A Future of Sustained
Ground Operations
| By Bruce R. Nardulli |
Bruce Nardulli is a RAND policy analyst who is leading a study on the role of the U.S. Army in fighting the global war on terrorism.
Almost a year has passed since the president declared the war on terrorism the nation's top security priority. Considerable uncertainty remains as to the scale, scope, and pace of that war. Yet it is already clear that waging a long-term global war on terrorism will entail the extensive use of American ground forces in a wide variety of missions. The U.S. Army, in particular, will encounter more frequent deployments, more long-term deployments, and a demand for additional counterterrorism capabilities.
To prepare for the future, the army needs to respond in two overarching ways. First, it must consider options to meet the likely increase in the tempo of operations, continued high demand for scarce military specialties, and expanded requirements to support operations overseas in numerous new locales. Second, the army should adjust some of its light-weight and medium-weight capabilities (so-called "light" and "medium" forces) to reinforce the offensive campaign against terrorism with increased speed and modified combat power. The army must undertake these efforts while simultaneously maintaining its readiness to fight major regional wars and transforming itself for future warfare.
More People, Places, and Things
The army already has long-term commitments of troops in such places as Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sinai. In all likelihood, these will continue. If anything, the events of Sept. 11 have increased the pressure on U.S. forces to remain as a stabilizing influence. Added to these ongoing commitments will be substantial military operations against terrorist groups, such as the operations in Afghanistan. About 6,000 U.S. Army soldiers are committed to operations there, indicating the scale and duration of deployments that can be entailed in rooting out terrorists and their infrastructure and preventing their reemergence. Other sizable rotational deployments are possible, not only in Central Asia but also in Southwest Asia and Africa.
Because the United States plans to conduct the war on a wide front, the army will likely carry out other types of operations as well. Stabilizing volatile regions will require potentially extended peacekeeping operations. Expanded training of foreign militaries in counterterrorism operations is and will continue to be a major element of the U.S. war effort. Such operations are likely to include growing involvement with new partners and in geographic areas previously of little or no interest to the United States. As terrorist groups gravitate toward unstable regions or dysfunctional states for secure bases of operations, U.S. counterterrorism efforts will blend into a host of much broader counterinsurgency and foreign internal defense activities. Friends and allies threatened by terrorists will also expect our support, as is now the case in the Philippines and Georgia. U.S. Army forces will be involved in all of these activities.
Offensively, some counterterror operations will require new mixes of U.S. military capabilities and responsiveness. Certain classes of targets are likely to require different combinations of ground units. For example, a large complex of well-defended terrorist installations in difficult terrain, comparable to Tora Bora in Afghanistan, might require an extended operation of robust forces. Or the mission might call for a simultaneous attack on multiple sites spread across a large area. Many of these operations will occur on short notice and require very rapid response. National decisionmakers will insist on having the capability to attack high-value but fleeting targets in far-flung places with high confidence of success. The ability to seize or neutralize weapons of mass destruction will be especially important in this regard.
How the Army Should Respond
The U.S. Army presently conducts rotational assignments that include Bosnia, Kosovo, and now Afghanistan. Our analysis indicates that the overseas deployment of more than four active component brigades from the United States will undercut preparedness for a major theater war. Each additional brigade deployed would further erode readiness and significantly stress the force. The reasons for this large effect are numerous and complex, much of it having to do with peacetime policies regulating the number of soldiers available for overseas deployment and the continuing demands of training. The army needs to explore its options for expanding the rotation base, either by drawing on overseas or reserve brigades, modifying peacetime personnel policies, or possibly increasing the number of soldiers in the active component.
 U.S. ARMY/PFC. MATTHEW ACOSTA U.S. Army paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division march across Kandahar Airfield moments after arriving on a C-17 transport plane on July 10. |
As overseas deployments increase, so will overseas support requirements, including the need for overseas bases and widely distributed logistics. The army is a major stakeholder in the development of overseas prepositioning and basing arrangements, and it needs to articulate how the war on terrorism will change its future support requirements.
New offensive capabilities can be added incrementally. For example, the army can enhance its Special Operations Forces with additional capabilities in such key areas as special operations aviation. The army could also expand the special operations training of its ranger and light infantry units to reduce the burden on Special Operations Forces. To provide forces that are lethal and well protected but that can also strike quickly against difficult and time-urgent targets (such as well-defended weapons of mass destruction), the army should take advantage of the opportunities emerging from the new "Stryker" brigades and advanced future technologies.
Elements of the Stryker brigades—which are now entering the force as part of the army's transformation toward lighter, more mobile, and more lethal units—could be used to create a battalion-sized task force that would integrate Special Operations Forces, rangers, combat aviators, and mounted infantry troops using wheeled vehicles instead of tanks. Such a force could provide the needed mix of combat power and yet could deploy very rapidly from overseas bases or from the United States.
Perhaps the biggest overall challenge for the army is to provide the capabilities the nation demands for the war on terrorism while also meeting its many other responsibilities. Balancing these efforts and their risks will be a central feature of army decisionmaking in the years ahead. Drawing on its existing and transforming force structure, the army can avail itself now of opportunities to meet that challenge.