types of forces emerging in the information era. A decade from now, it is unlikely that we will be talking in terms of divisions, wings, CVBGs, and MEFs as the currency in which to measure structure. Even if we do, the units by these names will probably look very different from what they do today. Or, at least, they should look very different from what they do today.
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[2] For example, "U.S. military strategy calls for the capability, in concert with regional allies, to fight and decisively win two MRCs that occur nearly simultaneously. This is the principal determinant of the size and composition of U.S. conventional forces." (Perry, 1996b, p. 5) (emphasis added).
[3] See Wilkening and Watman (1995) for discussion of WMD issues.
[4] This relates to the cognitive aspects of deterrence. For discussion and citations to both modeling work and the historical and psychological literatures, see Davis (1994), pp. 197-222; National Research Council (NRC) (1997); and the review article (Allan, 1994).
[5] An apt phrase that Maj Gen Jasper Welch (USAF, retired) used in the 1996 Defense Science Board (DSB) summer study.
[6] The points on the curve are based on assessments of the posture in 1990, currently, and under a roughly 12-percent reduction in budget without reengineering (e.g., akin to that in O'Hanlon, 1995, or to force structures generated in various RAND studies for lower budget levels). For discussion of why the curve is so steep, see Lewis (1994) or observe how drastically O'Hanlon had to cut CVBGs and procurement of advanced systems to achieve small budget savings.
[7] The view we take here is that traditional "threats" are at present relatively moderate and waning, but we nonetheless live in a dangerous world with an unpredictable future. See Kugler (1995); Davis (1994, pp. 135-196); and Khalilzad (1996) for RAND discussions of such matters. See also Institute for National Strategic Studies (1996) for assessments by the National Defense University.
[8] This discussion draws on work regarding overseas presence done for the Joint Staff; see Chapter Eight. See Zakheim et al. 1996) for an interesting interview-based study of the value of naval presence on regional stability and U.S. interests.
[9] The current stress on forces due to operational tempo is a complex issue. It is not evenly felt across the Services or within any particular Service. Much of it is probably due to management practices (affected by two-MRC thinking) rather than a shortage of overall forces. For example, certain active support units have been driven particularly hard because there are so few of them. The obvious remedy is to create more such active units, even at the expense of some active combat units. A second problem has been the frequent "surprise" crises or operations that have extended duty periods. A possible mitigant for the Army and Air Force is to adopt a scheduling approach more like that of the Navy and Marines, which plan deployment periods during which the units involved may conduct normal operations or react to crises as needed. Yet another mitigant may be to reduce requirements for "normal" operations that seem to have little purpose (Sheehan, 1995). There may, then, be many remedies other than cutting back on functional capabilities or increasing force structure.
[10] There is no rigorous basis for these figures. Rather, they summarize what we believe would be professional military judgment using current forces, doctrine, and practice. A corps is still the basic warfighting unit, because it has both maneuver forces and the full range of support. For complex reasons, about 4.5 to 6 fighter wings seem to be needed for a combination of air superiority, strike, air-defense suppression, and ground-force attack. Peacetime presence, as distinct from total forces-in-being committed to a region, has been treated as depending on CVBGs. Later in this chapter, we will discuss the implications of potential changes in force composition and doctrine.
[11] For discussion of how Army light divisions compare with Marine units, see Kassing (1994).
[12] O'Hanlon (1995), p. 53, suggests that the Air Force could provide Marines with interdiction support and strike.
[13] Numerous ideas have been proposed, including permanent overseas stationing of Air Force squadrons (some of which is in practice happening already) and advertising "virtual presence" of Air Force aircraft that can deploy quickly worldwide. Frequent exercises can help in this regard. O'Hanlon (1995) argues that the peace operations should count toward "presence" and can therefore be used to rationalize smaller traditional CVBG deployments. Such possibilities are addressed in Chapter Eight.
[14] All of the figures should be interpreted as involving "equivalent units," since the services use different organizational arrangements in different circumstances.
[15] Other analysts are using the tempo of OOTW and LRCs, along with presence, rotation-base, and training requirements, to generate estimates of force needs. It is likely that they will turn out to be similar in magnitude to those we provide here.
[16] Related issues are discussed in the Commission on Roles and Missions (1995).
[17] Some have argued (e.g., O'Hanlon, 1995) that fewer CVBGs are needed because land bases for aircraft can be counted upon. It is true that suitable or adequate bases exist in the general vicinity of a high percentage of plausible contingencies (something well established by past studies). However, timely political access to those bases (well before D-Day) is quite another matter. Further, there are uncertainties about the effectiveness of the infrastructure at some bases and about the effectiveness of host-nation support. If the United States has to deploy substantial support forces and infrastructure, the rate at which land-based air forces will be deployed and sustainable will be reduced. On the other hand, it is easy to imagine circumstances in which naval forces are not in the right region at the right time, while Air Forces are able to deploy quickly to good bases with prepositioned materials. In our view, prudent force planning should hedge on these matters: Airpower is critical; the United States has two ways to achieve early airpower in a contingency, and it should savor and preserve that flexibility.
[18] For earlier discussion of DoD assumptions on these matters, see National Defense Research Institute (1992).
[19] How many are apparently needed depends on a variety of analysis parameters that can be manipulated over wide ranges. For a simplified explanation, see Chapter Six.
[20] As noted earlier, the BUR called for 15 Army National Guard combat brigades to be given increased readiness for employment within 90 days. It is not clear to us that this goal has been achieved (General Accounting Office, 1995) or whether it will be. The Army has recently taken a number of measures that will help, however, including assigning regular-Army commanders (Graham, 1996). Other nations, notably Germany and Israel, have and rely upon high-readiness army combat reserves, with readiness measured in days rather than months.
[21] See Gompert and Kugler (1996) and Gompert and Larrabee (1997).
[22] See also Huber and Davis (1996) for an estimate of NATO force requirements.
[23] For discussion of future-force concepts, see Shalikashvili (1996), NRC (1996), DSB (1996), and periodic posture statements by the Service Chiefs of Staff. See also Barnett (1996) for a coherent description of work on the "Revolution in Military Affairs" by the Office of Net Assessment. Johnson and Libicki (1996) discusses the role of information dominance and includes a short statement by retired Admiral William Owens (then Vice Chairman) regarding his influential vision of future warfare.
[24] For an excellent example of the tangible impact of information-era capabilities--and tensions--see U.S. Marine Corps (1996).
[25] For a sampling of the many concepts and experiments the Army is currently pursuing in thinking about the future, see Reimer (1996), Killebrew (1996), and DSB (1996).
[26] We thank colleague Jed Peters for his assistance on this. For an interesting brigade-sized joint-task-force concept designed for early entry, see the TRADOC discussion of "Task Force Griffin" in Volume 2 of DSB (1996).
[27] The draft version of this chapter had an erroneous depiction of this force, listing the active divisions with only partial fill under reserve forces, giving the impression that we suggested much larger cuts than we intended. Roughly speaking, we believe that the number of reengineered active brigades should be equal to the number of current active brigades, budget permitting.
[28] For discussion of Navy and Marine futures, see NRC (1996). For discussion of Air Force futures see the "Vista report" (Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, 1995).
[29] See Lewis (1994). Recent unpublished data on Navy forces reinforces the point: Cutting "overhead" is very difficult, and the payback may be a decade after one begins closing bases.
[30] See also Chapter One in Khalilzad (1996).
[31] For an unclassified summary of potential performance, see Sovereign (1996).