Treat Europe as a Full
Partner, and It Will Be
| By David C. Gompert |
David Gompert is president of RAND Europe.
As President Bush has often said, the United States cannot defeat global terrorism alone. America does not control the global aviation, shipping, financial, energy, health, and information systems that terrorists can exploit and target.
Other than the United States, no global actor is as vital to combating terrorism as Europe, given its economic weight, openness, global connections, and alliance with the United States. Whether in finding terrorists, seizing their money, conducting operations against them, or safeguarding critical infrastructure, what Europe does—and therefore, what Europeans think—matters vitally.
At present, European views of the United States and its policies more closely resemble those of Sept. 10, 2001, than the sympathy and solidarity that followed the attacks of Sept. 11. This is not because Europeans oppose counterterrorism measures taken, or asked of them, by the United States. Rather, the prevailing view can be traced to an undercurrent of general unease among Europeans about whether the United States is handling its extraordinary power responsibly.
Before 9/11, Europeans perceived their mighty friend as increasingly prone to do what it deemed best for itself regardless of the opinions of and effects on others. In European eyes, U.S. rejection of the Kyoto protocol on climate change, the global land-mine ban, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and other international agreements revealed a penchant for unilateralism and an aversion to being constrained—worrisome traits for the world's superpower. Consequently, Europeans were relieved when the United States struck back at its 9/11 attackers calmly, proportionately, and precisely, and Europeans appreciated that the United States chose to form and work within a broad coalition.
Subsequently, however, smoldering suspicions among Europeans about U.S. intentions have burst into flames because of what has appeared to them to be a ploy to settle an old score with Saddam Hussein by force, using specious claims of Iraqi complicity in the 9/11 attacks. Tangentially, the escalation of the second Palestinian intifada has heightened European concerns that the United States winks at Israeli violations of the Oslo peace accords. And thanks to bad timing, Washington's 30 percent increase in steel tariffs and its almost ebullient rejection of the new International Criminal Court, though unrelated to terrorism, have sharpened the European image of an America engorged with power, living by "the rules" only when convenient.
Yet the record shows that the United States has been scrupulous about multilateral legitimacy and involvement in its counterterrorism campaign:
For their part, Americans seem to think that Europe has been less than stalwart in countering terrorism. This opinion is as incorrect as it is for Europeans to overlook U.S. multilateralism. Europeans have taken some major steps:
Despite this solid practical record on both sides with respect to counterterrorism, the U.S.-European political climate has turned increasingly foul. Much mud has been slung in both directions. Influential Americans have accused Europe of anti-Semitism, while some Europeans whisper that U.S. policymaking is under Jewish control. Such hurtful, harmful charges suggest that this is not just another transatlantic tiff. It reflects the cumulative effects of post-cold war divergence in strategic outlooks, disparity in global responsibilities, and differences in domestic socioeconomic priorities. Unlike previous U.S.-European episodes of discord, this one is not so easily washed away by the reservoir of European gratitude for liberation and protection during the cold war. Anti-Americanism is loudest among those born after D-Day and who barely recall the Iron Curtain.
An Italian police officer keeps watch as an inspector emerges from a manhole outside the U.S. Embassy in Rome after examining a utility tunnel near the embassy on Feb. 26. Italian police were investigating if holes found in the tunnel walls were linked to a suspected chemical attack. Four Moroccans were arrested.
Whether on terrorism or on other matters, Europeans no longer care to be treated like followers. While this may be a hard pill for Americans to swallow, it is more sustainable for Europeans to decide to do for their own reasons what the United States would prefer they do. A U.S.-European partnership should be based on shared interests rather than on one partner's kowtowing to the other.
The responsible question to ask now is what the United States can do to sustain and increase European counterterrorism efforts and cooperation. Can counterterrorism be shielded from the ups and downs—mostly downs, lately—in U.S.-European relations? Or must the broader relationship be put on a solid, new footing if the long struggle is to be won?
The answer is both. Because Europeans will want to strengthen preparedness for their own safety, routine transatlantic cooperation on counterterrorism—expanded U.S.-allied intelligence sharing, technical exchanges, and functional coordination—will go a long way. But the United States needs to understand that the Europeans have their own views on implementation. Rather than expecting the Europeans, the closest of its allies, to be the most complaisant, the United States must expect them to be the most strong-minded, given their capabilities and their own exposure to terror. American flexibility will be at a premium.
Turkish peacekeepers wait for orders before moving out on a three-hour patrol through western Kabul on June 25. Turkey took over command of the 19-nation International Security Assistance Force from Britain the week before.
It should not be assumed that the United States must compromise its security interests in order to act in concert with allies who hold their own views. Americans are not innately right, and Europeans perpetually wrong, when it comes to security problems, including terrorism. For instance, the Europeans may have a point when they argue in favor of differentiating Iran from Iraq instead of lumping the two together. The Europeans also have more economic leverage than the United States in the Middle East.
The next test for U.S.-European security partnership may well be Iraq—a test that could either firm up or undermine the coalition's ability to defeat global terrorism. The Atlantic partners should make clear, with one voice, that Saddam Hussein must either permit prompt, unconditional, and unrestricted inspections of his weapons of mass destruction or face destruction of his power base and, consequently, his rule. If the United States were to accept this as a necessary precondition for military action and the Europeans were to agree to join that action if the ultimatum were not met, a threat to international security could be eliminated and a new model for U.S.-European strategic partnership established.
If the Iraqi menace can be removed by the United States and Europe acting jointly, the prospects for success in the struggle against terrorism, as well as other new dangers, would be brighter than they are today. If not, the days of unity following 9/11 could prove to be the last hurrah of both the counterterror coalition and the Atlantic alliance.
The United States needs at least one strong, reliable partner to deal with terrorism, Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and other perils of the new era. If this was not apparent when the dollar was flying high, when U.S. corporations were the envy of the world, when the American information technology sector defied gravity, and when the federal budget was awash in surplus, it is surely apparent now. There is only one legitimate candidate. The war on terrorism will require the United States to find the humility, and Europe to summon the nerve, to become genuine partners.
What accounts for the solid European performance in counterterrorism so far, despite the high-
decibel transatlantic bickering? It's simple: Europeans fear large-scale terrorism, too. Their heads, contrary to American cartoons, are not in the sand. Europeans are not countering terrorism to please the United States. U.S. leadership is not propelling European actions. In many European countries, doing America's bidding is not smart politics, given the tarnished U.S. image.
AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS/CRISTIANA PALLOTTA
Moreover, a new political bargain must be reached if cooperation on counterterrorism is not to become a casualty of wider U.S.-European discord. This bargain should assuage both U.S. concerns about European shirking and European concerns about U.S. unilateralism. Europeans expect a say in addressing the strategic issues surrounding global terrorism, especially in the Middle East tinderbox. Why should the United States give them one? Because since 9/11, the Europeans have, in fact, assumed more international responsibility, just as the United States has asked. As Europeans accept a greater burden, the failure to hear and heed their voices will either discourage them from accepting still greater responsibilities or encourage them to pursue their interests separately.
AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS/SERGEI GRITS