Selective Service

Bring Back the Draft in Iraq, Not Here

By James T. Quinlivan

James Quinlivan is a military analyst and senior mathematician at RAND.

The longer that U.S. troops remain heavily deployed in Iraq, stretching the limits of the all-volunteer force, the stronger (or at least louder) become the voices of those who want to reinstitute the U.S. military draft. The time has indeed come to bring back the draft, but not in the United States.

Three reasonable arguments have been made against reinstituting a U.S. draft to fill the need for troops in Iraq and Afghanistan:

1. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan do not constitute a national emergency at the level that should reverse the U.S. commitment to an all-volunteer force. The United States is rich enough to pay enough to attract the required numbers of people to the military.
2. There is no feasible way to impose universal service on a large fraction of the more than two million young men (plus two million young women) who turn 18 every year in the United States, rendering conscription of some small fraction inherently unfair.
3. In the short period of a conscript’s service, he or she cannot be trained to the level of skill required for today’s professional military.

However true these statements may be for the United States, they are false for Iraq. In fact, the situation is the complete opposite for Iraq:

1. Iraq faces a national emergency that calls into question the survival of the Iraqi state. Limited to its own resources, Iraq is no longer a rich country that can afford to buy its way out of problems.
2. The Iraqi military, police, emergency, and public services can use a large fraction of the roughly 300,000 Iraqi males who turn 18 each year.
3. As in previous wars, counterinsurgencies, and difficult situations, Iraqi conscripts would qualify to fill the many military and civilian jobs that require courage, physical effort, and little training.

The interim Iraqi government is now considering calling back elements of the former Iraqi army. The government is also upgrading the skills of the volunteer Iraqi forces that were willing to enlist in the forces formed by the Coalition Provisional Authority. However, the need for manpower continues to grow. As the regular Iraqi forces improve their own performance, they also increase their ability to add lesser-skilled auxiliaries for more routine tasks. Sooner or later, either the interim government or its post-election successor will have to consider reintroducing the conscription that was a nearly universal feature of Iraqi life for decades before the U.S. and allied occupation.

Worth the Risk

It is now clear that Iraq faces an insurgency that genuinely threatens the Iraqi state. The interim government faces Iraqi insurgents who have some popular support and a continuing ability to thwart international reconstruction efforts.

To counter the insurgent threat, the new government has proclaimed that its most important duty is to provide security for the Iraqi people. The government must also demonstrate that it is the ultimate guarantor of the people’s rights and welfare.

In return, the ultimate test of the legitimacy of any Iraqi state is whether its citizens will defend it with their own lives. Providing security is a manpower-hungry activity that can require many more people than are required by the actual battles with insurgents. Reintroducing conscription might alienate some factions or regions within Iraq, perhaps sparking defiance, but taking the political risk might be the only way to ensure the political integrity of the state.

Security requires the protection of the people as they move through their daily lives; it requires checkpoints to screen cars for bombs; and it requires guards who control access to markets, schools, neighborhoods, and the children who move between them. For the ordinary citizen, a sense of security must include protection from common crime as well as from politically motivated terrorism.

The first requirement is simply to add more guards and checkpoints. That is a big part of the solution. Highly visible security halts some attacks, deters others, removes some opponents, and reassures many citizens. The skills required for these jobs are the simplest of military and police skills. But the benefits of simple skills applied to commonplace tasks and universally accepted services should not be underestimated: Improvised explosive devices cannot be hidden in trash near roads if members of a labor force collect the trash along the roadside every morning.

At a more complicated level, the economic life of the country requires the protection of big industries and their associated distribution networks, most notably the oil industry and its web of pipelines. The economy also requires the protection of the electrical power plants and their network of high-voltage distribution lines. Even water and sewage systems have been targets and require renovation, repair, and protection.

To secure the utility infrastructure, the balance of effort might be shifted away from capital, or equipment, and toward labor. High-technology solutions that depend on special-purpose tools, foreign technicians, and high-priced security contractors can be too vulnerable. In a situation in which the invulnerability of large new facilities cannot be guaranteed, designing multiple smaller facilities that are more easily replaced or repaired with indigenous work crews kept on perpetual alert can be a more resilient approach to maintaining the infrastructure.

All of these sorts of options depend on the availability of manpower. The population pyramid of Iraq (see the figure) tells a common story of a population that is growing — and growing younger. The figure, which breaks the population into five-year age bands, shows that roughly 300,000 males turn 18 every year in Iraq. Under Saddam Hussein’s regime, 18 was the conscription age for most Iraqis who could not wangle a deferment, and a high proportion eventually served in the regime’s many conflicts.

These young men are certainly capable of learning the simple skills needed to help bring security to Iraq. Not much training would be required for many laboring jobs, and other military and police skills would be within the teaching ability of the improved Iraqi forces. More complicated skills associated with conscript gendarmerie, with constabulary forces, or with reserve police might be taught by many of our NATO allies that have such forces, including the British, the Dutch, the French, and the Spanish.

As with conscripts everywhere, such service would be not only a test of their mettle but possibly also a physical outlet for their nationalism. Moreover, every conscript productively employed in the service of his country is not readily available to the insurgent militias or to the violent crowds of unemployed youths that can erupt around any street incident. Absolute loyalty to the regime would not be required for the conscripts to contribute to an improved security situation.

As the ultimate test of a new nation, there is no substitute for its own people taking on the burdens of its defense. The Iraqi conflict has moved into a stage in which it is no longer a conflict for the Americans to win. Only the Iraqis themselves can win this counterinsurgency.