Large-scale, scheduled public events—like the recent Winter Olympics—make for tempting terrorist targets. One upcoming event is extraordinarily significant from a terrorism perspective: the next general election.

While the presidency will not be at stake, the entire House of Representatives, one-third of the Senate, and many state and local offices will be. Of course, even more is at stake than just the results of one election. Changes in government occur only at scheduled elections, and the country has an enduring commitment to keep that schedule—to conduct democratic elections in what is likely to remain an uncertain and threatening climate.

If a terrorist attack forces the elections to be rescheduled or, in a more likely scenario, manages to keep many Americans from going to the polls, then the attack will produce fundamental damage. Make no mistake: The number of Americans who cast their ballots in the next election will be watched—and scored—by viewers across the globe, just like the recent Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City.

Protecting against such an attack promises to be very challenging. Unlike localized events like the Winter Olympics, the general election is national. Voting will take place at the polls in every neighborhood, community, city, and state and over extended periods of time across time zones. One of the lessons of the last election is that a disruption in one part of one state can throw the electoral process into chaos—or influence its outcome.

Beyond heightening physical security, what can legislatures, election officials, and security officials do to ensure that the election comes off as scheduled? One thing to emerge from the problems of the last election was a succession of panels and commissions that recommended changes in how we conduct our elections. One of the more frequently mentioned ideas—Internet voting—seemed attractive, but the panels generally agreed that the technology is not yet mature enough.

We need to shape electoral laws that set the conditions for new elections if disruptions prevent the full exercise of the vote.

Another idea—voting over a weekend or a period of several days—is more promising. While this would require security officials to protect polling places over a longer time period, each location would probably have fewer citizens exposed at any time, with reduced individual waiting times for every voter. Also, election officials could respond to situations or problems revealed in early voting to ensure that people have adequate access to polling places throughout the remainder of the voting period, despite problems that might occur.

Another way to reduce electoral vulnerability to terrorism would be to expand the use of provisional ballots at polling places nationwide. Provisional ballots would enable election officials to resolve questions of voter eligibility at a later time. Such ballots would reduce the time anyone has to spend in a polling place and would allow polling places other than a voter's designated polling place to take over if a primary polling place had to be closed because of an incident or threat.

Typically, provisional ballots would be used by eligible voters whose identities are temporarily unconfirmed. To deter terrorists from anonymously using provisional ballots to introduce dangerous substances into polling places, the thumbprints or even photographs of provisional voters could be taken and then placed on the envelopes of the provisional ballots.

Finally, as outrageous as it may seem, we need to shape electoral laws that not only punish those who disrupt elections but also set the conditions for new elections if disruptions prevent the full exercise of the vote.

In the last decade, we have seen citizens of many foreign nations line up to vote in the face of guerrilla violence, government repression, or criminal disruption. Each such situation has inspired American editorials praising the courage of common people and their attachment to their new right to vote. Unexpectedly, we, too, now face such a test of our own attachment to the right to vote.
 
James Quinlivan is an analyst at RAND.