Foreign Policy for a World of Decision

Perhaps no job will be more important for the next president than to maintain the unusually peaceful environment that has allowed the world's economy to flourish and democracy to emerge in so many countries. To help the next administration promote further economic and democratic progress around the world, we offer recommendations specific to various geographic regions, stretching mostly from the western fringes of Europe and Africa to the eastern edges of Asia.

Across this vast expanse, Russia and China could pose the biggest challenges of all. Although our recommendations specific to Russia and China appear to be small in number, the shadows of these two countries reach deep into our recommendations for other geographic areas as well, notably Europe, Central Asia, and South Asia.

In addition to managing the sensitive relationships with Russia and China, the next president will bear considerable responsibility for determining the future of NATO, ensuring access to the Persian Gulf, and containing conflicts with countries ranging from Yugoslavia to Iraq to Cuba.

Beyond regional challenges, the next president will shoulder obligations of a distinctly global nature. People around the world will look to the U.S. president for leadership in marshaling international efforts against arms proliferation, protecting the global environment, and bestowing international aid across a needy planet.

In all areas of foreign policy, it will be exceedingly difficult for the United States to succeed on its own. Strengthening relations with our allies--and adding new ones--could mean the difference between failure and success. The pages that follow offer further pointers from RAND research.

Europe and Its Perimeter

Shift the focus and resources of NATO southward. Fresh conflicts in Kosovo and Iraq have spotlighted the risks emanating from NATO's southern periphery. At the alliance's 50th anniversary summit in Washington last year, NATO identified the Mediterranean as a key area for countering terrorism, countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, responding to humanitarian crises, projecting power, and ensuring energy security. NATO's outdated infrastructure in the south must be improved. The front-line states for NATO are now Turkey, Greece, Italy, and Spain. The United States and Europe need to assist Greece and Turkey in their efforts toward détente and reduce their risk of conflict over Cyprus or the Aegean Sea. Such a conflict could jeopardize the role Turkey could play in projecting power toward the Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea. Italy's proximity to the Balkans and North Africa gives it a critical role in responding to crises in these areas. Some U.S. Air Force assets should be transferred from the congested north of Italy to the south. Italy and possibly Turkey would also be ideal spots for new multinational centers for air operations. Spain will be important in supporting humanitarian and peacekeeping operations in Africa, particularly in the coastal and mountainous Maghreb region of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. The return of France as a full NATO partner would be a transforming event in strategy toward the south and should be a priority of U.S. policy. NATO forces might also negotiate greater access privileges in the Balkans and the Caucasus and pursue more defense-related cooperation with the partners in the alliance's new Mediterranean Initiative, an ongoing dialogue with six countries in North Africa and the Middle East.

Retain U.S. bases for training in the north, develop NATO infrastructure in the east, and make NATO forces lighter and faster. For political, economic, and training reasons, the United States should continue to deploy forces at its main bases in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy, where the facilities are well-equipped to support personnel and their families. However, NATO should also work steadily to improve the infrastructure in countries on its eastern borders so that any deployed air and ground forces could readily conduct operations within and beyond the expanded treaty area. Prodded by the United States, NATO allies are coming to the consensus that their military forces must be better prepared for operations in defense of common interests outside the NATO treaty area. The European allies need to make substantial investments in new transportation, communications, and logistics assets to make their forces more capable of rapid deployment and sustained operations away from their home stations. If some portion of U.S. Army forces stationed in Europe were reconfigured from heavy to light infantry, they would also be more deployable and better suited to the full range of missions they are likely to conduct.

Create new international institutions to enforce the rule of law in the Balkans. Only international oversight and recourse can assure the peoples of the Balkans that the rule of law will operate impartially to protect their lives, rights, and property and prevent local police and court intimidation. Arms control officials from the United States and Europe should push for the following four measures under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: (1) Increase the number of police monitors to prevent police harassment; (2) establish an international courthouse for registering deeds, wills, and other important papers; (3) establish an international court of appeals to retry local civil and criminal cases; and (4) insert international news teams in the region to offset the propaganda broadcast by factional media.

Encourage Polish-Ukrainian collaboration as a way to anchor Ukraine more tightly to the West. The greatest threat to Ukraine's independence is not military but economic. The lack of a coherent economic reform program could perpetuate Ukraine's dependence on the Russian market and imperil Ukraine's ability to integrate into Euro-Atlantic institutions. The Kuchma-Gore Commission, a binational commission chaired by Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma and Vice President Al Gore, has helped Ukraine develop close ties to the United States since 1994. But the slow pace of economic reform has undercut support for Ukraine in the U.S. Congress. During the late 1990s, however, Ukraine and Poland have succeeded in overcoming past animosities and developing remarkably cordial relations, even fielding a joint battalion intended to be used in international peacekeeping operations under NATO and U.N. aegis. Poland serves as Ukraine's gateway to the West, and if Ukraine's economy begins to stabilize, Ukraine will become a much more attractive partner for Poland and other countries in Central Europe.

Russia

Persian Gulf

Devote attention to areas in which the United States and Iran share common interests. The past few years have seen a gradual decline in acrimony between the United States and Iran. But three issues that have traditionally divided the two countries remain significant: (1) Iran's support for terrorism, (2) Iran's opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace effort, and (3) Iran's attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD). One way to transcend some of these divisions is to focus on common concerns. These concerns include the continuing threat of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, whose WMD capabilities arguably justify attempts by Iran to develop its own WMD capabilities; the excesses of the Taliban in Afghanistan, in whom neither Washington nor Tehran places much confidence; and drug trafficking, on which Iran has taken a hard line. Domestic tensions inside Iran, however, complicate a possible rapprochement with the United States. On the one hand, the United States cannot ignore the friendly overtures of moderate Iranian President Mohammad Khatami. On the other hand, excessive U.S. attention to Khatami could backfire, because his domestic competitors seek new pretexts for conflict with the United States as a way to undermine him. In this environment, whatever Washington does will be criticized or misinterpreted by some in Tehran. There is no ideal position for the United States. Perhaps the most it can do is pursue common regional interests with Iran while, at the same time, making it abundantly clear that the United States has no involvement in domestic Iranian politics.

Offer Iran both carrots and sticks to induce desired changes. U.S. attempts to influence Iran with penalties but without incentives have failed. Washington has been unable to force Iran to change behavior in three key areas: sponsoring terrorism, opposing the Arab-Israeli peace process, and acquiring weapons of mass destruction. U.S. economic sanctions have only made it easier for hardliners in Tehran to blame economic stagnation on their victimization by the United States. Washington needs to rely on inducements for change as well as sanctions for noncompliance. Initially, Washington should offer moderate Iranian leaders something tangible, such as the phased release of frozen Iranian assets, in exchange for progress on one or more of the three areas of key concern. Sanctions should be retained but targeted to specific policies, with inducements offered for alternative policies. Continued sanctions can even help the moderates, who can highlight the costs of certain policies. Future U.S. demands should be formulated to make it harder for Iranian conservatives to depict the process as a "sellout" to the United States. Engagement should be seen as the result of mutual compromise, rather than as a victory by one side over the other. In the process, Iran can pursue its economic goals while gaining regional stature as a result of its growing recognition and acceptance by the world's premier power.

Target Saddam Hussein's "center of gravity": his security forces. Nearly a decade of military strikes, economic sanctions, and political isolation have failed to force the Iraqi dictator to relinquish his ambitions for regional hegemony, dismantle his weapons of mass destruction (WMD), repay Kuwaitis for war atrocities, or comply with other international demands. Over the past 25 years, though, he has bowed to foreign pressure when it threatened his domestic power base: the vast internal security apparatus indispensable to his continued rule over the Iraqi state. This apparatus includes elite military and paramilitary organizations--the Republican Guard and the Special Republican Guard--as well as intelligence and security agencies whose ranks are filled with Hussein loyalists. Military strikes, economic sanctions, and popular unrest influence his behavior when they directly threaten the privileged position of his loyalists. If the United States expects to coerce Hussein in the future, Washington will need to level a triple threat: (1) Keep him contained, with continued economic sanctions and military encirclement, to deter his regional ambitions; (2) strike back aggressively against the elite military and security forces whenever Hussein refuses to surrender his WMD stockpile or adhere to other obligations to the United Nations; and (3) support the Iraqi opposition with arms, training, intelligence, diplomatic support, rewards for defection, and safe haven in neighboring states. The opposition does not have to be victorious, but it must be credible enough to make Hussein more susceptible to the other coercive threats. To make this three-pronged strategy work, the United States must find the political will to conduct sustained military operations, and Washington must prepare its allies and the U.S. public for the possibility of innocent Iraqi deaths, since Hussein has demonstrated a willingness to engage in wholesale slaughter to ensure that he kills his opponents, even if it means killing innocents as well.

Pursue diplomatic and military initiatives to reduce political violence around the Persian Gulf. Political violence, including terrorism and politically motivated killings, took the lives of hundreds of U.S. soldiers and civilians in the Middle East in the 1980s and 1990s and remains a serious threat for the coming decades. Political violence around the Persian Gulf--specifically in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates--is particularly worrisome, because these nations are critical to Western energy security and are threatened by Iran and Iraq. Several changes in U.S. policy could reduce the vulnerability of U.S. forces in this region, but all these changes would involve trade-offs that might limit U.S. military effectiveness or counter U.S. political goals. The changes include: (1) Encourage political and economic reforms to decrease popular hostility to regional governments; (2) reduce the number of U.S. troops in the region, while basing more troops immediately outside the region, especially in Turkey, and increasing their speed and lethality; (3) encourage Europe to share regional leadership and responsibilities; (4) strengthen the diplomatic partnership between the United States and regional governments by sharing more information and presenting a united front against common threats; and (5) increase military contacts between the United States and regional governments to improve intelligence and deepen cooperation. Even if the causes of political violence can be reduced, the United States will still have to pay a high degree of attention to protecting its soldiers and citizens in and around the Gulf.

Central Asia

Resist an overextension of NATO commitments to the Caspian region. Since the mid-1990s, the area around the Caspian Sea has sparked a dramatic rise in Western interest, spurred largely by a Western desire to exploit Caspian oil and gas. The countries of the region have likewise reached out to NATO to bolster their security and reduce their dependence on Russia. Some observers say the region is an area of Western interest "vital" enough to require the deployment of NATO forces to ensure energy security and counteract Russian hegemony. Wrong. Even if the region becomes a major source of oil and gas, which is uncertain, its total potential contribution to global energy supplies will be modest. Russia, meanwhile, will lack the strength to prevent Western access to the region or dictate the policies of the Caspian states. In fact, the most serious threats to the security and stability of the Caspian states are internal. Western policy should therefore focus on helping these states overcome their political, economic, and social challenges. NATO's role, through the Partnership for Peace program, should be restricted to advisory assistance, training, and guidance on military reforms. The Western allies should consider offering higher levels of aid to countries that demonstrate a real commitment to democratic reforms. For Russia, the establishment of stable, prosperous, and independent states along its periphery is in its own legitimate interests of ensuring secure, stable borders. NATO initiatives in the region need not work at cross-purposes with a strategy of engaging Russia.

Support an alternative Caspian oil export route over the Black Sea and through Ukraine to Poland. Current options for exporting Caspian oil are beset with political and logistical problems. At the same time, Russia's increasing stranglehold over Ukraine's energy imports bodes ill for that nation's ability to maintain its hard-won sovereignty. Both problems could be ameliorated by developing a Caspian oil pipeline through Ukraine. To date, however, the United States has supported just one pipeline route for Caspian oil: from Baku, Azerbaijan, to Ceyhan, Turkey, on the Mediterranean Sea. This route offers tremendous political advantages: It avoids Iran and Armenia, slices northward through NATO Partnership for Peace states Azerbaijan and Georgia, and traverses southward through longtime NATO ally Turkey. But the route would take longer and cost more to build than almost any other alternative. It passes through harsh terrain and secession-minded regions of Georgia and Turkey. Constructing the pipeline and ensuring its security both pose significant challenges. If the United States wants to ensure a safe and secure route for Caspian oil, it cannot look solely to Baku-Ceyhan. Without reneging on that initial commitment, Washington can support a "complementary" route as a short-term option to get the oil to market while the Turkish pipeline is under construction. A short-term complement would also hedge against the long-term failure of the Turkish route. In these respects, a Ukrainian route offers real potential. For years, Ukraine has advocated a route that would go through Azerbaijan and Georgia using an already existing pipeline, then over the Black Sea via tanker, and then through Ukraine to Poland. Most of the Ukrainian pipeline already exists as well. Ukraine's ongoing improvements to its pipeline and refinery infrastructure, combined with some foreign assistance, would make the pipeline ready to transport oil in the next few years, while Baku-Ceyhan is being built, and able to process larger quantities later. The price tag would be relatively small, an estimated $1 billion, compared with $2.5-$4 billion for the Baku-Ceyhan route. Problems with the Ukrainian route include Ukraine's abysmal investment climate and lack of energy sector reform. Current tax laws penalize, rather than invite, foreign investors. And Ukraine's energy sector is among the least efficient in the world. U.S. support for any Ukrainian pipeline must be made contingent on Ukrainian economic reforms. Fortunately, Ukraine today has a reform-minded government. And Ukraine has a mighty incentive: If it is to hold on to its independence, it needs to reduce its energy dependence on Russia, which means it needs this route for Caspian oil--and soon. Otherwise, Ukraine, an avid member of NATO's Partnership for Peace program, may end up calling on the United States and its NATO allies for defense against Russia.

Do not allow an unreasonable fear of Chinese expansionism in Central Asia to obscure our common interests. China, too, seeks access to the energy resources of Central Asia and has reached an agreement with Kazakhstan to build a pipeline to bring Kazakh oil to energy-hungry East Asia. But the primary objective of China in Central Asia is to retain the territorial integrity of its own western province, the volatile Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region, scene of Turkic and Muslim separatist agitation. Chinese policy seeks to maintain stability and contain ethnic, religious, and nationalist separatism through economic development, trade, and commercial relationships with the Central Asian countries on its western border. Like America and its allies, China wishes to contain the spread of radical Islam, reduce the dependence of Central Asian states on Russia, promote their stability and development, transport their oil to international markets, and open up their economies to the outside world. In these ways, China's role in Central Asia complements U.S. policy goals for the region. While China may develop a dominant influence in areas of Central Asia near its western border, there is little threat of China dominating the region in a manner that restricts U.S. access. There are simply too many other actors in the region.

Avoid reinforcing the "strategic partnership" between Beijing and Moscow. The recently forged partnership between China and Russia, a thinly veiled attempt to reduce U.S. global influence and power, may itself collapse beneath the weight of regional rivalry in Central Asia. China's economic growth and Russia's economic turmoil in recent years portend a dramatic reversal in the balance of Russian and Chinese power. In the next 10 to 20 years, Russia is likely to become more concerned about the potential threat of growing Chinese power than it is about the enduring American power. Thus, the United States is an important variable in how Sino-Russian relations evolve. Greater tension in Sino-U.S. and Russian-U.S. relations will produce a stronger rationale for Russia and China to subordinate their differences in the interest of resisting the stronger and more threatening American power.

China, South Asia, and East Asia

Adopt a new, blended strategy of "congagement" toward China. The past two presidential administrations have described their strategy toward China as one of engagement. Engagement rests on the hope that economic, political, and military connections will either transform China into a cooperative democracy or at least lead to a mutual understanding of some common key interests. In the meantime, however, engagement helps China develop economically and militarily into a potentially more threatening adversary. Some on Capitol Hill argue that engagement already has failed. They claim that China is destined to become a major threat to the United States. They assert that the United States must move from engagement to containment. But containment is equally troublesome: It presupposes conflict where there presently is none, a presupposition that could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Neither engagement nor containment is adequate for dealing with China. Neither balances the two principal U.S. objectives: to encourage China to become more democratic and cooperative while, at the same time, protecting U.S. interests in case China becomes more hostile. The next administration should transcend both containment and engagement and opt instead for a mixed strategy of "congagement." Under congagement, the United States would enhance military, economic, and political relations with China--but would also hedge its bets. For example, the United States would: (1) prevent the Chinese military's acquisition of weapons that would be difficult to counter, (2) strengthen existing export controls among U.S. allies to further restrict Chinese access to the Western technologies relevant to the most dangerous weapons systems, and (3) strengthen U.S. military capabilities and those of its friends in East and Southeast Asia to deter and resist potential Chinese aggression.

Be frank with India and Pakistan about nuclear risks, and seek to reduce the underlying tensions between India and China. In the aftermath of their 1998 nuclear tests, both India and Pakistan are unable to deploy a nuclear force that could survive a first strike. Because Indian nuclear forces would be unlikely to withstand a Chinese first strike, Indian deployment of nuclear weapons would actually make a Chinese nuclear strike more likely. This reality--combined with the risks of accidents, theft, unauthorized use, and the drain of resources away from conventional military forces--makes it clear that India would only decrease its security by deploying nuclear forces. Nuclear weapons would present both India and Pakistan with substantial risks and expenditures, and the risks to the rest of the world are undeniable. The United States needs to level with India and Pakistan about the nuclear mess they are making. The United States should also explore what could be done to alleviate the underlying tensions in the region. For example, resolution of India's border disputes with China could hasten the force reductions that have begun in the last few years along the Sino-Indian border. Steps like these, rather than Indian and Pakistani deployment of vulnerable nuclear forces, hold the key to stability in South Asia.

Prepare for potential upheaval on the Korean peninsula. Despite signs of reduced tensions, including the recent summit between North and South, the dire economic and political conditions in North Korea could still provoke an array of unpredictable consequences. All major powers, including the United States, hope to avoid acute destabilization in the north by extending food, energy, and economic assistance to the north. Notwithstanding these efforts, Korean unification could still result under four widely different scenarios: (1) peaceful integration, (2) collapse of North Korea and unification through absorption, (3) unification through armed conflict, and (4) sustained disequilibrium with potential external intervention. Each scenario entails very different implications for U.S. forces. For nearly five decades, the United States and South Korea have emphasized deterrence of an invasion from the north and defense of South Korea in the event of deterrence failure. Today, however, the spectrum of potential military responsibilities is far greater. Should unification occur, these responsibilities could include dismantling weapons of mass destruction, providing large-scale humanitarian assistance, demobilizing the North Korean armed forces, and rebuilding the north's decrepit infrastructure. The U.S. and South Korean militaries need to outline a set of operational requirements and respective responsibilities under all these potential scenarios. The United States should also establish closer lines of communication with China, including its military leadership, in advance of any major political change. Absent such means of communication, there could be incentives for unilateral action that could trigger a serious crisis.

Lay the foundation for a new, more equal relationship with South Korea. Having achieved rapid economic growth, South Koreans aspire to become more self-reliant in their foreign and security policy. They do wish to continue their alliance with the United States. However, they are moving beyond the cold-war anxiety over North Korean aggression, and they are more discerning about the alliance's role and dubious about the long-term value of the U.S. regional military presence. The key short-term challenge is to ensure that Washington and Seoul pursue complementary approaches toward North Korea. For instance, South Koreans are likely to resist U.S. measures that might risk conflict on the peninsula in the absence of some clear and direct provocation from the north. Three long-term challenges stand out: improving South Korean impressions of their standing with and value to the United States, accommodating growing South Korean self-confidence, and preparing for a post-unification period. Large payoffs could come from three responses: (1) Adjust U.S. diplomatic style to convey greater respect for Korean capabilities and prerogatives; (2) return greater responsibility for North-South issues to the two Koreas themselves, with the United States playing a supporting role; and (3) initiate planning now to prepare for the period after unification. Such planning should focus on redefining what will be the alliance's purpose, military strategy, and division of roles once the two Koreas are unified. The odds of making a successful transition are likely to be much better if planning is initiated before unification.

Cuba

But lift the economic embargo later. There is little evidence that lifting the U.S. embargo today will prod Cuba toward a more open society. If anything, lifting the embargo unconditionally and shoring up the island's economy could serve as a powerful incentive for the regime not to enact deeper economic and democratic reforms. As long as Fidel Castro is on the scene, Cuba and the United States will remain divided by contradictory interests: The U.S. goal of a more open, democratic, and market-oriented Cuba is directly at odds with Castro's interests in maintaining his power, playing on the world stage, and assuring his defiant, anti-American legacy. No U.S. president can alter Castro's resistance to change. Fundamental change will have to await his passing or the weakening of his grip on power. Whenever the post-Castro moment arrives, the U.S. president should use the embargo's lifting as leverage to induce the regime to commence the island's democratic transition. Additionally, the U.S. government should be ready with a diplomacy strategy, humanitarian aid program, and economic and technical assistance program to assure the Cuban people that the United States is prepared to assist their democratic transition.

Create a bipartisan national commission to build a consensus on policy toward a Cuba without Castro. There is broad agreement on the ultimate goal of U.S. policy: to promote a free, democratic, and market-oriented Cuba. The deeper, more intractable differences concern the means by which to achieve this goal. The United States sorely needs a policy consensus to ease the tension between Congress and the executive branch before Castro fades from the scene. The commission needs to propose replacing the current hodgepodge of policies with a more coherent strategy. The commission should be created soon after the presidential election of 2000.

Global Environment

Foreign Aid

Target foreign aid more strategically to further foreign policy objectives. Global demographic trends have implications for U.S. foreign policy. Carefully targeted foreign aid could help some important allies and friends in the developing world restrain their rapid population growth, thus allowing them to conserve resources, develop their economies, and buy time to reform their political systems. A number of developing countries--such as Egypt, Malawi, Bolivia, and the Philippines--are interested in reducing their fertility rates and probably would be interested in more U.S. aid for this purpose. Two kinds of U.S. aid that would be particularly helpful in reducing fertility rates in these countries would be support for family planning efforts and for women's educational programs.