Perspectives

Voices of Experience

Former Defense Officials See Threats Looming on the Horizon

Looking beyond the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, four men with a combined 25 years of experience at the helm of U.S. defense policy gathered for a conversation at the RAND Corporation and warned of several long-term national security dangers that are now brewing. In general, the four elder statesmen of the U.S. defense establishment suggested that current U.S. defense and foreign policy might be ignoring some long-term dangers and might even be intensifying them.

The men focused their attention neither on terrorism nor on Iraq but discussed those ongoing conflicts in the context of other, growing threats. Chief among the long-term dangers faced by America, according to the group, are the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the ballooning national deficit, a scarcity of diplomacy to buttress defense policy, and an estrangement of America from international institutions.

The men also voiced concerns about the military’s long-term goals for “transformation.” In this regard, the men stressed the need to strike the proper balance in U.S. defense planning, programming, and budgeting between technology and people.

Conversation participants included

• Robert McNamara, secretary of defense for Presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson from 1961 to 1968
• Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser for President Richard Nixon from 1975 to 1977 and for President George H. W. Bush from 1989 to 1992
• Harold Brown, secretary of defense for President Jimmy Carter from 1977 to 1981
• Frank Carlucci, national security adviser for President Ronald Reagan from 1986 to 1987 and secretary of defense for President Reagan from 1987 to 1989.

“The two most important security problems we face do not include Iraq. The two most important problems are proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and a totally disastrous fiscal situation in this country that is bound to weaken our security.” — Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara

Nuclear and Economic Threats

“The two most important security problems we face do not include Iraq,” declared McNamara. “The two most important problems are proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and a totally disastrous fiscal situation in this country that is bound to weaken our security.”

The number one security problem, he said, is the march of nations toward acquiring nuclear weapons and the danger that yet other parties could obtain those weapons. “I don’t see any other problem that’s as serious as this.”

“The Global War on Terrorism is something of a misnomer. We’re not worried about Basque terrorism in this country. We’re not worried about the Chechens in this country. What we are worried about is Salafist Islam. It’s really a civil war within Islam rather than a global war on terrorism. That limits what we can do militarily.” — Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown

He focused on North Korea and Iran. “Look at North Korea today. I believe they have nuclear weapons. I’m not sure anything we do will persuade them to give them up.” Yet he saw no military solution. “I can’t conceive of attacking North Korea, even if we knew where the nuclear facilities were — and I’m not sure we do. They have several thousand artillery pieces as close to Seoul and our troops as Dulles airport is to Washington, D.C. If we attack North Korea, those artillery pieces are going to be destroying Seoul and destroying our troops. It’s inconceivable to me that we have a military option.”

McNamara saw no military solution with respect to Iran, either. “I don’t know how in the heck today we could go into Iran militarily. It would be a very, very serious problem. So with respect to North Korea and Iran, I think we have to do something different than we’re doing. We’ve got to put more weight on diplomacy. We certainly ought to stop nations such as Iran from the nuclear cycle — from enriching uranium and processing plutonium. There are a whole series of other actions we should take. We’re not taking them. And this is going to be our most serious, in my [opinion], security problem for the next several years.”

“I agree,” said Scowcroft. “It’s a very serious problem. And I think there are two broad aspects to it. The first is control of the nuclear materials that we have now.” He referred to efforts such as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, which aims to secure the vast but “very, very poorly controlled” nuclear arsenals possessed by Russia.

“The second is the development of new nuclear powers. Bob [McNamara] mentions we ought to stop Iran from enriching uranium. Well, that is a huge problem. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty permits Iran to enrich uranium — as long as it’s for peaceful purposes. They say it’s for peaceful purposes, but who knows, because once you have the fissile material, making a weapon is a much simpler process.”

PHOTOS: DIANE BALDWIN   Robert McNamara, defense secretary for Presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, and Harold Brown, defense secretary for President Jimmy Carter, share a moment of levity during a mostly weighty conversation.

Scowcroft recommended that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) exercise greater control over nuclear materials than currently allowed, as was recently proposed by a United Nations (UN) security panel. “They proposed that no new country be allowed to enrich uranium or to reprocess spent fuel rods to produce plutonium. Instead, the IAEA would guarantee a fuel supply for power reactors to any state in good standing with the IAEA.” In addition, the IAEA “would supervise the taking back of the spent fuel rods. That, I think, would be a big step forward.”

Scowcroft added that North Korea and Iran are not the only causes of concern. “Right behind Iran is Brazil,” he said. “Brazil is saying, ‘We think there’s money in enriching uranium. We’ve got a lot of natural uranium. It’s legal. We want to enrich uranium.’ And the danger is that this will cascade and pretty soon we’ll have 40 countries on the verge of the capability for nuclear weapons. So it’s a very serious problem.”

“I think all those statements are true,” concurred Brown. “And I think it would be very, very good if we could somehow get international agreement on an IAEA control of all fissionable material. Whether the U.S. would agree to have its fissionable material so controlled is a question in my mind.”

Brown renewed the emphasis on diplomacy in controlling the spread of nuclear weapons. “Fundamental to whether countries decide to take the step to go to nuclear weapons is their own judgment as to whether that will improve their security or not. They do it because they think it will. They may be wrong. Perhaps an approach would be to try to persuade them that their overall security — military, economic, and all the rest — is actually better if they don’t have nuclear weapons. Now, that takes diplomacy. Whether it can be done with Iran, let alone North Korea, is a big, big question. We certainly can’t do it alone — that is, the U.S. certainly cannot make a persuasive case by itself.”

“We have not really gotten our arms very well around how to integrate our military and our diplomacy for this kind of world. We can’t win a war on terrorism by ourselves. We have to reach out. We have to have friends. We have to have allies to share intelligence. We’ve got a ways to go.” — Former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft

“Let me ask you a question,” Scowcroft turned to Brown, “about North Korea and Iran and our behavior toward both of them. If you’re Iran sitting back looking at it, would you think it better to have nuclear weapons or better not to?”

“Certainly vis-à-vis the United States,” Brown answered, “you would feel safer if you had nuclear weapons, because Saddam Hussein didn’t have them, and look what happened to him. Now, if they look ahead at a somewhat longer perspective, which they’re unlikely to do, they may not feel the same way.

“If North Korea successfully deploys nuclear weapons and gets away with it,” Brown continued, “Japan is likely to follow. And I’m not sure that North Korea is then safer. If Iran adds nuclear weapons to its arsenal, they already have Israel to worry about, but they could very well have Turkey to worry about. They could very well have Saudi Arabia to worry about. It seems to me that you can solve this problem — that is, the incentive to have nuclear weapons — only on a regional basis in each of these cases.”

“I very much agree with what Harold [Brown] is saying,” McNamara chimed in. He proposed a diplomatic approach to North Korea. “In certain circumstances, some form of guarantee of security is required. I don’t think there’s any way to deal with this North Korean issue without some form of security guarantee.

“We’ve got to think about how we would feel if we were North Korea,” he stressed. “We’ve got to think how we would feel if we were Iran. We have to try to put ourselves in the position of the nation that doesn’t have nuclear weapons and look at it from their point of view. We haven’t done nearly enough of that. There’s no way to solve [the problems posed by] North Korea and Iran without doing that.”

Diplomacy and Engagement

The four interlocutors recognized that the so-called Global War on Terrorism currently dominates the thinking within the U.S. Department of Defense. However, they doubted whether the defense department could bring the proper perspective to the war or could even be the proper place to guide national thinking about such a war.

Carlucci described an inherent difficulty faced by defense officials today. “Every member of this panel participated in the Cold War, where we had a horrible threat, but it was at least a stable threat, and you knew who to negotiate with and you knew how to deter it. In today’s world, deterrence, by and large, is not a good option.”

Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser for Presidents Richard Nixon and George H. W. Bush, promotes an expanded international strategy to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Brown focused on further limitations faced by defense officials today. “The Global War on Terrorism, it seems to me, is something of a misnomer. We’re not worried about Basque terrorism in this country. We’re not worried about the Chechens in this country. What we are worried about is Salafist Islam. And it’s really a civil war within Islam rather than a global war on terrorism. And that limits what we can do militarily.

“We have to be prepared with homeland security. We have to be prepared to use the military option occasionally,” he acknowledged. “But [coping with Salafist Islam] also puts a very, very high value on diplomacy, on understanding those societies, on educating ourselves to deal with that kind of society and to help the moderates, if you want to call them that, in that society. And that applies to educating our intelligence people, educating our military people, and even educating our diplomats — not all of whom are very well qualified for this.”

Brown’s premise met with nods from the other discussants. “As Harold [Brown] says,” said Scowcroft, “it’s partly military, but it’s heavily political, it’s heavily economic, it’s heavily diplomatic. And I think we have not really gotten our arms very well around how to integrate our military and our diplomacy for this kind of world.”

Frank Carlucci, national security adviser and defense secretary for President Ronald Reagan, emphasizes the need to balance technological and human resources for military transformation.

“But I would suggest that absolutely fundamental to security in that kind of a world,” McNamara reiterated, “is economic stability in this country. And we’re not on a course to assure that. There will be a deficit of half a trillion dollars each year over the next decade. And that will rise further. Those of us interested in security should think about this. It’s the foundation of our security. We must maintain a stable economy in this rather unstable world that we’re going to move into with globalization.”

Because of globalization, Scowcroft warned, it is more important than ever for the United States to help make international institutions more effective. “What globalization really means is that national boundaries are eroding. There are forces, whether it’s capital flows, whether it’s health, whether it’s communications, whether it’s entertainment, culture, environment — they’re beyond now the capacity of a national government to control.

“Terrorism, for example. We can’t win a war on terrorism by ourselves. We have to reach out. We have to have friends. We have to have allies to share intelligence. All of these kinds of problems that globalization is bringing require reaching out to friends, allies, international organizations. And we’ve got a ways to go.”

“I don’t think we’re putting nearly enough attention on [international organizations],” echoed McNamara, “the UN in particular. We’re not going to deal with this problem of weapons of mass destruction effectively, in the long run, without UN support. It’s an absolutely fundamental interest of the United States to make these international organizations stronger.”

Technology and People

The men also shared their concerns about Pentagon plans for a “transformation” of the military. Military transformation refers, in short, to the use of technologically advanced information systems to substitute for the heft of armored forces. In a transformed military, fewer troops would rely on lighter vehicles and greater situational awareness.

“There’s a lot of talk about technology in our military,” Carlucci warned, “but the real key to our success in the military has been the quality and training of our people. You can’t let that erode.” He endorsed current plans to add 30,000 troops to the U.S. Army. “But we have to equip those troops. It’s the procurement accounts that are falling short right now. You can’t just say we’re going to add another 30,000 troops. You have to say: How are we going to train and equip them? And that has budget implications.”

Carlucci said the Pentagon “is surely right in trying to transform our military from a Cold War model to one that can deal with emerging threats.” However, he cautioned against placing too much responsibility for the job on technology.

“The real key to our success in the military has been the quality and training of our people. You can’t let that erode. Technology can take you only so far if you don’t have the quality of the soldier. Technology is important. It’s not a panacea.” — Former National Security Adviser and Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci

“Technology can take you only so far if you don’t have the quality of the soldier. We need to maintain the quality in training of our military people, above all. Technology is important. It’s not a panacea. We saw [what] could be done in Afghanistan, where you had B-52s doing close air support with people on horseback calling them in. You see the limits of technology in Iraq, with the roadside bombs and how you deal with house-to-house fighting. So we need to have a balanced approach to technology.”

He referred to one high-profile army initiative. “I am very concerned about the FCS, the Future Combat System, which is the big gamble the army is taking. It’s practically the whole army budget, betting on a system of systems, which already had to be reconfigured once. A lot of the technology we’re talking about is untried technology. You’ve got to be very careful that you don’t stretch the technology too far. It may just not work.”

Brown echoed the point. “If you have battlefield awareness, if you have the information about where everybody is and which way they’re going and what they’re capable of, and if you have precision munitions, you can win the conflict. The problem is: That may not degrade gracefully if you start to lose the information. And that is why you need that mixture of some of the traditional forces.”