RAND > RAND Review > Spring 2004 > Redefining the Enemy: The World Has Changed, But Our Mindset Has Not

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Redefining the Enemy

The World Has Changed, But Our Mindset Has Not

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"Soldiers" of Terrorism

Turkish women

Turkish women ask for help from a policeman as they seek information about relatives after an explosion near the Neve Shalom Synagogue in Istanbul, Turkey, on Nov. 15, 2003.

The most immediate threat we face is terrorism. The global jihad being waged by al Qaeda and like-minded Islamist fanatics draws upon these historical roots:

  • Muslim reactions to colonial rule
  • continued military defeats at the hands of the West
  • a deep sense of humiliation and desire for revenge
  • failures of governments and economies in North Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia
  • increased emigration and the isolation and alienation often felt by marginalized immigrant communities
  • a growing sense of unity among all Muslims fed by charismatic communicators, like Osama bin Laden, who use images of suffering—in Bosnia, Chechnya, Palestine, and Iraq, reinforced daily on Arab satellite television—to indoctrinate followers
  • the common sense of purpose and lasting connections created by the ultimately successful jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

We avoid the construct, but it is for America’s current jihadist foes a religious war starting centuries ago and lasting until judgment day. It is this mindset that has been grafted upon the tactics of contemporary terrorism. The two now flow together, applying jihadist codes of operation to a terrorist repertoire. It is a powerful and dangerous combination.

Today’s terrorist adversaries have no intention of matching America’s superior military capability. They intend to exploit its vulnerabilities. Like all religious fanatics, they see themselves as morally superior, armed with the sword of God, commanded to wage a holy war. They see Americans as soulless, spineless, materialistic beings, unwilling to make sacrifices—people whose sole measures of well-being are the Dow Jones average and retail consumption, desperate for the peace and tranquility that the terrorists can deny.

The 9/11 attacks had cascading effects on the economy. Total direct and indirect costs amounted to hundreds of billions of dollars, and the effects are still being felt in some sectors. Terrorists have recognized the potential of economic warfare. They speak about this potential more often, although they have yet to fully exploit it.

Tomorrow’s terrorists might become more adept in this endeavor. They could attempt to destroy our economy through terror alone—periodic devastating attacks, perhaps years apart, that will ensure the credibility of their continuing threats in the years in between. They already are becoming more adept at shaping our perceptions, exploiting the global news media to conduct "effect-based operations" in which they observe and measure how their own chatter and threats provoke security alerts that impose costly security measures and disrupt the economy.

Or they might move in the direction of cyberterrorism, applying technical skills to the task of protracted warfare against our information systems and commerce, possibly even carrying out remote physical sabotage via the Internet. What is now competitive "sport" to design a more malicious computer virus could become a more-organized strategy of destruction, or "virtual jihad."

"Combatants" of Organized Crime

Coffins of Afghanistan

Coffins of Afghanistan’s Civil Aviation Minister Mirwais Sadiq and two high-ranking police officers are carried during the funeral in Herat, Afghanistan, on March 23. Sadiq, son of the powerful Herat provincial governor Ismail Khan, was killed in bloody clashes in Herat.

The same conditions that foster terrorism also provide opportunities to organized crime. Failed government institutions, collapse of authority, cities filled with unemployed young men can be found in badlands and bad neighborhoods around the world. Organized crime has exploited its new space, as any other business corporation would, to include global sourcing, diversifying into new profitable areas, developing new markets, creating new business alliances.

The relationships between organized crime and terrorism are diverse and complex. To finance their operations, some terrorist groups have turned to crime or forged alliances of convenience with criminal groups, as in Colombia. In other parts of the world, organized crime is so pervasive and powerful that it challenges the state, as in the Balkans. In still other countries, the rulers themselves are criminals commanding states—sovereign outlaws.

Gangsters may recruit extremists to carry out terrorist attacks, as in Mumbai, India. National governments may employ criminals to attack foreign foes. Insurgents may move into organized crime. Professional criminals may act as middlemen in the transfer of small arms, explosives, or the ingredients of weapons of mass destruction; or they may provide the routes for the clandestine delivery of such weapons. Money laundering is an industry that serves both terrorists and organized crime.

Smaller but More Virulent

Power is descending. Violence is escalating. In 1974, I wrote that the power to kill, destroy, disrupt, cause alarm, and oblige societies to divert vast resources to security is descending into the hands of smaller and smaller groups whose grievances, real or imaginary, it will not always be possible to satisfy. The irreconcilables, fanatics, and lunatics—who have existed throughout history—have become an increasingly potent force to be reckoned with.

Subsequent events have borne this out. Over the past three decades, terrorists have multiplied the number of their victims by an order of magnitude every 15 years. In the 1970s, the bloodiest terrorist incidents involved tens of fatalities. By the 1990s, hundreds were being killed in the worst incidents, and these occurred more frequently. In 2001, the number reached the thousands, and today we fear scenarios in which tens of thousands might die.

Killing on this scale is hard to do. Conventional explosives alone won’t suffice, nor will chemical weapons, unless used in massive quantities, or radiological attacks. Only biological or nuclear weapons can attain this level of lethality.

The exchange ratios are aligned against us. As we concern ourselves more with avoiding collateral casualties, even conserving the lives of enemy soldiers, our terrorist foes are more willing to carry out large-scale indiscriminate attacks. While our tolerance for friendly casualties has declined, terrorists have turned their religious conviction into a weapons system based on their readiness to die.

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