Cleanse the Polluted
Urban Seas

By Russell W. Glenn

Russell Glenn, a senior defense and political analyst at RAND, has led several projects for the U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and Joint Staff on urban military operations.

Most attempts to categorize terrorist threats focus on the nature of the terrorist groups themselves: member motivations, ends sought, demographic characteristics, or tactics employed. It is perhaps more revealing to consider these threats from an alternative perspective: the nature of the urban populations in which the terrorists operate.

Terrorist and other insurgent groups often require support from their environments to a greater extent than do regular military forces. Mao Tse-Tung aptly characterized this relationship of dependence on the general population by his revolutionary guerrillas: "The former may be likened to water and the latter to the fish who inhabit it." No less than with Mao's revolutionaries, terrorist successes are functions of the seas in which the individuals operate.

From organized criminal elements to urban gangs to terrorist groups, all of these organizations rely on the acceptance or tolerance of those who share their operating areas. Both the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, for example, operate in areas where subsets of the population are sympathetic to their goals, while the greater population is either apathetic, uncooperative, or antipathetic. In many other urban areas, the sea is predisposed toward tolerance as long as its members believe that dissident groups are merely exercising legitimate rights.

Even if the urban sea is universally hostile to terrorists, it is nevertheless dense and heterogeneous, making it fairly easy for attackers to conceal themselves. Unlike in rural areas, those speaking a foreign language and unfamiliar with local customs are commonplace. Daily contacts are typically superficial. Unusual behaviors may go undetected due to the high density of activities. The "hum" of urban daily life veils what would immediately attract attention in less busy domains. Uncovering a planned attack may be virtually impossible barring infiltration of the organization itself or a mistake on the part of the perpetrators.

Thus, even the most hostile waters are in some ways hospitable. At a minimum, the indigenous population provides concealment merely by virtue of its considerable numbers. It probably provides sustenance through routine commercial exchange. The residents of most cities are little fazed by the diversity of people around them and receive at best limited guidance as to how to detect threats from unfriendly individuals. Most residents are therefore unlikely to take action when they see unattended articles, marginally unusual behaviors, or other signs that would signal potential danger to the better informed. The sea may be overwhelmingly antagonistic in intent, but it is benign, even supportive, in effect.

To mitigate the dangers, it is necessary to treat the waters on which the threats depend. Removal of oxygen from a river causes its fish to die. Likewise, public officials can stunt or kill the undesirable elements residing in troublesome seas, pools, ponds, or puddles. But the remedy must be tailored. A reckless poisoning will destroy legitimate and illegitimate enterprises alike. Effective treatment will vary depending on the nature of the threat and the sea in which it swims.

Two recent examples illustrate successful, yet completely different, kinds of treatments.

In Northern Ireland, dissatisfied members of the Catholic community have provided a haven for the IRA for decades. Long-standing antipathies, such as those between Protestants and Catholics, may be immune to rapid treatment. However, the British have demonstrated considerable patience in improving the economic and political status of Northern Ireland's Catholic population despite the resistance from Unionists. Slowly, ever so slowly, living standards, education levels, and other measures of basic well-being are improving through mutually supportive economic, social, political, and military efforts. There is now evidence that the IRA is being deprived of its oxygen. The once-friendly pool shows signs of desiring to purge itself of the group's violence.
GlennRoses.hi
AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS/LUCY NICHOLSON
FBI agents Greg Rabinovitz and John Connell walk along the Tournament of Roses parade route in Pasadena, Calif., on Jan. 1. The FBI cooperated with Pasadena police, the state highway patrol, and the sheriff's department as part of an unprecedented police presence to prevent terrorist incidents.

On the other side of the world, in San Diego, the city successfully contained demonstrators who were attempting to disrupt the 2001 Biotechnology Industry Organization trade show. City officials recognized that the key target group was the sea at large (the general population) in which the demonstrators had chosen to operate. A preemptive educational campaign directed at the urban area's residents undermined support for the demonstrators prior to the event. An informed, law-abiding citizenry and city police force together refused to tolerate incursions onto the property and rights of fellow residents, choosing instead to support law enforcement efforts to restrict the activities of demonstrators who had other-than-legitimate agendas.

Eliminating sources of popular discontent, encouraging public intolerance of illegal acts, increasing public awareness of criminal methods—such initiatives make the seas unwelcome for dangerous intruders. Intruders must then seek support from the shrinking segments of the population who remain willing to be of assistance. Sources of provisions shrink accordingly. Further actions taken by the authorities to limit the freedom of movement—monitoring explosive materials, imposing curfews, and restricting travel routes—force those with ill intentions ever further into the shallow waters where they are more readily detected and removed.

The final step is to throw a net around the more exposed threats. This step depends upon considerable cooperation between disparate governmental and sometimes nongovernmental agencies. Few local urban governments have the financial or other capabilities to remove the threats on their own.

The federal government should therefore take the lead in the bulk of efforts to rid urban areas of such threats. The federal government should also be the conduit for disseminating the lessons learned by local, national, and international authorities. Nongovernmental elements, most notably the public itself, should be invited to play a role. The greater the collective support to limit the activities of urban threats, the tighter the net can be woven to sweep the threats from their supporting seas.

Cleanse the PollutedUrban Seas

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Cleanse the Polluted
Urban Seas