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The U.S. Submarine Production Base
An Analysis of Cost, Schedule, and Risk for Selected Force Structures
In January 1993, the RAND National Defense Research Institute was asked by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition to compare the practicality and cost of two approaches to future submarine production: (1) allowing production to shut down as currently programmed submarines are finished, then restarting it when more are needed, and (2) continuing low-rate production. The research was motivated by concerns that the submarine production base might not be easily reconstituted if production is shut down and by the countervailing recognition that deferring new submarine starts might yield substantial savings, particularly over the short term.
See Also:
Research Brief
Executive Summary
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Pages: 232
ISBN/EAN: 0-8330-1548-6
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Contents
Chapter One:
Introduction
Chapter Two:
Background
Chapter Three:
Effects of a Production Gap on Shipyards
Chapter Four:
Effects of a Production Gap on Nuclearcomponent Vendors
Chapter Five:
Effects of a Production Gap on Nonnuclearcomponent Vendors
Chapter Six:
Alternative Fleet Replacement Strategies
Chapter Seven:
Comparing the Cost of Alternative Strategies
Chapter Eight:
Risk
Chapter Nine:
Conclusions and Recommendations
Appendix:
- Design Considerations
- Supplementary Background Information
- Shipyard Effects: Additional Cases
- British Production Restart Experience
- French Production Experience
- Workforce Reconstitution Model and Generic Results
- Operating and Support Costs
- Comparing Costs: Additional Cases
The research described in this report was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense under RAND’s National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center supported by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the defense agencies.
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