The historical roots of the conflict in Kosovo date back to the 8th and 9th centuries. One of the most cherished centers of the medieval Serbian empire, Kosovo remains a symbol of Serbian nationhood. It is the site of the battle of Kosovo Polje, where the Serbian kingdom met its destruction in 1389 at the hands of the Ottoman armies. For six centuries, that battle has been an inspiration for national survival--and national revival.
But Kosovo has an equally important, if more recent, significance for the Albanians. The Albanian national revival dates to the formation of the "Albanian League" of 1878, whose seat was in Prizren, southern Kosovo. For the Albanians, Kosovo is the springboard and nucleus of their national unification movement. Moreover, Albanians have constituted the majority of the population of Kosovo since the 18th century.
The seeds of the current conflict can be traced to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the peace arrangements worked out after the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. Under the Treaties of London and Bucharest, Albania became an independent state in 1913, but Kosovo and parts of Albanian-speaking Macedonia were ceded to Serbia, placing one third of the Albanian population under the jurisdiction of neighboring states. The Albanians felt they had been treated unjustly. Their national aspirations have been simmering ever since.
After World War I, the Serb government carried out a campaign of Serbianization and colonization of Kosovo, forcing Albanians to emigrate or assimilate. During World War II, Albania, then a vassal of Italy, annexed Kosovo and part of Western Macedonia and reversed the roles, conducting a campaign of Albanianization, evicting Serbs, and colonizing Kosovo with Albanians. Some 300,000 Serbs were expelled from Kosovo and never allowed to return.
As communist rule waned in Yugoslavia in the 1980s, Slobodan Milosevic exploited rising Serb nationalism, especially the sense of grievance regarding Kosovo. In 1989, he stripped Kosovo of its autonomy; removed Kosovar Albanians from key positions in administration, education, and the media; and put the province under martial law. The crackdown spurred Slovenia and Croatia to secede, thus provoking the breakup of Yugoslavia, and set the stage for the present conflict. The Kosovar Albanians declared their own independent republic in September 1991; set up their own hospitals, clinics, schools, and parliament; and boycotted Serb-dominated institutions and elections.
The Dayton Accords, which ended the war in Bosnia, were a watershed. Dayton did not deal with Kosovo, leaving the Kosovar Albanians embittered and contributing to their radicalization. Power increasingly passed from their nonviolent leader, Ibrahim Rugova, and into the hands of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). By the time the Rambouillet negotiations began in February 1999, the KLA had become the dominant force in Kosovo. Some KLA leaders support independence, while others yearn for a "greater Albania" that would also include heavily Albanian parts of Macedonia.
How the current conflict will end depends largely on Western policy and the NATO military campaign. But two things are clear. First, the Rambouillet accord is dead. It is hard to see Albanians willing to accept any form of Serb rule after the recent expulsions and ethnic cleansing. The most likely outcome is the establishment of a de facto independent Kosovo under Western protection. Second, the question of a "greater Albania," left hanging at the end of the Balkan Wars, is now back on the table. Most countries don't want to see a greater Albania because of the dangerous implications of redrawing borders based on ethnicity. For Western leaders, the problem is how to manage Albanian national aspirations without spreading the conflict further.
Kosovo by itself is not strategically important to the West. NATO has accepted responsibility for Kosovo less because of its intrinsic value than because of the magnitude of its humanitarian tragedy and broader concerns about the future of NATO itself. It is the desire of NATO allies to help the people of the Balkans join the rest of Central Europe in building a constructive, peaceful future.
For the first time in history, there is a chance of achieving the goal, proclaimed by President George Bush, of a "Europe whole and free." In the last seven years, NATO has recreated itself to pursue precisely that goal, as well as other common interests beyond Europe's borders. But in 1995, the allies finally understood that, if NATO proved ineffective in Bosnia, it would not be taken seriously with its broader mission. So NATO conducted air strikes against Bosnian Serbs, which led to the Dayton Accords, to the end of the war there, and to the introduction of the NATO-led Stabilization Force that has remained, without a single combat fatality, for more than 1,200 days.
In Kosovo, however, the allies failed to account for the obduracy of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, whose career has been built on bolstering Serb nationalism. When the Rambouillet peace talks failed in March, NATO opened what it foresaw to be a limited bombing campaign to demonstrate to Milosevic the futility of his actions, thereby hoping to repeat the allied success in Bosnia. This time, however, Milosevic outmaneuvered the allies by using the time spent on diplomacy to plan a massive assault, then killing civilian leaders in Kosovo by the thousands and forcing the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians, producing the largest mass of refugees in Europe since World War II. The peace talks, it turns out, had served as a cover for Milosevic to prepare his blitzkrieg.
At NATO's 50th anniversary summit in April, all 19 countries coalesced politically around a set of war aims: end the fighting, make Serb forces withdraw, enable refugees to go home, provide an international force to secure their safety, give the Kosovar Albanians some say over their future, and begin the reconstruction of the region. But regarding war means, the allies at the summit continued to focus on the use of air power alone and again foreclosed the possible use of ground forces. By failing even to begin preparations for a ground campaign, the allies also forfeited the potential deterrent value of such an action.
The key factor driving NATO strategy is the desire for minimal allied casualties. As a result, we see two separate wars: Milosevic is fighting on a short time frame of ethnic cleansing, NATO on a long time frame of degrading overall Yugoslav military capabilities and trying to influence political decisions through strategic bombing. So far, Milosevic is prevailing.
Looking beyond the war, the allies have to accept long-term responsibilities throughout the Balkans and Southeast Europe, an area of increasing strategic importance and the way station to the troubled Middle East and beyond. When the Kosovo conflict does come to an end, troops will be deployed in the former Yugoslavia for a long time to come--as in Bosnia, where reconstruction and creation of hope for the future are well under way. NATO must accept that it now "owns" the Balkans and will have to be engaged there for the indefinite future.
In parallel, the allies, with the Europeans in the lead, also need to create a comprehensive, effective policy of reconstruction for the entire region. This must include a mini-Marshall Plan for the countries in deepest need: the "frontline" states of Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Romania, Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia. The policy should also include renewed efforts to reduce tensions and work toward a settlement in the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus triangle. Beyond the conduct of the war itself, this broader strategy will be the true test of NATO's future in the region and of American leadership there.
NATO's air campaign has succeeded in its first objective of creating a fairly benign environment for air operations over Yugoslavia. The allies have also been effective at attacking a wide range of "strategic targets" thought to be of value to the Milosevic regime. Damage to these targets, however, has not persuaded Milosevic to change policy in any significant way vis-à-vis Kosovo. Hence, the key objective of NATO's air strategy now must be to damage, disable, and demoralize Serbian military forces in and around Kosovo.
Instances of bombing campaigns as effective coercive mechanisms are few and far between. Indeed, we should not be surprised that the most evident immediate result of NATO's air attacks on military, political, and economic targets in Serbia has been a rallying around the Milosevic regime. It would be unwise to expect continued bombing of such targets to bring about a dramatic reversal of policy in Belgrade.
Over time, however, continued air attacks on Serbian forces in Kosovo will have a telling effect. Targets there include Serbian armor and artillery, ammunition storage areas, petroleum stocks, support assets such as barracks and vehicles, and the Serbian troops themselves. As more attack and support aircraft arrive, NATO will increasingly be able to conduct round-the-clock operations over Kosovo and to exploit more fully any favorable weather conditions.
Nevertheless, progress will be slow. The terrain and prevailing weather in Kosovo favor the Serbian forces on the ground. And the nature of their operations is such that they are not compelled to move large numbers of troops or vehicles over great distances, thus limiting opportunities for NATO aircraft to locate and strike them. A total of two to three months of steady air attacks might be required before substantial damage is done.
The arrival of AH-64 Apache helicopters will help. These can be devastatingly effective armor killers, and their operations are not as sensitive to weather conditions as those of the high-flying, fixed-wing aircraft. But there are risks. It is not possible to suppress comprehensively the many shoulder-fired, short-range, surface-to-air missiles or anti-aircraft artillery pieces fielded by the Serbian forces. And because the Apaches fly low and slow, they are far more vulnerable to these threats than their higher-flying brethren.
Of course, air forces alone cannot prevent small groups of armed men from terrorizing unarmed civilians. Thus, NATO's prospects for success will turn ultimately on its ability to control operations on the ground. This reality mandates the need for NATO ground forces. Unless and until NATO prepares to send ground forces into Kosovo--with or without Belgrade's acquiescence--the alliance will be ceding the initiative to Milosevic. The challenge for ground force planners will be to develop a plan that can be executed with a reasonably sized force (something far smaller than the 200,000 figure mentioned publicly) yet with modest risks of friendly casualties. Air power can help prepare the way for such an operation, but it cannot substitute for it.
NATO has always planned to put ground forces into Kosovo. It wants to do so only under "permissive" conditions--where NATO forces can enter unopposed--and since the Rambouillet accord is now dead, the NATO peacekeepers now waiting in Macedonia to implement that accord may yet be used to enforce another agreement.
But dimming prospects for such an agreement are prompting talk of a NATO attack into Kosovo under semi- or even non-permissive conditions. As relations between NATO and Serbia grow more embittered, the difference between a peacekeeping and an offensive force is narrowing; at this point, neither NATO nor Kosovar Albanian refugees are likely to enter Kosovo without a strong force. In short, NATO ground forces are likely to enter Kosovo one way or another, and it makes sense to think in terms of an offensive force.
Despite occasional talk about "seizing Belgrade," NATO forces would more likely invade Kosovo with the goal of seizing, holding, and stabilizing that entity and providing security to returning refugees. This would probably require a force of roughly 50,000 to 70,000 troops, yielding a ratio of security forces to returning refugees even higher than the ratio of troops to civilians in Vietnam at the height of that war. While terrain and logistic difficulties favor light forces for this mission, some armor will be required to hedge against uncertainty. Helicopters will be useful both for firepower and for mobility.
Getting this force into position poses daunting logistic challenges. Albania is willing to host an offensive operation but sports only one decent airfield--at Tirana, well down the mountains from the border with Kosovo. There is but one road from Tirana to Kosovo, and it narrows to only one lane at some points. Launching out of Macedonia looks easier logistically, with airfields closer to the Kosovo border, a major road coming up from Thessaloníki, in Greece, and a NATO force already in place. But neither Macedonia nor Greece seems anxious to host offensive operations. It would be worth seeking to negotiate permission to run some level of military action out of Macedonia in return for moving Macedonia's swelling refugee population back into Kosovo. Using either Albania or Macedonia or both, it should take two months or more to assemble the force.
Although this will be a NATO operation, U.S. forces are likely to spearhead offensive action, because they are the ground forces with the best links to the strike aircraft that will support the operation, making it a truly effective joint operation. As the ground operation succeeds, the balance between European and U.S. forces can be shifted to reflect the kind of European dominance that U.S. policymakers have sought.
Having seized Kosovo, NATO forces could expect to stay for some time, making Kosovo a protectorate. We may well be watching the slow repositioning of NATO's military preponderance out of Germany, no longer threatened, and into the Balkans, which so often flare with violence during periods of geostrategic transition. There may be a chance to turn the province over to the KLA at some point, but little written about that organization suggests that it is coherent enough to defend Kosovo on its own, much less help establish a government. If an offense goes forward, there will be no chance of returning the province to Serbia.
An agreement between Milosevic and NATO is quite unlikely, because their war aims are mutually exclusive. Milosevic wants Serb rule in Kosovo and no return of refugees. NATO wants self-rule in Kosovo and the return of refugees. Negotiations between Russia and NATO are more about finding a constructive role for the Russians than about realistically mediating a deal.
There are two more-plausible outcomes for NATO: defeat and victory.
Defeat will occur if Milosevic doesn't buckle and NATO does. If bombing doesn't bring Milosevic around and NATO cannot reach consensus on ground intervention, NATO will splinter or become paralyzed. Milosevic would survive as a "world-class" rogue, and his regime would become even more dangerous, desperate, and isolated. Yugoslavia could become another Iraq or North Korea, possibly with an interest in weapons of mass destruction. Instability would continue within and outside Yugoslavia. The isolation of Yugoslavia and the refugee burden would make reconstruction of the region difficult. Facing major challenges elsewhere and no positive role in Europe, the United States might back out and leave to Europe the principal responsibility for dealing with Milosevic. A larger division of labor would emerge, with the Europeans--unprepared--left with responsibility for security in Europe, and the United States with responsibility for security in the Middle East and Asia. Such a division of labor would vitiate NATO and abort its new strategic purpose. NATO would formally survive but become a husk.
The alternative is victory. Once the Serb military gets sufficiently ground down, NATO would enter and occupy Kosovo in a "semi-permissive" environment. American air and ground forces would bear the brunt of the duty but would then gradually reduce their presence and shift ongoing security responsibilities to European forces. Refugees who wanted to go home could do so. Self-rule would be established. Balkan reconstruction could proceed, funded mainly by the European Union. Defeated and having lost Kosovo, the Milosevic regime would operate on borrowed time. Under these conditions, a new Atlantic partnership could emerge, with the United States and European allies jointly taking responsibility for security in Europe and beyond. If there is a silver lining to this tragic conflict, this is it: the emergence of a European-American partnership, rather than a division of labor.
For this victory to ensue, NATO must be prepared to insert ground forces without the approval of Milosevic. The alternative is not an acceptable agreement but rather failure.
Kosovo has other implications for U.S. strategy. First, U.S. strategists need to rethink the way we categorize military operations--such as "major theater wars" and "small-scale contingencies." Such categories do not adequately represent reality. Rather, we face a continuum of contingencies, ranging from major wars to minor operations. Second, the full cost of the American role in the world is greater than we have admitted. We have routinely supplemented the defense budget, deferred modernization of our forces, and placed undue strains on personnel. Add a national missile defense and homeland defense, and that amounts to an even heftier defense burden. Third, in view of this, it is time for the United States to lean more heavily on its closest allies--the Europeans--to improve their forces and make them interoperable with our own so they can contribute more. Kosovo is a watershed for NATO. The allies today have very little capability to intervene in Kosovo or anywhere else. That has to change.
Finally, there are serious implications for international law and order. The arrangement in which Russia and China have veto power on the Security Council would have made the United Nations inadequate to deal with the Kosovo problem. To protect their values and interests, the NATO democracies have had to take international law into their own hands. They have established the precedent that illegitimate regimes that slaughter their own people do not enjoy sovereign protection. So we are now in a world in which the United Nations, which has legal authority, is ineffective, while NATO, while effective, has no legal authority.