By the end of summer, U.S. Secretary of Defense and former RAND Trustee Donald Rumsfeld could propose sweeping changes in U.S. defense policy. Under his stewardship, more than 20 Pentagon panels have been scrutinizing different aspects of that policy since February. By late September, a new defense strategy will be promulgated, along with the defense budget proposal for fiscal year 2003 and an outline of the defense plan for five years thereafter.
Underlying the current Pentagon reviews are fundamental questions about the military's role in the world today and the ability of military organizations to fulfill that role. RAND researchers have been grappling with these questions since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. Since then, RAND has been trying to help the U.S. Department of Defense (1) define the roles that U.S. military power should play in the world and (2) outline the types of reorganization that U.S. forces should undergo internally so that they can successfully carry out the ambitious missions assigned to them. The ideas have figured prominently in some of the recent Pentagon reviews.
David Ochmanek, a RAND defense analyst, says the role of U.S. military forces goes far beyond fighting and winning the nation's wars. "U.S. forces during the cold war never fought 'the big one' against the Soviet Union," he explains, "but this does not mean that they failed to fulfill their purpose. Far from it: Deterring wars is generally a higher mark of success than winning them."
Others at RAND concur that U.S. forces should be ready to accomplish the full range of missions that might be required today, because that would be the best deterrent against being drawn into a major war. The full range of potential missions includes deterring and defeating large-scale aggression, terrorist attacks, and attacks on the United States; preventing the use of weapons of mass destruction; protecting Americans abroad; projecting stability abroad in peacetime; conducting humanitarian operations; and countering the production and smuggling of illegal drugs.
The role of U.S. military power today, therefore, can be defined broadly: to protect and promote American and allied interests and values virtually anywhere in the world. Sometimes that role requires fighting wars; more often, it involves preventing wars. Whether the United States extends a security guarantee overseas, remains engaged in hot spots like the Middle East, enforces order in unruly places like Kosovo, or responds to humanitarian crises, the overarching goal is to promote the common interests and values of America and its allies.
To advance the national agenda in today's globalizing world, the United States typically must secure the cooperation of other international actors--national governments, international institutions, transnational entities, and subnational groups--in the pursuit of common objectives. "America's unique capability to project military power rapidly to distant regions is a distinct asset in building international coalitions to tackle common problems," says Ochmanek.
Most observers agree that future military success will depend on the ability of U.S. forces, allied forces, and other international partners to better integrate their operations for greater speed and effectiveness. In other words, success will depend on integration, and integration will require reorganization. RAND researchers have delineated some of the organizational changes that will be necessary. The most comprehensive recommendations available from RAND at this time pertain to four types of global reorganization that are currently under way: (1) the expeditionary aerospace force, (2) rapidly employable ground forces, (3) allied interoperability, and (4) coordinated humanitarian operations.
Currently, the U.S. Air Force operates largely from permanent overseas bases that were inherited from the cold war. The bases are concentrated in the two regions of the world that were of greatest concern back then: Western Europe and Northeast Asia. Today, 13 of these bases remain. However, as shown in the map below, the bases are located far from many of the highly unstable regions of the world today. Since 1990, these regions have sparked many major deployments, notably Operation Desert Storm, subsequent duties in the Persian Gulf, peacekeeping and humanitarian relief missions in Africa, and counternarcotics operations in Latin America.
These deployments have placed a heavy strain on the air force personnel stationed permanently at the overseas bases. To spread its burden more evenly among its squadrons, the air force began reorganizing into an Expeditionary Aerospace Force in 1998. The goal is to help the force respond quickly--ideally within 48 hours--to crises anywhere in the world without requiring even more personnel to reside permanently overseas.
In practice, the U.S. Air Force has divided itself into ten forces of roughly equal size, each containing fighters, bombers, tankers, and other supporting aircraft. At any given moment, two of these ten forces (called Aerospace Expeditionary Forces) are on call for 90 days at a time, available either to initiate overseas deployments or to fill in for current deployments. After 90 days, the rotating forces spend 12 months in routine training and exercises before going on call again. There are also two Aerospace Expeditionary Wings, which can provide tailored support to the rotating forces as necessary.
RAND researchers laud this reorganization but point to some remaining problems--and possible solutions. Above all, the Aerospace Expeditionary Forces still must manage an immense amount of global uncertainty, based as they are in just the United States and two clusters of overseas bases that were situated to contain the former Soviet Union. If the air force is to fulfill its mission of quickly projecting substantial power to austere and unanticipated locations anywhere in the world with sufficient resources for indefinite periods of time, then a new basing strategy will be needed. RAND researchers have proposed a strategy that would rely on continuous access to a global network of overseas locations. The air force would maintain these locations for potential use as regional hubs on an as-needed basis. RAND researchers have dubbed this strategy "flexbasing."
The flexbasing hubs could be allied military bases, international airports, or unused airfields. They would take advantage of host-nation funding and commercially available products and services. As illustrated in the map below, these regional hubs would be the "forward support locations" (FSLs) that would vastly extend the global reach of C-17 cargo aircraft to a multitude of even farther-flung potential crisis zones.
Typically, Aerospace Expeditionary Forces would deploy from their permanent, main operating bases in the United States, Europe, or East Asia to relatively austere bases somewhere in a developing crisis zone. The FSLs would serve as the storage sites for each region's anticipated requirements, such as munitions, spare parts, or humanitarian supplies. During operations, the FSLs might also serve as repair facilities or transportation hubs. Moreover, each of the U.S. military services, not just the air force, could use the FSLs for supplies, equipment, and shelter.
For the flexbasing strategy to work, two other changes are required. First, there need to be centralized planning and coordination of global logistics and transportation. Second, there needs to be more attention given to comprehensive protection of U.S. personnel deployed at all locations.
Centralized planning will be needed to ensure that each FSL in the entire global network remains accessible, equipped, and prepared. Centralized coordination is crucial for ensuring that resources can be moved both from FSLs to operating bases and between FSLs under rapidly changing circumstances. Yet even with centralized planning and coordination, current logistics and transportation systems will not allow the air force to reach its stated goal of arriving anywhere in the world within 48 hours without prepositioning huge amounts of supplies and equipment at the far-flung forward operating locations.
RAND analyses reach a sobering conclusion: With today's logistics and technologies, deploying even a modest air force to a bare forward operating location (with just a runway, water supply, and fuel) would take at least a week. Although the 48-hour goal could be met by prepositioning supplies at such a location, the increased risk and cost might not justify the increased speed. One compromise would be to supply only those forward operating locations that are expected to be under the heaviest threat. Elsewhere in the world, where conflict is less likely or where humanitarian missions will be the norm, the prepositioned supplies could be relatively meager.
Regardless of the timelines involved, U.S. personnel deployed at all locations need to be able to detect and defeat a range of enemy attacks. Potential attacks could involve conventional weapons, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, chemical or biological agents, and information warfare. An absence of capabilities to protect U.S. forces would limit their access to the operating locations and thus undermine the flexbasing strategy altogether.
The 1999 war in Kosovo laid bare the limitations of relying on air power alone. Yet the war also showed the inability of ground forces to act fast enough to thwart adversaries on short warning. To defeat an enemy invasion of a friendly region, the United States would benefit greatly if it could employ--within days rather than weeks--a joint force from air, land, and sea. The joint force would combine long-range fires--from aircraft, ships, and land-based missiles--with maneuvering ground forces equipped with attack helicopters and shorter-range fires. Such a joint force could be very useful for certain types of contingencies.
An early version of such a force is feasible within the next five years, even without heroic technological advances. However, military leaders need to (1) revise their prevailing strategies and doctrine that emphasize massive ground wars and (2) rethink how ground troops and equipment are currently prepositioned around the world.
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Currently, few U.S. ground troops could arrive almost anywhere in the world within a few days. Other than very small groups of Special Operations Forces, the only U.S. ground troops that could arrive so quickly are perhaps a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and a ready brigade of the army's 82nd Airborne Division (see figure). An MEU, consisting of helicopters and a landing team stationed aboard an aircraft carrier, can arrive quickly--if the aircraft carrier is already deployed in a crisis region. Larger Marine Corps units, called Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs), take at least a week to arrive and usually much longer. MEBs consist of a larger contingent of ground forces, some mechanized vehicles, helicopters, and air support from aircraft carriers. Although the equipment for MEBs is prepositioned aboard ships, the U.S. Marines themselves are airlifted to the ships to assemble the equipment and commence operations.
Similarly, the U.S. Army today prepositions its equipment aboard ships for large and highly capable mechanized brigades, but the soldiers could arrive only after a week or so under the best conditions. Two other kinds of army divisions face their own limitations. At one extreme, elements of the 82nd Airborne Division can be airlifted to crisis zones within a few days, but these paratroopers are not intended to operate for long on their own. They would not have enough trucks and jeeps to move around effectively. At the other extreme, today's heavy army divisions are simply too bulky to deploy quickly, requiring at least three weeks. A big part of the problem is that today's heavy army divisions were designed to fight a protracted ground war characteristic of the cold war.
RAND researchers propose that the U.S. Department of Defense rethink
Time could be saved in three ways. First, the prepositioned ships could be deployed preemptively to a region of impending crisis--in the same way that the navy has maneuvered aircraft carriers for decades. Second, the storage of modern, lighter equipment aboard the ships could make any ensuing deployment much more agile. And third, smaller units of highly effective ground troops could be airlifted more rapidly to the deploying ships. This early, "lightweight," and nimble response could reduce the time required to deploy all ground forces to about a week. The overall plan envisions three distinct waves of ground troops.
Typically, the first wave would be an "allied-support force" of a few hundred U.S. personnel. This small, specialized force would link allied forces already in place to advanced U.S. systems for command and control, long-range fires, information, communications, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Using high-tech sensors and access to remote weapons, this initial force would gather intelligence and deny an encroaching enemy control of the terrain.
The second wave would be a "light mobile-infantry force" of 3,000-5,000 U.S. troops who would deploy about two days later. This force would resemble the army's 82nd Airborne Division but with upgraded weapons, vehicles, and communications. Initially, this force would defend key positions and facilities; later, it might advance further forward, perhaps behind enemy lines, to direct long-range fires and to ambush the enemy.
The third wave, a "light (or medium-weight) mechanized force," would arrive two to three days after the second wave, drawing equipment from the prepositioned ships. In the near future, this mechanized force would rely on the current generation of heavy tanks; in the longer run, the force would use the much lighter tanks and fighting vehicles that are now in development. The force would include 3,000-5,000 U.S. troops who would be capable of fighting the enemy's armored vehicles and armored forces, presuming those enemy forces had already been weakened by the long-range fires and ambushes conducted by the prior two waves of allied forces. Soldiers in the third wave would also field their own long-range missiles, shorter-range weapons, line-of-sight weapons, and attack helicopters.
All three waves would depend on agility, dispersal, networking, and precision fires. But none of the waves would depend on quantum leaps in speed and technology or require massive new procurements. Much could be accomplished within the next five years with the technologies already available or within reach. Reorganization is more essential than new technology. In the longer run, to be sure, the lighter mechanized forces would exploit technological advances, but waiting for those advances is not necessary. Moreover, the experience gained by a first version of such a force would be invaluable.
At the same time, funding would need to increase for some weapons, such as guided antitank missiles (which could hit tanks tens of miles away) and "loitering" missiles (which, in the longer term, could soar above the battlefield for half an hour or more). Improved information technologies would also be needed to safeguard the survival of dispersed troops by providing them with timely target locations and safer entry and exit routes. And, in the long term, air and ground robotic vehicles and unattended ground sensors would be unmanned to reduce casualties.
Additional changes would be required in military doctrine and training. Some of the concepts outlined here call for more U.S. forces to operate behind enemy lines and, in any case, to be much more dispersed and less dependent on large and vulnerable supply bases than in the past. Logistics might be provided largely from the sea. In training, U.S. units dispersed across army bases would need to link "virtually" so they could train while separated and learn to coordinate their actions before trying to do so in a distant land.
Both the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force want to improve the "interoperability" of their forces with those of the allies. Interoperability refers to the ability of different militaries to coordinate information, troops, and services so that they can operate together effectively. One obstacle to interoperability today is the technological gap between U.S. and allied forces. Perhaps an even greater obstacle is the organizational difficulty of managing multiple military organizations.
Among NATO armies, the technological disparity has less to do with weapons and hardware than with the information software systems of command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence. The U.S. Army is now "digitizing" the force in a way that could give everyone--from commanders down to individual soldiers--a computerized picture of battles as they unfold. The army's modernization appears to be unmatched by the allied armies that are likely to deploy alongside it in the future. Some fear that the widening gap will only exacerbate current incompatibilities and undermine future coalition operations.
On the one hand, RAND researchers point out that technological incompatibilities among allied armies are nothing new. In the past, the allies have worked around their technological differences through tried-and-true methods that should continue to work in the future. These methods include geographic separation of national contingents, loans of sophisticated equipment to less sophisticated armies, phased deployments that send the most capable forces first, and preplanning by the allies to devise a strategy that minimizes their incompatibilities.
On the other hand, these methods can go only so far. In the long term, the U.S. Army should take the lead in eliminating the multiple root causes of allied army incompatibility, according to Michele Zanini, a RAND researcher and Italian national. He explains that the root causes are both technological and organizational. In fact, greater allied use of sophisticated technologies would not guarantee compatibility with U.S. forces. To work together, ground force coalitions should also learn how to use and operate similar equipment in a coordinated fashion. Therefore, the U.S. Army should push for these coordinated, long-term steps to improve interoperability:
Researchers studying the interoperability of allied air forces have reached similar conclusions. A RAND team led by policy analyst Myron Hura emphasized the need to improve the organizational aspects of interoperability as well as the technical aspects.
Today, many European allies are upgrading their aircraft. However, unlike the Americans, the allies are focusing on peace operations and crisis response. The allies are investing little in U.S.-style advanced weapons systems, such as stealth aircraft, all-weather precision-guided bombs and missiles, and the improved targeting systems that are essential for conducting precision strikes during war while minimizing collateral damage and ensuring aircraft survivability.
Therefore, in a financially constrained environment, efforts to enhance allied interoperability in the air should emphasize non-materiel items. These items include common strategy and doctrine, common standards for sharing information, improved procedures for identifying friends and foes, and combined training of expert personnel. Efforts to enhance allied interoperability through hardware should be selective and focus primarily on compatible systems for command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. For example, tactical digital data links would be a major improvement over the allies' current reliance on radio and voice communications networks.
The allied air forces have at least one opportunity to reorganize their weapons systems as well. A separate RAND study of potential allied air campaigns in the Persian Gulf found that the allied air forces could coordinate, if not replicate, their existing fleets of aircraft and other resources. In fact, inefficient duplication of re-sources should not ne- cessarily be the goal. Rather, the allies could reorganize their resources into a functional division of labor.
Most NATO allies have complementary "niche" capabilities. The allies are strong in areas where the United States faces shortfalls--areas such as tactical reconnaissance and airborne early warning (for tracking enemy aircraft from a great distance). The allied air forces also contribute regional infrastructures, such as airfields and depots, which are crucial for projecting power beyond NATO.
Because the allies can make only limited contributions to an air campaign, the United States should encourage them to hone their niche capabilities. In short, the United States should concentrate on what it does best, and willing allies should do what they do best. This approach would not only exploit the comparative advantages of each country. It would also be politically sustainable, militarily feasible, and fiscally affordable for each country.
A functional division of labor could, for example, help ensure Western access to Persian Gulf oil. Among the European allies, Britain and France are the most committed to projecting military power abroad and protecting their interests outside Europe. Therefore, the United States should encourage these two countries to invest heavily in modernized forces.
Germany could contribute by moving troops and equipment to the Gulf, perhaps by earmarking part of the German civilian air fleet. Germany, Italy, and other allies could also supply aircraft for tactical reconnaissance, thus helping to compensate for U.S. shortfalls.
Many smaller members of NATO could contribute in smaller ways. Some Dutch, Danish, and Belgian F-16 fighters have been modified for reconnaissance, while Poland flies the MiG-21R reconnaissance aircraft. The Dutch, Danes, Belgians, Norwegians, Canadians, and other allies possess impressive mine warfare capabilities that could help keep ports, shipping lanes, and the Strait of Hormuz open to Western forces. Collectively, the NATO allies have roughly 300 medium-range airlifters, compared with about 200 in the U.S. Air Force.
Because of their geographic location, southern members of the alliance--Spain, Portugal, Italy, Turkey, and Greece--would be the springboards for Gulf deployments. Rather than prodding these nations to modernize their fleets, the United States should seek to ensure their approvals for basing and overflight rights. Italy could also supply reconnaissance aircraft and airlift.
Two of the newest NATO members--Hungary and the Czech Republic--could pitch in with credible capabilities to detect and decontaminate nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. These are areas where the United States and other allies are relatively unprepared.
Overall, this strategy of task specialization would be a realistic way for the allies to share the burden of collective defense both inside and outside Europe. However, specialization also brings risks. If the alliance were to become too dependent on one country for some critical capability, then that country could wield a veto power over any operation. Alternatively, any serious damage to that country's unique capability could potentially cripple an operation. In short, some specialization could be good, but a lot could be dangerous. Allied commanders will need to manage and balance their niche capabilities carefully for the security of all.
Since the end of the cold war, U.S. military forces have conducted humanitarian operations in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Humanitarian operations pose extremely complex organizational challenges because they involve so many disparate actors: the armed forces, donor countries, host countries, international organizations, regional organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). At times, everyone and no one may be in charge. The military mission might not be entirely clear. Military personnel may be compelled to improvise, or they may see their mission change in disconcerting ways.
U.S. military leaders could improve the coordination of humanitarian operations substantially, say political scientist Daniel Byman and others at RAND. At a minimum, military commanders should become familiar with the organizations that are most relevant to humanitarian operations. These organizations include United Nations agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and important NGOs. Officers in the unified commands--such as the U.S. Central Command and U.S. Southern Command--should maintain regular contact with the key organizations in their areas of responsibility. Simultaneously, the leaders of the unified commands and armed services should inform relief agencies about the military's capabilities.
Military leaders should also bring officials of major relief agencies into the planning process. The agencies should be encouraged to develop relief packages that could be quickly deployed by military personnel, and the personnel should transport agency workers during crises as necessary. Closer ties between relief agencies and the armed forces would increase speed and efficiency throughout a crisis and would pay particular dividends at the beginning of a crisis, when delay can cost many lives.
Just as allied militaries can leverage their strengths in battle by training together and sharing information, the U.S. military services and the relief agencies can leverage their strengths in humanitarian operations by training together and sharing information. Training exercises for humanitarian operations should include relief agencies more extensively. And the military services should exchange information regularly with the agencies, minimize the classification of data that they need, share after-action reports with the agencies, and solicit their responses.
RAND researchers again propose a functional division of labor: The armed forces should coordinate relief efforts until the NGOs and U.N. agencies can arrive on the scene to take over the job. Only the U.S. Air Force can quickly conduct a massive airlift early in a crisis. The military services and unified commands also possess a logistics expertise often lacking among relief agencies. But once the initial capacity for providing relief is in place, the relief agencies would know better how to establish relief priorities.
Byman and his coauthors believe that Washington should place transatlantic cooperation in humanitarian crises high on the agenda of consultations between NATO and the European Union. The United States should try to take advantage of French facilities and European relationships in and around Africa to support relief operations there. And the United States should encourage representatives from European NGOs to enroll in relevant courses at U.S. and NATO war colleges.
U.S. military forces cannot manage all aspects of humanitarian operations. But military leaders can work on those aspects that fall within their sphere of responsibility. Within that sphere, military leaders can make considerable improvements and act as a catalyst for broader organizational reform. The recommendations proposed here would make future humanitarian operations run more smoothly and thereby mitigate the suffering caused by humanitarian crises.
"Getting the Quadrennial Defense Review Right," David Ochmanek, and "Transforming Military Forces," Paul K. Davis, in Frank Carlucci, Robert Hunter, and Zalmay Khalilzad, eds., Taking Charge. Discussion Papers: A Bipartisan Report to the President-Elect on Foreign Policy and National Security/Transition 2001, RAND/MR-1306/1-RC, 2001, 366 pp., ISBN 0-8330-2957-6, $25.00.
Transforming U.S. Forces: Lessons from the Wider Revolution, David C. Gompert, Irving Lachow, RAND/IP-193, 2000, 12 pp., no charge.
The Expeditionary Aerospace Force
Flexbasing: Achieving Global Presence for Expeditionary Aerospace Forces, Paul S. Killingsworth, Lionel Galway, Eiichi Kamiya, Brian Nichiporuk, Timothy L. Ramey, Robert S. Tripp, James C. Wendt, RAND/MR-1113-AF, 2000, 119 pp., ISBN 0-8330-2777-8, $15.00.
Supporting Expeditionary Aerospace Forces: A Concept for Evolving the Agile Combat Support/Mobility System of the Future, Robert S. Tripp, Lionel Galway, Timothy L. Ramey, Mahyar Amouzegar, Eric Peltz, RAND/MR-1179-AF, 2000, 49 pp., ISBN 0-8330-2852-9, $8.00.
Supporting Expeditionary Aerospace Forces: An Analysis of F-15 Avionics Options, Eric Peltz, Hyman L. Shulman, Robert S. Tripp, Timothy Ramey, Randy King, John G. Drew, RAND/MR-1174-AF, 2000, 159 pp., ISBN 0-8330-2895-3, $15.00.
Supporting Expeditionary Aerospace Forces: An Integrated Strategic Agile Combat Support Planning Framework, Robert S. Tripp, Lionel Galway, Paul S. Killingsworth, Eric Peltz, Timothy L. Ramey, John G. Drew, RAND/MR-1056-AF, 1999, 145 pp., ISBN 0-8330-2763-8, $15.00.
Supporting Expeditionary Aerospace Forces: New Agile Combat Support Postures, Lionel Galway, Robert S. Tripp, Timothy L. Ramey, John G. Drew, RAND/MR-1075-AF, 2000, 66 pp., ISBN 0-8330-2801-4, $7.50.
Rapidly Employable Ground Forces
Agility by a Different Measure: Creating a More Flexible U.S. Army, Thomas McNaugher, David Johnson, Jerry Sollinger, RAND/IP-195, 2000, 5 pp., no charge.
Ground Forces for a Rapidly Employable Joint Task Force: First-Week Capabilities for Short-Warning Conflicts, Eugene C. Gritton, Paul K. Davis, Randall Steeb, John Matsumura, RAND/MR-1152-OSD/A, 2000, 142 pp., ISBN 0-8330-2797-2, $15.00.
Joint Operations Superiority in the 21st Century: Analytic Support to the 1998 Defense Science Board, John Matsumura, Randall Steeb, Ernest Isensee, Thomas Herbert, Scot Eisenhard, John Gordon, RAND/DB-260-A/OSD, 1999, 72 pp., ISBN 0-8330-2714-X, $30.00.
Lightning over Water: Sharpening America's Light Forces for Rapid-Reaction Missions, John Matsumura, Randall Steeb, John Gordon, Tom Herbert, Russell Glenn, Paul Steinberg, RAND/MR-1196-A/OSD, 2000, 245 pp., ISBN 0-8330-2845-6, $40.00.
Allied Interoperability
The Army and Multinational Force Compatibility, Michele Zanini, Jennifer M. Taw, RAND/MR-1154-A, 2000, 93 pp., ISBN 0-8330-2793-X, $8.00.
Improving Army Planning for Future Multinational Coalition Operations, Thomas S. Szayna, Frances M. Lussier, Krista Magras, Olga Oliker, Michele Zanini, Robert D. Howe, RAND/MR-1291-A, 2001, 346 pp., ISBN 0-8330-2960-6, $25.00.
Interoperability: A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air Operations, Myron Hura, Gary McLeod, Eric Larson, James Schneider, Daniel Gonzales, Dan Norton, Jody Jacobs, Kevin O'Connell, William Little, Richard Mesic, Lewis Jamison, RAND/MR-1235-AF, 2000, 269 pp., ISBN 0-8330-2912-6, $22.00.
Mind the Gap: Promoting a Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs, David C. Gompert, Richard L. Kugler, Martin C. Libicki, Institute for National Strategic Studies/National Defense University, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999.
Persian Gulf Security: Improving Allied Military Contributions, Richard Sokolsky, Stuart Johnson, F. Stephen Larrabee, eds., RAND/MR-1245-AF, 2000, 165 pp., ISBN 0-8330-2819-X, $20.00.
Coordinated Humanitarian Operations
Strengthening the Partnership: Improving Military Coordination with Relief Agencies and Allies in Humanitarian Operations, Daniel Byman, Ian Lesser, Bruce Pirnie, Cheryl Benard, Matthew Waxman, RAND/ MR-1185-AF, 2000, 260 pp., ISBN 0-8330-2868-5, $18.00.