AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS/ROYAL AIR FORCE
James A. Thomson is president and chief executive officer of RAND and chairman of the board of RAND Europe. This first appeared as a commentary in the International Herald Tribune.
At the April summit commemorating NATO's 50th anniversary, there was some talk of a European security and defense identity. But the main factor governing security relations between America and Europe--Europe's military weakness--was not seriously addressed.
Compared with the United States, Europe has little ability to protect common interests outside of Europe. For example, Europe is unable to participate meaningfully in any military coalition that might deal with dangers from weapons of mass destruction or help ensure the security of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Even within European geography, Europe is weak. Only about a quarter of the sorties in the current conflict against Yugoslavia have been conducted by European air forces.
Because the United States shoulders the military security responsibility, it also dominates the formulation of policy toward any international issue that has a military component beyond the European continent, whether it is dealing with Saddam Hussein or responding to international terrorism. European political leaders end up as backseat drivers. If they do not like the policy direction chosen by the United States, they can complain, be silent, or try to figure out how to get control of the wheel. Complaints from backseat drivers are usually not welcome. Grabs at the wheel are certain to be rebuffed.
Most disputes between the United States and European nations over security issues in the past few years can be seen in this light. America and France, in particular, have been at odds over NATO command assignments, policy toward Iran and Iraq, and the need for United Nations resolutions in advance of military actions. Other countries have been silent, often following policies at odds with American desires, such as those concerning sanctions against Iran.
Unless Europe and the United States create a true partnership based on European military strength, we can expect these sorts of disputes to continue. America will not yield control over military operations or forces while it provides the bulk of the capability and assumes the major risks. Europeans will continue to grouse about the U.S. tendency to see every crisis in military terms and to veer toward military responses.
The European Union (EU) has a larger population and economy than the United States. It also has more men and women under arms. Its subordination to the United States on security issues is both odd and galling.
Europe's military weakness is a legacy of the cold war. European nations provided the bulk of the ground forces that would have defended Europe against the Soviet threat. These forces were raised by conscription. The lower cost of conscript armies and Europe's focus on defending European soil permitted Europe to spend relatively less on defense than the United States did during the cold war.
AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS/ROYAL AIR FORCE
The exception to the rule: A British Tornado GR1 air-craft at Ali Al-Salim airbase in Kuwait gets prepared for Anglo-American strikes against Iraqi military targets as part of Operation Desert Fox, which has continued since December 1998. A collaborative project of the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy, the Tornado is in service with all three air forces and the German navy.
As a result, European forces are manpower-intensive and unable to be employed at great distances. In the aggregate, Europeans spend less than the United States on developing and buying new weapons and equipment and on the people who operate them. America has opted to spend its defense dollars on technology and high-quality volunteer forces. This has left European military forces at least a technological generation behind the United States.
Britain is the exception that proves the rule. She abandoned conscription decades ago. Although her forces are small, they are able to operate side by side with American forces. Both the United States and Britain spend about $200,000 per soldier, sailor, and airman. Europe, excluding Britain, spends about $70,000, demonstrating the imbalance of the technology and professionalism of European forces compared with American and British forces.
Britain's ability and willingness to be a military partner to the United States gives her influence over American policy. It helped President Bill Clinton that he could point to Britain's participation in the recent attacks on Iraq as evidence that he was not motivated by domestic political concerns. It is certain that Clinton listens carefully to the views of Prime Minister Tony Blair.
There are three ways for Europe to create the military strength needed for a true partnership of equals.
First, Europe could increase its defense spending, which currently stands at about 60 percent of the American level. But low levels of defense spending are built into European economies, and increases are unlikely.
Second, Europe could reduce territorial defenses, abandon conscription, cut back manpower levels, and build up volunteer forces able to operate at great distances. This sort of restructuring would be an immense political challenge. There are vested interests in every institution: military services, defense bureaucracies, and industries.
Third, Europe could organize as a single defense entity, rather than the current collection of 14 independent forces within the EU. This reorganization could be accomplished within NATO or outside it. What is needed is a combined European command structure and a centralized defense planning, programming, and budgeting authority.
This sort of integrated command and planning system is a far cry from anything that has been contemplated so far. The difficulties that European nations have had in the 1990s in coordinating security policies do not inspire confidence that serious progress can be expected in improving defense efficiency.
However, there has been modest movement in these directions. Force restructuring is happening, including in Germany, where a rapid reaction force is being created. France has abandoned conscription, and Italy is now considering it. Multinational military commands and units now exist. And Britain, which has opposed an EU defense role in the past, now supports one.
Americans should applaud this. But Americans and Europeans should be realistic in recognizing that these are but baby steps on a long and arduous road. Unless a major project is mounted that will promise greater European military strength, Americans will be skeptical of more communiqués promising a European security and defense identity. And Americans will be unwilling to agree to an increased European role on the basis of promises alone.