U.S. Army Finds Its Role
at Home Up for Grabs

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Richard Brennan is a retired U.S. Army officer and senior political scientist at RAND.

How should the U.S. Army help to defend the homeland?

In the past, the army has met the demand for homeland security requirements with forces designed primarily for conflicts abroad. Today, the prospect of an increasing level of terrorism within the borders of the United States has compelled the army to rethink that approach.

The army is examining the degree to which some of its units should be funded, manned, trained, and equipped for homeland security missions. The army has also been assessing how well state, local, and federal law enforcement agencies may be able to counter paramilitary and terrorist threats at home and how it might be required to work in conjunction with those agencies during times of crisis.

Prior to Sept. 11, 2001, army leaders had defined seven homeland security missions that might require the employment of army personnel, forces, or capabilities:

• protecting the nation's sovereignty and borders (controlling smuggling, drug traffic, illegal immigration, refugees, territorial incursions, terrorists, and theft of resources)

• providing military support to civil authorities (in response to natural disasters, riots, forest fires, or special events)

• responding to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced high-explosive (CBRNE) incidents

• protecting critical infrastructure (protecting U.S. facilities that are critical to the deployment of army forces)

• conducting information operations (protecting army communications and information systems and mitigating the effects of any attack on them)

• conducting national missile defense (countering limited ballistic missile attacks)

• combating terrorism.

As of July 2001, the steady-state requirements for army personnel in these seven areas totaled about 5,400 per day (see table). The surge capacity potentially needed in some mission areas was believed to be as much as 23,000 troops for a single event or incident. Simultaneous missions within the homeland could easily exceed these numbers. These totals excluded National Guard soldiers who were temporarily called to state active duty at the request of the governor to assist with small-scale local emergencies. Finally, because of security reasons, the totals did not include the number of soldiers that might be needed to assist federal law enforcement efforts in combating terrorism.

Clearly, given the new security environment, these estimates must now be revised upward. The fundamental assumptions about the roles and missions of the U.S. Army in homeland security have changed. Forthwith are some of the most salient points for reconsideration.

• In the aftermath of Sept. 11, the distinction between steady state and surge has blurred. Several thousand National Guard soldiers were rushed into security assignments at the nation's commercial airports for several months until increased civilian security protection could be organized, staffed, and trained.

• A large increase in army preparations to counter CBRNE threats seems likely. Such an increase would raise both steady-state and surge requirements.

• In two mission areas—critical infrastructure and information operations—the army has historically focused narrowly on protecting its own facilities. Now, the army could be called upon to protect similar facilities in the civilian sector, such as federal buildings.

• The size and duration of army personnel requirements for border security against terrorism and for counterterrorism in general are all open to question.

• Even the personnel requirements for national missile defense are unclear, given the uncertainties about its characteristics and evolution.

Ideally, civilian agencies would have sufficient resources to handle emergency situations, and civilian capabilities are now being expanded across the board. However, history shows that frequently only the army has adequate surge capacity to respond quickly to large-scale disasters. Disasters on the scale of the one experienced by New York City would overtax the resources of all but the nation's largest cities. The army must understand that, during times of crisis, civilian leaders are likely to call upon military resources to address the shortfalls in civilian capabilities.

The army could prepare for its new homeland missions in several ways. It could prepare for CBRNE attacks on U.S. territory, for example, by ensuring that its Chemical Reconnaissance and Decontamination platoons, Chemical Biological Rapid Response teams, Biological Integrated Detection System companies, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams have the proper training and equipment to integrate themselves easily with local first responders as well as with specialized county, state, and federal civilian organizations. While a large majority of these types of units reside within the reserve components, active-duty forces may also be called upon to perform these missions. The army could also increase the number of specialized units that have a mission of assisting domestic law enforcement efforts to defeat certain types of terrorism within the United States. For future tasks that promise to be significantly different from those in the past (such as quarantining urban areas), completely new force packages will probably need to be designed.

Beyond matters of personnel, the threats to homeland security should prod the army and the country's political leaders to rethink the current practice of consolidating military bases, power projection facilities, ammunition depots, and other sites. Although consolidation may enable greater efficiencies during times of peace, it may also exacerbate vulnerabilities during times of war. Large, centralized bases and depots are likely to be viewed as especially high-value targets by potential adversaries, because the loss of any one of these facilities could significantly hinder the U.S. response both at home and overseas.

The size and scope of army requirements for homeland security will remain a matter of debate and controversy. More analysis needs to be conducted to understand how much flexibility exists within the current and planned army capabilities for simultaneously fighting war abroad and contributing to security at home. Meeting these requirements will likely involve a mix of active and reserve forces and the National Guard. Determining the best mix of these forces is the essential next task for the army.

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