Centerpiece

No Single Policy Is Likely to Meet All Army Goals, Given Current Rate of Sustained Operations

The U.S. Army has borne the brunt of sustained military operations over the past four years. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have led to lengthier and more-frequent deployments of soldiers across the entire army, including both its active and reserve components. The deployments have placed growing stress on the army as it seeks to train its personnel and to maintain a pool of units ready to respond rapidly to new contingencies.

We identified two key measures of the army’s ability to fulfill its missions: (1) total “time at home” between deployments of active-duty brigades, and (2) the number of “ready” brigades. The table shows that the army has become stretched thin according to both criteria — and that each option that could mitigate the problems comes with its own downside. The table outlines the risks and likely outcomes of seven policy options for the army’s active-duty, “heavy-medium” brigades (units organized around armored or wheeled vehicles). All seven options presume a continuation of the current rate of sustained operations over the long term.

Option A places sole responsibility for overseas rotational deployments on the Active Component (AC). This policy would allow only a year at home between yearlong deployments and shrink the number of ready AC heavy-medium brigades to just 2 out of a grand total of 25.

The next four options rely on the Reserve Component (RC) in increasingly intensive, costly, and risky ways. Of these four, only Option E, which is the most drastic option, appears to meet the goals. Option E would alter the army’s plans for transformation by doubling the supply of RC heavy-medium brigades available for deployment abroad, deploy them more frequently than currently planned, and cost billions more.

Option F might appear to meet the goals at relatively little expense, but this option could pose appreciable risks on the battlefield. By permitting maximum flexibility in using AC and RC units interchangeably and infantry and heavy-medium units interchangeably, Option F could create a situation in which the army might have the wrong type of units in theater if tensions rose or the situation deteriorated.

Option G calls for either adding seven new AC heavy-medium brigades or shifting the planned mix of AC units away from infantry brigades toward costlier heavy-medium brigades. This option would ease the army’s burdens and risks considerably, but only at great expense to the nation.

What emerges in stark relief is the dilemma faced by the army today — and the complexity of making decisions that could help lengthen the time at home between deployments for AC brigades and increase the number of ready brigades available to respond quickly to new threats.

Option	Policy U.S. Army Personnel Mix of Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) Brigades for Overseas Operations	Risks	Resources Additional Heavy-Medium Brigades (above and beyond planned AC) RC New AC	RC Utilization Years at Home Year Mobilized:   Months Preparing   Months Deployed
A	Use planned (transformed) AC only; no use of RC	AC units at home only for short time; few ready brigades	0 (planned AC only)	Not applicable
B	Use planned (transformed) RC per current utilization policy	AC units at home only for short time; few ready brigades
C	Use planned RC more intensively than in current utilization policy	Assumes more-frequent RC use and improved preparation time; results still fall short of goal
D	Keep current RC heavy-medium brigades and use per current policy	Financial costs of keeping 25 heavy RC brigades and transforming them
E	Keep current RC heavy-medium brigades and use more intensively	Requires major investments plus frequent RC use plus shortened preparation
F	Permit flexibility in all unit types; use planned RC per current policy	Works well only if AC and RC are interchangeable and if armored protection is not important
G	Add new AC heavy-medium brigades or shift units from infantry	Meets operational goals but entails substantial financial costs to nation

Option	Outcomes
	Time at Home for AC Heavy-Medium Brigades Between Deployments (in years)	AC Heavy-Medium Brigades Ready for Deployment	Estimated Minimum Startup Costs (U.S. dollars)	Estimated Minimum Annual Costs (U.S. dollars)
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
Assumptions: Sustained requirement of 16 overseas brigades, 11 of which must be heavy-medium brigades, from a total of 41 rotating AC transformed brigades (23 heavy-medium) and variable RC brigades. RAND cost estimates are approximate and should be viewed as minimums. Cost estimates are expressed in 2005 U.S. dollars.
SOURCE: Stretched Thin: Army Forces for Sustained Operations, Lynn E. Davis, J. Michael Polich, William M. Hix, Michael D. Greenberg, Stephen D. Brady, Ronald E. Sortor, RAND/MG-362-A, 2005, 122 pp., ISBN 0-8330-3816-8 (Full Document).